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ABSTRACT
This thesis has three main foci. The first is an examination of the broader 
intentions behind the Government of India Act (1919) and the context of these reforms 
in the longer-term transfer of power in India. The second is the role played by the 
Indian Moderates within the nationalist movement leading to their defection from the 
Indian National Congress in 1918. Thirdly, it examines the relationship between the 
British rulers and the new Indian Liberal Party, both during the making of 
constitutional reforms and during the period of the first legislative councils elected 
under the reforms, 1921-23.
The working of the reforms is examined from the perspective of both central 
and provincial legislative politics. At the centre the main issues of controversy 
between the British and the Indian Liberals were: economic and constitutional matters, 
law and order issues connected with the Gandhian non-co-operation movement, the 
political reaction in British policy that took place during 1921-22, the Indianisation of 
the civil service and armed forces, and the treatment of Indians overseas. The 
experience of the provincial legislatures is studied, with special attention paid to three 
provinces where Indian Liberals played a key part in the new Ministries: Bengal, 
Bombay and the United Provinces. The failure of the Indian Liberals at the elections 
of 1923 is examined and reasons given for the collapse of the British-Indian Liberal 
relationship.
It is argued that the intentions and the results of the Montagu-Chelmsford 
reforms were more liberal than has generally been recognised. The reforms provided 
the first steps in establishing parliamentary democracy in India. Though the amount of 
power that was transferred to Indians was limited, and confined to the provincial 
level, the level of influence that Indians gained over the policy-making process at both 
central and provincial levels was considerably greater.
3CONTENTS
PART ONE: THE MAKING OF THE REFORMS
Page





1. A im s ...................................................................................................................................15
2. S tructure.............................................................................................................................23
3. Sources................................................................................................................................29
CHAPTER I. THE CONTEXT 30
1. British Rule in India: Some Inner Contradictions ...................................................... 32
2. Indian Nationalist Politics Before 1914 .......................................................................43
3. Re-Unification of Congress and M oderate-Extrem ist................................................ 50
Rivalry During the First World War
CHAPTER H. REFORMS MAKING 1917-1918 59
1. The Formulation of a P o licy ...........................................................................................61
2. The Publication of the Reforms and the Congress ................................................... 85
Split of 1918. Divide and Rule?
ctd....
4CHAPTER HI. BRITISH-INDIAN RELATIONS UNDER STRAIN, 1919-20 107
1. The Moderates and the Rowlatt B ills ...........................................................................108
2. The Joint Select Committee of 1 9 1 9 ........................................................................... 118
3. Congress Opts for Non-Co-operation...........................................................................133
PART TWO: THE WORKING OF THE REFORMS, 1921-1923
CHAPTER IV. HANDLING NON-CO-OPERATION, 1921-2 148
1. The Search for a Compromise...................................................................................... 151
2. The Debate About Gandhi’s A rre s t..............................................................................158
3. Montagu’s Resignation ..................................................................................................181
CHAPTER V. POLITICS AT THE CENTRE 193
1. Financial and Constitutional I s s u e s ..............................................................................193
2. The Civil Service Under the R e fo rm s ........................................................................214
3. Repeal of ’Repressive’ and Discriminatory Legislation........................................... 226
4. The Indian Liberals and Indians O verseas.................................................................. 234
CHAPTER VI. THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS 254
1. Bengal: Community P o litic s .........................................................................................254
2. Bombay: Lord Lloyd’s M in iste rs ................................................................................ 275
3. The United Provinces: Aman Sabhas- Landlords and
L iberals..............................................................................................................................290
4. Summary. The Experience of the Indian Liberals of 
Working the Reforms in the Provinces.................... . 299 
ctd....
5CHAPTER VH. THE COLLAPSE OF THE LIBERALS 306
1. A British B ack lash?.......................................................................................................306
2. The Failure of the Liberal Party Organisation ......................................................... 310
3. Organising for Elections .............................................................................................. 321
4. The Indian Liberals After 1923 ................................................................................. 325
CHAPTER VIH. CONCLUSION 330
APPENDICES
Appendix One - Biographical N o te s ................................................................................ 341
Appendix Two - Moderate Conference, 1918, M embership.......................................... 354
LIST OF SOURCES.................................................................................................... 356
TABLES
1. No. of Delegates, Annual Session of Congress, 1900-1919 ................................... 51
2. Constitution of the Bengal Legislative Council (1920-23) ................................... 260
3. Constitution of the Bombay Legislative C o u n c il.......................................................280
4. Constitution of the United Provinces Legislative Council ......................................292
ti
6ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis has been an inordinately long time in gestation and, therefore, there 
are many people who have contributed towards its ultimate completion. Firstly, I 
would like to thank my initial supervisor, Professor Kenneth Ballhatchet, whose 
liberal approach to scholarship allowed a rather individual undertaking to take shape, 
and whose patience was endless. Professor David Arnold generously agreed to take 
over the supervision after Professor Ballhatchet’s retirement and I am grateful to him 
for his perceptive and helpful guidance in bringing the thesis to its final version.
One of the best aspects of researching Indian history is the opportunity it 
provides for contact with a community of scholars both in India and the United 
Kingdom. I particularly appreciate the practical help and encouragement received 
from the following: Ray T. Smith Jr., Jim Masselos, Peter Reeves, Peter Marshall,
S.R. Mehrotra, Anthony Low, T.G. Fraser, David Hardiman and Parita Mukhta.
Numerous people responded generously to requests for information, interviews 
or access to archives: S.C. Nandy of Cossimbazar, P. Kodanda Rao, B. Shiva Rao, 
Lalji Pendse, Jamnadas Dwarkadas, D.V. Ambekar, E.A. Sethna, T.N. Jagadisan, 
Olive Stevenson Howell, Sri Ram, Col. H.E. Cotton (nephew of Evan Cotton) and 
L.F. Rushbrook Williams.
Scholars of Indian history are particularly well served by the librarians and 
archivists who provide them with the sources they need and the friendly guidance and 
interest which makes research more bearable. I owe a particular debt to the following 
individuals: Richard Bingle and Martin Moir at the India Office Library and Records, 
Indu Jolly and other staff at the Nehru Memorial Museum Library, New Delhi, and 
Lillian Storey of the Theosophical Society Library, London. Also the staff of the 
following libraries and archives: Birmingham University, Edinburgh University,
Trinity College, Cambridge, Churchill College, Cambridge, the Public Record Office, 
London, the Labour Party library, the National Archives of India, New Delhi, the 
Theosophical Society, Adyar, Madras, and the Gokhale Institute of Politics and 
Economics, Poona.
My colleagues in the History Division at Ealing College of Higher Education, 
now Thames Valley University, helped me with encouragement, practical advice and 
teaching cover during a sabbatical research visit to India in 1985.
Finally, I would like to thank my wife Judith, who has been the patient victim 
of scholarly obsession and who has endured the loss of numerous summer vacations to 
the seemingly endless research involved in this thesis. Without her support it would 
never have been completed.
8ABBREVIATIONS
1. REFERENCES TO MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS
The system of abbreviating sources of original documents used by Sir A. Rumbold 
in his book Watershed in India 1914-1922, London, 1979, has been followed for the 
most frequently used collections, with some minor variations. Thus the following 
symbols are used and are followed by a number indicating the volume or file number 
in a collection.
AC  Austen Chamberlain MSS, University of Birmingham Library
AS Edwin Montagu private papers Trinity College Library, Cambridge
University.
B Harcourt Butler MSS, EUR. F. 116, India Office Library & Records (IOLR)
C Chelmsford MSS, EUR. E.264, IOLR
F  Curzon MSS, EUR. F. 111, IOLR
GL George Lloyd MSS, Churchill College, Cambridge
H  Hardinge MSS, University of Cambridge Library
JM  James Meston MSS, EUR. F.136, IOLR
L Lytton MSS, EUR. F.160, IOLR
M  Edwin Montagu MSS, EUR D. 523, IOLR
R  Reading MSS, EUR. E.238, IOLR
R(P) Reading private papers, EUR F. 118, IOLR
RON Ronaldshay MSS EUR. D.609, IOLR
S  Seton MSS, EUR. E.267, IOLR
SAP/ Sapru MSS, IOLR microfilm of collection from National Library of India,
Calcutta
W Willingdon MSS, EUR. F.93, IOLR
WH Hailey MSS, EUR. E.220, IOLR
N.B. All other private papers, including all Indian collections, save the Sapru 
collection, are referred to by their full title.
2. OTHER ABBREVIATIONS
A.I.C.C. All India Congress Committee
B.P.A. Bombay Presidency Association
CD Commerce Department
C&ID Commerce & Industry Department
FD Finance Department
G/ Governor/Province
G/I Government of India
G.I.P.E. Gokhale Institute of Politics & Economics, Poona.
HD Home Department Home Poll. Home Department (Political)
Proceedings No. (with date)
IAR Indian Annual Register
ICS Indian Civil Service
IESHR Indian Economic and Social History Review
ILA Imperial Legislative Assembly
ILC Imperial Legislative Council
INC Indian National Congress
IOLR India Office Library & Records
LD Legislative Department
LG/ Lieutenant Governor/Province
MLC(A) Member of Legislative Council (Assembly)
NAI National Archives of India, New Delhi
N.L.F. National Liberal Federation
10
NMML Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New Delhi
pi. private letter N.B. All correspondence in the text is in the
form of private letters unless stated otherwise.
P.C.C. Provincial Congress Committee
PSV Viceroy’s Private Secretary
ptel. private telegram. (During Reading’s Viceroyalty some telegrams
were sent in U Cypher, which was entirely private to the Secretary of 
State; the Viceroy and their secretaries.)
RD Reforms Department
RO Reforms Office
Rs. Rupees. I lakh =  Rs. 100,000; I crore =  Rs. 100 lakhs
S/S Secretary of State
S.I.S. Servants of India Society
tel. telegram
U.P. United Provinces of Agra & Oudh
V Viceroy
W.I.N.L.A. Western India National Liberal Association
11
INTRODUCTION
When comparing themselves with other European colonial powers, the British 
came to pride themselves on their flexibility and pragmatism in dealing with the 
growth of nationalism within their colonies. Learning the lessons of the American 
Revolution and of their own experience with constitutional reform at home in the 
nineteenth century, they believed that they had perfected a policy of the timely 
devolution of power and the integration of key colonial groups into the governing 
circles before they became dangerously alienated.1 The Durham Report of 1839 
was seen as providing a blue-print for the policy to be pursued in the white colonies, 
but the adoption of a policy of constitutional devolution in India was seen as a 
particular triumph in that India seemed unsuited by its history and social make-up for 
the transfer of western democratic institutions. Furthermore, in India there had 
developed a nationalist movement in the last quarter of the nineteenth century which 
threatened to undermine the Raj unless an effective policy was found to contain it 
within the imperial framework. A policy which combined firm government with 
tactical concession had proved, it was argued, to be the right policy: Indian 
decolonisation was gradual, and the handover of power in 1947 to a relatively 
sympathetic Congress government, willing to maintain the Commonwealth link and 
the concomitant trade, investment, defence, cultural and other links, was considered
1 Two classic statements of this viewpoint were published during the Second World War; G. 
Schuster and G. Wint, India and Democracy, London, 1941, ch. 4, and Sir R. Coupland, The Indian 
Problem 1833-1935, London 1942. For post-Independence versions, see P.J. Griffiths, The British in 
India, London, 1946, ch. xviii, and The British Impact on India, London, 1951. A recent revival of this 
line of thought is to be found in G. Rizvi, Transfer of Power in India: A "Re-statement” of an 
Alternative Approach’, in R.F. Holland and G. Rizvi (eds.), Perspectives on Imperialism and 
Decolonization: Essays in Honour ofA.F. Madden, London, 1984.
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almost a model of the British technique of decolonisation. The post-Independence 
Indians continued to use the Westminster parliamentary model, the British educational 
system, a British-style bureaucracy and army, whilst English remained the language of 
government.
Of course, the British view of their decolonisation of India is far too uncritical 
and coloured by hindsight. Recent historical research has questioned whether there 
was any long-term planning of the British transfer of power in India, let alone whether 
genuine constitutional devolution was given any precedence in the thinking behind the 
various reform schemes of the twentieth century.2 However, the traditional 
British view still holds some important truths which should not be lost in the process 
of revisionism. Firstly, the maintenance of parliamentary democracy in India must be 
considered one of the more remarkable achievements of the twentieth century. Whilst 
numerous other ex-colonies, including neighbouring South Asian ones, have fallen to 
military dictatorship or one-party rule, India remains the world’s largest democracy, 
and there is little doubt that the length of British preparation of India in the 
democratic process has been an important, though not the only, basis of modem 
Indian democracy. Secondly, although the British were prepared to use force to 
repress the Indian nationalist movement, especially in 1933 and 1942, there was 
nothing on the scale of the colonial repression meted out, for instance, by the French 
in Vietnam in the interwar years.3 After the Amritsar Massacre of 1919, the army 
was held very much in reserve and the task of dealing with non-co-operation was left
2 This view is put most concisely by Anita Inder Singh, who argues that even after the Second 
World War the British Government still hankered after holding on to India and its defences. See A.I. 
Singh, ’Prospects of Agreement and the Partition of India, 1939-1947’, in N.J. Allen et al. (eds.), 
Oxford University Papers on India, vol. 1, part 2, Delhi, 1987.
3 See D. Marr, Vietnam: Harnessing the Whirlwind’ in R. Jeffrey (ed.), Asia- The Winning o f 
Independence, London, 1981, pp. 163-5.
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in the hands of the civil forces.4 It is pretty clear that the British in India had, 
during this period, to answer to metropolitan and international opinion in a way that 
the French, the Portuguese, Belgians and Dutch did not. This set important restraints 
on their treatment of the nationalist movement. Furthermore, the British were 
involved in a novel political process in India after the First World War: in establishing 
the basis of a parliamentary democratic system they had to keep in mind the point of 
view of the Indian legislatures and of influential centrist opinion.
It is well-known that the British had not always adopted these more liberal 
approaches to the devolution of power in India. Before the First World War they set 
their face against encouraging parliamentary institutions in India, they honoured the 
idea of encouraging Indians into the services much more in the breach than in the 
practice, they kept the educated elites at arm’s length and concentrated on fostering 
loyalists such as the landlords, princes and Muslims. They had little but disdain for 
the legislatures which they had set up to keep them more informed of influential 
Indian opinion: they were disappointed at the fact that the professional classes had 
come to dominate these institutions, not the native aristocracy as they had intended. 
The British were obsessed with the opponents of their rule, many of whom they 
wrongly classed as seditionists. Acts of liberal reform such as the Morley-Minto 
reforms were matched by acts of repression such as the Press Act of 1910- the 
’mailed fist in the velvet glove’.
The transition to a more realistic, more ’political’ role by the British took 
place in the period 1917 to 1923. It was during this period that they first established
4 For the development of more sophisticated Government policies for dealing with political 
agitation see P. Robb, ’The Government of India and Annie Besant, Modem Asian Studies, 10, 1,
1976, pp. 107-30; D. A. Low, ’The Government of India and the First Non-Co-operation Movement 
1920-1922’, in R. Kumar (ed.) Essays on Gandhian Politics: The Rowlatt Satyagraha o f 1919, Oxford, 
1971, pp. 298-323 [hereafter ’First Non-Co-operation Movement’- all page references are to this 
version of the article, which was also previously published in the Journal o f Asian Studies, xxv, 2 
(1966)].
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the goal of ultimate self-government on the dominion model, via the development of 
parliamentary institutions and the opening up of the services to Indians in much 
greater numbers. It was then that they established directly elected Indian majority 
legislatures with Indian ministers in charge of nation-building departments. They 
developed a much more sophisticated means of handling the nationalist leadership; the 
range of permissible opinion and acceptable political activity was greatly widened and 
a whole range of repressive measures was done away with. India gained fiscal 
autonomy under a convention that when the Government of India and the imperial 
legislature were agreed on such matters, the metropolitan government would not 
interfere. In international affairs India gained separate representation in key 
organisations such as the League of Nations and the imperial conferences. Indian 
representatives were able to put the Indian case over issues such as the equal treatment 
of British imperial citizens throughout the empire.
All the above changes were extremely important for the longer-term process of 
the devolution of power, but the most important change of all was that the old idea of 
the permanence of British rule in India had been undermined and replaced with a 
recognition that the existing form of British domination could not continue, and that 
some form of imperial partnership had to be developed if India was to move towards 
self-government within the empire.5 It was during these years that key British 
officials looked into the not too distant future and planned for the major changes that 
would be necessary to move towards a self-governing India. The importance of this 
change of vision cannot be overestimated, even if the optimism of the vision was 
short-lived and was soon to be replaced with a more pessimistic view that India’s 
religious and social divisions, the widening gulf between British and princely India 
and the lack of a defence capability would mean that the prospect of self-government
5 For an examination of the idea of the permanence of the Raj, see F.G. Hutchins, The Illusion o f  
Permanence: British Imperialism in India, Princeton, 1967.
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was still long distant. However, the old imperial confidence, indeed arrogance, could 
not return once the idea of permanence was brought into question. The constitutional 
process was inexorably leading to greater and greater Indian constitutional demands, 
and the awareness of the enhanced status and powers of the white dominions only 
fuelled these demands. Much as Liberal reformers like Edwin Montagu had expected 
and intended, the 1919 reforms proved to have a dynamic of their own, even if much 
of the impetus they gave to Indian politicians was provided by a sense of their 
unworkability and the need for true provincial autonomy to be granted if  the goals of 
the development of political responsibility were to be achieved. However much die- 
hards of the interwar years wished that the clock might be put back, it was not 
possible to do so.
1. Aims
The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and the formation of the Indian Moderate, 
which was to be a bulwark of those reforms, were two key events in the establishment 
of the processes described above and they were nearly synchronous. The Montagu- 
Chelmsford reforms were announced at the beginning of July 1918 and the Moderate 
Party was formed in the previous month, specifically in order to give free public 
expression to the support of leading Congressmen for the reforms scheme.
The Congress majority was far more critical of the reforms than the Moderate 
secessionists, although until 1920 most Congressmen were prepared to work the 
reforms and enter the enlarged Councils established under the new system. Two issues 
unconnected with the reforms, the Punjab and Khilafat grievances, and the failure of 
the British Government to deal adequately with these issues, led the Congress in 
September 1920, under Gandhi’s leadership, to determine to boycott the legislative 
councils and all other offices under the Raj, as part of a national movement of non-co- 
operation. This boycott left the Indian Liberal Party as the one national party fighting
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the elections, and as a result of the elections Liberal Ministers were represented in 
most of the new provincial governments, the exceptions being those of Madras, Bihar 
and the Punjab. In November 1923, after the Gandhian non-co-operation movement 
had collapsed, the Swarajist wing of the Congress decided to stand for the second set 
of Council elections and achieved notable successes. The Liberals lost the majority of 
their seats and were swept out of office. The period 1917 to 1923, therefore, forms a 
coherent time-span in which the Montford reforms were devised and put into 
operation, and in which the new Liberal Party was formed to support the reforms and 
had its heyday during the first councils.
The relationship between British policy-makers and the Indian Liberal Party 
forms a case-study which is intended to reveal the nature of British attitudes and 
policies towards India’s constitutional future. It also highlights changing British 
attitudes towards the educated elite in India, who formed the core of the Indian 
nationalist movement.
There are three main foci for this study. The primary interest is in examining 
the broader intentions behind the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, and the context of 
these reforms in the longer-term transfer of power in India. The Indian Liberals 
staked their political futures on the belief that the reforms offered genuine 
opportunities to move towards self-government along a constitutional path similar to 
that taken by the white dominions in the past. Were the Liberals duped by the British 
in an attempt to win over moderate collaborators to their side at a crucial phase in the 
development of the empire? Recent studies have tended to play down the liberalism 
of these reforms and treat them largely as a measure of administrative devolution or 
as a means of finding new supports for a beleaguered Raj.6 In this respect the
6 See for example, J. Gallagher, ’The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire’ in The 
Decline, Revival and Fall o f the British Empire. The Ford Lectures and Other Essays, edited by A.
Seal, Cambridge, 1982, p. 101; B.R. Tomlinson, The Indian National Congress and the Raj, 1929-
(continued...)
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reforms are seen as one of a series of constitutional measures designed not to devolve 
power to Indians, but rather to strengthen the British grip on the most important 
elements of government. Fairly typical are the arguments of Anita Inder Singh who 
writes that ’The constitutional reforms of 1919 and 1935 were aimed at preserving, 
not terminating empire. ’7 At one level this statement is indisputable, none of the 
British policy-makers responsible for the 1919 reforms sought to take India out of the 
empire, but it is the argument of this thesis that the tendency to treat the 1919 and 
1935 reforms as if they had the same conservative aims is entirely misleading.
Whereas the 1935 reforms manipulated the Indian communities and the political 
process in order to cancel out the various Indian elements, the 1919 reforms had a 
much more dynamic and educative intention; they aimed at introducing and developing 
western parliamentary institutions into India, something which had previously been 
publicly disallowed as a goal by the British. One must be careful not to assume that 
political cynicism, divide and rule, and strengthening of collaborationist elements were 
the key concepts behind the reforms. Whilst accepting that there were elements of 
such conservative considerations in the making of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, it 
is the argument of this thesis that they were very much inspired by a transformation of 
outlook amongst the British rulers which took place during and immediately after the 
First World War. This changed perspective resulted partly from India’s invaluable 
contribution to the war effort, but also partly from an acceptance of the idealistic
6 (...continued)
1942: The Penultimate Phase, London, 1976, p. 10; A.I. Singh, The Origins o f the Partition o f India, 
1936-1947, Delhi, 1987, p. 244; C. Bridge, Holding India to the Empire. The British Conservative 
Party and the 1935 Constitution, London, 1986, pp. 1-9; R .J. Moore, Endgames o f Empire. Studies o f  
Britain’s Indian Problem, Delhi, 1988, pp. 1, 9-10.
It is a pity that the cogent and convincing arguments of Peter Robb that the reforms had a strong 
ideological basis have not apparently convinced all scholars and now need further development. See P. 
Robb, The Government o f India and Reform: Policies Towards Politics and the Constitution 1916-1921, 
Oxford, 1976, ch. 9, especially p. 272.
7 The Origins o f the Partition o f India, p. 244.
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notions associated with the movement towards national self-determination in 
Europe.8 The reforms were, of necessity, compromise measures, but they marked 
a revolution in British approaches to India in two particular ways. Firstly, they 
formed part of a policy of progressive moves towards a publicly stated goal, 
self-government within the Empire. In effect, taken together with India’s recognised 
status within the Imperial War Cabinet and bodies like the League of Nations, this 
meant an implicit recognition that India should follow the constitutional path of the 
white dominions in the future. Secondly, they marked a clear belief, denied by the 
makers of the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909, that India’s constitution would be 
developed along the lines of British parliamentary democracy.9 The implications 
of these two assumptions were very far-reaching both for British rule in India and for 
the eventual form of Indian independence. There could be no going back on these two 
policies, but the exigencies of the British political system (in which Conservative 
imperialists dominated a Liberal-led coalition Government) meant that they were not 
made as explicit as they might have been during the passing of the Government of 
India Act through Parliament. Furthermore, the waning of war-time idealism and the 
reaction in Britain, caused partly by the Gandhian non-co-operation movement 
(1920-1922) and partly by the mounting pressure of nationalist movements across the 
Empire, meant that there was a distinct reaction against the liberal elements of the 
Montford reforms during the 1920s and 1930s. There was, in other words, no linear 
progress towards granting India independence, but it is the contention of this thesis 
that all the essential steps towards that goal had been raised for consideration by the 
rulers of the Raj in the years immediately after the end of the First World War.
8 For the background to the Allied acceptance of a new approach to the issue of national 
self-determination see A.J. Mayer, Political Origins o f the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918, Yale, 1959.
9 See Morley’s speech in the House of Lords, 17 Dec. 1908, cited in J. Morley, Indian Speeches, 
London, 1909, p. 91. The Government of India continued to oppose the development of the councils 
into quasi-parliaments even as late as November 1916. See the Government of India Despatch of 24 
Nov. 1916, cited in S.R. Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth 1885-1929, London, 1965, p. 74.
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Implicit in this argument is the view that, contrary to certain recent writings on 
the history of British decolonisation, the undermining of the attitudes and beliefs 
which underpinned the belief of the governing classes in the rightness and permanence 
of the imperial system was a crucial element in the process of decolonisation.10 
Nationalist pressures, the decline of economic strength and the relative loss of 
international dominance were vital components of decolonisation, but one should be 
careful not to treat imperial policy-makers as if they were accountants carefully 
weighing imperial costs and benefits, or far-seeing politicians skilfully playing off 
colonial groups in order to extend their rule indefinitely. Policy-makers were strongly 
imbued with a set of values which explained and justified the basic artificiality of their 
situation in despotically governing hundreds of millions of Africans and Asians. In 
India the dominant set of governing values can be summarised in the somewhat old- 
fashioned term, imperial trusteeship. Essentially the concept of trusteeship based 
British rule in India in terms of a God-given right of dominance for the purposes of 
improving the country.11 Britons had differing views as to whether improvement 
meant transferring western ideas and institutions to India or working though India’s 
traditional institutions and concentrating on importing western material improvement, 
but in either case they had imbibed through their education and domestic culture the 
idea that trusteeship was at the basis of British rule in India. The idea of trusteeship 
was a great bulwark of the British position in India, but it was also its Achilles’ heel 
because it was a doctrine predicated upon the ultimate temporariness of British rule.
In the period of high imperialism, epitomised by Lord Curzon’s viceroyalty at the turn 
of the century, but in fact typical of most of the period from the Mutiny to the Great
10 See particularly J. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: the Retreat from Empire in the Post- 
War World, London, 1988.
11 The term ’God-given’ is used advisedly. The buttressing of British rule by Christian beliefs has 
been rather underestimated, at least as far as the twentieth century is concerned. However, see G. 
Studdert-Kennedy, British Christians, Indian Nationalists and the Raj, Oxford, 1990.
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War, the sense of temporariness of British rule was forgotten in all the emphasis on 
the necessity of colonial material improvement in the face of Indian backwardness. 
However, the First World War and its aftermath resulted in what can only be 
described as a crisis of confidence in the permanence of British rule, which was seen 
most concretely in the difficulties in recruiting good quality candidates to the Indian 
Civil Service.12
It is the argument of this thesis that this imperial crisis of confidence, though 
short-lived, was very significant in that it involved those governing India in having to 
consider increasingly the Indian rather than the purely British imperial perspective on 
issues, and in thinking through the practical implications of a future transfer of power 
to Indians.
The second focus of this study is on the role played by the Indian Moderates 
within the nationalist movement at a crucial time in the development of that 
movement.13 What were the distinguishing characteristics of the Moderates who 
dominated Congress until the end of 1917, and who broke away to form their own 
organisation in 1918? Did they differ from the Extremists in ideology or were their 
disagreements basically factional disputes, the petty squabbles of the followers of 
particular nationalist leaders? There were a number of Britons at the time, especially 
on the die-hard wing, who believed that the whole Moderate/Extremist division was 
false and that both elements were essentially extremist in that they wanted to be rid of
12 See below, chapter V, section 2, on the ICS.
13 Throughout the words ’Moderate’ and ’Extremist’ in capitalised form have been used to indicate 
two rival groups within the Indian National Congress. Indian politicians understood and used these 
nomenclatures, although, of course, there was no fixity or precision in their usage. The term 
’Moderate’ becomes more closely defined after the Surat split of 1907, and even more so after the 
Congress Split of 1918. With the formation of the Moderate Party in 1918, the capitalised form of the 
word is used to refer to members of this party, which in 1919 became known as the Indian Liberal 
Party. The British did not use these terms with any precision, and conservative Britons often used the 
term ’moderates’ when they referred not to the Liberals but to loyalist or conservative Indians. I have 
used the uncapitalised form for this latter, broader, usage. I have tried to follow the original form used 
in direct quotations. For a fuller discussion of the difficulties in using this term see pp. 9S-100 below.
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the British, the only difference being that the Moderates covered their ambitions more 
skilfully.14 Judith Brown has argued forcefully that the Moderate/Extremist 
dichotomy is misleading and that these names ’pointed to no fundamental distinctions 
of ideology or method’.15 Cambridge historians have tended to play down the 
ideological and national basis of Indian politics in this period and have emphasised the 
role of faction, local interests and patron-client linkages.16 In contradiction to this 
approach, this thesis argues that the Moderate/Extremist split had a distinct ideological 
basis, firmly rooted in very different outlooks on Indian society and the imperial 
connection. Far from there being evidence of large numbers of Indian politicians 
shifting their allegiances to suit their political convenience, there is in this period 
evidence of remarkable loyalty to ’party’17 affiliations and a preparedness to make 
self-sacrifice in the national cause.18 To what degree did the Moderates represent 
an important and continuing strand of constitutionalism and Anglophilism within the
14 See, for example, the pamphlet published by the Indo-British Association, The Political 
Situation in India- The Defection o f The Moderates, London, 1919.
15 Judith M. Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power. Indian Politics 1915-1922, Cambridge, 1972, p.
130.
16 The main Cambridge publications which are relevant to this study are: A. Seal, The Emergence 
o f Indian Nationalism, Cambridge, 1968; C. Baker, G. Johnson and A. Seal (eds.), Locality, Province 
and Nation. Essays on Indian Politics 1870-1940, Cambridge, 1973; D.A. Washbrook, The Emergence 
o f Provincial Politics. The Madras Presidency 1870-1920, Cambridge, 1976; B.R. Tomlinson, The 
Political Economy o f the Raj 1914-1947. The Economics o f Decolonization in India, London, 1979; J. 
Gallagher, G. Johnson, and A. Seal (eds.), Power, Profit and Politics: Essays on Imperialism, 
Nationalism and Change in Twentieth Century India, Cambridge, 1981.
17 One must be careful not to think of ’party’ in western terms. There was in India none of the 
organisational machinery, manifestos, tight discipline, ideological identification, etc. that one associates 
with the modem British party system. However, Indian political loyalties were broader than just ties of 
personal affiliation, caste, community or faction. Western-educated Indian politicians were in a sort of 
half-way house; inevitably, the bases of their loyalties were traditional Indian ones, but they had 
imbibed the history and values of the British political system very thoroughly and modelled their 
political activities on the latter. The result was a peculiar hybrid. Moderates modelled their activities on 
parliamentary practice in Britain and extra-parliamentary campaign groups such as the Anti-Cora Law 
League. Extremists tended to prefer the models provided by the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
activities of the Irish nationalists. On the latter, see H.V. Brasted, ’Irish Models and the Indian National 
Congress 1870-1922’, South Asia, n.s., viii, 1/2, June/Dec. 1985, pp. 24-45.
18 Examples of the Cambridge emphasis on the minutiae of local political affiliations can be found 
in the Madras studies of D.A. Washbrook, The Emergence o f Provincial Politics. The Madras 
Presidency 1870-1920, Cambridge, 1976, and C.J. Baker, The Politics o f South India 1920-1937, 
Cambridge, 1976.
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nationalist movement? Indeed, were the Liberals true nationalists or did their western 
dress, patterns of thinking and loyalties preclude this title? Did the Liberals operate as 
a proper party organisation or were they merely a disparate group of patrician leaders, 
held together by a desperate urge to hold on to the national political leadership which 
they had assumed was their natural right, but which was now being challenged by the 
Extremist revival? Why did they break away from Congress just at a point when an 
unprecedented degree of nationalist unity had been achieved and when the 
maintenance of that unity was considered vital to squeezing the maximum in the way 
of post-war concessions from the British? Was the split intended to be permanent or 
did events determine that it should become so? Did the Liberals commit political 
suicide in breaking away from Congress?19
Thirdly, there is an examination of the relationship between the British rulers 
and the Liberal Party. Too many studies in the past have focused on one or other end 
of the colonial ruler/nationalist movement confrontation without properly examining 
the interplay between ruler and ruled. There is a particular importance to the 
interrelationship in this case. Firstly, because the Montford reforms mark a new 
approach in the policies of India’s rulers: instead of standing aloof from Indian 
politics British administrators determined to enter the Indian political arena directly. 
This was partly the result of the new political system created by the reforms in which 
the British had to try and create workable groups of supporters in elected majority 
legislatures, and partly the result of the unprecedented threat posed by the Gandhian 
non-co-operation movement which forced the British to look to new measures of 
counter-propaganda. The other side of the coin was that the Indian Liberals, having
19 There have been a number of studies of the Liberal Party, of which by far the most satisfactory 
is that by Dr. R.T. Smith, ’The Liberals in the Indian Nationalist Movement, 1918-1947. Their Role as 
Intermediaries’, University of California, Berkeley, unpub. Ph.D., 1964. See also R.T. Smith ’The 
Role of India’s "Liberals" in the Nationalist Movement, 1915-1947’, Asian Survey, viii, 7, July 1968, 
pp. 607-24; B.D. Shukla, History o f the Indian Liberal Party, Allahabad, 1960; V.N. Naik, Indian 
Liberalism, Bombay, 1945. However, none of the studies entirely answers the above questions.
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isolated themselves within Indian politics, were remarkably dependent on the British 
administration to provide the conditions under which their chosen constitutional path 
could prove successful to a wider audience. The relationship between the British and 
the Liberals is interesting on a number of levels. At a specific level, one would wish 
to know whether the British were responsible for the Congress split of 1918, whether 
they were determined to break up the unprecedented coalition of Moderates,
Extremists and the Muslim League which had been cemented at Lucknow in 1916, 
and whether this was another example of the policy of divide and rule? More broadly, 
it is very revealing of racial and imperial attitudes to see how the British treated these 
men who epitomised the so-called ’babus’, the westernised professional classes whom 
British policies had helped to create, and yet who represented the most likely group to 
inherit British India. At the level of policy-making one needs to know to what extent 
the British understood the complexities of Indian politics and therefore could 
successfully ’rotate’ collaborative groups?20 Those who governed India often 
talked of separating moderates from extremists and of ’rallying’ the former group, but 
we know little of what they really understood by these terms and to what extent they 
reflected the reality of the Indian situation.
2. Structure
The thesis is divided into two main parts. The first part, which covers the 
period up to the end of 1920, is arranged chronologically so as to portray the complex 
series of events which were involved in drawing up the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms
30 For a discussion of the concept of collaborative groups and their significance in imperial history 
see the seminal article by R. Robinson, ’Non-European foundations of European imperialism: sketch for 
a theory of collaboration’, E.R.J. Owen & R.B. Sutcliffe, (eds.) Studies in the Theory o f  Imperialism, 
London, 1972, pp. 117-42. One needs to ask whether the term ’collaborative group’ is helpful for 
studying the Liberals or should the loyalist groups, such as the landowners, be distinguished from 
nationalists who worked the British-dominated political system in order to alter it?
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and which led to the secession of the Moderates from the Indian National Congress. 
The second part covers the working of the reforms in the period of the first 
legislatures during the period 1921 to the end of 1923. This section is organised 
thematically so that the development of the major issues of contention between the 
British and the Indian Liberals can be examined.
Part One
The first chapter sets the context of the interplay of British policy and 
nationalist response in India. Particular emphasis is placed on the contradictions, both 
ideological and structural, within the system of British rule which meant that a 
progressive and coherent British policy of reform was often difficult to achieve. There 
was a fundamental contradiction between liberal and conservative approaches to India, 
and these were epitomised in different attitudes towards the introduction of western 
institutions, especially parliamentary democracy, into India. On this issue the British 
clashed with Moderate Indian nationalists who demanded a programme of political 
reform along western lines. The clash between the British and this western-educated 
elite, who formed the backbone of the nationalist movement, was at the heart of many 
of the contradictions within British rule in India. The British did much to create this 
group but found by the last quarter of the nineteenth century that the demands of the 
educated elite threatened the ideological and material basis of their rule. More 
progressive Britons argued that the imperial rulers had to work in some sort of 
partnership with the western-educated elite if British rule was to survive. The 
majority, however, argued that British interests were more properly linked to the 
requirements of the rural masses and their traditional leaders. The new elite was 
unrepresentative and should not be allowed to achieve political hegemony. This 
chapter examines the nature of the Indian Nationalist Congress in the years from its
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foundation in 1885 to the middle of the First World War, particularly concentrating 
on the problem of differentiating Moderates and Extremists within the nationalist 
movement. The Moderate nationalists dominated Congress in the years before the 
First World War, but by 1917 their supremacy was under severe challenge as a result 
of the recent re-entry of Tilak and his followers into Congress, and the radicalisation 
of politics which took place as a result of the First World War and of British 
responses to the perceived nationalist threat.
One response of the colonial power to the rising threat posed by a more 
activist form of Indian nationalism during the First World War was to try to 
strengthen Moderate elements by constitutional concessions, and to direct Indian 
politics along the road of constitutional and gradualist politics. Indeed it has been 
widely assumed by historians that this was the primary motivation behind the 
Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919. Chapter Two examines the motives behind the 
formulation of the reforms in the years 1916 to 1918. The reforms began as a very 
conservative package of concessions which intended to build on the fundamentally 
undemocratic Morley-Minto reforms of 1909. It was the events of the war years, both 
in India and internationally, that led to a much more dynamic and liberal policy to be 
pursued by the British Government with the concurrence of the Government of India. 
The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, outlined in July 1918, had at their heart the 
deliberate attempt to start India on the process of parliamentary democracy leading to 
ultimate self-government within the empire.
In personal talks with Moderate Indian leaders, Montagu and Chelmsford weaned 
them away from the Congress-League scheme of 1916 and convinced them that, 
unlike the new reforms, their scheme did not lead inevitably to British-style 
parliamentary democracy, which was their goal. In August 1918 the Congress split 
over the issue of the constitutional reforms and there is a full examination in this 
chapter of whether this was the result of a deliberate policy of divide and rule.
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Chapter Three focuses on the relations between the British and the Moderate 
nationalists under strain from three directions. Firstly, from the process of finalising 
the reforms and the fears that the Moderates had that the reforms would be whittled 
down either in the parliamentary process or when it came to drawing up the rules for 
their operation. Secondly, from the tension arising from the British decision to 
implement repressive measures to deal with political terrorism at the same time as the 
new reforms. Thirdly, from the hardening divisions within the Indian nationalist 
movement particularly as the policy of non-co-operation was taken up by the 
Congress.
Part Two
Chapters Four and Five examine the main issues in British-Indian Liberal 
relations at a national level. Chapter Four deals with very sensitive issue of the British 
treatment of the leadership of the first non-co-operation movement. From the British 
point of view non-co-operation confronted them with the most serious threat to their 
rule since the Mutiny of 1857. Just when they had inaugurated the experiment in 
parliamentary democracy in India, the whole basis of the legitimacy of their rule was 
brought into question by a mass nationalist movement which won support from both 
Hindus and Muslims, and from rural Indians as well as townspeople. Blatant 
repression was out of the question in the circumstances, and a policy of attempting to 
reach agreement with the nationalist leadership on the limits within which political 
activity would be allowed was followed by Lord Reading’s administration. A key 
consideration for the British was the need to keep the support of those politicians who 
had contested the elections in 1920, amongst whom the Indian Liberals were the most 
important national grouping. The Liberals acted as a weathercock of informed Indian 
opinion, by which the Government increasingly judged the acceptability of its policies. 
In addition, Liberal leaders, such as Tej Bahadur Sapru, played a crucial role as
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intermediaries in trying to reach an accommodation between the Government and 
Congress leaders. Ultimately Moderate efforts to mediate failed, but Government 
attempts to involve them served the purpose of strengthening their commitment to the 
reforms and thus helped the Government through a very difficult time. On the other 
hand Reading’s failure to carry out the instructions of the Home Government to arrest 
Gandhi immediately caused serious unease in Whitehall and led to the resignation of 
the Secretary of State, Edwin Montagu. Montagu’s resignation, which was regarded 
by Indian Liberals as a turning point in British relations with them, is examined 
closely to determine the roots of the reaction that was taking place in Britain. Whilst 
giving attention to the centre ground in Indian politics paid dividends within India, it 
exacerbated the growing reaction against any extension of the Montford reforms that 
was taking place in Britain.
Chapter Five continues to depict the way in which the Government of India took 
Indian Liberal opinion into account on the key issues of the day. This chapter on 
national politics is organised around the following themes. Firstly, the economic 
problems faced after the war and their constitutional impact. Secondly, the issue of 
the Indianisation of the Indian services, which was opened up by the reforms but left 
unresolved. This issue is seen as a litmus test for Britain’s sincerity in leading India 
towards self-government. The speech of the Prime Minister Lloyd George in August 
1922 and the subsequent establishment of a Royal Commission on the Public Services 
are both seen by Liberals as attempts to prop up the European element in the services. 
The third issue is that of legislation to repeal the so-called repressive legislation, 
including various restrictions on the Press in India, and to diminish the racial 
distinctions maintained in the judicial process in India. These sets of measures began 
their life in the more liberal period at the end of Lord Chelmsford’s regime and the 
beginning of Lord Reading’s. However, by the last year of the first councils* lives it 
was felt by many Indians that the home government was obstructing the more liberal
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aspects of this legislation. The final issue concerned the status of Indians overseas, 
especially in East Africa. It is argued that Liberal politicians placed particular 
emphasis on this issue as indicative of their belief in a multi-racial empire or 
commonwealth rather than a white-dominated empire. The Kenya White Paper of July 
1923 marked the final disillusionment of the hopes of Liberal leaders like Srinivasa 
Sastri and others.
In all the above issues the tensions and contradictions in British policy-making 
are emphasised. It is noted that increasingly the Viceroy is seen as the bulwark of 
Indian interests in conflict with the Secretary of State and the home government.
Chapter Six focuses on the working of the reforms at the provincial level. 
Three provincial ministries are examined in each of which the Liberals played the 
leading role: Bengal, Bombay, and the United Provinces. The intention is not to 
study the working of the dyarchical system per se but rather to study the relations 
between Ministers in the provinces and the British establishment during the first 
councils. Comparisons are made between the experience in the three provinces and 
with the working of some of the other provincial ministries.
Chapter Seven is an examination of the reasons for the collapse of the Liberal 
Party as a force in Indian national politics at the 1923 elections and after. Liberal 
organisation is studied and found to be gravely defective, especially in forming links 
with the widened electorate under the Montford reforms. This organisational failure is 
weighed against the British contribution in undermining the Liberals by a series of 
decisions made in 1923, most especially the decision to certify a doubling of the salt 
tax after the Assembly had voted it down. A brief examination is made of the Liberal 
contribution to Indian politics after 1923.
Chapter Eight is a concluding chapter which summarises the findings of the 
thesis and sets the role of the Moderates in a broader context by examining the longer- 
term significance of the relationship between Britain and the Indian Liberals.
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Comparisons are also made with the role of moderate nationalists in other parts of the 
British Empire at this crucial early phase of decolonisation.
3. Sources
The sources for this thesis have been found in almost equal quantities in 
Britain and in India. In both countries the quantity of sources, particularly official 
Government sources, is too voluminous to be studied exhaustively for a work of this 
scope. Because the main focus of this thesis is on political attitudes, greater reliance 
has been placed on private papers, which have the advantage of being rather more 
revealing than official government sources. Quite extensive quotations from the 
private papers have been used deliberately to try and convey the quality of 
contemporary attitudes. Inevitably, this thesis cannot cover all issues comprehensively. 
Relevance to the main theme has been the prime consideration for selection but, apart 
from the close examination of the crucial period of the making of the Montford 
reforms, I have tried to avoid going over ground that has been fully and satisfactorily 
covered by previous scholars. I hope in doing so that I have acknowledged my debt to 
them adequately.
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CHAPTER I : THE CONTEXT
India provided unique challenges for British imperial rule. The size of the 
country and the diversity of its population were quite unlike any other territory within 
the Empire. During the nineteenth century India became Britain’s most valuable 
economic possession and strategically its most important. Yet in India the British 
invested more than just capital: India became almost a testing-ground for ideas about 
the governance of overseas territory. Ideas of trusteeship, guardianship, education, 
and amelioration were more closely woven into the fabric of British rule in India than 
in any other of its non-white colonies. Utilitarian programmes of reform were 
imposed in a more undiluted way than was possible even in Britain. Yet there was a 
fundamental conflict between some of these grandiose reforming ambitions and the 
fundamental lack of manpower which Britain had available in India. The Mutiny 
exposed the fragility of these pretensions and reinstated a more conservative approach 
to ruling India. Henceforth there was a much stronger emphasis on governing with the 
grain of established Indian society, of attempting to work with the traditional leaders 
of Indian society, such as the large landowners, religious leaders, princes and 
notables. The British tended to treat Indian society as if it were static, disaggregated 
and determinedly traditional in its cultural values. In doing so, they failed to come to 
terms with a significant element of change within Indian society, one indeed which 
they themselves had encouraged in the period of liberal reform, the growth of a 
westem-educated elite. This failure was one of the factors that gave British policy a 
fundamentally ambivalent appearance: there was a cavernous gap between their liberal 
professions and their authoritarian practice. The British were prepared to involve more 
Indians in their administration and army, to democratise local government and to
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begin to establish representative institutions, but they were not prepared to do so 
whilst the educated elite was going to take a disproportionate share of the benefits of 
such reforms.
The threat posed by the westem-educated elite stemmed particularly from its 
dominance of the nationalist movement. It was this numerically small group that 
provided the organising basis for the political associations that developed in India 
from the middle of the century onwards. These associations provided a bridge between 
the political activities of India’s local leaders, landowners and merchants, for instance, 
and the development of nationalist politics. It was the westem-educated, professional 
classes who had the motivation and the ability to break the regional barriers that 
divided India politically and to combine together on a national basis. The formation of 
the Indian National Congress in 1885 was, in retrospect, the culmination of such 
activity. The Congress began as an avowedly loyalist organisation and was dominated 
by Moderate nationalists until the First World War. However, Moderate domination 
was not unquestioned and came under threat from a more activist wing of the 
Congress, led by B.G. Tilak in Maharashtra, Aurobindo Ghosh in Bengal and Lajpat 
Rai in the Punjab. The most serious clash between the Moderates and Extremists came 
at the time of the agitation over the partition of Bengal and resulted in a split at the 
Surat Congress of 1907. It was the Moderates who emerged as victors from this clash, 
but it was something of a pyrrhic victory as the British were able to take action 
against the Extremist leaders and the rump of the Congress became progressively 
more moribund without its more activist element. It was not until 1916 that the 
Extremists were re-admitted to Congress and the British were faced with an 
unprecedented but fragile unity within the nationalist movement.
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1. British Rule in India: Some Inner Contradictions
British rule in India contained within itself fundamental contradictions and the 
pull of opposing forces. The most basic contradiction is encapsulated in the fact that 
the British were a ’free though conquering people’.1 How could a parliamentary 
democracy deny the liberties which it had won to overseas territories like India?
What might be considered an abstract problem in the early stages of British rule 
became by the second half of the nineteenth century a very practical one as the British 
had to respond to the demands of westem-educated Indians for the transfer of British 
ideas and institutions to their country. The British found themselves ill-equipped to 
respond; they had established liberal ideals in governing India but had patently failed 
to follow them in practice. Furthermore, the cumbersome bureaucracy the British had 
established in India and the power of vested interests within the decision-making 
process, meant that it was difficult to develop and maintain a clear direction in policy­
making. The result was that British policy was prone to appear Janus-faced as periods 
of reform were followed by periods of reaction and paternalism and liberalism became 
almost inextricably intertwined.
One of the main issues the British faced once they had established their 
supremacy was whether Indian society and culture should be respected and maintained 
intact or whether the imperial power had a duty to facilitate the transfer of western 
institutions and values to India.2 The problems revolving around the issues of 
conservation or reform raised key issues of empire. In a situation where the colonised 
vastly outnumbered the colonisers it made sense to restrict interference in traditional 
customs to a minimum lest resistance be provoked. India was recognised as one of the
1 This phrase is taken from Peter Marshall’s inaugural lecture of the same title, King’s College, 
London, 1981.
2 See P.J. Marshall, Problems o f Empire. Britain and India 1757-1813, London, 1968.
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world’s great historic civilisations and some of the early Company men tried to 
encourage the maintenance and revival of traditional Sanskrit scholarship. The British 
had to recognise that the only way that they could establish themselves in India was 
through existing channels of power and influence. Yet, however much a policy of 
minimal interference was established in theory, in practice the British inevitably 
interpreted traditional India through their own perspective and therefore, even if 
inadvertently, transformed Indian institutions, such as land tenure systems. A more 
consciously reforming phase of British rule operated in the period from the 1820s 
onwards and reached a peak in the 1830s. Clearly this marked a confidence in the 
establishment of British rule in India, but much more it reflected the influence of 
predominant ideologies at home. Evangelical fervour and utilitarian love of efficiency 
together combined to make for a remarkable period of anglicisation , in which 
’barbaric’ institutions such as sati and thagi were attacked and new systems of land 
tenure imposed. 3 This period of confident westernisation was epitomised by 
Macaulay’s Education Minute of 1835, which talked of creating an Indian 
intermediary elite who would act as purveyors of western culture to the rest of Indian 
society. In practical terms, the results of this policy were disappointing in that the 
spread of western education remained limited to a generally high-caste Indian elite, 
residing in the seaboard provinces where the British had first established themselves, 
Bengal, Bombay and Madras. There was neither the will nor the wherewithal for a 
more ambitious educational policy, especially after the Mutiny had brought into 
question the whole basis of the policies of anglicisation and reform.
After 1857, conservative arguments regained the upperhand and anglicising 
reformers such as Ripon stood out as exceptions to the rule. Reasons of safety, 
economy and imperial self-confidence all reinforced the need to avoid any unnecessary
3 For the utilitarian influence see E. Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India, Oxford, 1959.
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interference with India’s traditional customs and ruling elites. The British relied on an 
alliance with the princes and the landlords. ’Scientific’ ideas of evolution were used to 
lend support to arguments of the permanence of imperial supremacy in India. Liberals 
had always been divided about whether liberal principles and institutions could 
transfer successfully into a different environment. Men like Macaulay believed they 
could, provided there was a suitable period of education and training, but the majority 
Liberal view came to be held by men such as John Stuart Mill and John Morley who 
argued that such ideas of the transferability of western institutions to an oriental 
situation were ’moonshine’.4 Despite the lone radical voices of Congress 
supporters like Hume and Wedderbum, it would have been difficult at the turn of the 
century to find a member of the British ruling elite who would have felt that British 
democratic institutions could be transferred to India successfully.5
The imperial ethos was at its height in the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
and, of course, India was seen as the linchpin of the British Empire, providing Britain 
with one-fifth of its overseas trade and investment, and balancing its world trade.
India, the ’English barrack in the Oriental Seas,’ was crucial to Britain’s global 
strategic needs. Imperial self-interest was therefore a major factor in the dominant 
view that British rule in India was a permanent necessity. Britons, however, still 
preferred to couch their imperial interests in terms of altruism and duty. They 
emphasised the continuing function of their trust to improve India materially and 
morally, and indeed, under Viceroys like Curzon, there was strong emphasis placed
4 S. Koss, John Morley at the India Office, 1905-1910, New Haven, 1969, p. 188.
5 This theme is developed in A.T. Embree, ’Pledged to India: the Liberal Experiment, 1885- 
1909’, in J.M.W. Bean (ed.), The Political Culture o f Modern Britain: Studies in Memory o f Stephen 
Koss, London, 1987, pp. 32-55.
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on improving the economic well-being of ordinary Indians. Good government became 
an end in itself and few thought of the liberal goal of developing self-government.6
Educational policy came to be seen as a failure in that it had focused on higher 
education rather than basic education, literary skills rather than technical ones, and 
had seemed to create an unemployable elite who formed the core of the nationalist 
critics of British rule in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. There was a 
tendency to dismiss the educated elite as ’babus’, mimics of British cultural values 
rather than as Macaulay’s ideal, intermediaries in cultural transmission. By their 
actions, either deliberate or unwitting, the British had helped to create this elite but 
their attitude to the patently loyalist activities of the nascent Congress epitomises one 
of their major failings, and the source of the main contradictions in the political 
ambitions of the Raj. From a policy of benevolent neutrality towards the new-born 
Congress in 1885, the British quickly moved to a position of suspicion and then 
outright hostility. Whereas the British were able to manipulate most of the other key 
groups in Indian society through ’collaborative’ arrangements, reaching a modus 
vivendi with the princes, the landlords and the Muslims, for example, the educated 
elite was kept at arm’s length until well into the twentieth century. Why did the 
British fail to establish a satisfactory relationship with the educated elites?
Firstly, the British saw the educated elites as an artificial and unrepresentative 
group, Dufferin’s ’microscopic minority’. The British emphasised the fact that the 
Congress leadership was predominantly high caste, Hindu and drawn from the urban- 
based professional classes, particularly from lawyers and journalists. These groups 
represented only a tiny proportion of India’s population and it was the British 
contention that if this group should achieve a share in power it would use it to further
6 The fundamental contradiction in British liberalism in relation to India, i.e. that in order to 
impart western liberal institutions in India it was deemed necessary to extend imperial rule, is superbly 
summarised by R.J. Moore, Liberalism and Indian Politics 1872-1922, London, 1966, pp. 14-1 S.
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its own interests rather than the wider interests of the Indian population. The new 
educated elite, the British argued, was displacing the traditional elites whom they, the 
British, had hoped would come forward to represent the ’real* India. The British had 
fallen into the trap of seeing India as part of the stereotyped ’unchanging East’. The 
British cultivated the image that they were maintaining ruling traditions through their 
princely durbars and did all that they could to protect the rural world from the forces 
of change that they had themselves unleashed.7 Their image of India countered 
advanced arguments that India was developing a national identity. Rather, India was 
seen by the British as a land divided by caste, race, and religion and unified only by 
the ’Pax Britannica’.
Secondly, the educated elite was not like other interest groups which could be 
accommodated by concessions which did not fundamentally weaken the Raj. The early 
demands of the Congress focused on the Indianisation of the services and the grant of 
representative institutions to India. Concessions which would satisfy Congress on 
either of these demands would not only threaten key British interests but would 
inevitably lead to larger demands.
The truth was that the educated elite posed a challenge to the ideological basis 
of British rule in India: the fact that they based their demands upon British Liberal 
principles and policies only alienated the British further. The title of Dadabhai 
Naoroji’s telling critique of British economic exploitation of India, The Poverty o f Un- 
British Rule in India, is typical of the way in which Congressmen contrasted British 
ideals and practices in India. To counter the success of the educated elite in 
competitive examinations, the British manipulated the conduct of the entry into the
7 For the British use of the durbars see B. Cohn, ’Representing Authority in British India’ in E. 
Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (eds.), The Invention o f Tradition, Cambridge, 1983. The British separation of 
rural India from outside influences is argued in P. Robb, ’Some Aspects of British Policy Towards 
Indian Nationalism. 1885-1920’, in M. Shepperdson & C. Simmons (eds.), The Indian National 
Congress and the Political Economy o f India 1885-1985, Aldershot, 1988, pp. 61-97.
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Indian Covenanted Service so as to make it very difficult for Indians to succeed. It 
was difficult to deny that Indians on an academic basis could have successfully filled 
many of the posts that were reserved to Britons, so the British fell back on arguments 
that Indians lacked the necessary ’character’ for these posts, by which they seem to 
have meant that they lacked the attributes of probity, impartiality, decisiveness and 
steadfastness which the typical British public school recruits were thought to possess.
Finally, although the demands of the educated elite, as expressed through the 
Congress, were moderate, the British mistrusted it and felt that moderation only hid 
its real aims, which were to replace the British from power. Some Britons, such as 
the highly influential Sir Alfred Lyall, believed that Brahminic Hinduism, the culture 
of many of the Congress leaders, was fundamentally opposed to social and political 
modernisation, and that it was the mix of reactionary religion and modem political 
ideas that was at the root of Indian unrest.8 The Brahmins of Bengal and 
Maharashtra were particularly singled out by Lyall and by Valentine Chirol as sources 
of unrest; amongst many of the latter, according to Chirol, ’hatred of the British is the 
dominant passion’.9 Curzon talked of the dream of Bengali Babus ’of a future 
when the English will have been turned out’, and Hardinge suspected that Gokhale 
really wanted to take over power from the British in twenty years time.10
The failure of the British to incorporate the westem-educated elites into their 
rule was of crucial historical importance. It led to a situation where it was the Indian 
Moderates who were confident that the future for India lay in the borrowing of 
western education, ideas and institutions, whilst the British rulers pessimistically
8 Sir A.C. Lyall, Introduction to V. Chirol, Indian Unrest, London, 1910, pp. vii-xvi.
9 Chirol, op. cit., p. 43.
10 Curzon to Brodrick, 17 Feb. 1904, Curzon MSS, F. 111/163, vol. 8, cited in S. Sarkar, The 
Swadeshi Movement in Bengal 1903-1908, New Delhi, 1973, pp. 19-20; Hardinge to Clarke, 16/19 
April 1912, Hardinge MSS, University of Cambridge, cited in B.R. Nanda, Gokhale: The Indian 
Moderates and the British Raj, Delhi, 1977, p. 403.
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foresaw that such a transfer would lead to the disintegration not only of traditional 
Indian society, but also potentially of the Raj itself.11
The ambivalence in British policies created by their mistrust of the westem- 
educated elites can be seen in the policies, or rather the lack of clear policies, of 
Indianisation of the army and civil service in the nineteenth century. The British were 
prepared to open up these professions to greater native participation, but not if it 
meant that the wrong sort of Indian benefited. What they meant by this was that any 
system of competitive examinations for entry would almost certainly lead to the 
educated elites taking up the posts at the expense of other groups. Hence, all sorts of 
ploys were used to avoid the educated elites benefiting; e.g. Lytton’s creation of a 
’statutory* civil service which was to be recruited on the basis of social status.12 
Offers from the educated classes to establish their own volunteer regiments were 
turned down and a myth created that the martial races of the North were the only 
suitable recruits for the army was established.13
British equivocation regarding the demands of the Indian educated elite can be 
seen even more clearly in relation to the demand for representative institutions to be 
granted to India. The British introduced legislative councils and widened their 
membership and powers in the reforms of 1861, 1892 and 1909, but found themselves 
always having to contradict any democratic tendencies in these reforms in order to 
counteract the over-representation of the educated classes in the legislatures. The same 
applied to local self-government, which was considered a safe outlet for a democratic 
experiment, but which was subverted by the British as they realised that the desired 
involvement of the traditional leaders of Indian society was not being achieved, but
11 This contrast is well brought out in D. Rothermund, ’Emancipation or Re-Integration. The 
Politics of Gopal Krishna Gokhale and Herbert Hope Risley’, in D.A. Low (ed.), Soundings in Modem 
South Asian History, London, 1968, pp. 131-58.
12 A. Seal, The Emergence o f  Indian Nationalism, Cambridge, 1971 edn., pp. 136-42.
13 Ibid., pp. 171-5.
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that it was the educated classes which were taking up the opportunities offered. 
Originally the British saw these councils essentially as a means by which they could 
be kept better informed of Indian opinion, by which they meant, the views of 
dominant elites in the countryside. There was an attempt to try to educate Indian 
opinion through the opening up of the relatively harmless sphere of local 
self-government under Ripon in the 1880s, but, in practice, British officials thwarted 
this attempt by maintaining their functions as chairmen of district boards. There was a 
tendency to lose sight of the educative function of politics, and instead the emphasis 
was placed on administrative and fiscal devolution. Thus there was no system of 
elections for the legislatures but rather a reliance on nomination and, after 1909, 
indirect election through recognised institutions. The British eschewed the territorial 
electorate in their Whiggish emphasis on representation of key Indian interests. They 
were disappointed that rural elites held back from the new local bodies and that it was 
the urban professional classes who came forward. From the British perspective, 
political institutions were a tool of government; electorates, where they existed, were 
to be used to balance interests and thus perpetuate British rule. The provision of 
separate electorates for the Muslims under the Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 was 
indicative of this attitude. It seemed to underline the fact that, early in the twentieth 
century, both sides of the House regarded India as unsuited to western political 
institutions, particularly parliamentary democracy based on territorial electorates. Lord 
Balfour, Leader of the Opposition, expressed this feeling most clearly in 1909 when 
he told the Commons that the British form of government was only suitable
...when you are dealing with a population in the main homogenous, in 
the main equal in every substantial and essential sense, in a community 
where the minority are prepared to accept the decisions of the majority, 
where they are all alike in the traditions in which they are brought up,
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in their general outlook upon the world and in their broad view of 
national aspirations.14
The implication was that the pattern of political transition which had been applied in 
the white colonies, such as Canada or New Zealand, the movement from 
representative to responsible government, was not to be followed in India, which was 
too divided a country for such a system to work.
It was not just the concession of separate electorates for the Muslims that 
signalled the fact that British policy-makers did not see India’s political future 
following the Westminster model. The 1909 reforms extended Indian representation in 
the provincial legislatures but only in Bengal were elected representatives allowed a 
majority, and even there a preponderance of votes could still be assured to the 
government. The power of the elected Indians to initiate or influence legislation was 
still highly restricted and the progenitors of the reforms, Morley and Minto, went out 
of their way to deny that the reforms were intended as a step in the direction of 
parliamentary institutions.15
Before 1914 Indian politicians were depressed by the lack of progress towards 
their political goals. Their cherished aims of emulating British political development 
seemed to be thwarted. The Morley-Minto reforms failed to meet Indian aspirations 
and, indeed, led only to the possibility of constitutional deadlock as Indian legislators 
could criticise but not control. In 1911 a Government of India despatch seemed to 
outline the gradual extension of a ’larger measure of self-government’ to the provinces 
as the way forward, but the Secretary of State was equivocal about the implications of 
this statement when questioned.16 What Indians most desired was that the British 
should stop relying on constitutional expedients and begin to give a clear indication of
14 Coupland, The Indian Problem, 1833-1945, p. 26.
15 See p. 18, n.9 above.
16 See Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, pp. 60-4.
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the direction in which they intended to take India. In the view of Indian Moderates 
there could be only one goal, responsible government as in Britain and her dominions, 
and only one path to this goal, via the development of parliamentary institutions.
In addition to the British ambivalence towards introducing western institutions 
to India, there was a fundamental structural tension within British rule. The nature of 
the system of government in India was not conducive to progressive decision-making. 
There was a strong tension between the two predominant figures in the administration 
of India, the Viceroy in Council, based in Calcutta until 1912 and Delhi thereafter, 
and the Secretary of State, in Whitehall. This tension had two important effects. 
Firstly, it meant that policy-making was cumbersome and time-consuming, with each 
party keen to assert itself and to present itself to the outside world as the dynamic 
force in policy-making. Secondly, policy was inevitably the result of compromise 
rather than of any clear-sighted view of the overall direction of policy. The fact that 
the Viceroy and Secretary State could be the appointment of two different political 
regimes and from opposite sides of the political spectrum, as were Morley (radical 
Liberal) and Minto (Whig Unionist) also made for uneasy partnerships. Neither, 
despite the constitutional precedence of Parliament and its representative, the 
Secretary of State, over the crown’s appointee, the Viceroy, was it clear where power 
lay. To some extent it depended upon the strength of personality of individual 
incumbents, but the tyranny of imperial distance always gave the ’man on the spot’ a 
crucial advantage. The position of Secretary of State was seen, more often than not, 
as a stepping stone to higher office or as a position awarded as part of the party 
power-game. Indian Secretaries were often ’passing through* and lacked the length of 
stay in office to be able to press their ideas through to fruition, especially if opposed 
in India. Everyone has heard of the Viceroys Ripon and Curzon, but who has heard 
of their London counterparts, Kimberley and Hamilton? John Morley’s appointment 
in December 1905 was an exception to this rule; it was not a stepping stone but a
42
tombstone marking the end of his political career. Morley’s relationship with Lord 
Minto epitomises the tensions of the imperial system in India and has been thoroughly 
documented. Considering Morley’s radical reputation and the overwhelming Liberal 
majority in Parliament, Indian nationalists seemed justified in expecting that a 
programme of major liberal reforms would be enacted. However, the reforms that 
were finally passed in 1909 were a grave disappointment even to moderate 
Congressmen. Not only were the reforms very limited in their impact (they were 
largely an extension of the thinking of the 1892 Councils Act) but they were 
accompanied by a programme of new repressive legislation and a crackdown on 
Indian extremist politicians. The system of governing India resulted in reform 
proposals that were inevitably a compromise between Secretary of State and Viceroy, 
but a compromise in which the Viceroy, his council, the provincial governors, and the 
Indian Civil Service, set the effective limits. Morley himself accepted that the details 
of the reforms’ regulations should be left to the Government of India as the people 
with detailed knowledge of the situation, but these regulations were used by Minto to 
further push the reforms in his own direction.
Both Secretary of State and Viceroy knew that a further set of constraints 
operated upon them. In Britain, Conservative domination of the House of Lords, and 
the power of ex-India men in that body, acted as a powerful constraint on change. In 
India, the influence of the bureaucracy and the European community should not be 
underestimated. The power of the European community to constrain a reforming 
government can be seen in the concessions that were forced from Ripon in the Ilbert 
Bill controversy in 1882-3. Whilst the Government of India was centred in Calcutta it 
was very open to the influence of this European community. The bureaucracy 
wielded power well beyond its numbers. It was not just the influence of the I.C.S. on 
the ground but also the fact that many of the top posts in India were in effect reserved 
to I.C.S. men. Only the very top posts, the Viceroyalty and the Governorships of the
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Presidencies, were appointments from outside India. All the other posts were 
traditionally I.C.S. preserves, and even on retirement I.C.S. men could wield their 
conservative influence for they formed the bulk of membership of the Secretary of 
State’s India Council.
Indian nationalists perceived these tensions within the imperial machine but 
often misread their dynamics. They placed too much faith in the basic willingness of 
Parliament to listen to their demands and in the fundamental liberalism of the British 
approach to India. They failed to understand fully the clash between British imperial 
interests and liberal ideology. Their view did not encompass the hardening in liberal 
attitudes which had taken place in the era of the New Imperialism and the impact of 
social Darwinism.
2. Indian Nationalist Politics Before 1914
The Indian Nationalist Congress, founded in 1885, was an avowedly loyalist 
and constitutionalist organisation, which was dominated for the first thirty years of its 
existence by Moderate nationalists. It represented the frustrations and ambitions of the 
English-educated middle class, drawn predominantly from the three 
Presidencies.17 Congress gathered once a year in the Christmas vacation in a 
large tent, festooned with loyal slogans. Having met and passed resolutions on matters 
of general concern to the professional elite, such as the demand for fairer access for 
Indians to the Services, Congress remained generally moribund throughout the rest of 
the year. Agitation on individual issues was left to the local organisations which
17 A. Seal, The Emergence o f Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later 
Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, 1971. McLane says that the nucleus of Indian leadership in the 
early Congress was drawn from a group of nine men from Bombay and Calcutta who had formed 
inter-regional friendships while in London studying for the bar and the I.C.S.. J.R. McLane, Indian 
Nationalism and the Early Congress, Princeton, 1977, p. 52.
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formed the basis of the Congress organisation in the provinces. There was no proper 
constitution until 1899 and the administration of the Congress was left in the hands of 
one or two men who were Britons, more often than not, during the first twenty years 
of the Congress. The looseness of the organisation allowed Congress to be dominated 
by a handful of Moderates, of whom Pherozeshah Mehta, a Parsi lawyer from 
Bombay, was the predominant figure. The Moderate dominance was reflected in the 
issues which Congress took up, but also, significantly, in the issues which they 
avoided. As an inter-regional alliance of political leaders, there was an inevitable 
tendency for Congress to move towards the lowest common denominator of 
acceptability and to eschew regional or controversial issues. This tendency was 
underlined by the need to avoid falling foul of their rulers and their patrons. Thus, as 
McLane has argued, Congress avoided issues such as social reform (a separate social 
reform conference was held annually after the Congress session) which would have 
opened up a potential rift between the different religions represented in 
Congress.18 Issues of agrarian reform were generally avoided so as not to alienate 
Congress patrons, such as wealthy landowners. By avoiding issues such as religious 
revival and agrarian reform, Congress effectively ensured that its appeal outside the 
confines of the urban, westem-educated elite would be limited. The presumption by 
Congress leaders that the fragility of the nationalist movement required playing down 
any sub-national loyalties, such as those to region, language, religion, caste etc., was 
a severe handicap to popular mobilisation in India where these loyalties were still the 
most meaningful ones to the majority of the population. Congressmen were influenced 
by the perspective of their rulers. Educated in the new universities established by the 
British in the late 1850s onwards, the Moderate nationalists were strongly imbued 
with the liberal values of Victorian Britain. Their emphasis on the benefits of the
18 Indian Nationalism, pp. 5-6.
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British connection, of the supremacy of the British democratic tradition, of the politics 
of gradualism and of constitutionalism, owed very much to their reliance on British 
culture and institutions. As Surendranath Baneijea, a Bengali Moderate nationalist, 
expressed this loyalty in 1895:
To England we look for inspiration and guidance. To England we look 
for sympathy in the struggle. From England must come the crowning 
mandate which will enfranchise our people. England is our political 
guide and moral preceptor in the exalted sphere of political duty.
English history has taught us those principles of freedom which we 
cherish with our life blood. We have been fed upon the strong food of 
English constitutional freedom.19
Congress loyalism won respect neither from the majority of British 
administrators, who mistrusted these statements of loyalty, nor from the increasingly 
large number of Indians who were looking for some means of restoring their national 
self-respect. The elitism of Congress under Moderate domination had been criticised 
even by Allan Octavian Hume, one of the founders of the movement, but it was not 
until the 1890s that an effective opposition grew up within the movement.20 The 
opposition of the New Party, as they later came to call themselves, was led by Bal 
Gangadhar Tilak of Maharashtra. Tilak was, like G.K. Gokhale the Moderate leader, 
a member of the Deccan Education Society (founded 1884), which had as its aims the 
bringing of western education to groups such as poor Brahmins and middle-class 
Marathis who would not normally receive it.21 Whereas Gokhale lectured at the 
Society’s Fergusson College, Tilak edited the Society’s newspapers, Kesari and 
Mahratta. Tilak and Gokhale, though coming from very similar backgrounds, came
19 S. Baneijea, The Gospel o f Surendranath, edited by Jnan Chandra Rai, Calcutta, 1912, pp. 
119-20, cited in H. Baneijee, Political Activity o f the Liberal Party in India, 1919-1937, Calcutta, 
1987, p. 1.
20 Hume tried to ^ viden the appeal of the Congress to encompass Muslims and peasants but to no 
avail. See McLane, Indian Nationalism, ch. 3.
21 See J. Masselos, Nationalism on the Indian Subcontinent, Melbourne, 1972, p. 75.
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to lead an Extremist and a Moderate grouping, respectively, within Poona.22 Tilak 
left the Deccan Education Society in 1890 and campaigned in the following year 
against the Age of Consent Bill, which raised the age of consent from ten to twelve 
years of age, and which the Government was introducing with the support of Indian 
social reformers, including Western Indian Moderates, such as Ranade, Agarkar and 
Gokhale. At one level this issue might be thought to reflect only the personal rivalry 
between the Moderate and Extremist leaders, in that Tilak, whose personal beliefs on 
social matters seemed to be quite liberal, took up the issue to put himself at the head 
of a movement of conservative religious opposition to the Moderate social 
reformers.23 However, the issue revealed deep-seated differences of outlook 
between Tilak and the Moderates, which revolved around different views of the 
importance of indigenous as against western culture. The Moderates accepted some of 
the western criticisms of the retrograde nature of certain Hindu social customs: they 
valued India’s attachment to the world’s greatest reforming nation and believed that in 
co-operation with the British, the damaging accretions of Hindu culture could be 
swept away and a truer Hinduism could be revived. Tilak, on the other hand, argued 
that if reform was needed it should come from within Hindu society and not be 
imposed by an outside power. His emphasis on Indian self-reliance and on the revival 
of traditional Hinduism was very much in tune with the need that many Indians felt 
for affirming their identity which was under threat from the impact of foreign rule.
Linked with Tilak’s apparent championing of traditional religious values was 
his belief that the nationalist movement needed to be a more agitational body, and that 
it needed to reach out to the concerns of a wider section of Indian society. Through 
his use of the Ganapati festivals, and the secular Shivaji celebrations, Tilak began to
22 See the comparative biographical study, S.R. Wolpert, Tilak and Gokhale, Berkeley & Los 
Angeles, 1962.
23 C.H. Heimsath, Indian Nationalism and Hindi Social Reform, Princeton, 1964, ch. vii.
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mobilise popular support in a way that the existing public associations had not 
done.24 He had none of the qualms of the Moderates about going outside the 
normal constitutional methods of protest. In 1896-7 he took up a no-rent campaign in 
Maharashtra in protest at the Government’s failure to reduce revenue demands in time 
of famine. Tilak was willing to risk confronting and offending the authorities in a way 
that the Moderates were not. He paid the price in a jail sentence and in Government 
ostracisation of his organisation, the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, but his stance appealed 
to a much wider Indian following.
Curzon*s partition of Bengal, combined with the Russian defeat by the 
Japanese in 1905, radicalised Indian politics and led to the linking of Tilak with 
Extremist leaders in other parts of India, such as Aurobindo Ghose in Bengal and 
Lajpat Rai in the Punjab. The new Extremist assertiveness can be seen in the 
challenge that they mounted to the Bombay Moderates at the Calcutta Congress in 
December 1906. Pherozeshah Mehta and other conservative Bombay leaders regarded 
the partition of Bengal as a local Bengali grievance and one that Congress as a 
national body should not concern itself with. Other Moderates, such as Gokhale, 
supported a programme of swadeshi (encouragement of indigenous products) but 
disapproved of a boycott campaign which they regarded as directly confronting their 
rulers in a way that was likely to be self-destructive. Bengal Moderates, who naturally 
felt the partition issue very keenly, joined with the Extremists and secured Congress’ 
acceptance of the goal of swaraj and a programme of swadeshi, boycott and national 
education. It was the determination of the Bombay Moderates to overturn this 
programme in the following year and the concern of the Extremists that the 1906 
programme should be adhered to that led to the famous Congress split at Surat in
24 R. Cashman, The Myth o f the Lokamanya, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975.
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December 1907.25 Despite the growth of popular support for the Extremists, the 
Moderate leaders were able to use their control of the Congress machinery to exclude 
the Extremists until the First World War. They were aided by their rulers in that a 
wave of British repression led to Tilak being sent to jail in 1908 for six years for 
sedition, Aurobindo Ghose fleeing to Pondicherry, and Bipan Chandra leaving for 
London. The Moderates took control of Congress, but, without the dynamism and 
appeal of the Extremists, Congress atrophied, until it was very nearly moribund when 
the war broke out in 1914.
The Moderate-Extremist categories in Indian nationalist politics were therefore 
established in the last decade of the nineteenth century and in the first decade of the 
twentieth. They were categories that were used by the British and Indians alike, but 
did they mark distinct and definable categories or did they merely reflect standpoints 
on particular issues at particular times? Were the differences based upon differences 
of class or age or other material factors? Were they fundamentally ideological or did 
they mark factional and personal loyalties? These are all questions over which 
historians have disagreed. Earlier historical studies which contrasted the lives and 
thought of opposing Indian leaders tended to exaggerate the cohesiveness of the 
followings of those leaders and also the conflict of coherent opposing sets of views. 
Daniel Argov, for instance, argued that the Moderate Congressmen were not true 
nationalists in that they did not aim to break the connection with Britain, and that the 
Congress only became truly nationalist when it was taken over by the
25 For details of the split see R.K. Ray, ’Moderates, Extremists and Revolutionaries: Bengal, 
1900-1908’, in R. Sisson & S. Wolpert (eds.), Congress and Indian Nationalism, California, 1988, 
pp. 74-80. See also B. Prasad, ’The Congress Split at Surat’, in B.R. Nanda & V.C. Joshi (eds.), 
Studies in Modern Indian History, no. 1, Delhi, 1972, pp. 144-76. Dr. Prasad insists that the Moderate 
intransigence at Surat resulted from their desire not to antagonise the Liberal Secretary of State for 
India, John Morley, from whom they had high expectations of being granted constitutional reforms, 
idem, p. 173. This suggests some interesting parallels between the Congress splits of 1907 and 1918.
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Extremists.26 Indeed, it may seem difficult to accept as nationalists men who so 
admired the culture of the power that ruled them that they conducted their campaigns 
in emulation of British political movements and ideas, used English as their common 
tongue, and were prepared to rely on a Briton to organise their affairs in their early 
years. More recent studies have reinstated the Moderates in the nationalist pantheon 
(albeit with a much more critical eye on their ’mendicancy’), and have tended to paint 
a much more subtle picture of Moderate/Extremist differences.27 The Moderates 
pioneered the economic critique of British rule, and, in this respect, developed a 
powerful and coherent nationalist standpoint.28 There is now widespread 
agreement that Moderates and Extremists, or rather their respective leaderships, were 
drawn from the same class, that is the professional middle class of lawyers, teachers 
and journalists. It may be that the Moderates tended to appeal to the older, more 
respectable and more well-to-do within this class.29 Extremist-Moderate 
differences are now considered to be more important with regard to their methods 
rather than their overall aims. The majority of both Moderates and Extremists talked 
of their goal as being swaraj or self-government, but within the British Empire. 
Broadly speaking, the Moderates confined themselves to constitutional means and 
eschewed passive resistance and direct action. However, in the early stages of the 
agitation over the partition of Bengal, Bengali Moderates, such as Surendranath 
Baneijea, were not to be outdone in their calls for strong measures against the
26 D. Argov, Moderates and Extremists in the Indian Nationalist Movement, London, 1967, pp. 
x-xii.
27 E.g., R. Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest in Bengal 1875-1927, Delhi, 1984, pp. 134-
5. Also B. Chandra, ’Elements of Continuity and Change in the Early Nationalist Activity’ in B.
Chandra, Nationalism and Colonialism in Modem India, New Delhi, 1979, pp. 123-43.
28 B. Chandra, The Rise and Growth o f Economic Nationalism in India, New Delhi, 1966.
29 Ray, ’Moderates, Extremists and Revolutionaries...’, p. 69; see also the rather 
over-schematised arguments in S.R. Mehrotra, ’The Early Indian National Congress 1885-1918; Ideals, 





Government.30 Historians now prefer to talk of temperamental or psychological 
differences between Moderates and Extremists, rather than the hard and fast 
differences based on material circumstances or ideology.31
3. Re-unification of Congress and Moderate-Extremist Rivalry During the First 
World War
After the Surat Split, the Moderates tried to establish a hierarchy of district 
organisations and to revitalise Congress politics in the regions. The attempt was a 
dismal failure, despite a good start in Madras and in the United Provinces.32 It 
was not long before Moderate lethargy and the absence of Extremist enthusiasm led to 
the Congress organisations in some of the regions lapsing. Attendances at the annual 
Congress sessions also dwindled. [See Table 1] Gokhale was one of the Moderate 
leaders who was aware of the problem and who tried to allow room for the more 
amenable of the Extremists to return to the Congress fold. The obstacle to the return 
of the Extremists was their refusal to accept the rule for the nomination of delegates 
by Congress organisations or Congress affiliated organisations only, rather than by 
public bodies which had accepted the Congress creed, as had been the case in the 
past.33 In the Subjects Committee of the 1911 annual Congress meeting a proposal 
to alter the constitution so as to readmit the Extremists was passed by over ninety 
votes against seven or eight. However, Bhupendranath Basu and Dinshaw Wacha
30 Ray, ’Moderates, Extremists and Revolutionaries...’, pp. 62-89.
31 See, e.g. H. Owen, ’The Leadership of the Indian National Movement, 1914-1920’, unpub. 
Ph.D., A.N.U., 1965, p. 30; R. Ray, op. cit. (1988), pp. 69, 86; S. Wolpert, op. cit., p. 302; R.T. 
Smith, ’V.S. Srinivasa Sastri and the Moderate Style in Indian Politics’, South Asia, 2, Aug. 1972, pp. 
81-100; S.R. Singh, ’Moderates and Extremists: The Congress till the Surat Split’, in B.N. Pande 
(ed.), A Centenary History o f the Indian National Congress, vol. 1, A.I.C.C. (I)/ Vikas, Delhi, 1985, 
p. 158.
32 H. Owen, thesis, p. 14.
33 See Gokhale to Besant, 21 Nov. 1914, Besant MSS.
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made such a commotion about the contemplated change that Gokhale thought it better 
to maintain unity by dropping the proposal for that year.34 By the end of 1914, 
Bhupendranath Basu had dropped his opposition to the readmission of the Extremists, 
thus leaving only the opposition of the Bombay followers of Pherozeshah Mehta.
Table 1
Number of Delegates at the Annual Session 
of Congress, 1900-1919 35
Year Number Year Number
1900 567 1910 636
1901 896 1911 446
1902 471 1912 207
1903 538 1913 550
1904 1010 1914 866
1905 757 1915 2259
1906 1663 1916 2301
1907 *1200/1300 1917 4967
1908 626 1918 4881
1909 243 1919 7031
* contemporary estimate
Further pressure for the reunification of Congress came from Annie Besant, 
the Theosophist leader, who had only recently become involved in Indian politics. 
Mrs. Besant, who had expressed the fear that Congress was losing touch with the 
younger men of India, acted as a go-between , having discussions with both Gokhale 
and Tilak, who had now completed his jail sentence and was making conciliatory
34 Idem.
35 Compiled from P.C. Ghosh, The Development o f the Indian National Congress 1892-1909, 
Calcutta, 1960, p. 24; B.N. Pande (ed.), A Centenary History o f the Indian National Congress, vol. 1, 
A.I.C.C. (I)/ Vikas, Delhi, 1985, pp. 447, 580.
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noises.36 The need for a united nationalist front had become more urgent in view 
of the outbreak of the war and the very real possibility that the British might make 
constitutional concessions to reward and maintain Indian support.
The talks broke down as a result of Tilak’s statement to the Congress 
Secretary, Subba Rao, that he would work to widen the rules for membership once he 
was re-admitted to Congress so as to achieve an Extremist majority. Gokhale was 
alienated by the revival of the fear of an Extremist takeover of Congress such as had 
been threatened in 1906-07.37
Following the deaths of the two Bombay Moderate leaders, Gokhale and 
Pherozeshah Mehta in 1915, the resistance to the re-entry of Tilak and his followers 
into Congress evaporated and the Extremists were effectively offered readmission at 
the December 1915 session. Although this represented a triumph for Besant’s efforts, 
she was still determined that Congress should become a campaigning organisation, 
lobbying for legislative changes in the short-run and for self-government in the longer 
term. Besant’s standpoint was reminiscent of other Britons, like A.O. Hume, who had 
supported Indian nationalism as the best means of maintaining the ties between Britain 
and India. She embodied a peculiar mixture of both Moderate and Extremist ideas.
Her experience of socialist politics in Britain, combined with her energy, made her 
impatient of the slowness of Moderate methods. She had a strong sense of the 
superiority of Indian spiritual and religious ideas which linked her more with the 
Extremists than the Moderates. But fundamentally she was a Moderate in her basic 
respect for law and order, her emphasis on training in democratic procedures and her 
loyalty to the crown.38 Her Extremist reputation in 1916-17 was the result of two 
circumstances. Firstly, the resistance of Congress leaders to her ideas to ginger up the 
Congress organisation forced her to undertake her own organisation, the Home Rule 
League, to achieve her ends. Secondly, British administrators in India misread her 
position and treated her as a dangerous extremist, eventually in 1917, giving her the 
martyr’s crown by restricting her movements within a small area of Madras province.
36 Besant to B. Basu, 28 Sept. 1914, Basu MSS.
37 This issue is very fully dealt with in B.R. Nanda, Gokhale, Delhi, 1977, ch. 40.
38 P. Woods, ’Annie Besant in Indian Politics, 1914-1920’, unpub. seminar paper, Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 28 Nov. 1974.
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The First World War saw important changes in the nature of Indian politics and in the 
British outlook on constitutional change in India. Though Asquith’s ’changed angle of 
vision’ may now seem hackneyed, it tells an important truth about the impact of the 
war on the Raj. The most direct impact of the war was in politicising a wider section 
of Indian society than before. As Judith Brown argues, the hand of the Raj, previously 
felt by a much more limited number of Indians than the rulers liked to pretend, was 
now felt by a much larger number of Indians.39 Recruiting for the volunteer 
army was perhaps the most obvious, and also the most resented form of government 
intervention in the lives of its citizens. The impact of wartime inflation, caused by 
government borrowing and restrictions on trade, was a more insidious but more 
widespread impact. Certain categories of citizens felt particular resentment at 
government policies during the war. The Muslim community felt threatened by the 
fact that the British were now at war with the Ottoman Empire, the territorial base of 
their spiritual homeland. For young Muslims, in particular, the British sponsorship of 
an alternative Hashimite caliphate was particularly threatening and they increasingly 
rejected the loyalist policies of their elders and called for unity with Hindu nationalists 
in response to these threats.
The war served to quicken the political ambitions of Indian nationalists and to 
foster an unprecedented degree of Hindu-Muslim unity. British talk of the rights of 
small nations and their broader sponsorship of national self-determination as a means 
of undermining their enemies was taken by Indian political leaders to be a green light 
to their own aspirations. It was argued that India’s enormous contribution to the war 
effort should be rewarded by constitutional concessions. Both rulers and ruled shared 
the assumption that India’s sacrifice of men, money and materials would indeed be 
rewarded. From the nationalist perspective, the war offered a golden opportunity 
to put forward a united claim for a substantial devolution of power. Congress and 
Muslim League leaders agreed at the end of 1916 on a common platform of political 
demands, the Congress-League Scheme, and on a division of electoral seats between 
the Hindu and Muslim communities. The Lucknow Pact, as the latter agreement was 
known, incorporated Congress acceptance of separate electorates, something which
39 J. Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915-22, Cambridge, 1972, p. 123.
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Congressmen had opposed in principle until then, and a system of weighted 
representation for Muslim minority provinces with compensatory weighted Hindu 
representation in Muslim majority provinces.40
From the point of view of the Moderate Congress leadership, the problem was 
how to maximise pressure on the British for constitutional concessions whilst avoiding 
the Extremists taking control of the movement. Annie Besant shared these objectives 
and was anxious for Congress to establish an agitational organisation, the Home Rule 
League, so that Indian youth could be absorbed within the official Congress 
organisation and not turn to direct action against British rule. It was a serious error on 
the part of the Moderate Congress leadership to fail to take up Besant* s idea: the 
result was that Tilak and Besant set up their own Leagues in April and September 
1916 respectively.41 The Home Rule Leagues not only set new standards for 
mobilising popular support but they also reached geographical areas where the 
Congress had not traditionally been much involved.42 The membership of the 
Besant League rose dramatically as a result of the Madras Government’s decision in 
June 1917 to intern Mrs Besant and two of her supporters. It was an inept decision 
which created a martyr of Mrs Besant and united Moderates and Extremists in 
condemnation of Government repression.43 Passive resistance against the 
internment was actively considered by Indian politicians, including M.K. Gandhi.
The summer of 1917 marked, therefore, the high point of nationalist unity and 
agitation for political reform. Muslims were apparently united with Hindus, and 
Moderates apparently united with Extremists. From the British point of view these
40 See H.F. Owen, ’Negotiating the Lucknow Pact’, Journal o f Asian Studies, xxxi, 3, May 1972, 
pp. 561-87.
41 This was certainly the view of Jawaharlal Nehru’s joint secretary of the Allahabad Home Rule 
League when he wrote a letter of resignation from his post. He argued that the formation of the Home 
Rule Leagues led to a revival of political activity and a swamping of the old Congress organisations by 
Home Rulers. Manzhar Ali Sokhta to Jawaharlal Nehru, 24 Jan. 1919, J. Nehru MSS, vol. 45.
42 See H.F. Owen, ’Towards Nation-wide Agitation and Organisation: The Home Rule Leagues, 
1915-18’, in D.A. Low (ed.), Soundings in Modern South Asian History, London, 1968, pp. 159-95.
43 Owen records that among those who joined the League were constitutionally minded men, such 
as Motilal Nehru , Jinnah, Sapru, and Chintamani. Even Moderates who did not join the League, such 
as Baneijea, Wacha, and Sastri, condemned the Government’s action, Owen, op. cit., p. 176, n.95 & 
96. There is evidence that it was not just the internment of Besant that worried the Moderates, but also 
the previous speeches by Lord Pentland and Sir Michael O’Dwyer, Governors of Madras and the 
Punjab respectively, which had seemed to indicate that the Government was clamping down on the 
constitutional movement for self-government. See Sir V. Lovett to Meston, 28 June 1917, Home Poll 
A, procs. 86-106, Aug. 1917.
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were indeed worrying times. However, nationalist unity was somewhat artificial and 
unstable. The consideration of passive resistance opened up all sorts of fissures in the 
Congress. Bombay Moderates were dismayed by Mrs Besant’s own support of passive 
resistance, including non-payment of taxes: Dinshaw Wacha, N.M. Samarth and 
Chimanlal Setalvad walked out of a joint meeting of Congress and the Muslim League 
which was considering the adoption of passive resistance on 28-29 July 1917.44 
The Bombay Moderates were subjected to a good deal of personal abuse in the 
meeting and were in a minority on the passive resistance issue. Surendranath 
Baneijea, who chaired the meeting, managed to get the issue deferred by having it 
sent to Provincial Congress Committees, apparently hoping that the Moderates would 
win the day in most of the provinces, as indeed they did.45 The Bombay 
Moderates felt that what had happened had vindicated their opposition to the re-entry 
of the Extremists to Congress, and they held Mrs Besant primarily responsible.46 
Srinivasa Sastri, representing more thoughtful Moderate opinion, explained his 
opposition to passive resistance in a letter to Vaze:
1. Roughly passive resistance is of two kinds: that which is almost 
forced upon us by Government’s prohibition of meetings and 
processions- being denial of elementary rights of free speech- and that 
which we invent as a special form of protest against wrong or as a 
means of obtaining political concessions. I was for the former but not 
for the latter.
2. Passive resistance is only justified when other means have been tried 
in vain. Gandhi tried meeting, protest, deputation, etc. [in South Africa] 
before resorting to passive resistance. We have yet to try resolutions in 
Viceroy’s Council and appeals to Parliament and English politicians.
3. Passive resistance will embarrass Government in war time and 
alienate Premier and other English friends whose sympathy is our chief 
hope in the present political situation.47
44 Home Poll A, procs 628-638, Nov. 1917.
45 Owen, thesis, pp. 276-85; Ronaldshay to King George V, 3 Oct. 1917, R3. In the meetings of 
the P.C.C.s , only Madras came out clearly in favour of passive resistance; the other provinces either 
voting against or shelving the issue as did Bombay, where the Moderates successfully called for a 
decision be postponed pending Montagu’s visit to India. The release of Mrs Besant in September 1917 
made the issue largely irrelevant.
46 D. Wacha to Vijiaraghavachariar, 8 Aug. 1917, Vijiaraghavachariar MSS.
47 V.S.S. Sastri to Vaze, 16 Aug. 1917, Sastri MSS, NAI. In fact the Servants of India Society 
was itself divided on the issue- Indulal Yajnik, one of their most dynamic young members was forced to 
resign because of his membership of the League.
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Sastri’s letter epitomises the Moderate-Extremist differences: outwardly the 
differences were over political methods, but at a deeper level they reflected entirely 
different outlooks on the British-Indian relationship. Moderates like Sastri believed in 
the fundamental beneficence and constitutional responsiveness of British rule. The 
British might do wrong, but these wrongs were aberrations which could be righted if 
the matter was brought to the attention of the proper authorities, ultimately 
Parliament. Parliament, however, was made up of a mixture of those sympathetic to 
Indian needs and those not, and it was vital that Indian politicians should do 
everything to support the former and do nothing which might give a handle to the 
latter.
The return of common sense to British policy-making also contributed to 
breaking the fragile nationalist coalition. The new Secretary of State for India, Edwin 
Montagu, announced the goal of British rule in India on 20 August 1917 and promised 
to visit India in the winter of 1917-18 in order to draw up constitutional reforms with 
the Viceroy and Government of India. In September Montagu had Besant released.
The basis of a good deal of the support of the Home Rule League was now gone and 
there is evidence that local organisations quickly lapsed into inactivity.48 There is 
little doubt that much of the Moderate opposition to Mrs Besant, explicitly stated by 
Dinshaw Wacha, but implicit in the writings of Srinivasa Sastri and others, was 
personal animosity and fear that Besant’s success threatened their own position in the 
Congress organisation. Besant’s regal manner, her organisational drive, and the 
adoration of her Theosophical disciples, all alienated the Moderate leaders.49
When Mrs Besant was released she was elected as President of the forthcoming 
annual session of the Indian National Congress at Calcutta. The decision was
48 See the evidence of the Allahabad branch in Manzhar Ali Sokhta to Jawaharlal Nehru, 24 Jan. 
1919, J.Nehru MSS, vol.45.
49 Owen, thesis, p. 279.
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contested by Bengal Moderates but their failure to have their own nominee, the Raja 
of Mahmudabad elected, was a sign of the growing domination of the Extremists in 
the Bengal Congress and the Moderate walkout from the Reception Committee was a 
forerunner of the Moderate-Extremist split of 1918. Bengal was the only province to 
refuse Besant* s election and a meeting of the Reception Committee for the 
forthcoming Congress was held at Calcutta on 30 August 1917 to resolve the matter. 
The Extremists packed the meeting and, as a result of the ensuing conflict with the 
Moderates, the chairman Rai Bakuntha Nath Sen dissolved the meeting and 
Surendranath Baneijea and some 100 moderates left the meeting.50 The Extremists 
elected Motilal Ghose to the chair and reversed the previous Bengal Provincial 
Congress Committee’s rejection of Besant as President. A compromise was eventually 
reached whereby Besant was elected President but Baikuntha Nath Sen was restored as 
chairman of the Reception Committee.51 One Bengali Moderate, Prithwis 
Chandra Ray, felt that the writing was now on the wall and that the Moderates were 
being swept off the board by a new broom. He exaggerated his case when he wrote an 
open letter to Congressmen on 10 November 1917 arguing that since 1915 Congress 
and all its machinery had practically been captured by the Extremist party, and that 
’the Congress today has no separate existence and only flourishes as an appanage of 
the Home Rule Leagues.’52 Ray’s call for the formation of a new Moderate 
organisation was premature but indicative of the pressure that Moderates felt. In many 
respects, the capture of the Congress organisation by the Extremists was only a 
matter of time. Tilak and Besant restrained their followers from pushing the 
Moderates into a comer lest the united national front should be lost.
50 Home Poll, Sept. 1917, no. 6 Dep., fortnightly report from Bengal, 1 Sept 1917, stated that the 
Extremist, Byomkesh Chakravarti, purchased some two to three hundred seats on the Reception 
Committee. —
51 Owen, thesis, p. 279; Ronaldshay to King George V , 3 Oct. 1917, R3.
52 Cited in Wolpert, Tilak and Gokhale, p. 286.
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The turning point came in December 1917 in the elections from provinces to 
the All India Congress Committee for the following year.53 In Bombay nine out 
of fifteen places went to Home Rulers and a number of prominent Moderates such as 
C.H. Setalvad, H.W. Wadia, N.M. Samarth and N.V. Gokhale were excluded.54 
In Bengal the Moderates were also swept aside, every Moderate losing his place , 
except for ex-Presidents who were permanent members. Bengal Moderates such as 
Baikuntha Nath Sen, P.C. Ray, H.C. Maitra, N. Sircar, K. Mitra and S. Mullick 
were kept out in favour of Extremists such as C.R. Das, I.B. Sen, Jitendralal Baneiji, 
B.C. Pal and Hirendranath Datta.55 Once the controversy died down, the annual 
Congress session of 1917 and Mrs Besant as chairman, proved to be less radical than 
the Moderates feared.56 Besant dropped the idea of passive resistance, fearing 
that it might lead to widespread violence and alienate the Moderates. Congress stuck 
to the Congress-League scheme despite the efforts of young Bengalis to press for 
more radical demands. However, the writing was clearly on the wall as far as 
Moderate domination of the Indian National Congress was concerned. The Extremists 
were beginning to dominate the machinery of Congress at the local level and this was 
inevitably feeding through to the national level by the end of 1917.57 Thus the 
Moderates were in a situation where their political survival seemed to depend on 
major British constitutional concessions which would vindicate the path that they had 
traditionally argued for. The Moderates were ripe, in other words, for Montagu’s 
efforts to woo them away from their adherence to the Congress-League scheme and 
towards the pattern of constitutional development which the British preferred.
53 See Owen, thesis, p. 304 for details.
54 Smith, thesis, p. 88.
55 Idem.
36 Sastri had predicted that this would be so. Owen, thesis, p. 287.
57 Smith, thesis, p. 88; Broomfield, Elite Conflict, pp. 138-9.
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CHAPTER H : REFORMS-MAKING 1917-1918
This chapter examines the intentions of British policy-makers in drawing up the 
constitutional reforms of 1919. A number of historians have assumed that the reforms 
were part of a consistent attempt by the Raj to meet new challenges by a process of 
timely constitutional concessions. These concessions, it is argued, were designed to 
widen the political field in which Indian politicians could operate and so incorporate 
further layers of ’collaborators’ in the imperial process.1 Further considerations 
included reversing some of the over-centralisation of administrative power which 
seemed to have accrued over the years, with the added benefit that in devolving power 
to the provinces Indians would have their minds distracted from the central vestiges of 
power, which were to remain untouched. It is the argument of this thesis that, whilst 
the above arguments formed part of British considerations in the making of the 
reforms, they do not in any way form an accurate reflection of the broader liberal and 
educative purposes of the reforms. The reforms, which started out in the hands of the 
Government of India bureaucracy as an attempt to adjust the reins of power whilst 
remaining firmly seated in the saddle, became a deliberate attempt to start India on the 
process of parliamentary democracy leading to ultimate self-government within the 
empire. The change in the nature of the reforms owed largely to the circumstances of 
the war, most particularly the pressures throughout the world for advances towards 
national self-determination, the radicalisation of Indian politics and the consequent 
pressures on the Indian Moderates, and the appointment in 1917 of Edwin Montagu, 
the most radical Secretary of State for India since Lord Ripon in the 1880s. It quickly 
became obvious to the Government of India that the type of reforms that would have
1 See, e.g. Bridge, Holding India to the Empire, p. 1; Hutchins, Spontaneous Revolution, p. 44; 
Tomlinson, The Indian National Congress and the Raj, introduction; J. Brown, Modem India: The 
Origins o f an Asian Democracy, Oxford, 1985, p. 194.
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been acceptable both in India and at home in 1916 would no longer be so in 1917 or 
1918.
The reforms can only be understood in terms of the international context in 
which India was recognised as having its own representation in the Imperial War 
Cabinet, at the Peace Conference and in the League of Nations that was bom out of 
it. The constitutional implications of India’s new status were that India should in 
future have greater independence from Whitehall and would be treated more and more 
like one of the Dominions, the white colonies which were rapidly establishing greater 
autonomy within the Empire. If, as was now agreed, the process of devolution of 
power should continue downwards to the provinces and to local government, this 
devolution would have to be accompanied by a clear devolution of political 
responsibility: Westminster could not consider transferring any of its powers unless 
they went to an authority that was properly answerable to an electorate. The 
devolution of power in India would therefore meet the needs of rewarding India’s war 
effort, making the over-centralised machinery of government more workable, 
transferring some of the burden of raising taxation to Indians themselves, and winning 
back the political initiative in India by establishing a clear goal for British rule and 
incorporating reasonable nationalist opinion in the constitutional process.
The process of making constitutional reforms was inevitably divisive in that it 
encouraged a wide variety of Indian groups to come forward and demand that their 
interests be recognised and safeguarded under the new system.2 For the British 
this was considered to be a natural part of the political process in India, but for many 
Indian nationalists it was considered to be a deliberate attempt to break up the new 
found unity of the Congress and the Muslim League. The Congress split of 1918, in 
which the Moderates left the Congress and formed their own party, might seem prima
2 See, for example, the petitions presented by various organisations in India to the Montagu 
delegation in 1917-18, MAS.
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facie  to be another example of the imperial tactic of divide and rule. The Moderates 
were wooed and encouraged to form their own party which would support the 
reforms. This chapter will examine this question of the British contribution to the 
Congress split of 1918 and will argue that although the breach was not directly 
encouraged by the British, in fact it was actively discouraged, the British did bear a 
major responsibility for the Moderate secession.
1. The Formulation of a Policy
The Search for a Goal
The process by which the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms were announced and 
then formulated provides an excellent example of the way in which the contradictions 
and tensions within the process of British policy-making for India worked.
Proponents of the liberal and the paternalist views were locked in combat over a 
period of some three and a half years and the resulting reforms inevitably bore the 
stamp of compromise between the two approaches. However, the reforms finally 
marked the triumph of the liberal view that India could and should be developed along 
western democratic lines. This conclusion, however, would have looked far from 
inevitable when the process began in the spring of 1916, at which point most 
provincial governors and members of the Government were still thinking in terms of 
further progress along the lines of the Morley-Minto reforms, which, as we have 
seen, were predicated on the unsuitability of India to western political institutions.
How did the Government come to accept a goal which was generally accepted to mean 
the development of India through parliamentary democracy towards the goal of 
dominion self-government? One answer is that the issues were never really presented 
in this form. Thus, conservatives were slow to realise the radical nature of political 
changes that were being agreed to because of the unexceptionable way in which the
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issues were initially posed. When the new Viceroy Lord Chelmsford circulated local 
governments with the questions, ’what is the goal of British rule in India?’ and ’what 
are the first steps on the road to that goal?’ he seemed to indicate a fairly leisurely 
reconsideration of the broad lines of India’s development after the war, without in any 
way indicating a response to pressures from the growth of Indian nationalist demands. 
Furthermore the Government of India’s recommended statement of goal of endowing 
’India as an integral part of the British Empire with the largest measure of 
self-government compatible with the maintenance of the supremacy of British rule’ 
was sufficiently circumscribed and open to varying interpretations that even the most 
conservative governors could accept it.3 Besides, recipients were assured that 
there would be no doctrinaire imposition of a dominion model of progress:
The special circumstances of India must govern the form of 
self-government with which we shall eventually be endowed. They 
differ so widely from those of any other part of the British Empire that 
we cannot altogether look for a model in those forms of 
self-government which already obtain in the great Dominions. In all 
parts of the Empire which now enjoy self-government it has been the 
result, not of any sudden inspiration of theoretical statesmanship, but of 
a steady process of practical evolution, substantially facilitated by the 
possession of a more or less common inheritance of political traditions, 
social customs and religious beliefs.
Governors would have taken this statement as an acknowledgement that India was a 
long way behind in this process of political evolution and that the necessary educative 
process would be the work of many generations.4
3 Circular letter from Chelmsford to local governments and administrations, 20 July 1916, C51. 
This volume in the Chelmsford MSS, entitled ’The Goal of British Rule in India, 1916-1917’ is an 
invaluable source for studying the origins of the August 1917 declaration in that it brings together a 
variety of relevant papers and correspondence in chronological order.
4 Danzig argues persuasively that the Government’s suggested statement of goal was deliberately 
eschewing any idea of dominion self-government. See R. Danzig ’The Announcement of August 20th. 
1917’, Journal o f Asian Studies, xxviii, 2, Feb. 1969, pp. 19-37.
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The orthodox nature of Government thinking on constitutional reform at this 
time can be further judged from the two memoranda which the Government of India 
circulated to local governments in June 1916 outlining alternative proposals.5 The 
first memorandum, which bore all the hallmarks of having been written by Sir 
Reginald Craddock, the very conservative Home Member, argued for a continuation 
of the Morley-Minto system, in which the provincial legislatures were advisory 
councils not assemblies of representatives.6 Further it argued that until the 
influence of Congress
can be reduced to its proper proportion, the introduction of any kind of 
representative government might be gravely prejudicial to the interests 
of the teeming millions whose continued happiness and prosperity must 
depend on the maintenance of peace and orderly progress. India 
requires breathing time during which the moderating sentiment which 
characterises those who have the greatest stake in the country may 
become vocal and responsible and hold their own in the constituencies, 
in the Legislative assemblies and in the press.7
The main method of progress that was recommended was to enlarge the electorates 
and remodel the constituencies so that ’the Councils be representative of the main 
classes and interests of the community in some reasonable ratio to their relative 
importance.’8
3 Memoranda attached to circular letter from Chelmsford to local governments 20 June 1916,
C51.
6 Memo B (Memo A was on the development of local self-government) marked ’most secret’,
regarding provincial legislative councils, C!51. It has some resemblance to arguments in Craddock’s 




The second memorandum rather gave the game away by starting with the 
premise that,
because of the war it is impossible to stand still in India...a policy of 
mere inaction would almost certainly, after the present crisis, be 
overruled from home...the fear is that if we don’t widen the councils 
then home pressure will give more power to the existing councils, thus 
creating an oligarchy of the intelligentsia.9
In other words, determination of the goal of British rule and reforms envisaged at the 
end of the war would allow the Government of India to maintain the initiative as 
against both the Home Government (much more closely influenced by the liberalising 
impact of the war) and Indian nationalists. Rather than giving more power to the 
councils, the memo opted for provincial councils with a substantial majority of elected 
members, seven-twelfths of whom would be elected by direct general constituencies. 
Thus the Morley-Minto system of representation by classes would now be superseded.
If the Government of India gave the conservative lead it was followed by the 
majority of local governments. The cautiousness of the provincial replies is 
remarkable; O’Dwyer’s response might have been taken as the watchword for 
continued paternalism- ’we must assure good government before self-government, 
unless they are compatible.’10 The majority seemed to want to continue with or 
build on the Morley-Minto system despite evidence of its failings. Most doubted 
whether India was suited to Dominion self-government and even people like 
Willingdon, who came from a British parliamentary background, were not in favour 
of initiating any parliamentary system in India.11 There was general agreement
9 Memo C, C51.
10 M. O’Dwyer (Lieutenant-Governor Punjab) to Chelmsford, 25 Aug. 1916, C51.
11 Willingdon to G.I.(HD), 24 Aug. 1916, C51.
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that no further powers should be granted to the legislatures and the main concern 
seemed to be to try and make the legislatures more representative of the ’real* India as 
Morley and Minto had intended. There was an almost obsessive concentration on the 
argument that the lawyer-politician element must be restricted and help given to the 
traditional allies of the British, for instance the landowners of the United Provinces, 
the rural masses and the Princes.12
Generally the responses seemed to be made within a bureaucratic vacuum. 
Some of the governors did seem to recognise the flaw in the Government’s proposals, 
namely that any statement of goal was intended to be directed at an Indian audience 
and would need to satisfy reasonable Indian political expectations. However, none of 
the versions currently under consideration would meet that basic requirement.13 
Percy Lyon, of the Bengal Government, was one of the few men to appear aware of 
the importance of burgeoning Indian nationalism to the considerations of post-war 
reforms. In a lucid paper he argued that the educated minority wanted 
self-government, and that it was ’probably unsafe to regard them as an isolated group 
in the population.’14 He argued in favour of a goal of ’the gradual transfer of the 
work of the government in India from foreign to Indian hands’ and argued that the 
bureaucracy in India would have to respond to nationalist demands that they be given 
real power to govern themselves.15
12 See e.g. Meston (Lieutenant-Governor, U.P.) to Chelmsford , 19 Aug. 1916; note by Vemey 
Lovett (Commissioner of Lucknow, 18 Aug. 1916; memo from W.M. Hailey (Chief Commissioner, 
Delhi) 22 Aug. 1916; M. O’Dwyer (Lieutenant-Governor, Punjab) to Chelmsford, 25 Aug. 1916, C51.
13 The most liberal replies came Willingdon in Bombay, and from Carmichael and Percy Lyon in 
Bengal. Willingdon to Chelmsford, 24 Aug. 1916; Carmichael to Chelmsford, 20 Aug. 1916; memo 
by P.C. Lyon (member Bengal Government), 15 Aug. 1916, attached to Carmichael's letter, C51. But 
even conservatives, such as Sir Archdale Earle, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, recognized this 
deficiency, though, in terms of the practical reforms he was willing to consider, he also failed to 
consider Indian opinion. A. Earle to Chelmsford, 6 Aug. 1916, C51. See also Roos-Keppel, 
Chief-Commissioner, N.W.F.P., to Chelmsford, 20 Aug 1916, C51.
14 See Lyon’s draft letter on the political situation in Bengal, attached to his memorandum above.
13 Idem. Interestingly, Lyon also argued that the transfer of power should begin at the provincial
level and not at the district level as conservatives tended to argue. Craddock described Lyon’s ideas as 
being ’fantastic’, but within two years many of his ideas would be accepted by his colleagues as very
(continued...)
66
The Government of India’s despatch16 was still almost as unattractively 
worded17 as Chelmsford’s original draft, although, following the advice of the 
India Office, there was no longer explicit reference to the ’maintenance of the 
supremacy of British rule.’18 The despatch concluded that ’we do not recommend 
any immediate expansion of these powers [of the legislative councils] in the direction 
which a number of "progressive” politicians desire. We have no wish to develop the 
councils as quasi-parliaments. ’ [my emphasis]19 Rather the despatch concentrated 
on extending the Morley-Minto system by giving elected majorities in the legislative 
councils and greatly expanding the franchise. The Government was divided on the 
issue of whether the system of election should be a continuation of the Morley-Minto 
system based on classes and interests or one based on territorial constituencies. 
Craddock was totally opposed to a system of territorial elections, seeing it as leading 
inevitably to a westem-style parliamentary system.20 He fought a running battle 
with Sankaran Nair who saw territorial electorates as an essential advance. 
Chelmsford, ever looking for consensus, agreed to leave the issue to local option, but 
this satisfied neither Craddock nor Nair, both of whom wrote minutes of 
dissent.21 Instead of extending the powers of the legislatures, the despatch
15 (...continued)
much in line with the thinking of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report. Craddock to Chelmsford, 25 Oct. 
1916, C51.
16 Despatch no. 17 , G.I.(HD) to S/S, 24 Nov. 1916, C51.
17 ’Elephantine’ is the description of the wording in Sir. A. Rumbold, Watershed in India, 
1914-1922, London, 1979, p. 55.
18 The aim now was ’the endowment of British India,-as an integral part of the Empire, with 
self-government,’ adding that ’the rate of progress...must depend upon the improvement and wide 
diffusion of education , the softening of racial and religious differences and the acquisition of political 
experience.’ Rumbold argues persuasively that, despite the change of wording, the intended effect was 
the same, i.e. to exclude the idea that India’s goal might be dominion self-government. Rumbold, 
Watershed, pp. 57-8.
19 According to Robb the Government was divided on this matter: Craddock, O’Dwyer and Duff 
were opposed to the concession of any increase in the powers of the legislatures, while Meyer, Hill 
Lowndes and Nair argued the case for moving forward in this direction. See Robb, Government o f 
India, pp. 58-61.
30 See e.g. Craddock’s arguments, cited in Robb, Government o f India, p. 61, n. 29.
21 See ’Conclusions in Executive Council as regards Provincial Legislative Councils’, 31 Aug. 
1916, C51. Craddock’s views on the desired formula are set out in a note of 12 Sept. 1916, C51.
67
concluded that the way forward would be through changes in local self-government 
and the Indianisation of the public services. The despatch was a disappointing 
document which either adhered to existing lines of development or fudged 
controversial issues. There are no signs of Chelmsford giving a lead in a reforming 
direction, indeed on the issue of territorial electorates he told Chamberlain that he was 
in substantial agreement with Craddock’s views.22
Neither the formula, with its emphasis on the preconditions for India’s advance 
towards what appeared to be a distant goal, nor the proposed reforms were likely to 
satisfy even Moderate nationalist opinion. The Government of India would have been 
well aware of Indian Moderate demands as they had a copy of Gokhale*s political 
testament before them in August 1916, and also details of the Congress deliberations 
during 1916 which culminated in the scheme of the 19 members of the Imperial 
Legislative Council and the Congress-League scheme at the end of the year.23 
All these schemes called for a substantial accession of power to Indians both in the 
centre and the provincial executive councils, as well as the increase in the elected 
element of the legislature. However, during most of 1916, the need to conciliate 
nationalist opinion was not the paramount consideration in Government thinking on 
reforms. Despite the establishment of Home Rule Leagues by Tilak and Besant, the 
Congress remained a predominantly Moderate body. The annual meeting of the 
Congress at the end of December 1916, however, indicated a marked shift towards 
Extremist domination at the provincial level and this was bound ultimately to work its 
way through to the national level.24 Willingdon was one of those to express 
alarm at the new trend and to write to Chamberlain suggesting an early announcement
22 See V to S/S, 24 Nov. 1916, C51.
23 All to be found in C51.
24 Meston actually attended the Congress and warned Chelmsford of the urgent need of a policy 
statement so as to rally the Moderates who were faced with an Extremist landslide. Meston to 
Chelmsford, 11 Jan. 1917, JM\%.
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of the goal of British rule in order to ’throw some plank to...the Moderates [who] 
would be swept away in the approaching Congress.’25 Chamberlain, who was 
sceptical of the value of a public pronouncement without corresponding measures of 
concrete reform, wavered for just a moment but returned to his old position when 
Chelmsford turned down the idea of an early announcement.26 The shift of power 
from the Moderates towards the Extremists was not the only worrying feature about 
the Lucknow Congress from the British point of view. At Lucknow the Congress and 
the Muslim League had met together and agreed a joint programme of constitutional 
reforms and had even agreed the details of communal representation. During 1917 
the pace of Indian political developments increased considerably and the Home Rule 
agitation took on an altogether more menacing perspective in the eyes of British 
administrators. At the end of January 1917 Chelmsford wrote to Chamberlain 
requesting a full statement of policy ’as early as we can*.27 However there 
remained a lack of urgency in the India Office’s deliberations on the matter.28 
An India Office committee chaired by Sir William Duke, reported internally to 
Chamberlain in March 1916 that they doubted ’the wisdom of dangling before the 
Indian politicians a formula of political progress, hedged with restrictions that nullify 
its meaning and calculated to embarrass, by the vagueness of its promises, our 
successors in Indian government.’ It argued that the Government of India’s reform 
proposals did not mark an effective way forward because they did not devolve any 
responsibility on Indians and merely perpetuated the faults of the Morley-Minto
25 S/S to V, ptel. and enclosures, 27 Nov. 1916, C51.
26 Robb, Government o f India, p. 69.
27 V to S/S, 31 Jan. 1917, C51.
28 Rumbold argues persuasively that the lack of a clear and agreed method of arriving at political 
decisions between the India Office and the Government of India, plus the lack of personal 
correspondence on the key issues at an early stage, meant that the process was much more drawn out 
than it need have been. It was still believed, well into 1917, that any declaration of goal would not be 
made until after the war was over, which was still a distant prospect. See Rumbold, Watershed, pp. 
61-2.
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Councils which could no longer be seen as a useful means of political education.29
The Announcement of 20 August 1917
It was not until May 1917 that the situation took on a real urgency.
Chelmsford was now persuaded of the need for an announcement of goal before any 
steps to implementing it. Two things convinced him. Firstly, he had come to realise 
that the home Government might not make an announcement of goal for some 
considerable time because Chamberlain had now indicated that the Government of 
India’s despatch was lacking in what was needed both in the matter of stated goal and 
the measures to be taken towards fulfilling it.30 For this reason, although 
Chamberlain was putting the despatch before the Cabinet, he felt that a further study 
of the problem was needed. Chelmsford knew already that this meant the appointment 
of a commission of enquiry which would adjudicate between conflicting opinions 
within British circles in India and allow some involvement of Indian non-official 
opinion in the process.31 Such an enquiry was considered an anathema by 
Chelmsford and the Government of India, who preferred that the Secretary of State 
himself visit India and then report.32 Secondly, Chelmsford was influenced by 
some important changes in British thinking about India’s constitutional position within 
the Empire. Chamberlain’s stress upon the need to allocate responsibility to Indians
29 See Rumbold, Watershed, p. 69; Robb, Government o f India, pp. 64-5. Robb notes the 
important introduction of this stress on a scheme which devolved responsibility in certain defined areas 
of government. It is interesting that the Duke committee came down against replacing class electorates 
with territorial ones because it felt the latter would only result in the continued dominance of the 
educated classes.
30 S/S to V(HD) ptel., 22 May 1917, C51.
31 J. Brunyate (IO) interpreted these as being among Chamberlain’s motives for wanting a 
commission. See Brunyate to Chelmsford, 20 June 1917, C51. He also added that Chamberlain felt that 
the forthcoming Mesopotamia Report would undermine confidence in the Government of India as the 
body to take such decisions.
32 See V to S/S, ptel., 30 May 1917, C51; V to S/S, 26 & 31 May 1917, C3.
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in certain definite areas had made Chelmsford reconsider the sort of ideas put forward 
by Lionel Curtis the previous year, which, despite Chelmsford’s initially favourable 
response, had been demolished by officials in India on grounds of their 
impracticability. Curtis’s suggestions seem, however, to have had an influence on 
India Office thinking, particularly on Sir William Duke. In the Viceroy’s Council it 
was Sir Claude Hill who seemed most influenced by Curtisite thinking and who wrote 
an important note to Chelmsford in June 1917 outlining his proposals.33 Hill put 
particular emphasis on the change which had taken place in India’s status within the 
Empire since the Government of India’s despatch was sent off in November 1916. In 
1917 India had been given separate representation in the Imperial War Cabinet and 
Conference. The significance of this was that whereas the Round Table group had 
been originally considering federation of the white dominions with India and other 
colonies being governed by an Imperial Parliament, now India would have the same 
status as the Dominions. As power was inevitably devolved from the Imperial 
Government to the Government of India so real power could be devolved to 
responsible Indian ministers selected from elected representatives.
The third factor influencing Chelmsford related to the deteriorating political 
situation in India. It resulted particularly from correspondence Chelmsford had with 
Willingdon, who, as Governor of Bombay, considered himself the Governor most 
affected by the slide towards the Home Rule movement that was taking place among 
politically active Indians. Willingdon seems to have been looking partly for a ’sop’ to 
satisfy Indian moderate opinion and partly for a clarification of which objectives were 
legitimate for Indian politicians to press for, so that he could come down hard on the 
Extremists. The Home Rule movement had left matters in a confused state and 
Chelmsford’s tendency to leave these issues to local authorities meant that there were
33 C. Hill to Chelmsford and enclosed note, 26 June 1917, C51.
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no clear guidelines, with each province dealing with the Home Rule movement and its 
leaders in a different way.34 Chelmsford outlined the rapidly changing political 
situation to Chamberlain, who now realised the urgent need to obtain Cabinet approval 
for some announcement of goal. In his telegram Chelmsford referred to the rapid and 
worrying rise of the Home Rule movement in India and the growth of democratic 
values in the world at large owing to the Russian Revolution and the subsequent 
outpouring of declarations of war aims sympathetic to the ideal of national 
self-determination.35 It was these political factors, especially the recognition of 
the need to rally moderate Indian opinion, which was in danger of drifting towards the 
Home Rule Leagues, which finally persuaded the Secretary of State, Chamberlain, to 
change his mind and agree to try and push the matter into the very busy War Cabinet 
agenda. As Chelmsford himself admitted, the pace of change in Indian and world 
affairs had made the Government of India despatch of 24 November 1916 seem almost 
reactionary.36 The pace of political change in India was quickened considerably 
by the Madras Government’s decision in June 1917 to intern the Home Rule leader 
Annie Besant and two of her followers. This led to precisely what the Government 
feared- a shift of moderate politicians towards the more extreme Home Rule 
movement. In the United Provinces such Moderate figures as Malaviya and Sapru 
actually joined the Home Rule Leagues, and Congress began to consider moves 
towards passive resistance to achieve Besant* s release. An announcement was now an 
urgent necessity if the middle ground was to be rallied; both Chamberlain and 
Chelmsford were prepared to accept a more limited interim announcement if it would 
secure the Cabinet’s approval.37 If in 1916 the prime consideration in making a
34 See Willingdon to Chelmsford, 14 Jan. 1917, C51; Willingdon to Montagu, 18 July 1917, 
M18.
33 V (HD) to S/S, ptel., 18 May 1917, C51.
36 Robb, Government o f India, p. 72, citing V to S/S, 7 May 1917, C3.
37 See e.g. V to S/S, ptel., 10 July 1917, C51.
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declaration of policy had been that of clarifying thinking on policy and goals within 
the Government itself, by 1917 external political considerations had taken priority .
The new Secretary of State, Edwin Montagu, was immediately pressed by 
Chelmsford to make an announcement as soon as possible.38 However, it took 
Montagu several weeks to obtain Cabinet agreement on a form of words for the 
declaration. Montagu slipped the following statement into a reply to a prepared 
question at the very end of a parliamentary session:
The policy of His Majesty’s Government, with which the 
Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing 
association of Indians in every branch of the administration, and the 
gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the 
progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral 
part of the British Empire...
I would add that progress in this policy can only be achieved by 
successive stages. The British Government and the Government of 
India, on whom the responsibility lies for the welfare and advancement 
of the Indian peoples must be judges of the time and measure of each 
advance, and they must be guided by the cooperation received from 
those upon whom new opportunities of service will thus be conferred 
and by the extent to which it is found that confidence can be reposed in 
their sense of responsibility.39
The origin and meaning of the wording of the declaration have been the subject 
of much historical debate.40 It is generally agreed that Curzon and Balfour were 
the delaying and constraining forces within the Cabinet. The latter took the view that 
India as an oriental country was not suited to receiving western democratic institutions 
and never would be: ’East is East and West is West. Does India as a whole possess 
the characteristics which would give Parliamentary government a chance? To me it
38 V to S/S ptel., 18 July 1917 & pi., 19 July 1917, C51.
39 97 H.C. Deb. 5s, cols. 1695-6.
40 See S.R. Mehrotra, ’The Politics Behind the Montagu Declaration of 1917’, in C.H. Philips 
(ed.), Politics and Society in India, London, 1963, pp. 71-96; Danzig, ’The Announcement of August 
20th, 1917’, pp. 19-37; P. Robb ’The British Cabinet and Indian Reform 1919-1919, Journal o f 
Imperial and Commonwealth History, 4, 3, 1976, pp. 318-34; Rumbold, op. cit., ch vi.
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seems that it does not.’41 Curzon, whilst sharing Balfour’s doubts, did not wish 
to raise false expectations in India. Curzon, as an ex-Viceroy, saw himself in the role 
as chief defendant of the British legacy in India against the advancing hordes of 
ill-informed reformers.42 It was Curzon who drafted the final wording of the 
declaration embodying the essence of the Government of India’s draft but making a 
number of significant changes. In fact, as Danzig argues, the change of wording 
resulted in giving a crucial foundation to the edifice of the Montford reforms, much of 
which Curzon detested.43 Curzon had argued against using the term 
’self-government’ because it was open to very different interpretations, and naturally 
Indians would adopt the most liberal interpretation! Curzon saw self-government as 
the gradual Indianisation of the administration, starting at the local level and working 
upwards. He did not envisage any parliamentary system in India, certainly not at the 
central government level.44 Because of the different ways in which the word 
’self-government’ was used and because of Balfour’s political objections to the term, 
Curzon preferred to use the term ’responsible government’ but seems to have believed 
that it amounted to the same thing. The new term seems to have connoted in Curzon’s 
view the prerequisite that the new constitutional system should be truly representative 
of, and answerable to, all India, not just the lawyer-politician oligarchy that had come 
to dominate the Morley-Minto councils.45 It had the advantage of meeting 
Balfour’s objections to the use of the term ’self-government’, whilst still suggesting to 
Indians that some form of self-government was a potential outcome. It also had moral 
connotations of requiring responsible attitudes from Indian politicians. Despite this,
41 Balfour: A Note on Indian Reform. Cab. 24/22 GT 1696.
42 See Curzon to Montagu, 26 July 1918, F439.
43 See Danzig, op. cit. (JAS, 1968), pp. 31-7.
44 Curzon to Montagu, 3 Aug. 1917, /1S3/2/13. See also Curzon memo, GT 1252, for the War 
Cabinet, 2 July 1917, Cab 24/17, which Lloyd George took as the definitive interpretation of the word 
’self-government’.
45 See R. Danzig, op.cit (JAS, 1968), p. 27.
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Curzon must have known that most people would interpret ’responsible government’ 
as involving a system of government where Indian ministers would be responsible to 
elected legislatures. Lionel Curtis had explained to interested parties in Britain and 
India that his preference for ’responsible government’ to ’self-government* as a goal 
was based on his belief that the former indicated a democratic form of government 
along the lines of western systems whilst the latter could have meant autocratic Indian 
government on the lines of the princely states, for instance. The use of the term by 
Curzon and the rest of the Cabinet can only be explained, therefore, by the particular 
situation in which it was made. For all his desire for clarity Curzon had, in the end, 
agreed to a deliberate ambiguity in the announcement in the interests of the war 
effort.46 In any case, the promise was for the very distant future and the agreed 
statement ensured that British authority and permanent supremacy was maintained.
The choice of the goal of ’responsible government* met the needs of Montagu 
for a liberal announcement to meet the demands of moderate Indian nationalists, 
whilst apparently satisfying the conservatives, Curzon and Balfour, that there were to 
be strict limits on the pace of advance and also that the continuance of British rule in 
India was inviolable. Such were the pressures of coalition government. As it turned 
out, it was Montagu’s more liberal interpretation that better suited the rapidly 
changing mood of Britain and India at the end of the war. Curzon’s strictures were 
quietly dropped and, not for the last time, Curzon found that he had given his support 
to a policy statement that came to be interpreted quite differently from the way he had
46 The statement was a political statement aimed at educated moderate Indian opinion. See 
Chamberlain’s contribution to the cabinet meeting on 29 June 1917 & Montagu’s to the Cabinet on 14 
Aug. 1917. Curzon also recognized this to be the case when he differentiated it from any reward that 
might be made to those Indians who had helped in the war effort. See Curzon’s memo GT 1199 for 
War Cabinet 27 June 1917 Cab. 24/17. One has only to examine the making of the nearly 
contemporary Balfour Declaration (2 Nov. 1917) or the later Anglo-French declarations regarding the 
future of the Middle East to see the same war-time considerations at work. See the treatment of the 
labyrinthine British diplomacy in the Middle East in R. Ovendale, The Origins o f the Arab-Israeli Wars, 
London, 1984, chs. 2-3. Curzon’s doubts are dealt with on p. 43.
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intended.47 Dr. Danzig is right, therefore, to see the reform-making process as 
analogous to the baking of a many-layered cake; each element of government, from 
provincial governors through to the Cabinet, contributed a layer to the cake and each 
was reasonably satisfied that the finished product was an accurate reflection of their 
labours.48 Perhaps the cake analogy would be better replaced by that of the 
proverbial broth being spoilt by too many cooks, for the resulting reforms lacked the 
basis of genuine political consensus. The resulting dissatisfaction when men like 
Curzon found that they were, in effect, giving their imprimatur to measures of which 
they entirely disapproved was eventually to play its part in undermining the working 
of the reforms and contributing to the backlash against the reforms which took place 
during 1922. Having announced the goal of British rule in India, Montagu now 
prepared to leave for India in order to turn the broad aims into concrete proposals.
Montagu’s Visit to India, 1917-1918
Montagu and his party left for India in November 1917. They had used the 
time on board ship to study a number of proposals for constitutional reform in India. 
There were three main sources of ideas on the subject. Firstly, of course, they had the 
views of the Government of India, as set out in the despatch of November 1916. As 
we have seen this despatch was deliberately cautious in its proposals in that it 
attempted to represent a broad consensus among both the Viceroy’s Council and the 
local governors. It emphasised progress through further democratisation of district 
boards and through greater Indianisation of the services. As far as the legislative 
councils were concerned, it was prepared to agree to elected majorities but would not
47 See, e.g., Curzon’s arguments re. the Balfour Declaration (2.11.1917), War Cabinet 245, CAB 
23/4 ,4 Oct. 1917, in T.G. Fraser (ed.), The Middle East 1914-1974 [Documents], London, 1980, pp. 
15*17. Also, for Curzon’s later disquiet, expressed as Chairman of the Eastern Committee, 5 Dec.
1918, in D. Ingrams-(ed.), The Palestine Papers 1917-1922f London, 1972, pp. 48-51.
48 R. Danzig, ’The Many-Layered Cake: A Case Study in the Reform of the Indian Empire’, 
Modern Asian Studies, 3, 1 (1969), pp. 57-74.
76
give those councils greater powers over the executive. There was an emphasis 
throughout on the need to make the electorates more representative so as to stop the 
lawyers dominating the councils and to allow other interests such as the landowners 
due representation. Although the scheme marked an advance on the Morley-Minto 
scheme it followed along the same lines. However, whereas the Morley-Minto scheme 
denied the logic of what it was implementing, i.e. it denied that it was developing 
parliamentary institutions, the 1916 despatch accepted that logic and tried to make 
good the failings oFthe Morley-Minto system to devise a system of representation that 
reflected the ’realities’ of Indian society. The despatch therefore, had much more 
liberal assumptions about the possibilities for the distant future; it was prepared to 
offer ’self-government’, but laid rather too much emphasis on the problems involved 
in laying the groundwork. All the evidence indicates that Chelmsford and his 
government adhered to the lines of the 1916 despatch until Montagu’s visit in the 
autumn of 1917.
Although Chelmsford had been careful to try and form a consensus, a number 
of the local governors had shown themselves unhappy with developments. As Danzig 
has argued, although conservatives might oppose constitutional developments leading 
towards parliamentary institutions in India, they would support reform along the lines 
of administrative devolution to the provincial level.49 There was widespread 
agreement at all levels that the British rule in India had become over-centralised and 
over-bureaucratic and needed overhaul.50 Provincial administrations were anxious 
to free themselves from having to refer even relatively small matters to Delhi, and the 
Government of India resented the fact that they were not free to govern India without
49 Idem, pp. 58-9.
30 Indeed, some historians have erroneously seen this administrative factor as the key to the 
Montford reforms. See, e.g., Tomlinson, Congress and the Raj, p. 10. For contemporary views on the 
problem see, e.g., F. Slocock (Chief Secretary Government of C.P.) to Seton, 28 Aug. 1917, 57 ; 
Islington’s speech at Oxford University on ’The Problems of India’, enclosure to Islington to 
Chelmsford, 9 Aug. 1917 C51.
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constant reference to Whitehall where domestic political needs or wider imperial 
considerations might take priority. The need for administrative reform was much 
accentuated by the war and the concomitant requirement for efficiency at the cost of 
red tape. The Mesopotamia Commission Report (June 1917) brought out all the 
failings of the machinery for governing India and led to the resignation of the 
Secretary of State, Austen Chamberlain. Administrative decentralization, in the form 
of devolution of power to the provinces was therefore widely considered to be the way 
forward and, as we shall see, was attractive not just to administrators in India but also 
imperial reformers such as Lionel Curtis, and those, such as Montagu, who wished to 
devolve greater power to Indian representatives as well.
The second main source of ideas for reform came from outside India, in the 
form of Lionel Curtis and the Round Table group of imperial reformers. Curtis’s 
influence turned out to quite progressive, despite the fears of many Indians that Curtis 
and his friends were aiming to place India under an Imperial Parliament containing 
Britain and the white dominions. Indian nationalists knew of Curtis from his South 
Africa days when he had been in charge of immigration controls on Asiatics in Lord 
Milner’s administration.51 This was hardly the sort of record that would endear 
him to Indians and there was a strong groundswell of mistrust to overcome when 
Curtis visited India in the winter of 1916-17. Curtis was writing a major study on the 
future of the Commonwealth and had come to realise that India would have to be 
included on a basis of equality in an Imperial Parliament whose creation, he believed, 
was crucial for the survival of the Empire. He claimed that it was in discussions 
which took place before the war with the Indian civil servant William Marris that he 
had come to realise that India was potentially suited to western democratic institutions 
and thus a status similar to the dominions.52 It seems that the experience of the
51 See W. Nimocks, Milner’s Young Men, London, 1970, passim.
52 See L. Curtis, ’A Letter to the People of India’, in Dyarchy, Oxford, 1920, pp. 41-2.
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war and India’s participation in it strengthened Curtis’s convictions and led to his 
ideas progressing ahead of other Round Table members in England. Curtis wrote to 
Philip Kerr, the editor of the Round Table journal and chairman of the London 
organisation, that ’Educated India has reached the stage when its political aspirations 
require sympathy and guidance instead of snubbings. In plain words, I am convinced 
that what you have to do is to foster political aspirations in India instead of repressing 
them.’53
Curtis’s method in India was to meet with officials and with educated Indians, 
to listen to their views and then to write draft proposals which were circulated to 
interested parties for circulation and comment. It was redolent more of academic 
debate than of political propaganda. The Round Table group was the equivalent of a 
present-day political ’think-tank’. There was a belief that well thought out 
programmes which had stood the test of detailed scrutiny by officials and non-officials 
would be able to have a strong influence on members of Government.54 This sort 
of influence seemed to be working at the time of Lord Chelmsford’s appointment 
when Curtis was asked to forward a copy of his draft proposals on Indian reform to 
the new Viceroy. Chelmsford seems to have been impressed with the proposals, which 
had been worked out by Sir William Duke, a Member of the India Council, but not 
long after found that his advisers in India shot holes in the scheme as a practical 
proposition.55
53 Curtis to Kerr, 25 Mar. 1917, Lothian MSS, vol. 33. For Kerr’s doubts about a rapid transfer 
of Western democracy to India see Kerr to Curtis, 20 July 1917, Lothian MSS, vol. 33.
54 In fact, members of the Round Table were actually in the Government: for instance, Milner 
was Secretary of State for the Colonies and Kerr took on an influential position at the end of 1916 in 
Lloyd George’s private office as the Prime Minister’s secretary, his so-called ’kitchen cabinet’.
55 This scheme became known as the Duke Memorandum. Chelmsford may have been attracted to 
the basis of the proposals because he shared Curtis’ background of working a colonial constitution (in 
Curtis’ case that of South Africa where as a member of Milner’s ’Kindergarten’, as Curtis and other 
young followers of Alfred Milner were known, he helped to devise the Union constitution. In 
Chelmsford’s case he had been Governor of two Australian provinces), and thus could more readily 
understand the arguments for a more devolved constitution.
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The officials in India probably didn’t like the Curtis scheme because of their 
view that India was entirely different from any of the white colonies, lacking their 
cultural homogeneity. What was Curtis proposing? He was advocating a goal of 
self-government for India, but preferred to call it ’responsible government within the 
Commonwealth’ to stress the maintenance of the imperial link. The goal, argued 
Curtis, could only be reached by successive stages and the pace would be determined 
by regular investigations by the Imperial parliament, whose representatives would 
include members from Britain, the Dominions and India itself. Curtis was convinced 
that the only way to train responsible Indian ministers was to devolve effective power 
on them in certain limited spheres at the provincial level. From this derived the idea 
of ’dyarchy’ or dividing the government into two parts- one responsible to the British 
people, and the other responsible to the Indian people. These ideas are so similar to 
the eventual Montagu-Chelmsford reforms that it is tempting to assume that the 
influence of Curtis was decisive in formulating the reforms. This would be 
misleading. As Curtis himself admitted, it would be perfectly possible to reach 
similar conclusions to his, once one accepted the same basic assumptions. It seems 
that the India Office was quicker to accept Curtis’s premises than the Government of 
India which, as we have seen, adhered, throughout 1916 and the first three-quarters of 
1917, to a very different set of proposals. Sir William Duke, Sir Lionel Abrahams, 
M.C. Seton, C.H. Kisch and J.E. Shuckburgh, all members of the India Office, had 
participated in Curtis’s early discussions on Indian reforms and seem to have fed back 
some of Curtis’s views to the Secretary of State, Austen Chamberlain. Thus, 
particularly in May 1916, Chamberlain criticised the Government of India scheme 
precisely because it perpetuated some of the faults of the Morley-Minto scheme, in 
that it did not devolve real power and responsibility to elected Indians. At this stage 
Chelmsford still believed that the criticisms of Indian officials had ruled out a 
Curtisite scheme and he did not believe it would stand the scrutiny of the Secretary of
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State or a reform commission sent to India. Indeed, the Government of India had 
instructed officials in India at the end of 1916 not to participate in Round Table moots 
or to write for the Round Table quarterly. This followed the leak of a private letter 
sent from Curtis to Kerr, which showed the extent to which Curtis had received the 
hospitality of Indian officials, such as Sir James Meston, the Governor of the U.P. 
and William Marris, and, it was claimed by some Indian nationalists that this letter 
indicated a British conspiracy to place India under the control of an Imperial 
Parliament in which India was not represented.56 The influence of Round Table 
thinking at the highest levels of policy-making, therefore, flowed initially in the 
direction of Whitehall to Delhi and not vice-versa. Curtisite ideas formed an 
important, though not easily quantifiable, influence on the thinking of many members 
of the Cabinet which met on 14 August 1917 and drew up the goal for India. Once 
this had happened Chelmsford took up the Curtisite scheme as the most effective 
proposal available for implementing the new policy, and Curtis’s scheme was amongst 
a number of documents circulated to local governments.57
The third influence on the making of the reforms came from the demands of 
Indian nationalists themselves. Sometimes it seemed that the reforms were being 
discussed by the British in a vacuum, but they always had to consider the need to take 
moderate Indian opinion with them in the reforms process and this increased once 
Montagu’s party arrived in India. The problem for the British was that they saw an 
enormous gulf between their own proposals and those of the Indian National Congress 
and Muslim League as agreed at Lucknow in December 1916. Chelmsford described
56 It was not until September 1917 that the Government of India took up a direct contact with 
Curtis again. See Curtis to Chelmsford, 8 Sept. 1917, C51. The matter of the government ban still 
rankled in December 1917 when Montagu recorded in his diary that Curtis refused to make peace with 
Chelmsford. See Edwin S. Montagu, An Indian Diary, London, 1930, p. 101.
37 If anything, Chelmsford turned out to be a stronger proponent of dyarchy, which was 
presumably advocated by Meston and Marris, than Montagu, who became worried that unless dyarchy 
was well hidden it would make the scheme unacceptable to many Britons and Indians alike. Montagu, 
Indian Diary, 24 & 25 Jan., pp. 218, 220.
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the Lucknow scheme as ’preposterous’ and few if any Britons were enamoured of it. 
The reason was partly that the scheme went much further than Government proposals, 
for instance it called for four-fifths of the members of both the Imperial legislative 
Council and provincial legislatures to be elected, and it gave councils much wider 
powers including budgetary control and the right to pass resolutions which would be 
ultimately binding on the Government. It made distinct inroads into the central 
government, which other schemes, such as the Government of India despatch of 
November 1916 and the Curtis scheme, had left sacrosanct. Provincial autonomy 
would mean restrictions on the powers of the central government and also the 
Secretary of State, who henceforth would have a relationship with the Government of 
India similar to that of the Secretary of State for the Colonies with the dominion 
governments. But what the British also objected to was the potential for deadlock 
which seemed to be built into the system, for the Executive Councils were to be half 
British (not I.C.S. men) and half Indian (elected by the members of the legislatures) 
and were subject to binding resolutions from the legislatures, subject only to the 
temporary veto of the Governor/Governor General in Council. The only spheres that 
were left unequivocally in the control of the British were foreign and military policy. 
The Congress-League scheme gave away the control of the British over the process of 
the devolution of power and Montagu remarked that ’it is practically responsible 
government at one fell swoop.’58
The task of Montagu and Chelmsford and their advisers in drawing up a 
scheme of reforms during the winter months of 1916- 1917 was:
1. to find a scheme which faithfully implemented the 20 August announcement, and 
this, it was agreed, meant devolving power in the provinces to Indian ministers who
58 Montagu, Indian Diary, p. 57.
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would have control over certain distinct departments and who would have some form 
of responsibility to a much more representative electorate.
2. to achieve a reasonable consensus within Government of India and local 
government circles in favour of the scheme.
3. to find a scheme which would satisfy moderate Indian opinion and to wean 
Indian educated opinion away from the Congress-League scheme.
4. to find a scheme which the British Parliament, including the House of Lords, 
would pass into law:
There was little doubt that if the first three aims were met then the fourth 
would present few problems. Montagu obviously felt that he would have to temper the 
reforms to go some way to meet the views of his most important Cabinet colleagues, 
Chamberlain and Curzon.59 He invited Lord Donoughmore to accompany him on 
his visit because he hoped that Donoughmore would be helpful in winning over 
Conservatives on his return.60 The problem was that the second and third aims 
pulled in opposite directions. By determining to visit India and devise reforms in 
consultation with the Viceroy, Montagu was effectively committing himself to 
achieving proposals with which Chelmsford agreed and this meant that Montagu had 
to be prepared to revise his ideas in a more conservative direction. On the other hand 
he was acutely aware that Indian nationalist opinion would find his own proposals too 
conservative and would definitely reject even more cautious proposals.61 This was 
the tightrope that Montagu walked in devising the reforms in India.
Montagu’s visit to India was an important stage in the politicisation of India. 
Indians responded to the prospect of real political power being devolved at the 
provincial level with a flurry of political activity in the form of the creation of
59 Montagu to Chamberlain, 12 July 1918, ASA/9123.
60 S/S to V, 21 Aug. 1917, M l ; also Indian Diary, p. 377.
61 See Indian Diary, p. 251.
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deputations and memorials by a wide variety of interest groups. The British 
encouraged this process, not always for the most progressive reasons. There was 
obviously a fear that only the voice of the articulate lawyer-politicians would be heard 
and that loyalist groups would fail to organise themselves. At one level this involved 
Chelmsford circularising local governments urging them that Tt is all-important that 
the interests of every class...should be represented* and encouraging them to awaken 
any important group which had not realised this.62 At another level, some 
members of the European community in Madras encouraged the non-Brahmin, Justice 
Party to organise itself to put forward its views on reforms, which were, of course, 
opposed to those of the Congress.63 Almost as soon as he arrived, Montagu was 
involved in seeing deputations on an official basis. He soon complained about the 
formality of the whole proceedings and managed to talk with members of the 
deputations on a more informal basis.64 Whereas Chelmsford was by nature, and 
now by office, aloof and dignified, Montagu saw the reception of the deputations as 
part of a political process; he wanted not only to listen but also to persuade and win 
over those who attended.65 The reception of deputations continued in the 
Presidency capitals, Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, and was not completed until the 
end of the year. In the new year Montagu’s party met with the Government of India 
and the local governors and a reforms scheme was devised.
Montagu had originally expected to leave India in January 1918 but this 
schedule proved much too optimistic, and he did not leave until the end of April, 
when he had helped to draft and agree the report that took his and Chelmsford’s 
names. Montagu and Chelmsford were agreed from an early stage on the basic aim
62 Chelmsford to heads of provinces, 27 Sept. 1917, C l9.
63 Irschick, Politics and Social Conflict, p. 66.
64 See Indian Diary, entry for 15 Nov. 1917, pp. 33-5.
65 Montagu argued that the Viceroyalty should be divided into ceremonial functions, which would 
be carried out by a member of the royal family and political functions, which would be carried out by a 
political appointee from home. See Indian Diary, pp. 16-17.
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which was the gradual transfer of responsibility in the provinces from British to Indian 
hands, and the means of achieving this was through ’dyarchy’, i.e. the division of 
subjects into those which were to be transferred to the domain of the legislatures, and 
those which were to be reserved and in which the Government’s authority was 
ultimately decisive. The main matters at issue were essentially at what stage this 
transfer should begin and how it should be progressed in the future, but as Montagu 
was prepared to reach a compromise on these issues they were not difficult to resolve. 
On other issues there was less agreement. Montagu believed that the reforms would 
have to include the sphere of the Government of India, partly because Indians would 
accept no less, but also because he saw that changes were needed at the higher levels 
of decision-making if provincial autonomy was to prove a reality. Chelmsford 
defended the citadel of the Government of India valiantly. It was not just a defence of 
vested interests but it also reflected a genuine belief that maintaining the British hold 
at the centre was what made the transfer of power in the provinces both politically 
acceptable at home, and also constitutionally correct.66 There were also the 
questions of how central and provincial finances should be divided, whether the 
official bloc should be maintained in the legislatures, whether the Imperial legislature 
should become a two-chamber assembly, whether a ratio should be established for 
Indianisation of the services, and whether a range of concessions to Indian opinion on 
other matters could be made- what Montagu called the ’lubricants.’ Montagu’s desire 
throughout was to lay the foundations of a parliamentary system in India. Thus, he 
opposed the maintenance of a bloc of official votes as undermining the political 
educative process, and his argument for a second chamber in the provinces followed 
from the same line of reasoning- if the Government needed constraints on the 
legislature he preferred that it should be provided from within the legislative system,
66 Interestingly, Lionel Curtis agreed with this argument. See Dyarchy, p. 122.
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by a body composed primarily of men experienced in the legislatures. Chelmsford’s 
natural preference was to ensure that the Government could continue to operate and 
maintain the essentials of good administration under the new system. Robb 
summarises the role of damage limitation which Chelmsford’s administration 
undertook when he argues that Montagu provided much of the impetus for change and 
the ideas for implementing reform, but that ’the Government of India effectively set 
the limits for the Reports’s proposals.’67
2. The Publication of the Reforms and the Congress Split of 1918. Divide and 
Rule?
Towards the end of his period in India Montagu summarised the achievements of his 
visit:
We have got an agreed report...We have kept India quiet for six critical 
months. When I came out, moderates were rushing to join the Home 
Rule League; on leaving, the succession of moderates from the Home 
Rule League is making marked headway, particularly in the United 
Provinces- Mahmudabad, Chintamani, Sapru etc.68
This statement immediately raises the question of whether the process of 
reforms-making was a deliberately divisive tactic on the British part. Some historians, 
presumably accepting Ronald Robinson’s argument that colonial powers maintain 
themselves in power by the skilful manipulation of competing elites in indigenous 
society, assume that this was the case. B.R. Tomlinson, for instance, argues that 
constitutional reforms were determined, in part, by the need to widen the base of 
political support for the Government.69 Carl Bridge follows a similar line of
67 Robb, Government o f India, p. 95.
68 Indian Diary, p. 363.
69 Indian National Congress and the Raj, p. 23.
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argument when he says of the reform acts of 1909, 1919 and 1935 that ’Constitutional 
reforms were more mechanisms for ensuring the survival of the Raj by creating a 
buffer of collaborators, than they were means of terminating it. *70 David Page, 
however, makes a much more serious allegation, namely that the reforms hardened 
communal divisions in Indian society by maintaining (and in fact widening) separate 
electorates by focusing on concessions at the provincial and not the national level, 
which tended to put a premium on issues that divided rather than united Indians, and 
by manipulating the balance of urban and rural constituencies to further their 
conservative ends.71 This search for collaborators was inevitably a divisive 
process as it involved not only the decision to work with some groups but also a 
determination to keep other groups at arm’s length.
In this section, two issues will be examined so as to throw light on the 
allegation of British tactics of divide and rule. Firstly, we will look at the problem of 
separate electorates and secondly, at much greater length, at the question of whether 
the British reformers contributed to the Congress split between Moderates and 
Extremists which took place in the summer of 1918. One of the problems in dealing 
with both of these issues is how to distinguish intention from result. It cannot be 
denied that on both of the above issues the Montford reforms did have an outcome 
that was divisive, but it will be argued that in neither case was this the deliberate 
intention of the reformers.
From their earliest discussions in 1916, the Government of India had called 
into question the continuation of separate electorates for Muslims which had been 
introduced in the Morley-Minto reforms and which had been seen as a concomitant of 
Lord Minto’s reply to the distinguished Muslim delegation in 1906. The issue was 
raised partly as a result of the debate as to whether future representation should be by
70 Bridge, Holding India to the Empire, p. 1.
71 Page, Prelude to Partition, ch. 1.
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classes and interests or whether territorial constituencies should be formed with direct 
elections to the legislatures. But even those who preferred representation by interests 
had their doubts about separate electorates and weighted representation for 
Muslims.72 In fact the Viceroy’s Council was divided on the matter and it was 
ducked in the despatch of 24 November 1916.73 Whatever doubts the British 
might have had about perpetuating separate electorates had to be set aside because the 
Muslims were crucial to the war effort, and it would be suicidal to antagonise Muslim 
interests just at the point when Islamic issues of great importance were being raised by 
the conflict with the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East and younger Muslims were 
tending to look away from the loyalist Muslim League towards a stance of nationalist 
unity with the predominantly Hindu Congress. The Lucknow Pact of December 1916, 
with its agreement to separate electorates and weighted representation for Muslims in 
minority provinces, reduced the problem from the British point of view. Whatever 
their theoretical dislike of communal electorates, they found that they were a fa it 
accompli, approved of (albeit very reluctantly and temporarily) in Congress circles. 
Montagu undoubtedly had a deep dislike for communal representation, arguing that it 
was ’fatal to democratisation of institutions and causes disunion between the Hindu 
and the Mohammedan’, but quickly recognised whilst on his Indian tour that separate 
voting could not be got rid of in the case of the Muslims.74 However, he was 
most reluctant to see the system extended, and wanted it to be recognised as only a 
temporary institution.75 Thus the Montagu-Chelmsford Report contained a 
damning indictment of separate electorates as being opposed to the ideals of political
72 Memo B (see p. 63 above), argued against plural voting for Muslims, and an end to numerical 
weighting. Memo C agreed and argued for proportional representation for Muslims, C51.
73 Letter and enclosure dated 9 Sept. 1916 from Sir W. Meyer, Member of Viceroy’s Council, 
regarding discussions in Council on 8 Sept and alterations to 31 Aug. conclusions, C51.
74 Indian Diaryr pp. 100 & 68. For other examples of Montagu’s dislike of communal 
representation, see Indian Diary, 1912-13, A/39, p. 61 ff.
75 Indian Diary, p. 100; Montagu’s memo on reforms, 1 Feb. 1918, A/41.
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education and common citizenry leading to self-government, but reluctantly 
maintained the system for Muslims (although it argued that they should be limited to 
provinces where Muslims formed a minority of voters) and extended it to the Sikhs 
as another minority in need of representation.76 In all other cases the report 
indicated a preference for representation of minorities, if necessary, to be by 
nomination and not by separate electorates.77 The whole tone in which this issue 
was dealt with in the malting of reforms suggested that far from a Machiavellian 
desire to perpetuate communal divisions, there was a genuine desire on the British 
behalf to recognise past mistakes and to try and correct them in the new spirit of 
democratisation.78
The Congress Split, 1918
It is much more difficult to determine whether the British deliberately helped 
to bring about the Moderate/Extremist split in the Congress Party in 1918. Before 
leaving for India, Montagu heard news of divisions within the Congress resulting from 
the debate at provincial level as to whether passive resistance should be used to try 
and bring about the release of Mrs Besant, and the question of Besant’s election as 
Congress President, which the Moderates opposed.79 He expressed satisfaction at 
the news and asked for further information.80 As we have seen, the policy of 
announcing a goal of British rule was largely undertaken with a view to ’rallying the 
moderates’ who were in danger of being swamped within the Congress organisation
76 Montagu-Chelmsford Report, Cmd. 9109, 1918, paras 227-232. The Sikhs, like the Muslims, 
had played an important part in the Indian Army during the Great War.
77 Ibid., para. 232.
78 This is not in any way to deny that ’divide and rule’ tactics were used by British officials in 
India, it is only to argue that they do not appear to have been a feature of the considerations of those 
involved at the higher levels with the making of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms.
79 V(HD) to S/S, ptel. 1110, 8 Oct. 1917, C8. See pp. 56-57 above.
80 S/S to V, ptel. 1900, 11 Oct. 1917, C8.
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and, indeed, of being won over to the Home Rule organisations.81 Montagu 
sensed when he met the Indian delegation that not everybody was wedded to the 
Congress-League scheme and he did what he could by personal negotiation to build on 
these doubts. He had unsolicited help from Lionel Curtis, who helped a group of 
Calcutta Moderates, Indian and European, to devise a scheme which would be put to 
the Government.82 Naturally the scheme favoured a dyarchical solution rather 
than one based on the Congress-League scheme.83
Montagu’s wooing of the Moderates went further than merely persuading them 
to accept one constitutional scheme rather than another. He firmly believed that 
Indians had been forced into a situation of opposition to the British, partly because of 
the failure of the Government to act politically and attempt to win them over, partly 
because previous constitutional schemes had placed them in that position, i.e. as 
irresponsible critics, and partly because the British had never allowed educated Indians 
sufficient outlets for their abilities. Montagu believed that it was a key aim of the 
reforms to break this perpetual opposition between Government and Indian 
nationalists. In his view Indian opinion was far more varied and more open to being 
won over to supporting the British on many issues than the Government had ever 
realised. The alienation of the educated elites was the most serious result of the 
tendency of Government to treat all dissent as seditious. In an important note which 
he drafted to his colleagues whilst on board ship bound for India, Montagu divided 
Indian people into three groups.84 Firstly, there were the outright extremists and 
anarchists who hated the British connection and for whom no reforms would
81 See pp. 68-71 above.
82 See Curtis, Dyarchy, pp. xxxvii-xxxviii & 326-356.
83 H.S.L. Polak regarded the support of Calcutta moderates for this scheme as an indication that 
they might secede from the Congress and form a new body. Polak to V.S.S. Sastri, 4 Feb. 1918, Sastri 
MSS, NAI.
84 Montagu’s note to colleagues, written on board Kaisar-i-Hind, 7 Nov. 1917, A/41.
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ultimately be acceptable.85 Secondly, there were the moderates whom Montagu 
described as
...people of genuine belief in the benefits of British rule; people really 
apprehensive that the growth of the extremist movement may endanger 
it; people anxious as citizens of the Empire, for a greater share in the 
destinies of their own country. These are few in number and in a 
precarious position. Although they are called moderates they are not 
always moderate in their views. They are competing, at present 
unsuccessfully, with the extremist for the younger politician. Their 
army is continually being seduced to the extremist army; their leaders 
are continually exposed to the dangers of the story that we do not mean 
what we say, and that what we propose is wholly inadequate. At the 
present moment, too, they are, I think, sulking in their tents and so 
untrusting and shaken, so far as many of them are concerned, in their 
position as to be of little political use. Now I believe that unless we can 
split them clearly from the seditionist without showing that is our 
desire; unless we can get them to organise as a fighting force against 
the seditionist; unless we can restore their confidence in themselves and 
fortify their belief in our intentions, we must fail. It is to them to whom 
we must look immediately for the acceptance of our scheme and for 
assistance in working it.86
The means to achieve this was to offer substantial reforms so as to meet their 
demands as far as possible, and where this could not be done to only do so when 
convincing arguments and not just prejudice could be raised against them. The third 
group was described in the rather condescending language that also characterised the 
Montagu-Chelmsford Report as ’the dumb, inarticulate mass of the people of India.’ 
Montagu argued that their eventual political awakening was a prerequisite to real 
responsible government. In other words Montagu wanted to politicise India, including 
the rural areas; to see political parties develop which would be based on ideological
85 It should be noted that Montagu believed that this group was rather narrower than those treated 
as Extremist by the Government of India and local governments. Thus, he felt that people like Besant, 
Jinnah and Malaviya could be won over and he spent some time with them. See respectively, Indian 
Diary, pp. 56-60, 117, 118-19; 56-7, 142-5; 61-2, 286-7, 325.
86 Montagu’s note to colleagues, written on board Kaisar-i-Hind, 7 Nov. 1917, MAX.
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differences and not just on deference or interests. For these reasons Montagu 
supported large electorates and additionally the transfer of the administration of land 
to elected ministers.87 On this basis, Montagu was keen to see the formation of a 
political party which would support the reforms. Otherwise he felt the reforms could 
fail by default. Unless Parliament could see evidence of support for the proposals 
from a substantial section of Indian opinion, it would be easy for the right-wing 
opponents of reform to sabotage them. Within a month of arriving Montagu had put 
his ideas to Chelmsford’s private secretary, John Maffey, namely that
When we get our scheme published we must have an organization to 
run it and to support it in every conceivable way; take the people into 
our confidence; invite a deputation on it to come over to England to 
help with the passage of the Bill; get a journalist out from England to 
run a good paper for it; collect funds for it, and so forth; allow the 
Civil Service to expound the scheme...and so on.88
Montagu proposed that before he left India, selected Indian political leaders be invited 
to Delhi and told the outlines of the reforms scheme. They should then be asked to 
’form the nucleus of an Association made to support it, and to give the Government 
every assistance in carrying it through. Every facility should be offered them. They 
should be informed that they will be kept in full confidence by the Government, 
recognised as the channel of communication on this subject between the Government
87 Montagu seems to have had in mind that the educated politicians, who had so far concentrated 
on constitutional demands, would take up rural concerns, and that the rural electorate would be able to 
judge properly whether their interests were being furthered by their elected representatives. This was 
very much opposed to traditional British thinking about India which tended to see classes, interests, 
religions etc. as being compartmentalised and opposed. Thus the British were always suspicious if 
western-educated politicians took up rural issues. They were regarded as encroaching outside of their 
sphere. See P. Robb, ’Some aspects of British Policy...’, 1988, pp. 61-97. Indian politicians like 
Bhupendranath Basu tried to counter this sort of argument during the reforms discussion. He contended 
that it was the Indian politicians and not the British who were best acquainted with the masses and their 
needs and cited their opposition to British increases in the salt tax and their support for the expansion of 
primary education as examples of this. See 'Minutes of a conference with Provincial Governors’, 22 
Jan. 1918, JM20.
88 Indian Diary, entry for 30 Nov. 1917, p. 71; see also p. 104.
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and the Indian peoples generally; that a special branch of the Secretariat be at their 
disposal to keep in touch with them, and to assist them by sending out leaflets, essays 
and perhaps, if they wished it, journalists to run newspapers for them.’89 These 
ideas were discussed with Moderate politicians like Srinivasa Sastri, Bhupendranath 
Basu and Satyendra Sinha, who all approved of Montagu’s ideas.90 Nothing came 
of Montagu’s idea of a Delhi conference, at least not in this form, and as he himself 
pointed out in listing the pros and cons of his own idea, it would be very difficult to 
know whom to invite and whom to exclude, and everyone in the latter category would 
regard themselves as alienated from the reforms.91 However, the idea of a 
Moderate organisation was maintained. It seems that Montagu expected it to include 
moderate Congressmen and loyalists (e.g. large landowners and Europeans).92 
His fertile mind had amalgamated a number of his concerns, including the need for 
the politicisation of India and the formation of parties on ideological grounds. But he 
had also incorporated his ideas on the need for the Government to undertake 
propaganda activities so as to persuade the Indian public of the Government case. 
Montagu was convinced that Indians would not listen to the formal Government 
channels of communication and in that respect the Government had its hands tied 
behind its back. If, however, Indian newspapers and Indian politicians would argue 
the Government case it would be another matter.93
Montagu’s method of taking Moderate Indian politicians into his confidence 
was disarming. If one looks at the example of one man, Srinivasa Sastri, one can see 
how many other Moderates were won over to support of the Montagu-Chelmsford
89 See Montagu note, dated 27 Dec. 1917, A/41.
90 See Indian Diary, pp. 123, 217. Of the Indians invited to the Delhi Conference, Sastri is 
reported as saying that ’they should be moderates, because a time is coming when we shall have to 
declare war on the extremists.’. Ibid., p. 123.
91 See Montagu note, dated 27 Dec. 1917, A/41.
92 Montagu to Marris, 13 March 1918, A/41.
93 This was a rather naive view of the inevitably adversarial politics of colonialism and 
nationalism, and Chelmsford and his advisers were rightly sceptical.
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scheme. Originally, Sastri was one of the strongest exponents of the 
Congress-League scheme and published an exposition of the it.94 Although Sastri 
supported the Congress-League scheme wholeheartedly, he was prepared to consider 
some parts of the scheme as negotiable as long as the main principles were left 
intact,95 and was still apparently unenthusiastic about Montagu and Chelmsford’s 
rival scheme when he met them on 1 February 1918.96 From Sastri’s own 
account of the meeting, however, it is clear that, although he was holding his cards 
close to his chest, he was now impressed with the Montford scheme, which he 
regarded as guaranteeing self-government in 15 years time. He was flattered generally 
by the importance attached to his opinion, and more specifically by the invitation 
proffered by Montagu and Chelmsford for Sastri, in conjunction with Basu, to make 
up a list of leading men who would be consulted on the reforms scheme at the end of 
the month.97 Sastri must have envisaged repeating the sort of role that his mentor 
Gokhale had performed in the making of the Morley-Minto reforms, an idea which 
Chelmsford may have skilfully played on when he presented Sastri with a copy of 
Lord Morley’s, Recollections,98 By April 1918, Sastri was persuading other 
Indian leaders, such as C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar, of the virtue of the Montford 
proposals,99 and writing to the editor of the Servant o f  India counselling support 
for the war effort and for the Empire in its hour of need.100 By the following
94 V.S.S. Sastri The Congress-League Scheme- an Exposition, Poona, 1917.
95 V.S.S. Sastri to T.R.V. Sastri, 8 Sept. 1917, Sastri MSS, NAI. These essentials were 
presumably the four principles he told Montagu of in their interview on 20 Dec. 1917, Indian Diary, 
pp. 122-3. In January 1918 Sastri was still opposed to Montagu’s dyarchical scheme. Sastri to Vaze, 14 
Jan. 1918, Sastri MSS, NAI.
96 Indian Diary, p. 236.
97 V.S.S. Sastri to Ramaswami Sastri, 3 Feb. 1918 Sastri MSS, NAI.
98 Sastri to Vaze, 13 April 1918, Sastri MSS, NAI. Montagu contributed as well by referring to 
Sastri as ’the Lionel Curtis of Indian Politics’! V.S.S. Sastri to Ramaswami 31 Jan 1918, Sastri MSS, 
NMML.
99 V.S.S. Sastri to Ramaswami, 31 Jan 1918, Sastri MSS, NMML.
100 Sastri to Vaze, 14 & 15 April 1918, Sastri MSS, NAI. The fact that this was a mutually 
supportive relationship can be seen by the fact that at about this time the Sir George Barnes of the 
Government of India offered to place advertisements in the Servant o f India. Sastri was too proud to
(continued...)
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month Sastri was organising fellow Moderates to come out in broad support of the 
report as soon as it was published.101 In Sastri’s case a whole range of factors 
seem, therefore, to have been important in winning his support for the reforms 
scheme, and thus separating him from the official Congress position. Firstly, although 
he maintained certain principles of reform, he was flexible as to how they could be 
achieved; this open-mindedness was an important factor. Secondly, he was looking for 
a way in which the Moderates could regain the advantage in Congress and this seemed 
a great opportunity for showing that the Moderates had the ear of British 
policy-makers. Thirdly, he was won over by Montagu by a mixture of flattery and 
openness.102
Sastri’s conversion was typical of the experience of a number of moderate 
politicians, such as C.Y. Chintamani,103 C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar,104 Motilal 
Setalvad ,105 Narayan Chandavarkar, 106 Surendranath Baneijea,107 and 
the Raja of Mahmudabad.108 All these men were taken into confidence about the 
scheme and gave their approval in one form or another. Even Annie Besant was 
apparently won over by the same mixture of flattery and candour.109 Montagu’s 
tactic with Besant may have been the same as that used with Sastri, namely that he
100 (...continued)
accept, though he wrote that he had expectations that the Bombay Government would help. Sastri to 
Vaze, 21 March 1918, Sastri MSS, NAI. Willingdon, the Governor of Bombay, had seen Sastri earlier 
in the year and encouraged him in his establishment of the Servant o f India weekly. See V.S.S. Sastri 
to Venkatasubbiah, 26 Jan 1918, Sastri MSS, NMML.
101 Sastri to Chintamani, 24 May 1918, Sastri MSS, NAI.
102 It may well have been that Montagu’s very vulnerability won over Sastri, who saw Montagu as 
an isolated figure, opposed by the Government of India on many issues and supported openly by few if 
any Indian politicians. See V.S.S. Sastri to Ramaswami Sastri, 21 March 1918, Sastri MSS, NMML.
103 Indian Diary, pp. 48, 279, 313, 322, 363.
104 Ibid., pp. 123, 177, 274.
105 Ibid., pp. 148-9.
106 Ibid., pp. 149, 163.
107 Ibid., pp. 56-7, 274-5,276.
108 Ibid., pp. 195, 338.
109 V.S.S. Sastri to Ramaswami Sastri, 24 Feb. 1918, Sastri MSS, NMML.
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indicated that if there was a general acceptance of the basis of the scheme he would 
do what he could to meet Indian criticisms of it when he returned to England.110
In the process of drawing up the reform proposals, therefore, the Moderates 
had been wooed by the British and encouraged to organise themselves in support of 
the reforms. The extent of this encouragement was quite unprecedented, but at this 
stage it seems the British had no thought of actually encouraging a split in the 
Congress organisation. After all, Congress remained the only representative nationalist 
organisation and it would be senseless to help create a situation in which the majority 
in Congress was permanently opposed to the reforms and a Congress rump was 
isolated in support.111 The British saw themselves as rallying the Moderates so 
that they would organise within the Congress and fight their cause. It was the 
Moderates themselves who initiated the split, but the manoeuvrings of Montagu and 
some of the provincial governors created the environment in which they felt that the 
division would be approved of and supported by the British.112 Furthermore the 
whole tendency of British administration in India in dealing with Indian nationalism 
was not only to view it as divided by religion, caste and interest but also to categorise 
it as either broadly tolerable to the maintenance of British interests in India or 
unacceptable. Thus Indian nationalists were divided into sheep and goats, Moderates 
and Extremists, those who could be parleyed with and those who were to be kept at 
arm’s length. Of course these categories were not entirely rigid and differed over a 
period of time, and from administrator to administrator, but, on the whole, there was 
a remarkable degree of unanimity amongst the British in India as to which category 
individual Indians fell into. Sometimes the views of Indian nationalists mellowed over
110 V.S.S. Sastri to Chintamani, 24 May 1918, Sastri MSS, NAI; C. Jinarajadasa to C.W. 
Leadbeater, n.d., enclosure, V to S/S, 31 Aug. 1918, M l.
111 It was generally recognised by both Moderates and British alike that the Moderates were by 
now in a minority within the Congress. Sastri admitted as much to Montagu. See Indian Diary, p. 236.
1,2 Ronaldshay and Willingdon were the provincial governors who gave most encouragement to the 
Moderates. See below, pp. 104-105.
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time and the firebrand of the past became a mild-mannered constitutionalist. 
Surendranath Baneijea was an obvious example; he had been a very effective critic of 
British rule in India and had played a leading role in the agitation against the partition 
of Bengal, but he had been successfully absorbed into the constitutional system 
through the Morley-Minto Councils and became a stalwart of the new Moderate 
breakaway organisation and eventually a Minister in the first Bengal Ministry.113 
Usually the British were slow to recognise such changes as representing a genuine 
change of heart and thus to re-order their categories. One can see, for instance, the 
slow re-categorisation which took place in the case of Annie Besant and her supporters 
during this period. In 1917 Besant was regarded as public enemy number one and is 
interned; by 1919 she was regarded as part of the legitimate mainstream of Indian 
politics, and by 1921 she was seen as a valuable critic of Gandhian non-co-operation. 
These changes in British perception of Besant partly reflected her growing 
conservatism, partly the fact that she was wrongly categorised in the first place, but 
most of all, that the criterion for categorising Indian politicians became more 
straightforward in this period- it became a matter of determining whether they were 
supportive of the Montford reforms or not. The British created this new litmus test of 
political moderation by the methods which they used to ensure the political success of 
the reforms, but it was the Gandhian boycott of the new reforms which gave the new 
test rigidity.
The British use of the terms ’Moderate’ and ’Extremist’ could form a study in 
its own right. The terms were rarely used with any precision and one suspects that 
this vagueness was often deliberate, in that its use would not stand up to closer 
analysis. In the broadest sense the word ’Moderate’ meant those who supported the 
British, but this could cover a range of people from those who would be better called
113 For a study of Baneijea, see Argov, Moderates and Extremists.
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’loyalists’, e.g. groups like the taluqdars of Oudh who traditionally owed their 
position to the British to those who were more discriminating supporters, for instance, 
those on the right-wing of the Congress. The term was used differently by different 
people, the more conservative administrators, like Harcourt Butler, tending to use the 
term to mean loyalists, whilst more liberal Britons, such as Edwin Montagu, using the 
term to refer to the reasonable element amongst the western-educated nationalist 
politicians. Increasingly the term is used to mean the latter group during this period, 
but usually with some idea that this group is connected to wider social groups in 
India. The scope of the term ’Moderate’ had therefore widened to include nationalists; 
the war had resulted in nationalism and even the demand for ultimate self-government 
being considered legitimate by the British. The term ’Extremist’ was also used rather 
unclearly and could cover anyone from a terrorist to a rather outspoken Congressman, 
in fact the British often assumed that the two were inter-connected. There were two 
rules of thumb for distinguishing Moderates from Extremists in British eyes, but 
neither was very reliable. The first test was whether Indians were fundamentally 
hostile to the continuance of British rule in the future and to the maintenance of 
Britons in the administration, and the second was whether they were prepared to limit 
themselves to achieving political change by constitutional methods and to eschew 
direct action. The second criterion was one, which as we have seen had some meaning 
by the standards of contemporary Indian politics. The first criterion was however, 
very rough and ready and based on a range of information, some of it of dubious 
reliability, much of it coming from the C.I.D. who seemed to keep a watch on the 
complete spectrum of Indian politicians.114
It is very important to understand the British use of the Moderate/Extremist 
categories if one is to understand how they envisaged the new round of constitutional
114 Montagu reported that he had heard that Gokhale and Bhupendranath Basu, two distinctly 
constitutionalist politicians, had been subjected to C.I.D. inspection. S/S to V, 8 March 1919, M3.
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reforms. Traditionally, the concession of Indian representation on executive and 
legislative councils was seen as a means of strengthening the Raj by the incorporation 
of influential Indians in advisory capacities. The 1892 reforms were essentially of this 
type and the Morley-Minto reforms continued along the same lines. However, the 
latter had also to take into account the growth of more extreme Indian nationalism, a 
nationalism more prepared to strike at the Raj directly by boycott or even by the 
bomb. No clear demarcation was made between political extremists and the terrorists: 
particularly in Bengal it was believed that they were connected. The Morley-Minto 
reforms were predicated on the basis that reasonable constitutional concessions would 
meet the needs of the Moderates, whilst the Extremists, who by their very nature 
would never be satisfied by constitutional reforms, would be clearly separated from 
the Moderates and would be vulnerable to repressive measures, such as a Press Act, 
which would accompany the reforms. The dual nature of this process, rallying the 
Moderates whilst smashing the Extremists, was agreed to by both Conservative and 
Liberal politicians. Morley, the disciple of Gladstone, was as firm in his resolve to 
crush political terrorism in India as his Conservative Viceroy Minto was. Montagu 
shared Morley’s distaste for arbitrary repressive measures but he also shared the belief 
that constitutional reforms would pave the way for tougher measures against political 
terrorism.115 The Montford reforms were also based on the idea that Indian 
politicians were divided into Moderates and Extremists, but there was no desire to 
exclude Extremist politicians from the political arena, providing that they eschewed 
violent methods. The scope of acceptable political comment and activity had been 
broadened as a result of the announcement of August 1917 and the new policy towards 
the Home Rule movement. The reforms were based upon the view that the Extremists
115 In fact Montagu believed that the reforms, by involving responsible Indians in decisions on 
matters of law and order, would make the British task considerably easier. See Montagu to Ronaldshay, 
25 Sept. 1918, M il.
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would form the opposition in the new political system and that they would be 
outnumbered by the Government in conjunction with Moderates, i.e. loyalists and 
Moderate nationalists. At this general level Peter Robb is correct when he argues that 
’the reforms were directed at all those Indians who believed in the advance to 
self-government’ and not just at the Moderates.116 Montagu and Chelmsford 
were, of course, hoping for support for their scheme from a wide spectrum of Indian 
politicians, but the limits they placed on constitutional advance and the way in which 
they took Moderate politicians into their confidence and held Extremist ones at arm’s 
length, suggested that, in practice, the reforms were targeted at the Moderates and 
that it was felt that it was inevitable from an early stage that Extremists would not 
find them acceptable. In this respect I cannot agree with Robb’s view that the British 
only concentrated on Moderate support after they realised that the Extremists 
dominating the Congress would reject the reforms.117 The fact that Montagu did 
not expect extremist support for the reforms can be seen in the note he wrote to his 
colleagues on board ship bound for India in November 1917.118 While he was in 
India, Montagu tried to win over individual Congress leaders to support of the 
reforms but he gives no real indication in his Diary of expecting Congress to find 
them acceptable. A little later, on returning to England in April 1918, he had read a 
speech by Tilak which made it clear that he would not accept the reform proposals. 
Montagu commented that, ’This seems all to the good: he is the leader of the 
opposition.’119 This remark might be considered mere bravado, but the second 
phrase entirely accords with Montagu’s view of the reforms. Montagu had commented 
earlier that Tilak was the one real Extremist he had met whilst touring India, and he 
was quite convinced that he would not be satisfied with less than the Congress-League
116 Robb, thesis, p. 288.
117 See Robb, Government o f India and Reform, p. 263.
118 7 Nov. 1917, M41.
119 Indian Diary, p. 374.
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scheme.120 In August, shortly before the Special Congress, Montagu expressed 
himself satisfied on the whole with the attitude towards the reform proposals. ’I never 
expected’, he told Ronaldshay, ’to have the extremists with me and they would have 
been an embarrassment rather than a source of help.’121 Later Montagu and 
Ronaldshay agreed that Congressmen were unacceptable as appointments to executive 
councils and to underline this Montagu added with characteristic hyperbole that ’My 
whole aim in life is to work with the moderates and to regard the extremists as the 
opposition.’122
Further evidence of the way in which the British clearly distinguished between 
the Moderates and the Extremists can be seen in the War Conference which was held 
in Delhi in April 1918. Montagu was keen that Chelmsford bring leading Indian 
figures together so that the Government could make a personal appeal to a wide 
spectrum of Indian opinion for political differences to be put aside for the duration of 
the war and for concentration on further contributions to that war effort.123 
However, Chelmsford had a rather different view of how the Conference would 
operate; about one hundred representatives were selected by the provinces, 
predominantly from amongst Moderate and loyalist Indians, and sixteen princes also 
attended. A small Home Rule contingent was invited, including G.S. Khaparde, but 
the Home Rule leaders, Tilak and Besant, were not invited.124 Any political 
discussion was ruled out of order.125
120 See Indian Diary, pp. 216-7 & 61.
121 Montagu to Ronaldshay, 13 Aug. 1918, A/27.
122 Montagu to Ronaldshay, 4 March 1919, A/27.
123 S/S to V, 15 & 17 April 1918, A/41.
124 Gandhi was, invited, however, as he had a record of recruiting Indians for the war effort. See 
V(HD) to S/S , ptel. 465, 1 May 1918, C9; V to S/S, 28 April 1918, A/7.
125 Montagu’s disapproval of the way that Chelmsford conducted the Conference and his exclusion 
of the Extremists can be seen in Montagu to Willingdon, 4 July 1918, M16.
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The Publication of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report
When the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was published on 8 July 1918 its 
reception had been carefully prepared by Montagu. The previous month 
Bhupendranath Basu, the Indian Member of the India Council, had wired his 
counterpart in the Indian Government, Sankaran Nair, asking him to ’endeavour to 
have telegrams sent to the Viceroy and Secretary of State from public bodies and 
associations all over India...according hearty support for the scheme.’126 There 
can be little doubt that this message was intended for Moderate Indians with whom 
Nair was in close touch. In fact Moderate leaders had already prepared a concerted 
strategy to ensure that their views were first in the field and that they should give 
general approval to the scheme.127
Montagu had become nervous about the reception of the report in the days 
running up to its publication and stressed to Chelmsford the importance of not 
censoring hostile opinion on the reforms from the right-wing in England: he felt that 
’the Indian reform party may otherwise undervalue our proposals and think that their 
very moderation has commended them to the British public and that by pressure more 
could be obtained.’128 He also tried to persuade Chelmsford to make a personal 
appeal to Indian leaders, including Extremists like Besant and Tilak, for moderation in 
their response,129 anxiously pointing out that it would not matter ’if the extremist 
section were isolated or in a small minority, but will they not sweep the whole 
board?’130 There is no doubt from this correspondence that Montagu was 
worried at this stage of the impact of an outright rejection of the reforms by 
Congress, reminding Chelmsford ’that the Congress has some historical significance to 
people in this country.’131
126 S/S to V, ptel. 1348, 17 June 1918, 09.
127 See V.S.S. Sastri to Chintamani, 24 May 1918, Sastri MSS, NAI.
128 S/S to V, ptel. 1438, 27 June 1918 09.
129 S/S to V, ptels. 1465, 1592 & 1663, 2, 15 & 24 July 1918, 09.
130 S/S to V, ptel. 1663, 24 July 1918, 09.
131 S/S to V, ptel. 1663, 24 July 1918, 09.
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Chelmsford would have been extremely busy if he had followed Montagu’s 
advice and interviewed all the politicians he was recommended to see, but, in fact, the 
Viceroy was convinced that Montagu’s fears were hopelessly pessimistic and he 
replied that ’the fact that the extremists are committed to an unreasoning policy must 
be accepted by us and I am therefore not in favour of any personal appeal to the 
Besant-Tilak group.132 Chelmsford’s attitude was re-iterated at the end of July 
when he reported that the special session of Congress which was due to be held at the 
end of August was most likely to condemn the reform proposals as the machinery of 
Congress had been captured by the Extremists at the end of the previous year. 
Chelmsford reported growing Moderate organisation in the provinces and confidently 
concluded that ’it is difficult to see why, in the face of this solid body of opinion, the 
scheme should be jeopardized by the ban of a Congress constituted mainly by Besant 
and Tilak and their entourage.’133
Montagu’s jitteriness over the reception accorded to the report reflected the 
difficult position he was in at home. He could not get the Cabinet to give any 
commitment to any part of the report and Curzon, who was particularly aware of the 
crucial role he could play in the success or failure of the reforms, wanted to slow 
down the pace and scope of change.134 Austen Chamberlain acted as a very 
effective conciliator in the disputes between Curzon and Montagu and, step by step, 
the reforms were moved towards legislative enactment. By the end of the year, 
however, Curzon was absorbed in his work as Foreign Secretary and Montagu’s path 
seemed a little easier. The difficulty of Montagu’s political position at home at a time 
when he knew that reforms were an urgent necessity if they were to be accepted in
132 V to S/S, ptel. 738, 3 July 1918, C9.
133 V to S/S, ptel. 849, 27 July 1918, C9.
134 Curzon to Montagu, 25 July 1918, >453/2/63. See Rumbold, Watershed, p. 121, for an
excellent description of the difficult relations between Montagu and Curzon.
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India helps to explain some of his concern at the reception of the reforms in India at 
this time.
The Congress Special Session and First Moderate Conference, August 1918
Montagu would not have to wait long for the Congress response to the reforms 
as a special session was held to discuss them in August 1918. The majority of 
Moderates, fearing that they would lose the argument on reforms, that their opinion 
would be submerged and thus jeopardise the reforms, decided not to attend the Special 
Congress and held their own conference instead. All the evidence indicates that there 
was little, if any, direct encouragement of this split from the British side. 
Bhupendranath Basu, a member of the Secretary of State’s Council, who would have 
been the likely channel for any such encouragement, was in fact doing what he could 
to encourage Moderates to go to the Congress and fight it out. Only if they were 
defeated should they hold their own convention, which could form the basis of a new 
Moderate party if Congress remained in the hands of the Extremists.135 Montagu 
gave no direct encouragement but was obviously interested in the possibilities that 
presented themselves if a split should take place. He told Chelmsford that:
I know you appreciate the importance of doing all in our power to help 
the moderates, who seem to be making a genuine effort to separate 
themselves from the extremists. If the moderates, as suggested, stand 
aloof from the forthcoming special Congress would not the occasion be 
ripe for the formation of a separate organisation to back reforms on our 
lines? A combination of the moderates in Bengal, Bombay and the 
United Provinces, taking the announcement of August 20th. as their 
watchword, might form a rallying point for persons still sitting on the
135 B. Basu to V.S.S. Sastri, 1 Aug. 1918, Sastri MSS, NAI. Henry Polak, the editor of India, 
the journal of the British Committee of the Congress, wrote in a similar vein after the split had taken 
place, reporting that both Sinha and Basu deplored the separatist attitude adopted by the Moderate 
leaders. H.S.L. Polak to V.S.S. Sastri, 30 Aug. 1918. Sastri MSS, NAI. Polak could foresee that with 
a formal split in Congress the British organisation would soon have to fall into line with the new 
Congress policy.
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fence, and I believe if such an organisation could be established in 
India, it will be easy to establish a corresponding branch in 
London...The creation of such an organisation would no doubt 
immensely facilitate our task here as well as in India.136
Montagu’s arguments in the above telegram follow in direct line from everything that 
he had been pressing on Chelmsford during his winter visit. His support for a separate 
Moderate organisation was shared by two of the provincial governors, Willingdon and 
Ronaldshay. Willingdon took the same sort of pleasure as Montagu in the political 
game. He was in touch with Bombay Moderates and was obviously trying to ginger 
them up to take a stand in support of reforms and avoid a compromise with the 
Extremists.137 However, Willingdon seems to have envisaged the Moderates 
operating within the Congress and was in fact keen that they should attend the Special 
Congress and fight it out with the Extremists. Once it became clear, however, that the 
Moderates were actually going to form their own organisation, Willingdon could see 
the advantages for the future in that a separate party organisation would mean that 
they ’may be able effectively to contest some of the seats against the extremists and 
not allow them to win the lot.’138 Ronaldshay, the Governor of Bengal, was also 
involved in encouraging Moderate leaders to make their opinions known and to 
’possess an influential newspaper with editions in English and Bengali.’139 
Although Ronaldshay expressed his pleasure at the establishment of a separate
136 S/S to V, ptel. 1727, 1 Aug. 1918, C9.
137 Willingdon to Montagu, 30 July 1918, M l8.
138 Willingdon to Montagu, 11 Aug. 1918, A/18. Interestingly, Stanley Reed, the editor of the 
Times of India and someone who was involved with Moderate politicians in Bombay and with 
Government publicity schemes, told Willingdon that he was ’certain we are backing the wrong horse.’ 
Willingdon to Montagu, 8 Nov. 1918, A/18.
139 Ronaldshay to King George V, 27 April 1918, R3. Ronaldshay stressed that his 
encouragement to the Moderates had necessarily to be ’quiet and unostentatious’, so as to avoid ’the 
possibility of creating any suspicion that the movement is one the wires of which are being pulled by 
official agency.’
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Moderate organisation there is no evidence that he encouraged the Moderates to stay 
away from the Special Congress or to split from Congress permanently.140
Chelmsford was sceptical about Montagu’s plans for Government 
encouragement of the Moderates. He sensibly felt that any direct encouragement 
would be counterproductive as it would taint the Moderates as Government 
lackeys.141 A practical way of supporting the Moderates was to ensure that they 
and not the Extremists were represented on any committees the Government 
established in connection with the reforms. Thus when two reforms committees were 
established under the overall chairmanship of Lord Southborough, one to decide on 
the division of functions in the provinces, and the other to examine the franchise, 
Chelmsford refused any suggestions of men who might be considered Extremist. He 
rejected Malaviya because he was President-elect of Congress and warned that such an 
appointment ’would directly discourage those who are attempting to give us their 
assistance.’142
Chelmsford’s interest in supporting the Moderates had less to do with any 
belief that the Moderates could form a pro-Govemment political party and more to do 
with the immediate concerns of Indian politics. In the current Imperial Legislative 
Council the Moderates were the dominant presence and their support was needed, not 
only with regard to the reform bill (they welcomed the Montagu-Chelmsford report in 
an overwhelming vote in September 1918), but for the pressing problem of dealing 
with legislation to replace the special powers the Government had taken on during the
140 Ronaldshay to King George V, 18 Oct. 1918, R3.
141 V to S/S, ptel. 25, 7 Aug. 1918, C9.
142 V to S/S, ptel., 10 Dec. 1918, C9. Malaviya had in fact been suggested by Bhupendranath
Basu, see S/S to V, ptel. 2845, 9 Dec. 1918, C9. Montagu also saw such appointments as a way of 
supporting the Moderates and had suggested Surendranath Baneijea for the Franchise Committee for 
this very reason. See Montagu to Ronaldshay, 25 Sept. 1918, M il.  Moderates played an important 
part as non-officials on these committees and on the provincial committees established to advise the 
main committees: K. Natarajan & N.M. Samarth (Bombay), Dr. Suhrawardy & P.C. Mitter (Bengal), 
C.Y. Chintamani (U.P.), M.V. Joshi & Krishna Sahay (C.P.). See V (HD) to S/S, ptel. 2, 27 Nov 
1918, C9.
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war to deal with terrorism and sedition. Elections were due for the legislative 
assembly in the spring of 1919, but Chelmsford had the assembly’s life extended by a 
year, arguing that this was
...in  the interests of the infant moderate party who for their attitude in 
the last Council have been subjected to much abuse and who will need 
heartening if they are to maintain new relations with the Government 
which is considered of great importance.143
143 V to S/S, ptel. 2287, 13 Nov. 1918, C9.
107
CHAPTER H I: BRTTISH-INDIAN LIBERAL RELATIONS 
UNDER STRAIN, 1919-1920
The years 1919 and 1920 were difficult ones for the new Moderate Party.
Their relations with both the Congress Party that they had left and their British rulers 
were put under great strain by two issues, the Punjab and Khilafat grievances. Taken 
together, these two issues were to push Congress into embarking on a programme of 
non-co-operation at the end of 1920, which marked the final break between Congress 
and the Moderate secessionists. It was somewhat ironic that the new constitutional 
reforms did not in the end prove the crucial issue between the British and the Indian 
nationalists. Almost up until the time when nominations were to be put forward for 
the elections, it looked likely that Congress would be represented. For all the 
criticisms that men like Tilak had made of the reforms, most Congressmen were 
prepared to work them.
The Punjab and Khilafat issues were ones over which the Moderates and the 
bulk of the Congress saw broadly eye to eye. The differences between them were 
once again over method, not over aims. Yet these differences over method reflected 
fundamental differences of political outlook. The Moderates’ emphasis on 
constitutional methods, their abhorrence of anything that might involve the wider 
Indian public in a political agitation which they could not control and contain, and 
their fear lest anything was done which might jeopardise the constitutional reforms on 
which they had staked their political futures, meant that they completely failed to keep 
in touch with popular feeling at this time. The different responses of individual Indian 
politicians to the Punjab and Khilafat grievances polarised Indian politics in a decisive 
way. When Congress took up Gandhi’s programme of non-co-operation in September 
1920 to fight against these grievances it marked the complete break between Moderate
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constitutionalism and the new grass-roots activism of the Congress. Right up to this 
point some Moderates persevered in attending Congress and putting their case. Now 
they realised that their actions were futile.
The Moderates might have felt less isolated if they had believed that the British 
sympathised with their position, but these years were marked by a series of errors on 
the part of the colonial rulers which highlighted some of the worst aspects of 
imperialism and must have made the Moderates doubt whether they had taken the 
right decision in hoisting their flag to the mast of the reforms. In the final stage of 
making those reforms the Moderates felt that they had to fight a rearguard action to 
stop the Government of India whittling the bill down. In fighting the Rowlatt Bills, 
which had the purpose of continuing special war-time anti-terrorist legislation into 
peace-time, the Moderates considered that the Government showed little sympathy for 
their position.
1. The Moderates and the Rowlatt Bills
Probably no other issue caused so much friction between the British and the 
new Moderate Party as that of repressive legislation. The Moderate Party was 
founded in support of constitutional reforms but soon found that an extension of 
British powers to deal with terrorism was considered by some British policy-makers to 
be the inevitable concomitant of political reform.1 This had also been the case 
with the Morley-Minto reforms, which were followed a year later in 1910 by a Press 
Act which was effectively forced on a reluctant Gokhale as the price of reforms. Now 
similar arguments were used for the extension of powers which the Government had 
taken on in wartime and which were due to expire six months after the peace. The
1 See e.g. Austen Chamberlain to Ronaldshay, 7 June 1918, AC21/5/70.
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Government believed that the Defence of India Act (1915) had been responsible for 
the dramatic decrease in outrages which took place in the second half of the war.2 
They feared that, unless they made new provisions, prisoners interned under the 
D.I.A. would have to be released sometime after the war had ended. It was argued 
that without the maintenance of special Government powers to deal with political 
violence it would be difficult to convince critics at home that it was safe to pass the 
new reforms. In retrospect it seems incredible that the Government should have tried 
to introduce a new political regime which involved greater democracy and 
participation of Indians in government whilst simultaneously strengthening their 
autocratic powers. Yet Chelmsford’s government did not see things in this way: they 
believed that the case for new legislation was overwhelming and urgent. In fact, they 
believed originally that the legislation would be passed quickly during wartime and, 
therefore, would not clash with post-war political reforms. But, in the belief that 
political objections to the new measures would be best met by establishing a 
committee of enquiry into anarchical crime, they actually delayed the whole process 
and thus led to the very unfortunate coincidence of the reforms passing through 
Parliament whilst the Imperial Legislature was debating the new measures against 
political crime.3
The committee of enquiry, under the chairmanship of the Scottish judge, 
S.A.T. Rowlatt, and containing Indian non-official representation in the form of an 
Indian Judge, C.V. Kumaraswami Sastri of Madras, and P.C. Mitter, a prominent 
Moderate member of the Bengal Legislative Council, was established in December 
1917 and its report was published not long after the Montagu-Chelmsford report in
2 The number of ’revolutionary outrages’ in Bengal decreased from 64 in 1915-16 to only 10 
between January 1917 and February 1918. See Robb, Government o f India, p. 147.
3 Even the right-wing Home Member, Craddock, had stressed the need to avoid such a clash when 
the matter was first discussed at the end of 1916. See R.H. Craddock’s letter, 21 Dec. 1916, in Home 
Poll. A Procs., 225-232, Aug 1917.
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July 1918.4 It concluded that normal judicial methods had completely failed to 
solve the problem of revolutionary crime, especially in Bengal where such crime was 
virtually endemic, and that special measures were needed to counter it. It proposed 
that extra-judicial wartime powers should be continued, although with added 
safeguards. Measures could be introduced by notification in specific areas, with the 
authorisation of the Governor-General in Council, in three escalating stages. The first 
stage allowed for the speeding up of trials by establishing trials for seditious crime by 
three high court judges, thus doing away with the right to juries, appeals etc. In the 
second stage, suspects could be required to give security, and have their movements 
and activities restricted. In the third stage the authorities would be permitted to arrest 
and search without warrant and to detain prisoners for up to one month, subject to 
independent investigation. These powers were to be available throughout the country, 
not just in Bengal which had been the centre of the problem, and could be applied 
without notification to persons already restricted under the D.I.A. when it expired. 
There were also to be permanent changes in the criminal law which were designed to 
strengthen the chances of successful convictions, for example, allowing evidence of 
previous convictions to be revealed in cases of sedition. As Peter Robb has argued, 
the Rowlatt Report, which was clearly intended as a propaganda measure, acted as a 
straitjacket on Government policy.5 It would have proved very difficult indeed not 
to have implemented Rowlatt’s recommendations in full: the committee’s report was 
regarded as authoritative. However, whilst Austen Chamberlain had been pressing for 
firm action against political terrorism, his successor, Montagu, shared the Liberal 
distaste for extra-legal measures. In fact Montagu was already pressing Chelmsford to 
start to do away with existing repressive legislation, such as the Press Act of 1910, so
4 Report o f Committee Appointed to Investigate Revolutionary Conspiracies In India [Rowlatt], 
Cmd. 9190, 1918.
5 See Robb, Government o f India, ch.6. This chapter provides an excellent analysis of the factors 
leading to the implementation of the new legislation.
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as to meet Moderate criticisms.6 His initial response to the Rowlatt report was 
that,
There is much in its recommendations which is most repugnant to my 
mind...I loathe the suggestion at first sight of preserving the D.I.A. in 
peace time to such an extent as Rowlatt and his friends think necessary 
Why cannot these things be done by normal or even exceptional 
processes of law? I hate to give the Pentlands of this world or the 
O’Dwyers the chance of locking up a man without trial.7
However, Montagu agreed to publication of the Report and met the Government of 
India’s request that they should start legislation to implement the report’s 
recommendations. It may be that Montagu saw the new legislation as a necessary 
price for the scrapping of other repressive legislation such as Regulation m  of 1818, 
or, more broadly, as the necessary price for constitutional reforms to go through.8 
He told Lloyd that he recognised that drastic legislation was ’unavoidable on the 
unanimous recommendations of the [Rowlatt] Committee which contains a strong 
Indian element.’9 Chelmsford’s reassurances that the Legislative Council would 
not balk at the legislation may have calmed his worries. He saw no contradiction 
between the new legislation and the reforms, indeed he told Ronaldshay that the 
Rowlatt Report
...emphasises the urgency of pressing on with our reforms so that we 
may establish a definite Indian party which will help and work with the 
Government in suppressing a movement which is fraught with a danger 
[sic] to the future of the country. It will be infinitely easier to deal with 
anarchical crime when there is a stronger popular element in the 
Government than at present.10
6 S/S to V, 10 Oct. 1918, M2.
7 Idem.
8 Robb, Government o f India, p. 156.
9 Montagu to Lloyd, 16 March 1919, M22.
10 Montagu to Ronaldshay, 25 Sept. 1918, A/27.
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Clearly Montagu expected the Moderates to support the Government on law and order 
issues. If they did so, autocratic powers could be safely replaced by democratic 
powers to deal with revolutionary crime.
The belief that the Moderates hated revolutionary crime was well-founded, but 
Montagu misjudged the nationalism of the Moderates; they could not afford to be seen 
in the eyes of the public to be helping the Government to extend repressive measures. 
This misunderstanding was at the heart of much of the failure of the British and the 
Moderates to work together. When the Moderates criticised Government repressive 
measures many Britons felt that the Moderates had let them down, that they had been 
cowardly. The British particularly resented what they claimed was Moderate perfidy: 
they might support stem measures against the Extremists in private conversation but 
attack any such measures in the public arena. The attitude of the Moderates to the 
Rowlatt Bills was to be the testing ground of British relations with the new Moderate 
Party. It was also to be a crucial element in the widening gap between the Moderates 
and the Congress Party which they had now left.
One element in Chelmsford’s desire to have the recommendations of the 
Rowlatt Committee made law as a matter of urgency was his mistaken belief that the 
present legislative council would accept the need for the new legislation. This view 
was probably formed as a result of a debate in the legislative council in September 
1918 when G.S. Khaparde, a Tilakite, had tried to have consideration of the Rowlatt 
Report delayed. He was opposed by Moderates such as Sastri, Sapru and Baneijea. 
Sastri argued that ’the vote was meant to be a test vote and would have cost us more 
than we could have saved...England would have been rent with cries of "no reforms"- 
and this country would have replied with vigorous agitation.’11 Seton, in the India 
Office, regarded the outcome of the debate ’as indicating that legislation on the lines
11 V.S.S. Sastri to Vaze, 11 Oct. 1918, Sastri MSS, NAI, cited in S. Mahajan, Imperialist 
Strategy and Moderate Politics. Indian Legislature at Work, 1909-1920, Delhi, 1983, p. 147.
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proposed would not be unfavourably received.’12 Government intelligence 
received from Bombay also suggested that Moderates would not go further in their 
protests at the new legislation than to recommend amendments and additional 
safeguards.13
In January 1919 two draft bills were published and in February the main bill, 
containing the emergency powers, was introduced in the legislature.14 It received 
a rough ride from the non-official members, amongst whom not a single one could be 
found to support it.15 A Select Committee of the Legislature, on which both 
Moderate and Extremist members were represented, was set up to examine the Bill. It 
appears that the greatest resistance on this Committee came from the Extremist 
members, Khaparde, Vithalbhai Patel, and Malaviya.16 The other members of the 
select committee including the Moderates, Sastri and Surendranath Baneijea, were 
unwilling to take the sort of obstructive measures considered by the Extremists, such 
as walking out of the legislatures.17 They shared some of the British horror of 
revolutionary crime, and accepted that special measures should be used to meet these 
special categories of criminal, provided that it was clear that this would in no way 
impinge upon legitimate political activity.18
The Government was prepared to make concessions along these lines. The Act was 
made temporary, it would last only three years and it was written into it that it was
12 Robb, Government o f India, p. 154, n. 44.
13 See Bombay Fortnightly reports by James Crerar, 1/4 Feb. & 16/21 Feb. 1919, Home Poll., 
Feb & March 1919, nos. 42 & 16.
14 The second bill was eventually dropped by the Government.
15 A unique sign of unanimity according to G.S. Khaparde. See B.G. Kunte (ed.), Correspondence 
and Diary o f G.S. Khaparde, Government of Maharashtra, 1978, pp. 448-9, entry for 7 Feb. 1919 
[hereafter Khaparde Correspondence].
16 Ibid., p. 449, entry for 18 March 1919. This is corroborated by Chelmsford. V to S/S, 19 Feb. 
1919, A/8.
17 Additional members were Mohammad Shaft and Nawab Ali Chowdhri. See V.S.S. Sastri to 
Sapru, copy pi., 5 March 1919, Sastri MSS, NAI.
18 For Moderate ambivalence on the Rowlatt Bills, see V.S.S. Sastri to Vaze, 28 Jan. 1919, S.I.S. 
Papers, NMML.
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specifically for the purpose of dealing with anarchical and revolutionary crime.19 
Sastri now felt satisfied that ’the legislation cannot be used against ordinary 
agitation.’20 Perhaps because of the reasonable attitude of the Moderates, 
Chelmsford was optimistic that opposition to the legislation would eventually be 
overcome.21 He told Montagu that he felt that they were on ’solid ground and 
that the position is healthy’, despite the overwhelming evidence of the opposition of 
non-official members. 22 His belief was that many non-official members privately 
supported the legislation j23 a view which was made less tenable by the decisions 
to resign from the Council on this issue of Jinnah, Malaviya and B.D. Shukul.24
Even Gandhi’s threat to start passive resistance over the issue did not deter 
Chelmsford, who talked of calling Gandhi’s bluff.25 He was strengthened 
somewhat by the publication of a manifesto signed by Moderate members of the 
Legislative Council, which, while condemning the Bills, deprecated Gandhi’s call for 
passive resistance.26 But Moderates like Sastri not only disapproved of passive 
resistance in principle, but felt that it was not a suitable remedy in the case of the 
Rowlatt legislation, which could not itself be disobeyed ,27 However, one of 
Sastri’s main concerns was that passive resistance would create a backlash of opinion
19 The Servant o f India , 6 March 1919, p. 53, claimed that these concessions resulted from
Moderate influence, and the evidence suggests that the 3 year limit resulted from private discussions
between the Government and Moderate leaders. V to S/S, ptel., 11 Feb. 1919, CIO.
20 Sastri to Vaze, 3 March 1919, Sastri MSS, NAI, emphasis in original. A number of other 
amendments were accepted, see Robb, Government o f India , pp. 162-3.
21 Chelmsford told Montagu of ’a nucleus of reasonable people led by Sastri and Baneijea...’. V 
to S/S, 12 March 1919, A/8. The figures show that out of 16 divisions on the Rowlatt Bill, Wacha 
voted twice with the officials and Sastri, Majithia and Nandi did this once, Mahajan, Imperialist 
Strategy, p. 171.
22 V to S/S, 20 March 1919, A/8.
23 Chelmsford to King George V, 21 May 1919, Cl.
24 B.N. Sarma also thought of resigning but was persuaded by the Viceroy not to. See Mahajan, 
op. cit., p. 173.
25 Idem. Also V to S/S, ptel., 28 March 1919, CIO.
26 See V(HD) to S/S, ptel. 242, 6 March 1919, CIO. The manifesto was dated 2 March 1919. 
Naturally the Extremists were disappointed by the action of the Moderates- Khaparde remarking that 
’They [the Moderates] were not called upon to help Gandhi, but why should they obstruct him?’. Kunte 
(ed.), Khaparde Correspondence, p. 451, entry for 2 March 1919.
27 Sastri to Vaze, 3 March 1919, Sastri MSS, NAI.
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in Britain and might jeopardise the reforms, for which the Moderates had sacrificed so 
much.28 Another Moderate, R.P. Paranjpye, probably summarised Moderate 
dislike for passive resistance when he said that ’such a movement, though it may start 
as a protest against the bills, will very soon degenerate- expand if you like- into a 
movement against law and order generally.,29 He felt that the movement was 
bound to fall under the control of Extremists leaders and that the Moderates would 
lose their reputation for supporting progress with order if they lent their support to it. 
Like other Moderates, Paranjpye stressed the need not to jeopardise the reforms, 
which ’however meagre they may be, will put more power into our hands....’30
The growing division between the Moderates and Gandhi can be traced back 
earlier in the war when Sastri’s Servants of India Society had rejected Gandhi’s 
application for membership on the grounds that Gandhi would have radically changed 
the nature of the Society.31 Many Moderates objected to the religiosity which 
Gandhi imported into the nationalist movement (though so too did many Extremists, 
e.g. Tilak and his followers). Sastri regarded Gandhi as a good man, but one who was 
politically naive.32 Mrs Besant added her voice to those nationalists who objected 
to passive resistance against the Rowlatt Act, and thus edged closer to the Moderates.
The violence that took place in various parts of India as a result of Gandhi’s 
campaign of passive resistance and Government responses to it brought protests from 
all sections of Indian political opinion.33 Details of events in the Punjab were still 
hazy and it took some months before news of the Amritsar Massacre, which took
28 Idem. Also V.S.S. Sastri to Sapru, copy pi., 4 March 1919, Sastri MSS, NAI.
29 R.P. Paranjpye to Satyananda Bose, 28 Feb. 1919, Paranjpye MSS.
30 Idem.
31 Gandhi was, of course, originally a Moderate and a follower of G.K. Gokhale. The British 
seem to have continued to regard him as so, although a rather maverick one, as long as he was 
recruiting for them during the War. Thus he was invited to the Delhi Unity Conference in April 1918.
32 ’A straight, unbending, adorable person, but unpractical.’ was how Sastri described Gandhi. 
V.S.S. Sastri to Sapru, copy pi., 4 March 1919, Sastri MSS, NAI.
33 For details of the satyagraha in different regions see R. Kumar (ed.), Essays on Gandhian 
Politics. The Rowlatt Satyagraha o f 1919, Oxford, 1971.
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place on 13 April 1919, became general knowledge. But Surendranath Baneijea 
telegraphed an early appeal for the withdrawal of martial law, the replacement of 
O’Dwyer as Lieutenant-Governor, the release of the two leaders, Kitchlew and 
Satyapal, who had been deported from the Punjab, and the use of ordinary criminal 
procedure for those arrested.34 The fact that Moderates protested as loudly as the 
Extremists over Government actions tended to alienate the British, who felt that the 
Moderates should have supported them in what was the most serious crisis they had 
faced since the Mutiny.35 Willingdon protested of the Moderates that ’they don’t 
care to come out honestly or courageously in even partial support of Government on 
any occasion’.36
The approaches of the Moderates and Extremists to the Rowlatt legislation and 
the violence that took place in India in April 1919 were markedly different. Moderates 
maintained the view that Government had a duty to maintain law and order, and, 
whilst they protested loudly at what they considered repressive measures, they adhered 
to the view that all protest should be through constitutional channels.37 Whilst the 
Extremists talked of boycott and passive resistance, Moderate leaders, such as Sastri, 
believed that they achieved real improvements in the legislation due to discussions 
with the Government of India. Likewise, they believed that they were much more 
successful than the Congress delegation in discussing the Punjab issue when they were 
in London for the Joint Select Committee hearings in 1919.38 The Moderates 
recognised the wrongs that had been done by the British in the Punjab in April 1919 
and protested as fully as they could at the prolongation of martial law, but they
34 Baneijea to Chelmsford, 28 April. 1919, C22.
35 See, for instance, the resolutions of the Moderate Conference Committee held in Calcutta on 27 
April 1919, reported in the Leader, 1 May 1919.
36 Willingdon to Chelmsford, 23 April 1919, C22. ’But’, he added, T still feel that we must try 
to bolster them up and see if we can’t get a little courage, Dutch or otherwise into their natures.’
37 Wacha to G.A. Natesan, 12 April 1919, Natesan MSS.
38 V.S.S. Sastri to Ramaswami Sastri, 17 Aug. 1919, Sastri MSS, NMML.
117
believed that the remedy lay through normal channels of protest. Two Moderates, 
Pandit Jagat Narayan and Chimanlal Setalvad, agreed to sit on the Hunter Committee 
which'was set up to examine the happenings in the Punjab. The Indian Members 
insisted on signing a minority report which was much more critical than the majority 
report of the way in which British officials had handled the crisis.39 But the 
Moderates position on the Punjab entirely failed to match the public mood, and 
whereas Extremist leaders identified themselves with the sufferings of the people of 
the Punjab by visiting the province and collecting evidence from witnesses for their 
independent enquiry, the Moderates lay low, knowing that if they raised their heads 
they were likely to be reviled by both British and nationalists alike.40 It was hard 
for the public to understand why, on this of all issues, the Moderates and Extremists 
should not have joined forces in England and India in pressing their case. But, whilst 
Congress held its annual session at Amritsar the Moderates stayed at Calcutta, and 
ignored Motilal Nehru’s pleas that they should attend the Congress.41 The 
Bombay Liberals justified their refusal by arguing that although they agreed with 
Congress about the Punjab grievances they differed as to the best means to protest 
about them.42
Not only did the Liberal response to the Punjab issue fail to match the public 
mood but it also indicated important divisions in the Moderate Party. These were 
illustrated in the debates on an Indemnity Bill which the Government put before the 
legislature in September 1919 in order to try and protect officials from private
39 See pp. 137 below for more details.
40 See Sapru to V.S.S. Sastri, April 1919, Sastri MSS, NAI. For complaints from the Punjab of 
the failure of Moderate leaders to come to the Punjab, see Ruchi Ram to Devadhar, 30 Dec. 1919, 
Sivaswamy Aiyer MSS.
41 See P.S.S. Aiyer to M. Nehru, 5 Dec. 1919; M. Nehru to P.S.S. Aiyer, 12 Dec. 1919, M. 
Nehru MSS.
42 As evidence of this they cited the Congress boycott of the Hunter Committee because of the 
restrictions on non-official evidence. See ’Draft reply to Congress letters of 20 Nov. & 1 Dec. 1919 
exhorting the Liberals to attend the next session of Congress’, Dec. 1919, WINLA correspondence 
files.
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prosecutions on actions they had taken during the Punjab crisis. Some Liberals, such 
as Sivaswamy Aiyer, opposed the Indemnity Bill as prejudging issues prior to an 
enquiry, but others, notably Sir Dinshaw Wacha, supported the bill.43
2. The Joint Select Committee of 1919
The proceedings of the Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament 
on the India Bill, 1919, were significant for two reasons. Firstly, because they largely 
decided the final shape of the Montford reforms, determining that there should be no 
going back on the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals, and, indeed, that in certain 
important respects there should be advance. Secondly, however, the events that took 
place in London in 1919 helped to harden and define the splits in the nationalist 
movement which had opened up over the issue of constitutional reform in the previous 
year. Although the Congress ’old-guard’ had been effectively ousted from positions 
of importance in the organization in 1918, the split was not irrevocable. Some 
Moderates, such as Srinivasa Sastri, were expecting to attend future Congress 
meetings to put their point of view. They realized the importance of maintaining, as 
far possible, a united nationalist front if the British were to take them seriously and 
not to play on divisions within the nationalist movement. Sastri’s view was that the 
delegations, even if they could not co-operate on the reforms issue, should at least 
come together on the Punjab and South African questions.44 Amongst the 
Extremists, B.G. Tilak also felt that the deputations should co-operate, and that the 
differences between his followers and those of Besant’s delegation, which now tended 
to ally with Moderates, were minimal and that every effort should be made to
43 See P.S.S. Aiyer to V.S.S. Sastri, [n.d.], Sept. 1919, Aiyer MSS; V(HD) to S/S, ptel. 948, 
29 Sept. 1919, & V to S/S, ptel.916, 20 Sept. 1919, C ll.
44 V.S.S. Sastri to V.S. Ramaswami Sastri, 17 Aug. 1919, Sastri MSS, NMML.
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achieve co-operation.45 Unfortunately, Sastri and Tilak represented only the 
middle spectrum of their respective parties, and were outvoted by their 
colleagues.46 The result was that the Moderates and Extremists not only failed to 
join together on the Punjab issue on which they generally agreed, but also gave 
separate and conflicting evidence to the Joint Committee, thus parading their 
differences publicly in England.
On 3 July 1919, the House of Commons voted to put the Government of India 
Bill to a Joint Select Committee of both Houses of Parliament.47 The Committee 
was to consider whether the Bill, which was substantially based on the 
Montagu-Chelmsford Report of July 1918, was the best way to execute the 
Government’s policy announcement of 20 August 1917. In fact there were five 
documents for the Committee to consider. First, the Reforms Bill drawn up by a 
Cabinet Committee consisting of Sinha, Milner, Fisher and Chamberlain; next, the 
two reports of the Franchise and Functions committees, which had investigated 
detailed aspects of the reforms during the winter of 1918/19, and in which Moderates 
had participated; fourthly, the Crewe Committee Report on the Home Management of 
Indian Affairs ; and lastly, the Government of India’s considered recommendations on 
the preceding documents, set out in a despatch of 5 March 1919. The Joint Select 
Committee had, in effect, not only to decide whether dyarchy was the best means of 
implementing reform, but also whether they preferred the alternative dyarchical
43 S.L. Karandikar, Lokamanya Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Poona, 1957, p. 525.
46 For the position of Tilak and his supporters, see V.S.S. Sastri to A.V. Patwardhan, 26 June
1919, in T.N. Jagadisan (ed.) Letters o f Srinivasa Sastri, London 1963 edn., p. 56 [hereafter Sastri 
Letters]. For an idea of Sastri’s sense of isolation at this time, see V.S.S. Sastri to Venkatasubbiah, 10
Sept. 1919, Sastri MSS, S.I.S., Madras.
47 The members of Committee were:- from the House of Lords: Lord S el borne (chairman), 
Marquess of Crewe,-Duke of Northumberland, Viscount Midleton, Lord Islington, Lord Sinha and 
Lord Sydenham. From the House of Commons: T.J. Bennett, Sir Henry Craik, Major Ormsby-Gore, 
Sir John Rees, Ben Spoor, Edwin Montagu, F.D. Acland.
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schemes of the Government of India or of the Secretary of State.48 The essential 
difference between Delhi and Whitehall was that whereas the former supported 
dyarchy in the provinces, they did not wish to see any weakening of British authority 
at the centre. Montagu, on the other hand, saw the opportunity to broaden the reforms 
scheme, something which he had failed to achieve in the initial negotiations with 
Chelmsford, and which would have been impolitic in the period after the report was 
published. In particular, he wished to add a third Indian member to the Viceroy’s 
Executive Council, to give both provincial and central legislative assemblies the right 
to vote on budgets, with the provincial budget to include both reserved and transferred 
subjects, and for higher education to be added to the list of transferred subjects in the 
provinces. These were all points on which Montagu could expect support from the 
main Indian delegations to the Committee, but the advantage to Montagu of fostering 
the Moderate delegation rather than the more widely representative Congress 
delegation was that it suited his political game. He believed that the support of the 
Extremists would only serve to alienate the more conservative members of the 
Committee. The Moderates, however, were pictured as representative of reasonable 
Indian opinion, and were used by Montagu to argue his case for liberalising the 
reforms. Significantly, they were allowed to present their evidence first, and when 
Tilak stood up to put the Congress case, not only did the die-hard Lord Sydenham 
leave the room, but, much to Tilak’s surprise and dismay, he was not even 
cross-examined by the rest of the committee. The Moderates were rewarded by being 
allowed into government circles; Srinivasa Sastri was included in the India Office 
team which helped to draft the Bill, and Surendranath Baneijea was appointed the only 
non-official member of a committee to enquire into the applicability of the institutions
48 For detailed discussion see Robb, Government o f India, pp. 105-16, and Rumbold, Watershed, 
p. 157 if.. Rumbold points out that, unusually, the Cabinet had refused to give their support to the 
Reforms Bill before publication of the report of the Joint Select Committee. This gave the committee 
greater power to determine the final outcome of the reforms.
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of local self-government in England to Indian conditions.49 Sir James Meston, 
representing the Government of India’s interests in England, was horrified at the sway 
of the Indian Moderates over Montagu.50 Meston regarded Moderate influence as 
sinister and saw his own role as counteracting it, whilst keeping Chelmsford as well 
informed of the proceedings as possible.51 Not surprisingly, Meston was pleased 
when the delegations returned to India, and he felt certain that Montagu became more 
reasonable when ’released from the curious magnetic influence which Sastri, 
Chintamani & Co. exercise over him’.52 The end result of the deliberations of the 
Joint Select Committee was a compromise which, whilst upholding dyarchy in the 
provinces, proved reluctant to go much further in the direction of the demands of the 
Indian nationalists. Montagu’s most important victories were the addition of a third 
Indian member on the Viceroy’s Executive Council, the addition of higher education 
as a transferred subject in the provinces, and the granting of some powers over the 
budget to the central legislature.
On the face of it, therefore, the Moderates were not very successful in their 
tactic of allying their demands with those of the Secretary of State. However, this 
would be to misunderstand their expectations in 1919. Their greatest anxiety was that 
the reforms might in fact be whittled down under pressure from the bureaucracy in 
India. Their fears were based upon their knowledge of the fact that the majority of the 
local governors continued to oppose dyarchy and had come up with a unitary scheme 
which emphasised the power of provincial governors to override their executive and 
legislative councils as they thought necessary.53 As Rumbold says, their scheme
49 See S. Baneijea, A Nation in the Making, Madras, 1925, p. 324.
50 See Meston to Chelmsford, 31 Oct. 1919, C15.
51 See Rumbold, Watershed, p. 167.
52 Meston to Chelmsford, 10 Aug. 1919, C15.
53 In fact only Bihar & Orissa supported the dyarchical scheme when the local governors met in 
January 1919. See V to S/S, 15 Jan. 1919, enclosure B ,’The Structure of the Provincial Executive.’ 
MS.
122
’would have left the door open for India’s progress to self-government otherwise than 
down the path of the Westminster system of parliamentary democracy.,54 
Chelmsford’s argument was that the governors were continuing on the lines of 
association of Indians with government rather than responsibility of Indians in 
government. O’Dwyer rather confirmed Chelmsford’s view when he stated that the 
governors
...had not been thinking of the politicians or the politically minded 
classes. Their anxiety for the good government of the country explained 
what might be regarded as anomalous in their views, their adherence to 
the existing system and their desire for continuity. In their plan they 
had deliberately given a back seat to responsibility in fulfilment of their 
duty to the great masses.55
The ’satraps” scheme, as Montagu called it, was sent to the Joint Select Committee 
accompanying the Government of India’s despatch of 5 March 1919, which was in 
itself a conservative interpretation of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report.56 The 
controversial features of the despatch were the insistence on a separation of reserved 
and transferred finances in the provinces (a departure from the original report), the 
disapproval of making higher education a transferred subject, and opposition to any 
further concessions in the Government of India.57 C.Y. Chintamani saw the 
Government of India proposals as another example of the bureaucracy tending to 
whittle down in practice what had been conceded in principle.58 Kunzru believed
54 Rumbold, Watershed, p. 156. Chelmsford wrote that the govemors’s scheme ’would be an 
admirable working out of the Government of India despatch of 1916 but, if accepted, the Moderate 
Party in India would be shattered.’ V to S/S, 15 Jan. 1919, MS.
55 Minutes of a conference between Viceroy, Heads of Government and Government of India, Jan.
1919. Enclosure to V to S/S, 22 Jan. 1919, MS.
56 This was Montagu’s description but it was accepted by Chelmsford also. See S/S to V, 31 
March 1919, M3 ; V to S/S, 30 April 1919, MS.
57 For an explanation of the rationale behind these requirements see Robb, Government o f  India, 
pp. 107-8.
58 Servant o f India, 29 May 1919, pp. 196-8.
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that the proposal for a divided purse, which he attributed to Meston, would, if 
accepted by the committee, give a death blow to responsible government in the 
provinces. He argued that it was ’easily the most reactionary and the most dangerous 
of all the amendments which the Government of India desire to see introduced into the 
scheme. ’59 In the end a compromise was reached on this last issue whereby there 
was to be a joint purse originally, but the government was to be allowed to intervene 
and allocate separate revenues for the two halves of government if friction 
occurred.60 Higher education did become a transferred subject, whilst the 
Government of India remained inviolate, apart from having to accept a third Indian 
member on the Viceroy’s Council, and the grant of limited budgetary powers to the 
legislature.61
From the Moderate point of view, the first task of their delegation to London 
was to ensure that ’the reactionary proposals made by the Government of India in 
their despatch of 5 March and the alternative scheme of five heads of local 
governments were not accepted by the Joint Committee.’62 The second task was 
to see that the Bill was brought up to the level of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report in 
all essentials, and thirdly the deputation sought ’to press for an advance over that 
scheme on the lines of the Moderate Conference of November [1918], more 
particularly as regards fiscal autonomy and the introduction of a measure of 
responsibility in the Central Government.’63 The Moderate view of the situation 
was basically pessimistic. They believed that they would do well to hold on to the 
Montagu-Chelmsford scheme, let alone advance on it, particularly in view of the 
emphasis they placed on the influence of conservative factors in Britain in the
59 H.N. Kunzru report, 28 Aug. 1919, Servant o f India, 25 Sept. 1919, pp. 404-6.
60 Ibid., p. 110.
61 Military, political and certain other subjects were not to be voted on.
62 Chintamani speech on returning to India, Servant o f India, 4 Dec. 1919, pp. 525-7.
63 Idem.
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finalising of the reforms. They over-emphasised the potential influence of die-hards 
like Lord Sydenham and the Indo-British Association, and were worried by the fact 
that Lords Sydenham and Midleton, both considered to be Tast-ditchers’t were 
appointed to the Joint Select Committee and that the chairman, Lord Selbome, had 
recently questioned the suitability of establishing responsible government in India on 
the lines of the dominions in a speech in the Lords in 1918.64
This Moderate pessimism is an important key to their tactics in 1919 and is in 
marked contrast to the position of the Congress delegation who believed that talk of 
die-hard influence was a trick of the bureaucracy to try to get Indians to reduce their 
demands.65 This pessimism was not warranted, especially in view of the fact 
that, as Curzon noticed, Montagu had packed the Joint Select Committee with people 
likely to support him.66
In his report on events in India in 1919, Professor Rushbrook Williams had 
written fulsomely of the success of the Moderate delegation in London in 1919. He 
wrote that,
Indeed there was little doubt as the summer went on, that the Moderate 
party, both on account of the responsible attitude of its representatives, 
and the skill with which they urged their case, had been more 
successful in winning for itself the confidence of English public men in 
power than had been the case with the extreme Nationalist 
Party...When the Joint Committee’s report was published, it was hailed 
by the Moderate party and by Mrs Besant’s supporters as a conspicuous 
triumph. Nor indeed can it be denied that the views and opinions 
which had been submitted by these bodies had exerted very great 
influence upon the final shaping of the measure, for while the Moderate
64 See Servant o f India, 10 July 1919, p. 266. Selbome’s background was, indeed, not very 
promising to Moderate expectations. He had been Governor of the Transvaal and High Commissioner 
of South Africa in the years 1905 to 1910 when the South African Union was being developed.
65 Tilak put great emphasis on the fact that the die-hard bogey had been exaggerated and it was 
’therefore, no use lessening our demands in view of this opposition.’ Tilak to Khaparde, 5 & 13 March 
1919, B.G. Kunte (ed.), Khaparde Correspondence, pp. 82-4. See also Tilak to D.V. Gokhale, 23 Jan. 
1919, ibid., p. 4; B.S. Moonje, ’How We are Getting On’, 1 May 1919, ibid., p. 13.
66 Curzon to Montagu, 27 June 1919, AS3I3I26.
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party had not secured the satisfaction of every claim put forward, they
had been successful in achieving much.67
Yet one needs to treat this piece of propaganda with some caution. Were the 
Moderates really so effective in presenting their case or was Rushbrook Williams 
trying to encourage the political methods of the Moderates? It seems that a number of 
factors undermined the effectiveness of the Moderate delegation. Firstly, the 
pessimism that we have noted seems to have vitiated their position in seeking 
improvements in the reforms from the Joint Select Committee. Despite their demands 
for further revisions to be made to the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals, it was 
transparently clear that they were generally satisfied with the reforms offered and that 
they would work whatever scheme was finally granted. Surendranath Baneijea, the 
Moderate leader, argued that this was the main difference between his delegation and 
the Congress delegation; the latter refused to accept the reforms unless they were 
greatly transformed. The drawback of this position as a negotiating stance is obvious, 
and the failure of the Moderates to make a stronger critique of the reforms needs 
explaining. Firstly, of course, support for the reforms was the raison d'etre for the 
Moderates; to go back on their general acceptance of the reforms would make a 
nonsense of their having stood apart from Congress and of having organised a 
separate delegation to London.68 Secondly, they undoubtedly felt ties of loyalty 
to Montagu, who had taken them into his confidence and appeared to be jeopardising 
his whole career for Indian reforms. Finally, as we have seen, they accepted the view 
which Montagu propagated, namely that if Indians raised their demands too high they
67 L.F. Rushbrook Williams, India in 1919, Calcutta, 1920, p. 45. This publication was the new 
form of presentation of the annual report made by the Government of India to Parliament. It was 
formerly known as the Moral and Material Progress Report and the new format was a sign of the new 
interest shown in propagating the official view on Indian affairs. Its author was later appointed 
Director of Publicity. See Robb, Government o f India, p. 32.
68 As Tilak explained, in a different context, the Moderates needed to differentiate themselves 
from the Extremists- 'to show they are four annas less than you...that they are Moderates’ as he put it. 
Tilak to Khaparde, 13 March 1919, Kunte (ed.), Khaparde Correspondence, p. 84.
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would be playing into the hands of the die-hards in Britain, who would see that the 
reforms were wrecked.
Another problem for the Moderates was that they could not maintain unity in 
their delegation, small though it was. For example, whereas Baneijea and Sastri 
stood out against the vote for women at this stage, Chintamani and Prithwis Chandra 
Ray argued in its favour. Some of the delegates could not resist giving their personal 
opinions, even if they conflicted with the official party line.69 Sastri was 
exasperated with the" open divisions within the delegation and the personal 
backbiting.70 At this stage there was little question of party cohesion or discipline; 
the Moderate party gave the impression of being largely made up of ageing ’prima 
donnas’, anxious not to be upstaged by their rivals from other regions. The Bengalis, 
Surendranath Baneijea and Prithwis Chandra Ray, whose region had dominated 
Congress politics for so long, maintained a rivalry with the younger delegates from 
the United Provinces, H.N. Kunzru and C.Y. Chintamani. All of this was particularly 
distressing to Srinivasa Sastri as he felt a particular obligation to help Montagu with 
the reforms, and saw himself as playing a very similar role to that of his guru 
Gokhale in the making of the 1909 reforms. Sastri was impressed by Montagu on a 
personal basis, and also by the difficulties which the latter faced in British political 
circles.71
Sastri contrasted his role in London with that of Tilak who ’has no entry into 
the higher political circles’.72 He realized though that there was a danger of the
69 Kunzru reported that K.C. Roy and Prithwis Chandra Ray, although witnesses on behalf of the 
Moderates deputation, 'did not support the representation submitted to the committee by the deputation 
and took a line of their own.’ Servant o f India, 11 Sept. 1919, p. 380.
70 V.S. Sastri to Venkatasubbiah, 27 Aug. 1919, Sastri MSS, S.I.S., Madras.
71 V.S.S. Sastri to Joshi [presumably N.M. Joshi], 5 June 1919; V.S.S. Sastri to Ramaswami 
[Sastri], 14 Aug. 1919, Sastri Mss, S.I.S., Madras. Further evidence of the unbounded admiration 
which the Moderates felt for Montagu may be found in Baneijea, Nation, p. 323.
72 V.S.S. Sastri to S.G.Vaze, 28 May 1919, Sastri MSS, S.I.S., Madras.
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Moderates losing political support in India if they were seen to be 
’official-worshipping’ and if they neglected to maintain an activist stance.73
There were four other main delegations, representing the Congress, the 
Besantite or National Home Rule League, the Muslim League, and the Justice Party, 
representing the non-Brahmins of South India. The Moderate delegation seems to 
have enjoyed good relationships with Besant’s group, and with the Muslim League, 
represented by M.A. Jinnah, whose political views virtually coincided with the 
Moderates. Besant benefited from co-operation with the Moderates by being treated 
well in official circles in London, whilst she in turn, provided them with an indirect 
link with Labour Party circles through M.P.s like George Lansbury and John Scurr. 
Besant also provided them with her dynamic organizational and activist skills, 
something notably lacking in Moderate circles. Her evidence was superbly presented 
and provided strong support for the Moderate case. There were minor areas of 
disagreement, particularly with Baneijea’s more conservative interpretation of the 
Moderate programme, but, on the whole, Besant accepted the need for gradualism, 
remarking that ’it is wise to conciliate contrary opinion, to effect by compromise that 
which otherwise might arouse dangerous conflict of opinion and increase racial 
antagonism’.74 Besant agreed with Sastri and other Moderates that communal 
electorates should be opposed on principle ( the Lucknow Pact with the Muslims being 
a temporary exception). Sastri, himself, refused to do a deal with the Justice Party 
representatives and, inevitably, the Moderates received tough cross-examination from 
the die-hard supporters of the non-Brahmins.75
Besant had arrived in London in a very similar position of political isolation to 
the Moderates. Her views were nearest to those of Srinivasa Sastri, who did not yet
73 V.S.S. Sastri to Venkatasubbiah, 10 Sept. 1919, Sastri Mss, S.I.S., Madras.
74 See Mrs. Besant’s evidence to the Joint Select Committee, Report of the Joint Select 
Committee, vol.2, Evidence, H.C. 203, 1919, para. 1336, p. 72.
75 See Irschick, Politics and Social Conflict in South India, pp. 137 ff., for more details.
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see the break with Congress as irrevocable. She had, after all, played the leading role 
in re-uniting Congress in 1915-1916,and she regarded Congress as a pluralistic rather 
than a monolithic organisation.76 In December 1918, she and Sastri had been 
soundly defeated on a number of issues at the annual Congress session. The most 
important issue was the Tilakite demand for immediate provincial autonomy, which 
Sastri and Besant opposed on the grounds that unless there was a simultaneous 
advance in central government they would merely be playing into British hands by 
allowing their rulers to oversee India’s centrifugal tendencies. Besant had good 
reason to resent the way in which the followers of Tilak and Gandhi were forcing her 
and her supporters out of the regional Congress organisations. She refused to be 
mandated as a Congress delegate to the Joint Select Committee and, despite strenuous 
efforts by the Tilakites to arrange for her to work jointly with the Congress 
delegation, she maintained her separate role.77 Despite never formally joining the 
Moderate party (she would not have been allowed admittance by the Bombay 
Moderates in particular), henceforth she was, in effect, one of their number. After 
the delegations returned to India, the Tilakites made a devastating attack on Besant’s 
activities in London, complaining that ’she, like the Moderates, embarrassed the 
Congress deputation and obstructed its work’.78 There some truth in these 
charges, as Besant was an active and effective organiser of Parliamentary, particularly
76 See A. Besant ’Letter to Various Political Leaders’, 29 Dec. 1924, Besant MSS. For more 
details on Mrs. Besant’s political position at this time, see P. Woods, ’Annie Besant in Indian Politics, 
1914-1929’, unpublished paper presented to postgraduate seminar on Commonwealth History, Institute 
of Commonwealth Studies, London University, 1974.
77 For Tilak’s desire to keep in with Mrs Besant see Tilak to D.V. Gokhale, 6 Feb. 1919, Tilak 
to Khaparde, 6 Feb. 1919, in Kunte (ed.),Khaparde Correspondence, pp. 6 & 80. Also Kelkar to 
Besant, 17 Jan. 1919, and Besant to Kelkar, 24 Jan. 1919, Besant MSS.
78 See Tilak to A.I.C.C., 16 April 1920, letter published as a supplement to the Mahratta 
newspaper, 25 April 1920, and reproduced in T.V. Parvate, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Ahmedabad, 1972 
edn., pp. 458-64.
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Labour, support, for which the Congress was also vying.79 It is ironic to find that 
Besant, who was interned by the British in 1917 for her nationalist activities, was now 
allowed to present her evidence immediately after Baneijea and before the Congress, 
despite the fact that she represented no organisation of any standing in India. 
Conversely, from being the darling of the Indian nationalist movement in 1917-1918, 
she was now likened by Khaparde to Putana, the Puranic female demon.80
One of the major sources of conflict between the Moderate and Congress 
delegations was over the control of the British Committee of the Congress. This 
committee resulted from the traditional Congress emphasis on propaganda in England. 
Indeed, for many years Congress spent more money on its propagandising activities in 
England than it did on its work in India.81 Tilak and other members of the ’New 
Party’ generally believed that Congress resources should be concentrated in India. 
However, when the Tilakites gained control of Congress in 1918, they were keen to 
continue the work of the British Committee of Congress, which they regarded as a 
valuable propaganda weapon in a period when major decisions relating to India would 
be taken in London, in the case of the constitutional reforms, or Paris, in the case of 
the post-war peace conference. Tilak also valued the committee as a means of 
maintaining contact with the Labour Party, which he expected one day to form the 
Government. What was needed was to bring the work of the British Committee into 
line with Congress policies. Tilak, in England since November 1918 pursuing his 
libel case against the Times journalist, Valentine Chirol, regarded the British
79 Parvate , Tilak., p. 462. The Moderates did not share the enthusiasm of Besant and Tilak for 
securing Labour Party support; quite apart from their natural inclination towards the British Liberal 
Party, they did not feel it was wise to put all their political eggs into one basket.
80 Idem.
81 For the history of Congress activities in England, see H. Kaushick, The Indian National 
Congress in England (1885-1920), Delhi, 1972.
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Committee and its organ India as mere adjuncts of the India Office.82 Dr Clark, 
the acting Chairman, followed what he himself regarded as a policy of neutrality 
between the Moderate and Extremist factions, although this policy tended to maintain 
the status quo ante the Extremist takeover. Clark’s view was that income from 
Congress delegate fees assigned to the British Committee only amounted to about one 
half of expenditure, and that the balance was made up by voluntary contributions in 
this country.83 The clear message was that if Congress wished to call the tune 
they must first pay the piper. Sastri, realizing the danger of losing control of the 
British Committee, wired India for money to be sent immediately to secure its 
allegiance.84
The Tilakites eventually won the day and insisted that the British Committee 
adopt a new constitution, which was in line with its Indian parent. The Moderate,
H.S.L. Polak, was replaced as editor of India by Helena Normanton. Just as in India, 
the Moderates responded to their defeat by establishing their own rival organizations. 
Annie Besant set up the Parliamentary Committee on India, which was made up 
mostly of Theosophists and Labour politicians. It was typical of Besant’s dynamism 
that by 1920 between 200 and 250 Trade Union and Labour organisations were 
claimed to be affiliated to this body.
The Moderates, led by N.M. Samarth, organised their own Indian Reform 
Committee, which received a message of support from Edwin Montagu on its 
inauguration in January 1920.85 There can be little doubt that the India Office
82 See B.G. Tilak et al.,’Paper to be placed before the Subjects Committee of the Indian National 
Congress , Dec. 1918, on The British Committee of the Indian National Congress’, dated 28 Nov. 
1918, Besant MSS.
83 See Indian Review, 1 April 1919.
84 See V.S. Sastri to Vaze, 28 May 1919, Sastri MSS, S.I.S., Madras.
85 For more details on the Parliamentary Committee on India and on the Indian Reforms 
Committee, see C. Cook et al. (eds.), Sources in British Political History, 1900-1951, vol.l, A Guide 
to the Archives of Selected Organizations and Societies, London, 1975, section on ’Indian Pressure 
Groups’.
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encouraged the setting up of this organization; this surely was the British organisation 
in support of the Indian Moderate Party which Montagu had promised during his visit 
to India in 1917-18. 86 The membership of the committee included Lord 
Carmichael, the Liberal ex-Govemor of Bengal, Charles Roberts, who had served on 
the Montagu delegation to India in the winter of 1917-1918, J.D. Rees M .P., who 
served on the Joint Select Committee, and Evan Cotton of the old Liberal Indian civil 
servant family. Like some other Indian Liberal institutions, the Indian Reform 
Committee existed more in name than in activity, but it does confirm the close links 
that were maintained between the India Office and the Indian Moderates. The final 
irony is that, after the prolonged struggle for control of the British Committee, the 
victorious Extremists were soon to find the Committee disbanded as a result of the 
adoption of the new Gandhian constitution for Congress in December 1920. 
Henceforth, Congress managed without a British organization until Krishna Menon 
founded the India League in 1930.
Was the distance that the Moderates kept from the Congress delegation in 1919 
really necessary and did it damage the nationalist cause? Certainly the Congress 
delegation thought so. 87 In questioning Surendranath Baneijea, Ben Spoor, the 
Labour M.P., asserted that ’the Congress and the Moderates differed very little in 
fundamentals on the reforms’.88 Naturally, Baneijea disagreed, arguing that the 
Congress refused to accept the reforms unless the scheme was greatly transformed, 
whereas the Moderates welcomed the scheme as a definite advance, whilst pressing 
for changes. But as Kunzru admitted,
M See Montagu, Indian Diary, p. 70.
87 See Tilak to AT.C.C., 16 April 1920, letter published as a supplement to the Mahratta 
newspaper, 25 April 1920, and reproduced in Parvate, Tilak, pp. 458-64.
88 Jt. Sel. Comm. Report, vol.2 , para. 1113, p. 64.
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on most questions of practical importance the deputations gave 
expression to similar views. For instance every deputation asked for the 
introduction of responsibility into the central government, the 
equalisation of the number of Indians and Europeans in the Viceroy’s 
Executive Council, the grant of fiscal autonomy, unified finance in the 
provinces, the inclusion of land revenue among transferred subjects, 
etc. etc..89
The issues on which the Moderates and Extremists differed were the demand of the 
latter for immediate transfer of all powers at the provincial level to Indian Ministers 
and also their desire for a fixed time limit for the achievement of self-government. 
Moderates believed that neither of these demands were in harmony with the British 
view of the declaration of 20 August 1917 and that they would be refused. It is 
difficult to believe, however, that the prospects of the reforms would be damaged by 
making a case for constitutional changes which the British felt to be too advanced. It 
was not as if the Congress was threatening to boycott the reforms if their demands 
were not met. Vithalbhai Patel, giving evidence on behalf of the Congress, agreed 
that if the Bill was passed on its present line the Congress would work it, whilst 
continuing to agitate to change it.90 The differences between the Moderates and 
Extremists continued to reflect a combination of personal rivalries and fundamental 
differences in outlook on the interplay between the nationalist movement and the 
imperial ruler. The question of constitutional reform brought these rivalries to a head 
and crystallised the differences of outlook but were not in themselves the cause of the 
rift.
Congress’s eventual decision to boycott the reforms resulted not from any 
deficiencies in the reforms themselves, but from the unrelated issues of Amritsar and 
the Khilafat. The boycott decision was not taken until September 1920 and that
89 Servant o f India, 4 Dec. 1919, p. 522.
90 Ibid., paras. 1790 & 1791, p. 112.
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decision, it is now apparent, was a much closer affair than has been previously been 
recognised. 91
3. Congress Opts for Non-co-operation.
On 23 December 1919 the royal assent was given to the India Act and the 
inauguration of the new reforms was marked by a general amnesty for those convicted 
of political offences or detained under special legislation. The fact that the central 
issue between the Moderates and Extremists had now been decided on might have led 
to expectations that the Moderates would now rejoin the Congress. Srinivasa Sastri did 
indeed favour such a line and attended the annual Congress session at Amritsar.92 
The address of the Congress President Motilal Nehru was suitably conciliatory and a 
resolution was passed thanking Montagu for his efforts and urging the working of the 
reforms (admittedly in somewhat ambiguous terms and balanced by a continued 
condemnation of the reforms).93 But again Sastri was in a minority; Sivaswamy 
Aiyer and other prominent Moderate leaders rejected calls from Motilal Nehru to 
attend the Congress and continued with the Moderate Conference, which was held in 
Calcutta.94 At this Conference the name of the Moderate Party was changed to 
the National Liberal Federation and a constitution and programme of work was 
established.95 In his presidential speech Aiyer argued, rather illogically in view of 
the events of the last two years, that while the nationalist movement was struggling to 
wrest concessions from the Government it needed unity, but that now ’in time of
91 See R. Gordon, ’Non-co-operation and Council Entry, 1919-1920,’ Modern Asian Studies, 7, 3, 
(1973), pp. 443-73.
92 See A.M. Zaidi (ed.), The Encyclopedia o f the Indian National Congress, New Delhi, 1979, 
vol. 7, p. 454.
93 See Resolution xiv of the 34th. Session of the I.N.C., Dec. 1919. The most convenient place to 
find this is in A.M. Zaidi (ed.), op. cit., pp. 530-1.
94 See P.S.S. Aiyer to M. Nehru, 5 Dec. 1919, Motilal Nehru MSS.
95 See copy of the resolutions of the Moderate Conference in L/P&J/6/1656/1920.
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responsible government parties may be a good thing.’96 Sastri was not convinced, 
and wrote to Aiyer on the anniversary of the Amritsar massacre admitting that a party 
system was a necessary basis of parliamentary government, but indicating that the 
practical reality was that India did not have ideologically based parties at present, and 
was not likely to have them for some years to come.97 Sastri expected such 
parties to evolve in time, and that they would be based around disagreements over 
major issues, and not follow the lines of the division between Moderates and 
Extremists. He felt that the best chance for a successful working of the reforms was 
for all nationalists to unite rather than forming opposition groups to ministers. He still 
felt the magnetic force of the Congress Party and urged that Moderates should not be 
forced out or place themselves in positions where they were liable to be represented as 
enemies of Congress. ’I am all for moderate organs and liberal leagues’, he wrote,
’But they are to be for propaganda, not for conduct of elections or undermining 
Congress.’98 Sastri’s voice was, however, a lone one on this issue, and at the 
local level the Extremists took the view that only candidates who accepted the 
Congress resolutions framed at Amritsar could be endorsed on the Congress 
ticket.99 At the Bombay Provincial Conference held at Sholapur in April 1920 the 
Moderates and Extremists clashed head on. The Moderates, who included R.P. 
Paranjpye, B.S. Kamat, V.G. Kale, Sir Narayan Chandavarkar and Mrs Besant and 
her supporters, brought with them a very large number of supporters- the Deccan 
Sabha alone was reported to have issued one thousand delegate forms.100 The
96 Newspaper reports on the Moderate conference, in L/P&J/&/1648/1920.
97 V.S.S. Sastri to P.S.S. Aiyer, 13 April 1919, in Jagadisan (ed.), Sastri Letters, pp. 64-7.
98 Idem.
99 See Citizen, vol. 1, no. 3, 10 April 1920, p. 33, which reported on the recent provincial 
conferences at Jullundhar (Punjab), Midnapore (Bengal) and Sholapur (Bombay).
100 Home Poll, April 75-Dep. OM’s report 12.4. 1920, and enclosure ’A Bombay Letter’, 7 April 
1920. The Deccan Sabha formed an alliance with the non-Brahm ins and the depressed classes to 
oppose Tilak and the social conservatives. They had tried the same tactic a month earlier in March 1920 
when they unsuccessfully tried to take a large number of peasant delegates to the Poona District 
Conference at Junnar. See Deccan Sabha Annual Report for 1920-21, Deccan Sabha files, G.I.P.E..
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conference nearly disintegrated in violence and the police had to intervene. When 
peace was restored the Moderates argued the case that people should be asked to vote 
for candidates who adhered to the general policy of Congress on administrative and 
legislative questions, not just those who adhered to the views of only one Congress 
session. However, the Moderates were defeated by 1600 votes to 750. Jamnadas 
Dwarkadas accused Tilak of depriving the Congress of its national character and 
reducing it to a party institution.101
However, it was not the attitude to the reforms that was to be decisive in 
finally splitting the Liberals from the Congress Party but the decision taken by a 
Special Congress in August 1920 to undertake a programme of non-co-operation based 
upon two main grievances, the Khilafat issue and the continuance of the Punjab 
grievance. Liberals felt some sympathy with their fellow nationalists on both these 
issues but regarded Gandhi’s schemes of non-co-operation with abhorrence, 
particularly when, after July 1920, they came to include boycott of the new councils 
as part of their programme. The Khilafat issue came to a head in May 1920 with the 
publication of the allied peace terms which were being offered to Turkey. These terms 
seemed to undermine seriously the territorial integrity of the caliph or religious head 
of Islam. Many Indian Muslims were genuinely offended by what they regarded as a 
continuation of the dismemberment of the world of Islam by the dominant Christian 
states.102 At the end of the month a manifesto of the Central Khilafat Committee 
outlined plans for non-co-operation as a protest. At the beginning of June a four stage 
plan of non-co-operation was adopted, which involved, firstly the resignation of titles 
and honours, secondly the resignation of government posts, thirdly the resignation of
101 Home Poll, April 75-Dep. OM’s report 12.4. 1920, and enclosure ’A Bombay Letter’, 7 April
1920.
102 For details of the Khilafat movement (from rather different perspectives), see Brown, Gandhi’s 
Rise to Power, ch.6; Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement, New York, 1982.
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police and soldiers, and finally a refusal to pay taxes.103 Gandhi played a 
decisive role in the movement, believing that it was crucial to ally the Hindu and 
Muslim causes. It was not until the end of June, however, that Gandhi came out 
clearly in favour of boycott of the council elections which were due in 
November.104
Liberals, such as Srinivasa Sastri, were highly dubious of the idea of non-co- 
operation, especially in the cause of what they considered a Muslim religious issue. 
Sastri’s views were summed up in an article in the new organ of the Madras Liberals, 
the Citizen:
The main strength of their [Indian Muslims’] cause seems to rest on the 
pledge given by the Prime Minister of Great Britain, a pledge which is 
to be treated as idle breath because of the rich oil fields of Mosul and 
other temptations...I agree with Mr. Gandhi in condemning the 
violation of Mr. Lloyd George’s promise. But I do not agree with him 
in considering the people of India in any sense a party to the 
wrong...We, in India, are not responsible at all, not even for the 
actions of the Government of India. And this Government stands clear 
and without blemish in this affair...I cannot, I confess, see the 
obligation resting on me to withdraw cooperation from a Government 
which has done right, in order to influence another Government which 
has done wrong, merely because the former is politically subordinate to 
the latter. The whole argument is fantastic to a degree.105
Sastri doubted Gandhi’s ability to control Muslim feelings and feared that the latter 
would turn to violence.106
The second issue, that of the Punjab grievances, also resurfaced in May 1920, 
with the publication of the Hunter Committee report and accompanying despatches.
103 This resolution was passed at an all-parties conference at Allahabad which was attended by 
Besant, Sapru and Chintamani, who naturally opposed it. See V(HD) to S/S, ptel. 477, 11 June 1920, 
C12.
104 See Brown, Gandhi’s Rise, pp. 221-2.
105 Citizen, 15 May 1920, cited in P.K. Rao, The Right Honourable V.S. Srinivasa Sastri. A
Political Biography, Bombay, 1963, pp. 83-4.
106 See V.S.S. Sastri to P.S.S. Aiyer, 13 April 1920, in Jagadisan (ed.), Sastri Letters, pp. 64-7.
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The committee divided on racial lines, the Indian members writing a minority report 
which played down the seriousness of the situation facing the authorities in the Punjab 
in April 1919, argued that martial law was unnecessary and was much more forthright 
than the majority report in its condemnation of Dyer and the martial law authorities. 
Two of the three authors of the minority report, Jagat Narayan and Chimanlal 
Setalvad, were Moderates, so that it was not surprising that Moderate organisations 
came out in favour of that version.107
The Home Department rather unfairly dismissed the Moderate response as 
being made in part with a view to the forthcoming elections and a desire not to seem 
less critical than the Extremists.108 However, it recognised that the ’violent 
utterances of the English press and bodies like the Bihar planters and European 
Association render it difficult for Indian moderates to remain moderate.’109 The 
British response to the Hunter Report was, indeed, a painful revelation to all Indian 
nationalists. In the debate on the report in the House of Commons Montagu was given 
an extremely rough ride when, apparently nervous at confronting his critics, he made 
a speech that most M.P.s thought entirely inappropriate to the occasion. Instead of 
sticking to the facts of the treatment of Dyer he managed only an emotional tirade, 
asking whether India was to be ruled by ’terrorism, Prussianism, racial humiliation’ 
or by ’partnership’. The speech gave his critics all the leverage they needed with 
which to attack him and this they did, with a good deal of anti-Jewish fervour. Austen 
Chamberlain wrote that he had ’never seen the House so fiercely angry...A Jew 
[Montagu] rounding on an Englishman [General Dyer] and throwing him to the
107 For the resolutions of the council of the National Liberal Federation, see V(HD) to S/S, ptel. 
497, 19 June 1920, C12.
108 V(HD) to S/S, ptel. 461, 4 June 1920, C12. It argued that many Moderates felt privately that 
the Government had gone as far as could be expected. V(HD) to S/S, ptel. 477, 11 June 1920, C12.
109 Idem.
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wolves- that was the feeling.’110 Maffey, Chelmsford’s private secretary, was 
also in the House at the time and reported to his chief that Montagu now seemed to be 
a burden to the coalition Government and that he would be surprised if he was still in 
the Government in three months time.111 With the aid of supportive speeches 
from Asquith and Churchill the Government recovered and won the division, but a 
large number of Coalition supporters voted against the Government. A petition calling 
for Montagu’s resignation was signed by 93 members of the House of 
Commons.112 The debate in the House of Lords on 19 and 20 July was much 
more circumspect and was marked by very effective speeches criticising Dyer from 
Curzon and Birkenhead. In this case the vote went against the Government by 129 
votes to 86. It was this vote and the fact that Britons rapidly subscribed over £26,000 
to a fund organised by the Morning Post for the benefit of Dyer which attracted so 
much attention in India. Racial tension was compounded by the fact that various 
European Associations, Ladies Associations and English newspapers energetically 
supported Dyer’s fund.113 As Judith Brown argues, the combination of the 
British handling of the Punjab and Khilafat questions ’together resolved the ambiguity 
of Gandhi’s attitude to the British Raj and prompted him to resort to non-co-operation 
with the rulers.’114 Gandhi came to believe that the British no longer had the 
intention of enacting the ideals of the new constitution.115
The British handling of the introduction of the Rowlatt bills and the Punjab 
disorders that followed showed up some of the worst aspects of British rule and 
British attitudes in India. The British could not see that wide-ranging repressive
110 Sir Charles Petrie, The Life and Times o f the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain, vol. 2, 
London, 1940, pp. 152-3.
111 J.L. Maffey to Chelmsford, 10 July 1920, C16.
112 Rumbold, Watershed, p. 203.
1,3 V(HD) to S/S, ptel. 624, 30 July 1920, C13.
114 J. Brown, Gandhi’s Rise, p. 246.
115 Idem.
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legislation was in itself a reminder of the subservience to a semi-autocratic ruler, but 
that the introduction of such legislation, by riding roughshod over elected Indian 
opinion, entirely contradicted the new democratic spirit they were trying to inculcate. 
Furthermore, the haste with which India’s rulers closed ranks and covered up for one 
another during and after the Punjab crisis was indicative of the worst aspects of 
imperialism.116 Chelmsford’s support of O’Dwyer was far too uncritical and 
coloured by fears of the reaction of the European community in India rather than an 
intrinsic sense of justice. The closing of ranks was supported by a complete failure to 
properly investigate what had taken place and to provide the necessary information to 
the Secretary of State in good time. The Government of India tried to avoid an 
enquiry, fearing that it would undermine the morale of the services in India. Montagu 
was too prepared to leave issues of the maintenance of law and order to the men on 
the spot, but also perhaps was fearful of revelations that would threaten the passage of 
the constitutional reforms. The response of some members of the House of Commons 
in the debate on Dyer’s treatment betrayed the worst aspects of the British ruling elite 
with its latent anti-semitism. The response of some members of the European 
community in supporting Dyer only confirmed that racial attitudes still ran deep in 
British India. All in all, the British handling of the Punjab matter must have left the 
Indian Liberals totally dispirited. Once their rulers had ensnared themselves in the 
policy of ’facing it out’ it became impossible for them to extricate themselves by 
fulsome apology or the provision of proper compensation. The whole business was a 
very sorry one, but it seems that most Liberals in the Imperial Legislative Council
116 See H. Fein, Imperial Crime and Punishment: The Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and British 
Judgment, 1919-20, Hawaii, 1977.
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wanted to begin to put the matter behind them and to get on with the business of 
getting themselves elected to the new councils.117
The Government held out hope that Indians would themselves become involved in 
decisions on the maintenance of peace. During the summer of 1920, B.N. Sarma and 
T.B. Sapru were appointed to the Viceroy’s Executive Council, and Satyendra Sinha 
was appointed as the Governor of Bihar and Orissa.118 Sinha’s appointment was 
Montagu’s own idea and proved highly controversial amongst British officials in 
India. Many of the arguments that were raised against Sinha’s appointment were 
practical ones, for instance, there were fears that the I.C.S. would be antagonised 
because the position traditionally went to one of their number or that the new 
executive council would have an imbalance of Indians over Britons, or that the Indian 
states in Orissa would not wish to be governed by an Indian politician.119 But a 
number of the objections raised were based upon racial snobbery and the argument 
that the appointment was the thin end of the wedge. Montagu, who may have taken 
some pleasure in the fact that the I.C.S. member who was to be passed over was 
Vincent, whom he felt had been obstructive over the making of the reforms, stuck to 
his guns and argued that in future all the provincial governors should be Indian, just 
as the heads of provinces in Canada were Canadian.120
The death of Bal Gangadhar Tilak on 1 August 1920 removed the Indian 
politician who was most likely to be able to lead a successful opposition to the
117 When Sastri joined with some of the Extremist members to press a motion on the Punjab 
grievances in September 1920, Surendranath Baneijea privately persuaded the Viceroy to disallow the 
motion because the Moderates wanted the issue buried and wanted to be saved from themselves. V to 
S/S, 1 Sept. 1920, MW ; V to S/S, ptel. 755, 14 Sept. 1920, C13.
118 Montagu defended the appointment against the attacks of the existing Governor, Sir E. Gait, 
and also of Willingdon. V to S/S, ptel. 41, 23 Jan. 1920, C12, ; Willingdon to Montagu, 22 Aug. & 6. 
Oct. 1920, W4 ; Willingdon to Ronaldshay, 18 Aug. 1920, RONS.
119 See V to S/S , 26 Feb. 1920, M10.
120 Montagu to Willingdon, 16 Sept. 1920, W4 & M29. In fact when Sinha resigned due to ill 
health in 1921 he was replaced by a Briton so that no precedent should be established. Montagu argued 
that Sinha had ben appointed on merit, not because he was an Indian. See S/S to V, ptel. 1625, 16 
Nov. 1921, R10.
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adoption of non-co-operation at the Special Congress session in September 1920. As it 
was, there was a good deal of resistance to Gandhi’s proposed programme, 
particularly from the three presidency regions. Once again the majority of Moderates 
did not attend the Congress, Surendranath Baneijea claiming that there was no point in 
attending because the Congress would be packed by Gandhi’s supporters. Besant and 
her followers, such as Jamnadas Dwarkadas, did attend, however, and fought against 
the non-co-operation proposal. There turned out to be some basis for Baneijea’s 
allegation, in that Gandhi brought large numbers of Muslim supporters who proved to 
play an important part in achieving the Gandhian majorities in the provincial 
delegations on the all-important subjects committee.121 It was only after long 
debate, during which Motilal Nehru switched to supporting Gandhi, that the majority 
for non-co-operation was achieved in the subjects committee, and then only by 144 
votes to 132. The Gandhian majority in the open session was much larger, 1826 votes 
to 884, but about half the delegates did not vote.122 It seems that Gandhi won the 
day by his superior organisational skills, and that once the ball began rolling in his 
favour a number of politicians decided to defend their positions by going over to the 
winning side. It was reported that the Tilakites were ’very bitter against Gandhi and 
the Khilafatists in outmanoeuvring them...all the more so as Gandhi adopted the very 
tactics which they themselves utilised to oust the Moderates from Congress.’123
One of the most immediate effects of the Congress decision was the boycott of 
the council elections which took place in November 1920. Chelmsford remained 
blissfully unmoved by the prospect. Earlier in the year when Montagu had expressed 
concern at the impact on Britain’s image of a possible Congress boycott, Chelmsford 
replied that he did not think that many politicians would be prepared to ’cut off their
121 See Brown, Gandhi’s Rise, p. 263.
122 V to S/S, ptel. 747, 10 Sept. 1920, C13.
123 Fortnightly report from Bombay for the first half of September 1920, Home Poll Dep., Sept. 
1920, no. 70, cited in Brown, Gandhi’s Rise, p. 269.
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nose to spite their face’.124 He remained unperturbed even when he realised that 
his earlier forecast would be proved wrong. He saw the Congress boycott as a mixed 
blessing. On the one hand, the fact that all parties would not now be represented in 
the councils was to be deplored, but on the other hand he told Montagu that ’we have 
yet to see whether as a result any form of direct action will be tried after the Councils 
are established. If so, in any action we may take ought to have the support of the 
Moderates who will be in possession of the Councils.*125 Leaving aside the signs 
in the above statement that the British continued to fail to respect Moderate 
independence, one can see that Chelmsford was coming to see a new importance to 
the role of the Moderates. If they were to become the dominant party in legislatures in 
which the British would be in a permanent minority, it would become more and more 
important to take Moderate opinion into account. The Government’s concern not to 
alienate the Moderates can be seen most clearly in the cautious policy they followed in 
handling the non-co-operation movement and its leaders.126 The Government had 
learnt the lessons from the internment of Mrs Besant in 1916 and was determined to 
avoid the unnecessary creation of martyrs. Thus the Government pursued a dual 
policy of leaving the leaders of the movement alone whilst being prepared to sanction 
action against minor figures and anyone who advocated violence. In October 1920 
Chelmsford’s council considered whether Gandhi should be prosecuted. Interestingly, 
the need to avoid alienating the Moderates was used on both sides of the argument. It 
could be argued that Government was letting its supporters down by not taking firm 
action against non-co-operation and thus allowing loyalists and moderates to suffer 
from social boycott. However, the alternative argument prevailed, namely that 
Gandhi’s arrest would weaken the Moderates and jeopardise the elections and the
124 S/S to V, ptel., 28 June 1920, C12; V to S/S, ptel., 30 June 1920, C12.
125 V to S/S, ptel. 474a, 24 Oct. 1920, C13.
126 This issue is dealt with very fully in Robb, Government o f India, ch. 8.
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reforms.127 This policy of patience was also influenced by other considerations 
such as the temporary weakness of the army, the continued threats on the Frontier, the 
difficulties of dealing with non-co-operation through normal legal channels, and 
uncertainty whether the Secretary of State would support tougher measures.128 
But the need to conciliate Moderate opinion as expressed in the new legislatures, was 
to become more and more important under the reforms.
To some extent the Government of India felt vindicated by the election results 
of November 1920. In only 6 seats out of a total of 637 was there a complete absence 
of candidates.129 In all provinces, except the Central Provinces, a majority of 
seats was contested.130 The turnout was, however, generally low, on average just 
over 30% for the legislative councils and 25% for the Legislative Assembly, and this 
could only partly be explained by the lack of popular electoral experience.131 The 
shortfall of Muslim voters undoubtedly reflected the strength of feeling about the 
Khilafat issue.
With the Congress not contesting the seats, Liberals did quite well in the first 
council elections. About 50 Liberals were elected to the various councils throughout 
India.132 Although this made them the largest single group of members with any 
clear party affiliation, it meant that in individual provincial legislatures and in the 
central legislative assembly they formed only small minorities. Ray Smith calculates 
that out of the total of some 140 elected, nominated and official members of the new
127 V(HD) to S/S, ptel. 3-C, 24 Oct. 1920, C13.
128 Rumbold, Watershed, p. 219.
129 Brown, Gandhi’s Rise, p. 218.
130 Robb, Government o f India, p. 239.
131 Figures are extrapolated from Smith, thesis, p. 257. They can be compared with an average 
turnout for the 1923 elections (when the Swarajists stood) of just over 45% for the legislative councils 
and 44.6% for the legislative assembly. Polls varied from over 50% in parts of Madras to only 8% in 
Bombay City, and even lower (4.4%) in the urban Muslim constituencies of Bombay Presidency. 
Brown, Gandhi’s Rise, p. 285.
132 Smith, thesis, pp. 258-9. 1 am indebted to Dr. Smith’s research for the information on the 
1920 elections in this section.
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central legislative assembly, the Liberals numbered about 20 (14%); among 113 
Indian members they constituted only about 17-18%. The Liberals did not form a 
larger proportion than this in the provincial legislative councils either. Smith 
comments that what the Liberals lacked in quantity they made up for in quality, 
providing at least one Minister in four provinces and the Law Member in the 
Executive Council of the Government of Bombay (Setalvad) and the Law Member in 
the Viceroy’s Executive Council (Sapru).133 It is clear also that the Liberals 
provided the best quality of contributions to the central legislative assembly.134
At Nagpur at the end of the year, Congress confirmed the non-co-operation 
decision and spelt out the programme that it envisaged more clearly. The Nagpur 
Congress was a triumph for Gandhi in that his former critics, such as C.R. Das of 
Bengal, fell into line and supported his programme. Moreover, Congress adopted a 
new constitution which changed its stated aim and gave it an effective organisation 
reaching from the villages upwards. The new constitution marked officially the 
transition from the Moderate style of politics which had been the dominant mode since 
its birth in 1885. That style had emphasised the maintenance of the British connection, 
the use of constitutional methods only, a loose organisation allowing control by 
Presidency politicians, continued propaganda in Great Britain and a reliance on local 
organisations for agitational effort during the year. At Nagpur each of these tenets of 
the old Congress was undermined. The new aim of Congress was ’the attainment of 
swarajya by the people of India by all legitimate and peaceful means’. The old 
requirement that the means be ’constitutional’ was dropped. It was decided to abandon 
the British Committee of Congress in London, and its paper India. The argument used 
to support this measure was that Congress should become more self-reliant rather than
133 Ibid.
134 A.F. Whyte, report on Imperial Legislative Assembly, 18.4.1922, enclosure to Reading to 
Peel, 20 April 1922, R5.
145
dependent on petitioning the British authorities for change. Congress was reorganised 
on language areas rather around the British-determined provinces. Delegate numbers 
were to be accorded on a population basis so as to try and end the system whereby the 
Presidency leaders had sometimes swamped Congress meetings with their supporters. 
As Judith Brown says, ’it meant that in the future control of Congress would go either 
to a continental alliance of regional leaders or to a politician who could muster an 
all-India following.’135 Gandhi’s almost dictatorial hold on decision-making in 
Congress was marked by the establishment of a much smaller Working Committee of 
the All India Congress Committee and this body was to be responsible for the day to 
day running of the party. Thus Gandhi simultaneously democratised the party 
(establishing a pyramidical system of election from village level upwards) and made it 
a more effective instrument for executing his will and that of his supporters. As Gopal 
Krishna argues, the Gandhian domination of Congress during the non-co-operation 
movement of 1920 to 1922, posed the most serious challenge to the traditional 
leadership of the western-educated professional middle classes.136 If council 
boycott had seemed unattractive, the giving up of legal practices and the withdrawal 
of children and students from the government-supported educational system, seemed 
to threaten not only political but also social and economic ambitions. Many were 
swept along in a tide of what seemed to be inevitable change, whilst others saw the 
adoption of non-co-operation as a temporary expedient only. The range and numbers 
of those opposed to Gandhi was therefore much broader than the apparently 
unanimous support given to him at Nagpur. From the Government point of view this 
gave hope for the future. They continued to believe that non-co-operation would 
destroy itself by its own absurdities and that the sacrifices required of the professional
135 Brown, Gandhi’s Rise, p. 299.
136 G. Krishna, ’The Development of the Indian National Congress as a Mass Organisation, 
1918-1923’, Journal o f Asian Studies, xxv, 3, May 1966.
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classes would undermine the movement. They were right in their last assumption, but 
what they underestimated was the extent to which Congress had now organised itself 
to reach areas and classes that were not much touched by Congress politics 
traditionally. This would have important implications should Congress be drawn back 
into the electoral system.
Unfortunately, Chelmsford lacked the imagination and human touch of a 
Viceroy like his predecessor Hardinge to be able to make the sort of magnanimous 
gesture or statement which might have gone some way to healing the damaged 
feelings of Indians resulting from the Punjab and Khilafat grievances. He did in fact 
have the martial law manual rewritten to try and avoid a recurrence of what had 
happened in the Punjab, but he felt constrained from taking the sort of measures 
which Indians were demanding for the punishment of officials and officers who were 
deemed responsible for what had happened. One constraint was that Chelmsford did 
not believe that any officer should receive a punishment that was the equivalent of or 
more severe than that meted out to the most serious offender, General Dyer, namely 
dismissal from the army.137 But, more importantly, Chelmsford felt that an 
unbridgeable gap existed between his view of what had happened in the Punjab and 
that of the Indian nationalists.138 Thus he refused to meet a Moderate deputation 
led by Chimanlal Setalvad on the grounds that some of their demands (they covered 
the Punjab, Khilafat and future constitutional reforms) were ’quite 
preposterous.’139 Chelmsford explained that ’no-one knows better than Setalvad 
the gravity of the rising in the Punjab last year, but this side of the question is entirely 
ignored by him.’140 Chelmsford was beginning to mark time until the opening of
137 Robb, Government o f India, p. 213.
138 See Chelmsford to Lloyd, 4 Dec. 1920, C25.
139 Chelmsford to Lloyd, 16 Dec. 1920, C25. For the history of this abortive deputation of 
Bombay Moderates see Lloyd to Chelmsford, 12 Nov. 1920, C25; S. Reed to Chelmsford, 20 Nov. 
1920, C25. For details of the Moderate requisition see Lloyd to Chelmsford, 10 Dec. 1920, C25,
140 Chelmsford to Lloyd, 4 Dec. 1920, C25.
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the new councils in February 1920 and the end of his own term of office at the 
beginning of April. He was becoming more and more distanced from the difficulties 
of the situation he was leaving his successor who, he told Montagu, would ’find a 
peaceful atmosphere, not altogether devoid of anxiety because of the season, but on 
the whole not dangerous’.141
141 V to S/S, 16 March 1921, C6.
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PART 2: THE WORKING OF REFORMS, 1921-1923 
CHAPTER IV: HANDLING NON-CO-OPERATION, 1921-22
The way in which the British handled the unprecedented threat of mass civil 
disobedience in the years 1920 to 1922 was a matter of prime importance to the 
relationship between the Indian Liberals and the Government. It was also one of the 
most sensitive areas in the relationship. British administrators felt that the main defect 
in Moderate support for the government was its unreliability on matters of law and 
order. There were constant complaints that whilst privately many Moderates expressed 
their keenness to see law-breakers (even if politically inspired) arrested, they would 
never express this support publicly, and thus from the British point of view, were 
moral cowards. What the British forgot was that the Moderates were both Liberals 
and Indian nationalists; the Moderates were genuinely offended by what they saw as 
over-zealous use of bureaucratic authority and identified themselves with the genuine 
patriotism of the broad Indian nationalist movement. The Liberals were in an 
awkward political situation. The relatively low levels of electoral support that they had 
garnered in the elections to the Councils indicated the limits to their public popularity. 
They were well aware that, come the next elections, due as early as the end of 1923, 
they would be held to some extent responsible for the Government’s treatment of 
non-co-operators. It was important therefore not to be too closely identified with 
British policies for dealing with non-co-operation.1
Astute members of the British administration recognised the difficulty of the
1 One can see the ambivalence of their position in the United Provinces where Liberals supported 
anti-non-co-operation organisations provided they were not seen as officially sponsored. See below, pp. 
292-294.
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Moderate position and did not test the relationship too far.2 Generally speaking 
this involved a policy of distinguishing between the leaders of the non-co-operation 
movement, Gandhi in particular, and the bulk of the rank and file. Learning the 
lessons of the Besant internment of 1917, the Government stalked Gandhi, waiting for 
him to overstep the mark and alienate the middle ground in Indian politics.3 The 
game of cat and mouse that ensued during 1921 and the early part of 1922 proved to 
be a risky political gambit for the British, in that it threatened to alienate their more 
conservative allies in India, such as the landowners and princes, whilst it also 
endangered the finely balanced coalition that Lloyd George had built up in British 
politics. At the end of the day, Reading’s indecision and his patent bending to the 
concerns of Indian Moderate opinion so angered the Prime Minister that he submitted 
to die-hard pressure and made the Secretary of State, Edwin Montagu, a sacrificial 
victim in February 1922, shortly before Gandhi was finally arrested. Montagu’s 
resignation was considered by many Indian Liberals to the turning point in their 
relations with the British, which from that point they perceived as steadily 
deteriorating. However, this was to misread the situation, as British opinion on India 
had been hardening long before Montagu’s resignation and there is plenty of evidence 
that Montagu himself shared some of the disillusion with Indian politics that set in 
around the time of the Prince of Wales’ visit to India in the winter of 1921-1922.
It was not just a matter of the Government of India and local governments 
having now to consider the views of their legislatures and thus follow a policy of 
restraint in their treatment of the Congress leadership. These governments now 
included Indians within their ranks and, although law and order issues were the 
preserve of the Reserved side of government, in some provinces Indian Ministers
2 Lord Readings the Viceroy, and Sir William Vincent, the Home Member, are prime examples. 
See Low, ’First Non-Co-operation Movement’, pp. 298-323.
3 P. Robb, ’The Government of India and Annie Besant’, pp. 107-30.
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were involved in discussions on these matters, and in the case of the Government of 
India, the Law Member, who held responsibility for these matters, was an Indian 
Liberal,. Tej Bahadur Sapru. It was Sapru’s concern for the proper use of judicial 
powers and his desire to seek a compromise solution between the non-co-operators 
and the Government, that influenced Reading so profoundly.4 Reading’s 
government listened more carefully to the ’middle ground’ of Indian politics than any 
of its predecessors.5 Reading defined the Indian centre ground in Indian politics 
widely enough to include not only the Indian Liberals but also Congressmen such as 
M.M. Malaviya, who acted as an intermediary between the Government and Gandhi. 
The failure of the intermediaries to bring Gandhi to the negotiating table may have 
been more a result of the stronger influence of Muslim Khilafatist no-compromisers 
on Gandhi than any failure on Reading’s part. Reading was very keen to make some 
sort of political truce with Gandhi, at least so as to cover the period of the Prince of 
Wales’s visit in the winter of 1921-1922. The extent to which Reading was prepared 
to go in order to reach such an agreement with Gandhi, including the calling of a 
round table conference at a time when the new reforms had only just been 
implemented, is indicative of the keenness of British policy-makers to maintain the 
constitutional nature of their rule. The Indian Liberals, as will be seen, were the most 
immediate beneficiaries of this concern; they took on a role that they were to play 
several times in coming decades, the role of intermediaries between government and 
the main-stream of the nationalist movement.
4 Low, ’First Non-Cooperation Movement’, pp. 306-16.
5 For a study which argues the importance of the Indian centre as a political consideration for the 
British, see T.G.P. Spear, ’A Third Force in India 1920-1947: A Study in Political Analysis’, in C.H. 
Philips & M.D. Wainwright (eds.), The Partition o f India. Policies and Perspectives 1935-1947, 
London, 1970, pp. 490-503.
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1. The Search for a Compromise
The New Viceroy
Rufus Isaacs, 1st. Marquess of Reading, was a popular replacement for the 
lacklustre Lord Chelmsford when he retired in April 1921. Indians were pleased to 
see that the Government had chosen a Liberal politician of the first rank, a man who 
had been Lord Chief Justice as well as Ambassador to the United States of 
America.6 It did not go unremarked that both the top posts in the administration 
of India had gone to Jews.7 Generally, however, there was a willingness all round 
to give the new Viceroy a chance to prove himself. There was a general expectation 
among Indian Moderate politicians that Reading might be prepared to consider further 
constitutional advances, and right from the start people were pressing on him the idea 
of a conference with Indian politicians of all hues.8
Arriving in April 1921, Reading came at one of the most difficult times for the 
Government in dealing with the non-co-operation movement. In the months before the 
monsoon broke there were fears that the movement would escalate. Indeed, Reading 
was far less sanguine about the prospects of countering non-co-operation; he 
recognised that the movement was far more dangerous now that it had reached beyond 
the urban educated classes and touched the lives of the rural masses.9 There were 
some signs that Reading was looking to take a tougher policy against non-co­
6 There are a number of biographies of Reading, including one by his son, G.R. Isaacs, the 2nd. 
Marquess of Reading, Rufus Isaacs, First Marquess o f Reading, 2 vols., London, 1942-45; also, H. 
Montgomery Hyde, Lord Reading, London, 1967; D. Judd, Lord Reading, London, 1982; A. Sinha, 
Lord Reading: Viceroy o f India, New Delhi, 1985.
7 See Hyde, Reading, p. 346. Anti-semitic prejudice is an important background factor which it is 
important to appreciate if one is to understand the hostility that Montagu and Reading incurred from 
some of their fellow Britons. People still revived memories of the financial scandals of 1912-1913 with 
which the names of Reading (Marconi) and Montagu (Samuel Montagu & Co. Indian silver 
transactions) had been associated. See G.D. Searle, Corruption in British Politics 1895-1930, Oxford, 
1987, pp. 333-4.
8 V to S/S, ptel. 330, 28 Apr. 1921, RIO.
9 Idem.
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operation, but it was not long before he seemed to have settled comfortably into the 
policy of tactical non-interference with the leaders of the movement, which had been 
the preferred policy of his predecessor.10 Where Reading did differ from 
Chelmsford was in his background as a professional politician. Having dealt at the 
highest level with the growth of nationalism in areas like Ireland and the Middle East, 
Reading had a better appreciation of the forces behind the growth of nationalist 
feeling. Unlike Chelmsford he did not determine to keep Indian nationalists at arm’s 
length, even if they were considered by the official establishment to be ’extremists’. 
Reading showed a willingness in his early months in office to speak to men like 
Malaviya, Lajpat Rai and Jinnah, people well outside the accepted circle of Moderate 
politicians. Eventually, Reading even agreed to meet with Gandhi: indeed, he believed 
that it was inevitable sooner or later that the British should parley with the leaders of 
the nationalist movement, if only to understand what their aims really were. Personal 
contact, face to face negotiation, offered Reading the prospect also of using his 
famous debating skills and perhaps winning over some converts or making cracks in 
the unity of the nationalist movement. With his background in international affairs 
Reading also had a broader perspective on the significance of the Khilafat movement 
and the possibilities that presented themselves of dividing the Muslims away from the 
non-co-operation movement and bringing them back to what many Britons saw as 
their rightful role as loyalists.11 Reading’s political skills provided Montagu with 
just the sort of colleague that he had desired: it was ironic that it was not long before 
the Secretary of State was actually trying to restrain the political activities of the new 
Viceroy.
10 For the policy of Chelmsford’s Government, see Robb, Government o f India, ch. 8.
11 See V to S/S, 21 Sept. 1922, R5
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The Ali Brothers’ Apology
The first chance Reading had to use his political skills came with the question 
of whether to prosecute the Muslim leaders, Mohammed and Shaukat Ali, for 
speeches they had made in the United Provinces in April 1921 in which they 
advocated violence. The matter was referred to the local Government, which, with 
one dissenting voice, was prepared to support a prosecution.12 The Viceroy’s 
Council, however, was divided on the question. The British members favoured 
prosecution, but the three Indian members, and Sapru in particular, favoured 
caution.13 It is interesting, in view of the fact that the Home Member Sir 
William Vincent is generally associated with masterminding the policy of tactical 
non-intervention, that Vincent, in this particular case, argued for immediate arrest of 
the Ali brothers, and was against prior talks with Gandhi.14
It was generally recognised that a danger in prosecuting the Ali brothers was that 
Gandhi would almost certainly seek prosecution as well, in order to maintain 
Hindu-Muslim solidarity in the movement. If Gandhi was arrested who could tell what 
trouble might ensue? Sapru argued for a delay, in which period it might be seen if 
Gandhi could be won over.15 Butler was persuaded to delay the prosecution until 
after the middle of May. In the meantime Malaviya and C.F. Andrews urged upon the 
Viceroy the benefits to be gained from seeing Gandhi.16 Reading was doubtful 
but agreed on condition that Gandhi should request the interview. Thus, there began a 
remarkable series of six interviews between Viceroy and Mahatma, talks which were 
to presage the more famous talks with Irwin in 1931. Like Irwin, Reading seems to
12 Pandit Jagat Narayan opposed the prosecution, see Butler to H. Erie Richards , 26 April 1921, 
£ 21 .
13 H. Butler to G. Butler, 9 May 1921, £25.
14 For the traditional view, see Low, ’First Non-Co-operation Movement’, pp. 302-305. For an
important record of the meeting of the Viceroy’s Council in Simla , May 1921, see the note recorded
by Sir G. Lloyd, Lloyd MSS, GL10/20.
15 H. Butler to G. Butler, 9 May 1921, £25.
16 Reading to Willingdon, 6 May 1921, W5.
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have been impressed with the moral stature of Gandhi, and although the interviews 
proved to be hard-going, Reading did manage to get Gandhi to see the contradiction 
between his non-violent professions and the incitements to violence of some who 
called themselves his supporters. Gandhi offered to intercede with the Ali brothers and 
to try and obtain an apology for their speeches and a promise that they would not 
advocate violence again. Good lawyer that he was, Reading made sure that the terms 
of the agreement and even the draft of the apology letter were clearly understood and 
accepted by Gandhi. Significantly, in view of Gandhi’s later claims, Reading made it 
quite clear that, whilst he was in this case distinguishing between violent and 
non-violent nationalist activities, he was not in any way promising to turn a blind eye 
to some of the activities which Congress described as non-violent, for instance the 
drilling of volunteers and picketing of liquor shops. Despite some doubts expressed in 
his Council, Reading got agreement to go ahead with the attempt to get an apology 
from the Ali brothers.17 Gandhi successfully obtained the apology, which was 
published on 30 May, and there is no doubt that this was a triumph for Reading and a 
political embarrassment for both Gandhi and the Ali brothers. Montagu congratulated 
his colleague and commented that,
The prosecution would, after all, have been political and it is much 
better, after all, from an internal point of view in particular, and so 
long as you can, to secure order in India with and through the help of 
Indians who are non-official.18
In fact, confrontation with the leaders of the Khilafat movement had only been 
delayed. In July at a meeting of the All-India Khilafat Committee at Karachi, the Ali 
brothers were held to be responsible for a resolution being passed which endorsed a 
fatw a , issued by Muslim religious leaders, which called on Muslims to stop serving in
17 See the note recorded by Lloyd, GL10/20.
18 S/S to V, ptel. 702, 30 May 1921, RIO.
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the army.19 Prompted by the Commander-in-Chief, the Government determined 
upon prosecution, although, as Rumbold points out, the grounds for taking action 
against Gandhi if he repeated the offence were not as morally strong as they would 
have been back in May.20 After long delays, the brothers were eventually 
arrested in September and given a sentence of two years’ rigorous imprisonment in 
October 1921. Not long after, Gandhi and others repeated the statement for which the 
Ali brothers had been arrested, but Reading refused to take the bait. Reading could 
still think of the way he had handled the Ali brothers issue as a success, for he was 
essentially manoeuvring for the support of the Indians in his Council and more 
broadly for moderate opinion in India. Reading’s willingness to talk with Indian 
political leaders had met the first requirement of the Indians in his Council, who had 
seen the Government becoming increasingly more isolated under Chelmsford. Reading 
had also been careful not to become involved in making political concessions to the 
Extremists rather than the Moderates, which would have antagonised the latter.21 
He skilfully played on the fact that moderate Hindu politicians did not like the links 
that the non-co-operation movement had forged with more militant Islamic elements. 
Reading reported that Malaviya, for instance, was clearly worried by the Ali brothers’ 
talk of an Afghan invasion.22
19 For the response of the Bombay Government see pp. 286-287 below.
20 Rumbold, Watershed, p. 261.
21 In fact Reading had nearly fallen into this trap when he considered telling Gandhi during his 
talks with him that the government was going to repeal the Rowlatt Acts. Montagu reminded him, 
however, that the Bill was going to be considered by a committee of the Indian Legislative Assembly 
and it was important that any concession should be made through constitutional channels and not as a 
concession to non-cooperators. See V to S/S, ptel. 386, 11 May 1921; S/S to V, ptel. 625 , 13 May 
1921, RIO.
22 See V to S/S, ptel. 362, 5 May 1921, RIO.
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Malaviya and the Decision to Go Ahead with the Prince’s Visit
Madan Mohan Malaviya seemed the perfect choice as an intermediary for 
Reading’s purposes: he straddled the Moderate and Extremist camps and had good 
relations with fellow Allahabadis, Motilal Nehru and Tej Bahadur Sapru. Malaviya 
was reputed to have said that, while his head was with the Moderates, his heart was 
with the Extremists.23 As an educationalist with a special interest in improving 
the standard of Hindu literacy and culture, Malaviya was alienated by the Gandhian 
boycott of educational institutions.24 He also had grave doubts about the efficacy 
of the boycott of the Councils but remained on close terms with Gandhi. Reading was 
impressed with Malaviya and described him as ’... as thoughtful a politician as I know 
here.,25 For his part Malaviya, a rather vain man who was temperamentally 
inclined to see all sides of an issue (a typical Moderate in other words), seems to have 
enjoyed the role of Reading’s non-official Indian advisor and go-between.
Malaviya urged upon Reading the importance of going ahead with the Prince 
of Wales’s visit, which had been postponed in the previous year. It seems that 
Malaviya was confident that the British would follow tradition and announce a boon to 
mark the visit, and that this dramatic gesture might end the non-co-operation 
movement. In this instance he misjudged Reading, who felt that whatever boons were 
to be given had already been proffered at the time of the Duke of Connaught’s visit 
when inaugurating the reforms. Malaviya was able to impress upon Reading the 
strength of feeling about the Punjab grievances and Reading agreed to review 
personally the cases of Indians still in prison for offences committed relating to the 
events in the Punjab in April 1919.26 However, Reading did not see any chance
23 H. Butler to Chelmsford, 14 Aug. 1917, £49.
24 See R. Gordon /The Hindu Mahasabha and the Indian National Congress 1915-1920’, Modem 
Asian Studies, 9, 2 (1975), p. 164.
25 V to S/S, ptel. 581, 6 July 1921, £10.
26 Rumbold, Watershed, p. 247.
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of offering constitutional advances or a round table conference, and shrewdly doubted 
whether Malaviya held the most potent influence with Gandhi. Still, Reading took 
what he considered to be a bold move in associating Malaviya with a Committee 
which he established to look after the arrangements for the Prince’s visit. As it turned 
out it was this visit that offered Malaviya his role as an intermediary.
The decision to accept the visit of the Prince of Wales, which was announced 
on 22 June, was a very difficult one for Reading to make and in some ways it 
reflected some of the worst aspects of Reading’s tendency to indecision, resulting 
from his desire to predict all eventualities. The problems ahead seemed pretty 
foreboding; there was, for instance, the possibility of a poor monsoon which would 
not only exacerbate economic difficulties but also make the expenses of the tamasha 
seem obscene. There was a distinct possibility also that Gandhi might repeat the tactic 
of hartal or shutdown of premises as a means of boycotting the visit. Reading was 
determined not to let the threat of a boycott stop the visit and he agreed with 
Montagu that it would look as if India was rife with disloyalty if the tour had to be 
abandoned a second time.27 The pressures on Montagu and Chelmsford were 
increased by the fact that the Prince himself came to have nervous doubts about the 
visit.28 Whilst Reading had the support of his Executive Council in the decision, 
Willingdon, the Governor of Madras, was adamantly against it.29 As Rumbold 
asserts, the decision to go ahead with the visit was a serious mistake.30 It was to 
place the Government of India on the defensive in dealing with non-co-operation 
throughout the winter months in which the tour took place. It must also have absorbed 
a great deal of Reading’s time and energy, when it was already clear that he was 
overwhelmed with the burdens of his office. Perhaps Reading shared the general
27 V to S/S, U cypher tel., 15 July 1921, £63c(i).
28 See S/S to V, U cypher tel., 13 July 1921, £63c(i).
29 Rumbold, Watershed, p. 260.
30 Idem.
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British view that all Indians loved a spectacle and would therefore ensure the success 
of the visit and show the world that the majority of Indians were loyal. It does seem, 
however, that Montagu and Reading, cornered by critics of the Government’s inability 
to put down the non-co-operation movement, took an unnecessary gamble.
2. The Debate about Gandhi’s Arrest
Within the nationalist movement, the Mapilla rising which took place in 
August 1921, alienated many Hindu supporters of the non-co-operation movement and 
made Gandhi more dependent on Khilafatist support.31 One means of 
re-establishing the link with the Khilafatists was for Gandhi to repeat the offence for 
which they had been sent to jail; this he did at the end of September, and called on 
others to do the same. Reading’s immediate reaction was that now Gandhi would have 
to be arrested. ’We could not arrest small fry and leave Gandhi the inciter, free’, he 
told Montagu.32 Montagu agreed, but re-iterated his opinion that it was up to the 
Viceroy to decide such matters and he assured him of his support, whatever his 
decision. Montagu did, however, ask Reading to take into account longer-term 
considerations, such as what he would do if Gandhi started a hunger-strike in prison 
or if there were pressures from ’well-disposed people who want to make some sort of 
peace’.33 Perhaps Montagu had psychic powers, for only three days later, on 9 
October, Malaviya called on Reading and asked him not to cancel the Prince of 
Wales’ visit and also tried to persuade him to call a round table conference. Reading 
admitted to Montagu that he had been thinking of some sort of a conference ’to 
enquire into the causes of discontent and to make recommendations for their remedy’,
31 Rumbold, Watershed, p. 264.
32 V to S/S, U cypher tel., 3 Oct. 1921, £63C(i).
33 Idem.
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however, he doubted whether Gandhi would come without the Ali brothers being 
released. At the same time Reading was turning against the idea of arresting Gandhi. 
On the same day that he saw Malaviya, Sapru had sent a long note to Vincent 
indicating his opposition to the arrest of Gandhi and permitting him to inform Reading 
of his views. Vincent agreed with Sapru’s opinion and supported his arguments in the 
meeting of the Executive Council that followed.34 For Sapru the matter was ’not 
so much a question of law as it is one of political expediency.’35 It was a matter 
of choosing between two evils: delaying prosecution seemed the lesser evil. It was 
vital to choose one’s ground carefully so as to have public opinion one one’s side and 
Sapru feared that the present prosecution based upon words and not deeds, would not 
be sure of gaining moderate support. People would inevitably interpret the 
Government’s change of policy as ’calculated repression’. ’Speaking frankly’, he said, 
’I do not expect that even the Moderate Party as a whole will approve of the 
prosecution of Mr. Gandhi...I have also grave doubts as to whether we would be able 
even to carry the Assembly with us in regard to this matter.’36 However, Sapru 
did see signs that some influential men in India were coming to oppose Gandhi and he 
cited the criticisms made by Rabindranath Tagore and also by the Tilakites in the 
Deccan. He also sensed a growing alienation of Hindus from the Khilafat agitation. 
The Government needed to look ahead to the potential swarm of non-co-operators who 
would willingly fill the jails by repeating Gandhi’s offence. Gandhi’s arrest would 
inevitably coincide with and mar the Prince of Wales’ visit. Furthermore, once 
Gandhi was imprisoned Government would always be on the defensive and whatever 
concessions it made to India, whether it be the release of the Mahatma or offers of 
constitutional progress, would always be seen as a triumph for agitational methods.
34 Sinha, Reading, pp. 50-1.




We have waited so long, I think we may yet wait a little longer and I 
should like to wait for Mr Gandhi to put himself palpably in the wrong 
so as to make it impossible for anyone to say that the Government 
should ignore what he was doing. We may either reach a stage when 
Mr. Gandhi by some overt act will place himself so much in the wrong 
that we should be doing the right thing in prosecuting him then or we 
may reach a stage when a considerable body of opinion will have 
detached itself from Mr Gandhi and the situation then will have become 
much easier.37
It is difficult to know whether Reading was influenced by either Malaviya or 
Sapru in deciding not to arrest Gandhi immediately. It must have been enormously 
helpful to have such frank statements of the predicament as seen from the position of 
the Moderate Indian politician, the very sort of person Reading’s policy was designed 
to assuage. Malaviya’s visit provided a useful indication of the fact that there were 
moderates in the Gandhi camp who were preparing to return to constitutional politics- 
the inference was obvious, the arrest of Gandhi would completely undermine this 
movement. Sapru, on the other hand, provided a valuable antidote to officials who 
told Reading that the Moderates were enthusiastically supporting Gandhi’s arrest.
Sapru was effectively warning Reading not to be misled as to the views of genuine 
Moderates but also not to overestimate Moderate influence in the country over a 
matter like the arrest of Gandhi. He frankly admitted that Gandhi had won over nearly 
all classes in India except the landowners and ’Even those who differ from him among 
the Moderate party respect him for his personal character. ’38 What Sapru and 
Malaviya provided was an Indian political dimension to the Viceroy’s considerations, 
but they were probably helping to re-enforce views the latter already held. Reading 




manifesto on which the prosecution would be based had been produced in a number of 
different versions.39 Secondly, he was naturally worried what impact Gandhi’s 
arrest would have on the Prince of Wales’ visit which was due to begin in Bombay on 
17 November.40 Thirdly, he wondered whether the prosecution was really 
necessary; in his view the non-co-operation movement was fizzling out and the call to 
the troops to resign had no significant impact.41 The danger he foresaw was that 
by arresting Gandhi it would make him into a martyr and revive the movement.42 
Reading cabled his Government’s decision on 10 October and, after Montagu had put 
the matter to Cabinet two days later, he informed Reading of the Cabinet’s clear 
conviction that Gandhi should be arrested immediately.
Montagu had been considering deporting Gandhi but consulted Sastri, who was 
in London at that time. Sastri supported the arrest but was opposed to deportation, 
which he argued would be seen as a breach of faith in view of the fact that the 
Government had accepted the report of the Repressive Laws Committee. The majority 
of the Cabinet agreed with this view, but there were clear signs of a loss of patience 
with Reading. Montagu evidently didn’t like Reading’s talk with Malaviya and the 
idea of the round table conference. He agreed with Reading that constitutional change 
might come well in advance of the ten year interval laid down in the 1919 Act, but 
stressed that it must come as a result of proven experience of working the reforms and 
not from external pressure. Montagu stressed that it was wrong to bypass the elected 
legislatures.43 Although Montagu emphasised that there was no desire to force 
Reading’s hand, there could not have been any clearer form of Cabinet instruction 
than that sent on 13 October, and yet Reading ignored it and decided not to arrest
39 V to S/S, U cypher tel. 10 Oct. 1921, R 63C(i).
40 Idem.
41 V to S/S, U-eypher tel., 9 Oct. 1921, R63C(i).
42 V to S/S, U cypher tel., 17 Oct. 1921, R63C(i).
43 S/S to V, U cypher tel., 13 Oct. 1921, /?63C(i).
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Gandhi, though he accepted the objections to a conference as in accord ’in principle’ 
with his own thinking. Montagu further clarified the reasons for arrest; one of the 
most telling being that if Gandhi was not prosecuted it would make it very difficult to 
charge anyone else who committed the same offence.44
An extraordinary situation had now been created by Reading’s refusal to 
comply with the wishes of the Cabinet. As Rumbold indicates, Montagu had been 
given a fairly free hand on Indian matters by his Cabinet colleagues for some time and 
now there were signs that this freedom was coming to an end. At a meeting of 
Ministers on 21 October, at which Montagu was not present, it was agreed that the 
Prime Minister should send a personal telegram to Reading to indicate the wider 
imperial view.45 Lloyd George wired,
I am convinced the time has passed for patience and toleration towards 
direct incentives to the assault upon the very foundations of 
government...The majority of Indians are co-operating loyally in 
working the Reforms, and it is essential that they should not be allowed 
to doubt which is the stronger, Gandhi or the British Raj. Our course in 
India is being watched in many quarters, and we cannot afford to be 
misunderstood. The British Empire is passing through a very critical 
phase, and it will not survive unless it shows now in the most 
unmistakable fashion that it has the will and the power to stand by its 
policies and to deal conclusively with any who challenge its 
authority.46
With a final twist of the dagger, Lloyd George added ’ I know you will not permit 
notorious Indian methods of red-tape and circumlocution to create delays in dealing 
with a situation demanding promptitude. ’ A Viceroy of any less political standing 
than Reading would have buckled under this pressure, but he stuck doggedly to his 
guns.47 Reading was taking grave risks if, as he assured the Cabinet, he was
44 S/S to V, U cypher tel., 20 Oct. 1921, R63C(i).
45 Cabinet Conclusion 82 (21) App. 2, 21 Oct. 1921, (Cab. 23).
46 P.M. to V, U cypher tel., 21 Oct. 1921, R63C(i).
47 V to S/S, U cypher tel., 22 Oct. 1921, /?63C(i).
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only expecting a delay of a matter of days before arresting Gandhi. The appearance of 
indecision which he gave, and the willingness to adapt to the views of Indian 
politicians, seriously undermined Montagu’s already precarious standing in the 
Cabinet. It was not so much the decisions that Reading made but rather the way in 
which they were made and the impression that was created that counted against him.
In the telegrams which he sent to Montagu, which the latter had inevitably to pass on 
to the Cabinet, Reading confused issues of law and order, as they would have been 
seen to be in England, with wider political considerations, such as the possibility of 
convening a round table conference.48 This was bound to antagonise many 
members of the British Cabinet who felt that they had already gone as far, if not 
further than they wanted, in agreeing to the Montford reforms in the first place; they 
were certainly not going to consider further political concessions in the light of the 
short and far from satisfactory experience of the working of the reforms. One of the 
ironies is that Reading probably shared the view that constitutional concessions were 
out of the question but, unfortunately, he gave the impression that he was, at the very 
least, willing to consider such an idea. One difficulty was that the good relationship 
between Montagu and Reading encouraged a very free expression of views between 
them , but there was always the danger that such opinions, sometimes only 'thinking 
aloud’, might be misconstrued. An example of this is provided by the telegram in 
which Reading informed Montagu of his Government’s decision not to arrest Gandhi, 
Reading foolishly admitted that it was Gandhi who had in his power to determine 
when he should actually be arrested! This was actually true, as Reading was only 
waiting for Gandhi to take up civil disobedience to effect his arrest, but the 
implication that Gandhi could choose his time and could provoke a crisis at any point 
in the Prince of Wales’ tour that suited him was very damaging to Reading’s
48 V to S/S, U cypher tel., 9 Oct. 1921, R63C(i).
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reputation. Montagu did all in his power to support the Viceroy, ensuring that the 
Cabinet ultimately deferred to the Viceroy and that a debate in the House of 
Commons on the issue was avoided. However, he must have known that the damage 
to the Indian administration had already been done and that, despite the fact that he 
had urged a tougher policy on Reading, he was now associated with a policy 
stigmatised as weakness in the face of the threat of non-co-operation. Montagu's 
position in the Cabinet had been irreparably undermined and the events of the winter 
of 1921-22 served only to emphasise his isolation.
The Prince of Wales’ Visit
At the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee at Delhi on 4 November 
1922, Gandhi laid the basis for provincial Congress committees to institute civil 
disobedience if certain prerequisites were met, and he himself prepared to inaugurate a 
campaign in Bardoli taluka in Gujarat on the 23rd. of the month. With only a 
fortnight before the Prince of Wales arrived in Bombay the situation looked bad for 
the Government- it seemed likely that they would have to arrest Gandhi shortly after 
the Prince’s tour began on 17 November.49
Dr. Sapru, the Law Member, was, however, looking for a way of avoiding the 
forthcoming clash between Government and the leaders of the non-co-operation 
movement. He had suggested in November the idea of a conference of Indian leaders 
as a prelude to a meeting with Government but, although Malaviya and Jinnah had 
both supported the idea, nothing had yet come of it.50 Jinnah, who had seen the 
Viceroy on 1 November, may have been put off by the latter’s rather negative 
attitude.51
49 V to S/S, U cypher tel., 12 Nov. 1921, R63C(i).
50 J. Dwarkadas to A. Besant, 10 Dec. 1921, Besant MSS, file AS/12.
51 For Reading’s views, see V to S/S, ptel. 1061, 2 Nov. 1921, RIO.
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The issue was brought up again in the Viceroy's Council and by Malaviya in 
an interview with Reading on 14 November.52 By now Reading was more willing 
to consider the matter and asked Malaviya to come forward with more definite 
proposals. At this point the storm broke. On the day of the arrival of the Prince in 
Bombay a hartal was declared across India and, though the Prince received a 
tumultuous welcome from a crowd of tens of thousands in Bombay, there was an 
outbreak of serious rioting lasting several days in the city.53 In other parts of 
India the strike was more effective. In Calcutta, for instance, the whole city closed 
down and Government lost control of the centre of the city to Congress and Khilafat 
volunteers.54 In other cities in Northern India the hartal was highly 
successful.55 Gandhi, however, was horrified by the violence displayed, saw it 
as a sign of the unpreparedness of many Indians for a more activist campaign and 
therefore postponed the beginning of the civil disobedience campaign.
Reading’s Government saw the events of 17 November as a signal for a change 
of tactics and, following a telegram from Montagu which urged tougher action, it sent 
instructions to local Governments that ’a stage has now been reached at which action 
on a more drastic and comprehensive scale than has hitherto been attempted is now 
required.’56 Instructions were issued to declare volunteer organisations illegal and 
to prosecute anyone they wished to, without reference to Delhi. The result was 
probably more drastic than the Government intended.57 In Bengal volunteer 
movements were proscribed, political meetings banned and numerous arrests were
52 V to S/S, U cypher tel., 12 Nov. 1921, R63C(i); V to S/S ptel. 1129, 14 Nov. 1921, RIO.
53 See also p. 287 below.
54 Ray, Social Conflict and Political Unrest in Bengal, 1875-1927, pp. 292-3.
55 Low, ’First Non-Co-operation Movement’, p. 307.
56 S/S to V, ptel. 1680, 23 Nov. 1921, RIO; Home Poll. 415/1921, cited in D.A. Low, ’First 
Non-Co-operation Movement’, p. 308.
51 Certainly Sapru thought so. See Sapru to Reading, 22 Dec. 1921, SAPfR292, 1st. series.
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made, including leaders such as C.R. Das and members of his family.58 In the 
United Provinces eminent Congress figures such as Motilal and Jawaharlal Nehru 
were arrested and the latter received a prison sentence of six months duration and a 
fine of Rs. 100.59
The drastic nature of the action taken was counter-productive as it created a 
turnaround in the opinions of many of the moderate Indians whom the Government 
aimed to keep on their side. The Indian Association in Calcutta, the worst affected 
area, complained of indiscriminate arrests, including the arrest of ladies, the 
maltreatment of arrested prisoners and assaults and rude behaviour of officers against 
innocent persons. They objected to the use of Part Two of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act and the Seditious Meetings Act and complained of a ’state of 
terrorism’. The Association concluded by asking whether the Bengal Ministers were 
consulted and whether they agreed to these actions?60 In the United Provinces 
there were protests from the Lucknow Liberal League and from Moderates in 
Allahabad.61 There was a sense of outrage across India that respectable educated 
leaders could be arrested and imprisoned. Reading later admitted that there probably 
were cases in which officers had been over-zealous and that young men had been 
arrested when they probably could have been just reprimanded.62 The problem 
was that now non-co-operators were actively seeking arrest and the numbers of people
58 More than 3000 people had gone to jail in Calcutta by the end of the year. See S. Sarkar, 
Modern India, Delhi, 1983 p. 219.
59 S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. 1, London, 1975, p. 63.
60 Indian Association minute, 14 Dec. 1921, Indian Association Files. The answer was that the 
Ministers had been consulted and that they had successfully objected to certain actions such as 
extemments which Ronaldshay wished to use. However, at the end of the day the Ministers were not 
responsible for law and order in the Bengal Government. See below, pp. 264-266.
61 IAR, 1922, entries for 15 & 20 Dec. 1922.
62 See, e.g., V to S/S, ptel. 111-C, 18 Dec. 1921, RIO.
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in jail were becoming an embarrassment to Government. Reading told Montagu that,
It cannot be denied that there is a general feeling that the Government 
policy is now purely repressive, and the effect is to make many 
moderates and others who are not non-cooperators place themselves in 
criticism of, or in opposition to, Government. I am myself of opinion 
that the tendency is to swing the pendulum too far in the direction of 
enforcing law although it is extremely difficult to take action which 
would limit it without discouraging the police and local 
authorities.63
Reading searched for a way out of the impasse by negotiating a truce with the 
non-co-operators. He had received telegrams from Members of the Legislative 
Assembly, the Bengal Assembly and others suggesting a round table conference or a 
Royal Commission to enquire into the discontent.64 He was increasingly worried 
by the forthcoming visit of the Prince of Wales to Calcutta, the heart of the recent 
disturbances. There were indications that the large European community in Calcutta 
was thoroughly alarmed.65 Any repetition of the loss of Government control 
which had happened on 17 November would seriously undermine the support of the 
European community in India and would transmit itself to the authorities at home. 
Reading seemed to be badly affected by the fact that the Calcutta Bar had cancelled 
their invitation to him to attend their dinner due to the opposition of a minority of 
vakils and pleaders.66 The Viceroy became almost obsessed with the need to 
obtain a truce in time for the Calcutta visit on 24 December. He authorised Sapru to 
act as his secret intermediary to help bring about a round table conference.67 It 
was a difficult role as everything had to be completed by 21 December, the last date
63 V to S/S, ptel. 106-C, 17 Dec. 1921, RIO.
64 Ibid.
65 Ray, Social Conflict, p. 293.
66 V to S/S, pteL-106-C, 17 Dec. 1921, RIO; H. Butler to Lord Hardinge et al., 22 Dec. 1921, 
B29.
67 V to S/S, ptel. 106-C, 17 Dec. 1921, RIO.
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on which the Viceroy was available in Calcutta to meet a deputation requesting a 
conference. Sapru’s position was particularly delicate as he had to stress to those with 
whom he spoke that he was acting privately and could not commit the Government in 
any way.68 Even as Sapru talked to nationalist politicians, more arrests were 
taking place, thus making his task more difficult. He was assured by Malaviya, who 
also played a leading role in arranging the deputation to the Viceroy, that Gandhi 
would accept an invitation to the conference. Sapru sent two Liberals, Jamnadas 
Dwarkadas and H.N7 Kunzru, to Ahmedabad to see Gandhi and make sure that he 
was really prepared to attend.69 M.R. Jayakar was present at Ahmedabad when 
Gandhi received the emissaries and sent them away with an affirmative answer. 
Jayakar recalls in his autobiography that the offer that was made to Gandhi was that if 
the agitation was called off Reading would convene a round table conference and at 
that conference Reading ’would, on behalf of the British Government offer full 
Provincial Autonomy, dyarchy in Central Government would be negotiated.’70 
Perhaps Kunzru and Dwarkadas overstated what was on offer in order to tempt 
Gandhi, but it must be stressed that at no time did Reading either commit himself to, 
or apparently even consider, entering a conference with the purpose of making major 
constitutional concessions of this kind. Even if he had, he must have known that he 
would have been repudiated by the authorities in London.71 It is a very important 
point to establish because, if it were true that the British were prepared to concede full 
provincial autonomy after only one year of the working of the new reforms, it would 
indicate a remarkable rapidity of political concession, amounting to panic in
68 Sapru to Reading, 16 Dec. 1921, SAP/K290, 1st. series.
69 Sapru to Hignell, 16 Dec. 1921, SAP/R291.
70 M.R. Jayakar, The Story o f My Life, vol. 1, Bombay 1959, p. 504 ff.
71 This myth has found its way into a number of accounts, e.g., K. Dwarkadas, India’s Fight fo r  
Freedom, 1913-1937, Bombay 1966, p. 189; Sinha, Reading, p. 55, repeats it, and the point is left 
somewhat unclear in the account by Low, ’First Non-Co-operation Movement’, pp. 309-10. Rumbold, 
however, dismisses the idea, Watershed, p. 274, n. 107.
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government circles.72
In any case, it appears that Gandhi, after consultation with his advisers 
(predominantly moulvis), and after reflection, changed his mind about accepting 
Reading’s invitation without any prior conditions. He sent a telegram to C.R. Das and 
Abul Kalam Azad, who were both keen to have a conference, that his pre-conditions 
included the release of the fatwa prisoners, i.e. including the Ali brothers and those 
involved in the Karachi resolution.73 Gandhi was now imprisoned by his Khilafat 
allies, the very men that had helped to give him leadership of Congress in the autumn 
of 1920.
Unaware of Gandhi’s pre-conditions, Sapru met with other moderate leaders to 
bring about a deputation to the Viceroy. He met with two local Ministers, Ibrahim 
Rahimtulla from Bombay and Lala Harkishen Lai from the Punjab, at Cawnpore on 
16 December. He also encouraged Besant and her followers to go to Calcutta to join 
in the deputation.74 Malaviya persuaded Jinnah to agree to join in the 
deputation.75 Everything seemed to augur well and Reading sent telegrams to the 
local Governors informing them of what was taking place and then wired Montagu to 
try to achieve Cabinet approval.76 This last telegram was to be a fateful one for 
it led to a Cabinet repudiation of the idea of a round table conference, at least for the 
immediate future. One of the reasons for this may have been that Reading only gave 
the Cabinet some 24 hours to reply to his request and this in itself was not likely to 
have been well-received at home. Furthermore the Cabinet also saw the request very 
much in the context of the Irish negotiations that had recently concluded and felt that
72 The argument stated here tends to support the argument of John Darwin that there was no panic 
in British governing circles in this post-war period, but rather a policy of planned reduction of imperial 
commitments. See J. Darwin, Britain, Egypt and the Middle East, Cambridge, 1981, p. 241.
73 Jayakar, My Life, p. 506.
74 J. Dwarkadas to Besant, 10 Dec. 1921; Sapru to Besant, ptels., 13 Dec. 1922 , Besant MSS, 
file AS 12.
75 Sapru to Reading, 16 Dec 1921, S/4P/R.291, 1st. series.
76 V to S/S, ptel. 111-C, 18 Dec. 1921. RIO
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the experience of these negotiations tended to show that once Government participated 
in them it was difficult not to be drawn much further along the path of political 
concession than was originally intended.77 The Cabinet was right to the extent 
that Indian nationalists did see the Irish negotiations as a hopeful precedent. Thirdly, it 
must be said that the way in which Reading phrased the request made it sound as if he 
was looking for a bargain to meet the immediate crisis caused by the Prince of Wales’ 
forthcoming visit to Calcutta.78 It is not surprising that the Cabinet, chaired by 
Austen Chamberlain in Lloyd George’s absence, wanted nothing to do with anything 
that smacked of a bargain to achieve a successful Royal visit. Reading was very vague 
as to what the purpose of the Conference was. At one point he made it sound as if it 
was merely for an airing of opinions: ’ I have all along been anxious to meet agitators 
and to strive to understand their practical propositions...What is meant by swaraj 
when used by various leaders has never yet been defined.,79 On the other hand, 
he seemed to see the Conference as providing practical political remedies, an 
alternative to the negative policy of maintaining law and order and talked of the 
possibilities of an earlier revision of the 1919 Act, adding that,
At this moment I am not myself prepared to go further than say that I 
can conceive proposals for amendment of the present Act with the 
object of improving the constitutional machinery and advancing on the 
road to the ultimate goal of Dominion Status. But I am not prepared to 
advise this step at present or even so far as I can gather, the immediate 
future.80
Reading’s indications that he had the support of the Governor of Bengal for his 
policy and hoped soon to have the support of his own Council could only have added
77 S/S to V, ptel. 4, 31 Dec. 1921, RIO.
78 S/S to V, ptel. 1838, 20 Dec. 1921, RIO.
79 V to S/S, ptel. 111-C, 18 Dec. 1921, RIO.
80 Idem.
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to the Cabinet’s impression of his scheme as being hastily constructed and ill thought 
out. Reading even admitted that he was not sure that all the local governments would 
approve the truce and the release of those recently arrested, but he thought that some 
such truce was inevitable: ’Indeed it would be absurd if Governments continue to 
enforce a law which rouses such strong opposition when the immediate object of the 
proclamation can be attained by agreement making for peace.’ Reading concluded by 
arguing that if he refused the requests for a conference ’the effect would be to break 
down the whole Reform Scheme, for I think the various Councils and the Legislative 
Assembly would undoubtedly pass resolutions to this effect. Please also bear in mind 
the position of my Indian colleagues in the Council. ’81
This telegram has been quoted extensively in order to try to indicate Reading’s 
political assumptions at this stage, but also so as to appreciate the impact which the 
telegram would have had on the Conservative-dominated Cabinet in London. It must 
have completely undermined the Cabinet’s confidence in the running of the 
Government of India, and convinced them that with such woolly-minded Liberals in 
charge, the Raj was nearing its end. Not surprisingly the Cabinet refused to sanction a 
conference at the present time, preferring H.A.L. Fisher’s advice that the Viceroy 
should ’hold on and wait’. It also conveyed the ’definite view that Parliament will not 
sanction the extension of the 1919 Act- there can be no political bargaining.*82 
Montagu spelt out the Cabinet’s message more fully, but the repudiation was just as 
clear. Concessions must first come from Congress. Cabinet members were not happy 
with the idea of negotiations with those ’who have refused or failed to secure election 
to the Legislature’ and, more importantly, were worried that the conference was 
bound to lead to impossible demands to overturn the 1919 Act which had been in
81 Idem.
82 Cabinet conclusion 93 (21), 20 Dec. 1921 (Cab. 23).
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operation for less than a year.83 Reading’s telegram to the Local Governors was 
not one of his better pieces of writing; Harcourt Butler commented that he ’had never 
read such a production. It took five hours to decypher and could all have been put in a 
few lines.’84 As with his corresponding telegram to Montagu, Reading had failed 
to explain his reasons for being prepared to enter a round table conference with 
Congress with any persuasiveness or clarity.85
The replies of the Local Governors made depressing reading for Reading. Only 
the Governors of Bengal, neighbouring Bihar and Orissa, and the Central Provinces 
gave full support to Reading.86 Madras was against any conference ’designed to 
produce a temporary arrangement to tide over the Prince’s visit’, which Willingdon 
had in any case opposed all along.87 Assam opposed the release of prisoners but 
felt that a conference might help to expose the paucity of nationalist thinking about 
India’s future. Marris regarded the proposals ’as an endeavour to relieve the position 
in Calcutta itself at the expense of other places.’88 Whilst Marris was sceptical of 
Reading’s argument about the need to assuage Moderate Indian opinion because he felt 
the Moderates were unreliable, Lloyd, Governor of Bombay, argued vehemently 
against a conference, precisely because he felt that such a conference would 
undermine the Moderates. Lloyd felt that Moderate criticism of recent Government
83 S/S to V, ptel. 1838, 20 Dec. 1921, RIO.
84 Butler to Hardinge et al., 22 Dec. 1921, B29. : Reading to Governors, ptel., 19 Dec. 1921, 
R23.
83 Indeed Reading’s behaviour at this juncture seems to require explanation, for the confused 
thinking which marks his communications at this time was quite in contrast to the usual clarity of legal 
mind. It may be that he was suffering from some form of nervous breakdown, brought on by the 
pressures of office and, in particular, the responsibility which he had taken on himself for the success 
of the Prince of Wales’ visit. The only evidence we have, however, is secondhand, in that Sapru is 
reported as telling Kanji Dwarkadas at a later date that this was the case. See K. Dwarkadas, India’s 
Fight, pp. 188-9.
86 Ronaldshay’s support had already been indicated by personal discussion; Haviland Le Mesurier, 
Acting Governor, Bihar & Orissa to Reading, ptel. 1843, 20 Dec. 1921, R23; F. Sly ( Governor of 
C.P.) to Reading ptel. 1835, 20 Dec. 1921; the U.P. was totally against a release of prisoners. Butler 
to Reading, ptel. 1833, 20 Dec. 1921, R23.
87 Willingdon to Reading, ptel. 1842, 20 Dec. 1921, R23.
88 Marris (Assam) to Reading, ptel. 1844, 20 Dec. 1921, R23.
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policy was a temporary phenomenon, ’due more to timidity than conviction’. He 
argued that Bombay Moderates were united against any conference with Gandhi which 
would ’involve practically the annihilation of their party. Lloyd was concerned that in 
any conference in which Moderates and Extremists participated, the former must be 
influenced by the latter and ’would soon surrender to the pressure and adopt an 
attitude in which continued co-operation with Government would be impossible.’
Lloyd concluded that the Government should continue to look to the moderate party 
which ’still remains in my judgment the soundest and most consistent course in which 
Government can direct its policy.’89
The majority of Local Governors, therefore, opposed Reading’s scheme and 
many saw it, just as the Cabinet had done, as much too large a concession to make in 
order to win a temporary truce.90 When Reading received the deputation led by 
Malaviya in Calcutta on 21 December, he had to speak entirely on his own 
responsibility. He had not yet received the Cabinet’s views nor those of the local 
Governors. Fortunately, however, he was aware that Gandhi had not provided the 
necessary assurances relating to the cessation of non-co-operation activities which 
would allow the conference to be convened, and thus avoided committing the 
Government in any way.91 Despite the fact that Reading was unable to convene a 
conference, he made a sympathetic speech which recognised the good intentions of 
those who had worked for a conference and deliberately left the door open to a 
conference at a future date if his conditions should be met.92 He confessed that 
he hated ’this making of numerous arrests and prosecutions’ and admitted that some 
excesses may have been committed on the government side. However, he promised to
89 Lloyd to Reading, ptels. 1834 & 1846, 20 Dec. 1921, R23.
90 Craddock (Burma) was not surprisingly against Reading’s proposals: Craddock to Reading, ptel. 
1858, 21 Dec. 1921H?23.
91 Low, ’First Non-Co-operation Movement’, p. 311.
92 Earl of Reading, Speeches, vol. 1, Government of India Press, Simla, 1926, pp. 177-86.
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try to prevent any recurrence and to ensure that existing cases were looked into and 
rectified if necessary. Sympathetic as the general tenor of the speech was, Reading 
reminded his audience that it could not be said that the reforms had yet been properly 
tested and, in any case, any advances in the constitutional system could only come 
from Parliament and that body was bound to be influenced by the way in which the 
Prince of Wales was received in India. The speech was well-received and Sapru 
wanted it widely distributed in the vernaculars as well as in English.93 Once 
Reading received Gandhi’s pre-conditions for the conference, he was able to tell 
Malaviya that discussion about a conference was at an end, and that he could not 
accept the sort of truce that Das was putting forward based on the calling off of the 
hartals in return for the release of those imprisoned in the recent wave. Malaviya was 
obviously very discouraged. Another disappointed man was Lord Ronaldshay, who 
had already indicated to his legislature the possibility of a truce, whilst in Bihar and 
Orissa the Acting Governor had jumped the gun by immediately releasing prisoners in 
the belief that a truce was imminent.
Reading felt bitter at his repudiation by the Cabinet and felt that he had been 
misunderstood. He tried to stress that he was not just looking to a calling off of the 
boycott of the Prince of Wales but of all illegal non-co-operation activity. The 
urgency of his request stemmed from his belief that if the Prince’s visit to Calcutta 
went badly it would so sour British-Indian relations at all levels that any talk of 
negotiation would placed out of court for some considerable time. He insisted that he 
detested the policy of ’repression’ and did not regard the refusal of a conference as 
final.94
As it turned out the visit of the Prince of Wales to Calcutta passed off 
reasonably well, Ronaldshay confiding to his diary that the ’Prince’s reception was
93 Sapru to Reading, 22 Dec. 1921, 5AP/R292, 1st. series.
94 V to S/S, U Cypher tel., 22 Dec. 1921, R63c(i); V to S/S, ptel. 131-C, 24 Dec. 1921, RIO.
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better than I ever dared hope.’95 But the problems remained. On 20 December,
70 volunteers were arrested at Allahabad whilst picketing a school. Amongst those 
arrested were the son and a nephew of Pandit Malaviya. Motilal Nehru’s son and two 
nephews were sentenced to six months imprisonment. Moderates remained very 
unhappy at these signs of continuing repression. Sapru wrote to the Viceroy that the 
’wholesale arrest and prosecution of a large number of young men and boys 
particularly in Bengal and the United Provinces’ was causing him great anxiety 
because of the bitterness that it would generate. He felt that the sentences were often 
’quite out of proportion to the situation or the character of the offence’ and in some 
cases the legal procedure doubtful. He concluded that the Moderate Party would not 
support this policy and it was unreasonable to expect it to do so. It was not lacking in 
courage, in fact it had shown great courage in breaking away from Congress and 
working the reforms, at the cost of facing the odium of public attack. In answer to 
the arguments of men like Lloyd or Harcourt Butler that in fact the Moderates were 
supporting the Government’s policy, Sapru retorted that ’we should not make mistake 
[sic] of attaching too much weight to the support of some of the older leaders or even 
of some of the Ministers in a matter of this character.,96 The fact that the 
majority of the Moderate Party was alienated by the actions of local Governments was 
borne out by the proceedings of the annual Liberal Conference which took place in 
Allahabad between 28 and 30 December.97 But it is significant that the Bombay 
Liberals were not happy with this criticism of government policy in upholding law and 
order.98
95 Diary entry, 25 Dec. 1921, RON1. Perhaps in celebration, he recorded that 1,155 bottles of 
champagne had been consumed at Government House during December, more than for the whole year, 
1919-1920!
96 Sapru to Reading, 22 Dec. 1921, S/1/VR292, 1st. series.
97 IAR, 1922, vol. 1, pp. 439-440. A resolution from Besant, which was generally supportive of 
Government action against the non-cooperators, was defeated by a margin of 2:1. The delegates from 
U.P., Madras and Punjab voted solidly against. A much more balanced resolution was adopted.
98 See D. Wacha to P.S.S. Aiyer, 21 and 24 Dec. 1921, Aiyer MSS.
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It was Gandhi’s intransigence that finally played into Government hands. C.R. 
Das later stated that Gandhi made a number of crucial blunders after September 1921, 
which undermined the non-co-operation movement. The most serious error in his view 
was the rejection of Reading’s offer of a round table conference in December 
1921." But the failure of the all party leaders’ conference in Bombay in January 
1922 was also very important and Gandhi bears a considerable responsibility for that 
failure too. Gandhi seems to have recognised that he was locked in battle for the 
support of moderate opinion in India, but he was not able to show the necessary 
flexibility to win this support and simultaneously keep his more militant supporters 
happy. At the annual Congress session in Ahmedabad in December 1922 Gandhi had 
managed to see off attempts to tie Congress to a goal of complete independence. 
However, he was under greater pressure now that his promise of swaraj in one year 
was unfulfilled, and he announced that he would start civil disobedience in Bardoli in 
the new year. Lloyd regarded the speeches and policy declared at Ahmedabad were 
’very serious indeed’ and pressed Reading to allow him to prosecute Gandhi.100 
Reading refused, explaining to Montagu that any prosecution should be based not on 
speeches made but on actions taken. He argued that the public response to Gandhi’s 
arrest ’will be far less serious if arrest is made for an act which threatens the whole 
social fabric and security of life and property, such as civil disobedience by 
non-payment of taxes.’101
All-Party Leaders’ Conference, Bombay.
Malaviya and other ’independent’ politicians felt that the door was not yet 
closed on the possibility of a round table conference. After all, there seemed some
99 See Jayakar, My Life, vol. 1, pp. 509-517; Reading to Peel, 19 Apr. 1923, R6 ; S.C. Bose,
The Indian Struggle 1920-42, Bombay, 1964, p. 68.
100 Lloyd to Montagu, 13 Jan. 1922, A/26.
101 V to S/S, ptel. 33, 15 Jan. 1922, R16.
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hope of shared ground in the nationalist movement; the Liberal Conference had been 
highly critical of recent Government policy, whilst Congress had remained committed 
to national development within the British Commonwealth. On 3 January 1922 they 
sent letters to a number of leaders from across the political spectrum inviting them to 
a representative conference to try to find a way out of present difficulties.102 
The Conference met in Bombay on 14 and 15 January and over 200 people were 
present, including some Liberals.103 Gandhi and other non-co-operators attended 
as observers and did not vote on the resolutions. The Conference was chaired by Sir 
Sankaran Nair, but he resigned and left the Conference on the second day, being 
unable to impose his will on the meeting. The main resolutions showed far more 
willingness to meet the views of the non-co-operators than the Liberals were prepared 
to accept, and the pre-conditions laid down for a round table conference still included 
the release of the fatwa prisoners, which was known to be unacceptable to 
Reading.104 A committee of twenty was established to implement the resolutions 
of the Conference, but recognised Liberals were noticeably absent from this 
Committee. Indeed the Bombay conference served to highlight the continuing rift 
between the Liberals and other Indian politicians. Sir Sankaran Nair’s letter to the 
newspapers on 17 January, explaining why he resigned the chair at the conference, 
was a devastating critique of what he saw as Gandhian intransigence about 
pre-conditions, which he said amounted to an unwillingness to work for a round table
102 See Jayakar, My Life, vol. 1, pp. 519-545 for the history of the Bombay conference. The letter 
of invitation was signed by M.M. Malaviya, M.A. Jinnah, M.R. Jayakar, P. Thakurdas, A. Sarabhai, 
K. Natarajan, G.M. Bhurgri. See also the account in the letter sent by the Secretaries of the Conference 
to Reading, 28 Jan. 1922, R24.
103 Besant did not attend as she did not approve of the conference and felt that Gandhi was playing 
to gain time. See Besant annotation to Ratansi & K. Dwarkadas, ptel., 13 Jan. 1922; Besant to ’Hansu’ 
[R.D. Moraiji ?] ptel., n.d., Besant MSS. See also K. Dwarkadas, India's Fight, p. 192.
104 Jayakar, My Life, pp. 525-527. Lloyd reported that the resolutions were only carried by about 
twenty people, all the rest abstaining. See Lloyd to Reading, ptel. 79, 17 Jan. 1922, R24.
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conference.105 Reading’s whole attitude had by now hardened towards any 
compromise and he was pleased that the conference had failed and that Gandhi had 
made another tactical error in alienating moderate opinion.106 Reading’s pleasure 
was increased when both the Indian Legislative Assembly and the Council of State 
turned down resolutions calling for a conference. Reading told Montagu that ’the 
tactical advantage Gandhi gained in December...had been lost by his latest action’ and 
it now resided with the Government.107 Government action of the last two 
months had restored the confidence of British officials and the police in the 
Government’s authority.108 Within the next fortnight, however, that confidence 
was to be shattered by Reading’s indecision regarding Gandhi’s arrest.
Reading was under mounting pressure from the British Government and also 
from some of the Local Governors to arrest Gandhi but he still wished to defer action 
until active civil disobedience had been started.109
Gandhi had delayed the start of civil disobedience at Bardoli until the 
beginning of February in order to allow negotiations for a round table conference to 
have a chance of succeeding.110 On 1 February Gandhi sent an ultimatum to the 
Viceroy calling upon him to undo Government’s repressive actions within seven days 
or face civil disobedience.111 Reading felt aggrieved not only by the tone of 
Gandhi’s demands but also by the misrepresentation of his agreement with Gandhi at
1(15 Jayakar, My Life, pp. 528-532. Nair’s stand would have been all the more effective because he 
had a reputation of independence, having resigned from Chelmsford’s government over the issue of the 
continuance of martial law in the Punjab in May 1919. See Chelmsford to Montagu, 28 May 1919, A/8.
106 V to S/S, ptel. 46, 18 Jan. 1922, R\6. As far as he was concerned there was no point in 
prolonging negotiations for a conference. V to S/S, ptel. 112, 1 Feb. 1922, /?16.
107 V to S/S, ptel. 49, 20 Jan. 1922, R16.
108 V to S/S. ptel. 112, 1 Feb. 1922, R\6.
109 Montagu reported that Churchill, following the example of action taken against Zaghlul, the 
Egyptian nationalist leader, wanted Gandhi deported and that he believed that Austen Chamberlain 
thought the same way. S/S to V, U Cypher tel., 19 Jan. 1922, R63C(i). See also S/S to V (HD), ptels.
177 & 198, 2 & 6 Feb. 1922, Rl l .  Lloyd pressed for Gandhi’s arrest on several occasions, see Lloyd
to Reading ptels. 12, 28 79; 5, 7, & 17 Jan. 1922, R24. Butler also wanted Gandhi arrested, Butler to 
Reading, 12 Jan. 1922, R24.
110 Low, ’First Non-Co-operation Movement’, pp. 312-14.
111 See Jayakar, My Life, vol.l, pp. 546-8.
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the end of May 1921, and, following news of the murder of policemen at Chauri 
Chaura, Gorakhpur District, U .P., on 4 February, agreed to sanction Gandhi’s 
arrest.112 Soon afterwards, Reading asked Lloyd to delay the arrest until after the 
Prince of Wales’ visit to Delhi which took place on 14 February.113 On 11-12 
February 1922 the Congress Working Committee at Bardoli endorsed Gandhi’s 
decision to suspend civil disobedience in view of what had happened at 
Chauri-Chaura. Reading’s Council, meeting on 13 February, was now divided along 
racial lines as to whether to arrest Gandhi. The Britons in the majority, however, 
decided that the arrest should go ahead. Sapru was very unhappy with the decision 
and after re-reading the Bardoli resolutions, wrote Reading a long letter calling for the 
arrest to be postponed. Sapru saw the resolutions as ’the biggest climbdown for Mr. 
Gandhi’ and a recognition at last of the dangers inherent in the non-co-operation 
movement. Sapru argued that arresting Gandhi at this stage might well mean losing 
the moral advantage just gained and ’should he go back on these Resolutions...we 
would be in a much stronger position to deal with him effectively.’114
It must have been a very difficult decision for Reading to take, especially in 
view of the fact that the House of Commons was due to debate the Indian situation the 
very next day and Montagu was expecting to announce that Gandhi had been arrested. 
Yet Reading felt that he could not afford to risk the resignation of Sapru and possibly 
the two other Indian Councillors, especially if it was only a matter of waiting a few
112 Gandhi seemed now to argue that Reading had promised not to interfere with non-cooperation 
activities ’so long as they remained non-violent in word and deed’. Reading to Lloyd, ptels., 4 & 7 
Feb. 1922 R24.
113 Reading to Lloyd, ptel. 174, 11 Feb. 1922, R24. Reading had asked local officials to report 
on the safety of the Prince on his visit to northern India. The Chief Commissioner in Delhi, C.A. 
Barron, had asked that if Gandhi was to be arrested it should not be just before the Prince was due to 
reach Delhi. Barron to Reading, 29 Jan. 1922, R63C(i). These considerations must have weighed 
heavily with Reading-particularly when Montagu told him of the King’s ’great anxiety’ about the 
situation in India. See S/S to V, U Cypher tel. 172, 1 Feb 1922, R63C(i).
114 Sapru to Reading, 13. Feb. 1922, S/1/VR295 (draft), 1st. series.
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days to see the true import of the Bardoli resolutions.115 Lloyd received the 
decision with horror and amazement, particularly as he had received a telegram on 11 
February in which Reading said that the arrest should go ahead even if Gandhi 
postponed civil disobedience. Lloyd told Montagu that Reading ’has made a fool of 
me and my Government in face of both the Indian and British publics.’116 As a 
result, Lloyd’s Home Member offered his resignation and his Ministers complained of 
being placed in an embarrassing situation.117 D.A. Low sees Reading’s decision 
as a wise one, allowing time for the impact of Gandhi’s climb-down to be appreciated 
by the Moderates, so that by the time Gandhi was finally arrested in March, the 
non-co-operation movement had effectively collapsed.118 This may be so, but the 
cost of Reading’s indecision needs also to be considered. Reading completely lost the 
confidence of two of his Presidency Governors, Willingdon and Lloyd, men whose 
hostility or resignation could make Reading’s position extremely difficult.119 He 
also contributed to a much wider feeling that those in charge of Indian affairs were 
unable to take firm action to maintain British rule and that they were too much 
influenced by Indian advisors for their own good.120 Ironically it was Montagu 
who took the blame for what had happened, despite the fact that he had argued for 
Gandhi’s arrest.
Reading realised at the time of postponing the arrest that he would have to 
explain himself in person to the Presidency Governors and he invited them to Delhi 
for a conference at the end of the month.121 As it happened, Ronaldshay was
" 5 V to S'S. 13 Feb. 1922, U Cypher tel., R63C(i).
116 Lloyd to Montagu, 17 Feb. 1922, A/26.
1,7 Idem.
118 Low, ’First Non-Co-operation Movement’ p. 316.
1,9 Willingdon talked of he and Lloyd resigning. Willingdon to Montagu, 22 Feb. 1922, W4.
120 Butler wrote that ’The Viceroy’s evil geniuses are Sapru, the Law Member, who hates the 
British more than anyone in India, and Madan Mohan Malaviya who is the most double dealing man in 
India.’ H. Butler to Lord Hardinge et. al., 22 Dec. 1921, B29.
121 V to S/S, U cypher tel., 13 Feb. 1922, R63C(i).
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unable to attend, -so Willingdon and Lloyd had the Viceroy to themselves. The issues 
discussed included the crisis before the Prince of Wales’ visit to Calcutta, about which 
Lloyd complained of the lack of time allowed for consultation with Local Governors, 
and the fact that Reading had countenanced ’secret negotiations’ with Gandhi and 
Malaviya, using the clear the line state telegraph ’under my very nose in my own 
Presidency’.122 The main issue brought up by Lloyd, however, was the 
vacillation regarding Gandhi’s arrest in February. Lloyd was particularly aggrieved 
that, just as in December, he had not been given a chance to put his views in time for 
him to influence any decision. Lloyd threatened resignation and the power of his 
arguments and the support he received from Willingdon forced Reading into a comer 
out of which he extricated himself only by giving written assurances so that Lloyd 
could assure mollify his Council. Lloyd still remained unsatisfied and wrote that *1 left 
Delhi sick at heart and with my confidence in Reading much impaired.’123 In 
view of this conference and all the other pressures brought on Reading, Gandhi’s 
arrest was only a matter of time and it finally took place with minimum fuss on 10 
March 1922. It came just one day after Montagu’s resignation.
3. M ontagu’s Resignation
The incident that led to Montagu’s resignation was his decision, without 
Cabinet permission, to publish a telegram on the Turkish settlement which the Viceroy 
was very keen to have published before the arrest of Gandhi took place.124 This 
telegram called for changes in the Treaty of Sevres to meet some of the demands of 
Muslims in India. Since he arrived as Viceroy, Reading had been convinced that if he
122 Lloyd to Montagu, 3 March 1922, A/26.
123 Idem.
124 The details of Montagu’s resignation have been well covered in Waley, Montagu, ch xix; and 
Rumbold, Watershed, ch. xvi.
182
could help to find some resolution of the Khilafat grievances it would bring Indian 
Muslims back to their more normal role as loyalists. He was constantly aware that the 
Khilafat movement provided the real cutting edge of Gandhi’s non-co-operation 
movement, and if it could be dulled his task would be much easier.125 Montagu 
agreed entirely, but felt that Lloyd George was obsessed with a pro-Greek policy and 
remained fervently committed to antiquated and prejudiced views of the Turkish 
nation.126 The spirited military resistance of the Turkish nationalist leader,
Mustapha Kemal, made a nonsense of the British policy of supporting the large-scale 
takeover by the Greeks of territory on the Turkish mainland. The Treaty of Sevres 
was no longer enforceable. The French were playing a wily game of ditching their 
British imperial rivals and preparing to come to terms with the Turkish regime, and 
the impression created in India was that it was only British stubbornness that stopped 
a resolution of the problem. Reading had tried on numerous occasions to have the 
Indian point of view recognised and Montagu had previously argued, but in vain, that 
India’s place on the Paris Peace Conference, allowed her the right to make a separate 
representation of her views.127 Montagu admitted that his constant carping on the 
subject had antagonised the Prime Minister and that this had lost him any influence he 
might have had on other subjects.128 Montagu had also antagonised Curzon, the 
Foreign Secretary, with whom he constantly battled in Cabinet. The situation was 
fairly hopeless, therefore, when Reading cabled to Montagu asking whether it would 
be helpful if the Government of India and the Provincial Governments made a joint 
representation about the modification of the Treaty of Sevres in a way that would meet 
the reasonable aspirations of Indian Muslims, i.e. by the Allies evacuating
125 See e.g., Reading to Lloyd George, 21 Feb. 1921, cited in Hyde, Reading, pp. 331-2 ; V to 
S/S, 13 July 1922, R5 ; V to S/S, 21 Sept. 1922 R5.
126 S/S to V, U Cypher tel., 25 Dec. 1921, R63d(i).
127 See Rumbold, Watershed, p. 303.
128 S/S to V, U cypher tel., 25 Dec. 1921, /?63d(i).
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Constantinople, restoring Thrace and Smyrna to Turkey, and ensuring Turkish 
suzerainty over the Holy Places. Reading indicated that this was less drastic than a 
suggestion that had been made to him by Willingdon which involved the resignations 
of those responsible for governing India but he thought it would strengthen Montagu’s 
hands and ’would amount to the final act that the Viceroy and Governors could take 
short of actual resignations to enforce a policy which they consider 
imperative.*129 Montagu replied encouragingly and the die was cast.130
Reading’s ploy would not have had its fateful consequences except for a series 
of rather fortuitous occurrences which led to Montagu taking the decision on the 
weekend of 4-5 March to allow Reading’s telegram of 28 February to be published 
without obtaining prior Cabinet approval. Montagu had in fact circulated the telegram 
to the Cabinet.131 Although Curzon was clearly annoyed by what Montagu had 
done and wrote to him to say so, the matter did not look as if it would lead further, 
until, on Thursday 9 March, Curzon indicated that the matter was too serious to be 
allowed to stand as it did. On the same day the newspapers carried comment on the 
Government of India’s telegram. Lloyd George summoned Montagu and asked for his 
resignation. The resignation that reluctantly followed was a messy affair with a good 
deal of public recrimination and bitterness. Montagu was a broken man; his political 
career was ruined and his central purpose in life destroyed.132 Most historians 
agree that although Montagu had breached Cabinet etiquette it was not a very serious 
offence in view of the fact that the Government of India had made public very similar 
views in the past and was, indeed, soon to publish a White Paper on the 
subject.133 The timing was, however, inopportune as Curzon was just about to
129 V to S/S, ptel. 162, 9 Feb. 1922, R16.
130 S/S to V, ptel. 245, 15 Feb. 1922, R16.
131 For details of the incident see Rumbold, Watershed, pp. 300-5.
132 Waley, Montagu, p. 277.
133 Rumbold, Watershed, p. 303.
184
participate in negotiations in Paris with the Turks. Rumbold, an historian not 
generally sympathetic to Montagu, concludes that Tt would have been difficult, but 
not impossible, for Chamberlain and Lloyd George to deal in Parliament with 
Montagu’s error in a way which satisfied Curzon without forcing Montagu’s 
resignation. But they did not wish to try.’134 Collective cabinet responsibility 
had been breached so often in the Lloyd George regime that it seemed to Montagu 
hypocritical to focus on this particular incident.135
The fact that Montagu’s resignation coincided with the arrest of Gandhi 
suggested to many Indians that Montagu had been sacrificed for reasons of differences 
with the Cabinet over how to deal with the non-co-operation movement. In fact they 
were wrong, in that Montagu had been pressing for Gandhi’s arrest for several 
months.136 However, they were right to the extent that they realised that there 
were deeper reasons for Montagu’s resignation than the apparent one of the 
publication of the Viceroy’s message calling for revision of the Treaty of Sevres. 
Montagu’s resignation, as he himself remarked, owed a good deal to the swing to the 
right in British politics that had been taking place since the War.137 It was Lloyd 
George’s authority that kept what was, after all, a Conservative majority Government, 
in power. Yet Lloyd George’s hold on power was slipping as the domestic economy 
faltered and crises mounted in Ireland, Egypt, Turkey the Middle East and India. In 
each of these areas the Government was forced to make major concessions to 
mounting nationalism and there was a feeling amongst some Conservatives that a line
134 Ibid., p. 304.
135 Ibid., p. 277.
136 For Montagu’s views on the establishment of this myth, see Montagu to Lytton, 30 Sept. 1922, 
L25.
137 The position of Montagu and the few Asquithian Liberals who were in the Coalition 
Government became^increasingly less certain. Chelmsford argued that Montagu ’...is not master in his 
own house...He dare not resign because there is no political group to which he can go, and they cannot 
get rid of him because his name still counts in India.’ Chelmsford to Reading, 1 Mar. 1922, F2\.
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had to be drawn somewhere.138 India, the most valuable British possession, 
seemed the obvious place to draw it. Montagu was made the sacrificial victim to 
appease the right-wing critics of Lloyd George’s regime. The Conservatives had never 
liked Montagu and the die-hard element had never forgiven him for his strident 
performance in the debate on General Dyer and the Amritsar Massacre in July 
1920.139
The hardening of attitudes towards India can be seen in a series of Cabinet 
meetings which toolc place in February 1922, shortly before Gandhi was due to be 
arrested. The first meeting focused on Reading’s delay in arresting Gandhi and 
Montagu took the lead in calling for stronger action against the non-co-operation 
movement, arguing that ’Gandhi’s organ should be suppressed, its meetings, 
prohibited its leaders imprisoned or deported.*140 On 9 February the Cabinet 
was convened on Chamberlain’s request to discuss the military/political 
situation.141 Once again, Reading’s policies were under criticism and once again 
Montagu sided with the Cabinet’s view rather than that of his counterpart in Delhi. 
Reading’s request for a reduction of the number of British troops in India and for the 
acceptance of a scheme for the total Indianisation of the Indian army over a period of 
between 30 and 42 years was rejected by the Cabinet. It felt it could not commit itself 
to such a scheme, particularly in view of the serious political situation which might 
require additional British troops at any time. But it was the arguments used by 
Ministers that were most significant. Curzon objected to what he saw as a response to 
political agitation in India and ’a sop to the Councils to secure the passage of the 
Budget.’ Churchill, attacking the Indianisation proposals, believed ’an idea was
138 Montagu reported, following the debate in the House of Commons that, ’there is an uneasy 
feeling that our Empire is slipping away’. S/S to V, U cypher tel., 15 Feb. 1922, R63c(i).
139 Sir Charles Petrie, The Life and Letters o f the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain, vol.2, p. 
153. Chamberlain saw this debate as the beginning of the end for the Lloyd George coalition.
140 Cab. Conclusion 8 (22),4, 6 Feb. 1922 (Cab. 23).
141 Cabinet Conclusion 12 (22), App. 1, Conference of Ministers, 9 Feb. 1922 (Cab. 23).
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prevalent among -many people, both in India and at home that we were fighting a 
rearguard action in India and that the British Raj was doomed and that India would 
gradually be handed over to Indians’.142 Up to now, he said, he had supported 
the constitutional reforms in India but they had received a great setback and he 
believed ’that opinion would change soon as to the expediency of granting democratic 
institutions to backward races which had no capacity for self-government.’ He 
believed ’that a way out of our difficulties might be found by extending the system of 
native states, with their influential aristocracies and landed proprietors. That system 
would be in harmony with the ideas of Indians to whom European democratic 
institutions were generally repugnant. ’ Churchill had put his finger on the very 
heart of the issue: some Ministers had, in the wake of the non-co-operation 
movement, turned against the spirit of the Montford reforms which were predicated 
upon the basis of transferring western political institutions to India, Indianising the 
Services, and leading India towards self-government. Churchill was, in effect, 
questioning each one of these policies. The Prime Minister, though, did not share 
these views, but did lend his support to the call for a firmer approach in governing 
India. He endorsed the need to contradict the prevalent view ’that His Majesty’s 
Government contemplated withdrawal from India’. When the meeting resumed on the 
next day he told his colleagues that,
It must be made clear that the Government had no intention of leaving 
India or of allowing British supremacy there to be challenged. A 
considerable measure of self-government had been granted to India; but 
any further extension in that direction must depend on whether the 
Indians showed that they were capable of making proper use of the 
constitution that had been granted to them. There must be a master in 
India...We were now masters in India and we should let it be
142 Ibid.
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understood that we meant to remain so.143
On 14 February Montagu replied to what amounted to a censure motion put 
down by the die-hard M .P., Sir W. Joynson-Hicks, who claimed that ’The right hon. 
gentleman has used his position as a Liberal Minister in a Coalition Government to 
govern India in accordance with Liberal and Home Rule ideas’, and that he was 
guilty of betraying ’every white man and white woman in India all through 1919, 
1920 and 1921.’144 Montagu made a brave attempt to justify the Liberal position 
and cited Lord Macaulay’s famous speech of 1833 in which he said that if Indians 
were in the future to demand European institutions, it would be the proudest day in 
English history. However, the main thrust of his speech was an attempt to re-affirm 
the Government’s determination to maintain law and order. However, because of 
Reading’s failure to arrest Gandhi as instructed, Montagu had no concrete proof of the 
Government’s intentions. This, as Rumbold argues, sealed Montagu’s fate; ’the 
Viceroy did not seem to carry out his orders. Montagu’s past performance, his known 
preference for soft government, his personality and whole style, made him an 
untrustworthy instrument for the application of the tighter rein from London that was 
now essential.’145 The knife was turned by the Northcliffe Press. On the 
day after the debate the Times editorial called for Montagu’s resignation in ringing 
terms:
After a trial lasting many months it has now become obvious that the 
combination of Lord Reading and Mr. Montagu at the head of Indian 
affairs is not working well. The public are alarmed and with good 
reason. There must be a separation. No one suggests a change of
143 Cabinet Conclusion 12 (22), App.3, Meeting of conference of ministers , 10 Feb. 1922 (Cab.
23).
144 Waley, Edwin Montagu, p. 269. Montagu’s reply had been rehearsed in Cabinet the previous 
day and it followed the recent hard line on India. He was on the defensive as over ninety members of 
the House had signed a petition calling for his dismissal.
145 Rumbold, Watershed, p. 297.
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Viceroy and the necessary alternative is to appoint a new head of the
India Office, preferably a statesman of stronger fibre.146
Northcliffe had himself recently returned from a visit to India and was known to be 
shocked by the change of attitude he had found amongst Indians. Reading had made a 
point of seeing him whilst he was in India and had obviously felt that he had recruited 
him as a useful publicist for explaining the Indian situation in England.147 
However, Northcliffe, like Joynson-Hicks, another recent visitor to India, seems to 
have used his new knowledge to attack the Montagu-Reading administration. 
Valentine Chirol, who had written extensively for the Times, believed that Northcliffe 
was behind the Times editorial attacking Montagu, but also argued that Montagu had 
contributed to his own downfall. ’He seems’, he told Butler, ’to be temperamentally 
unable to steer a straight course...he has always tried at the same time to run with the 
Moderate hare and the Extremist hound’.148
Montagu’s fate had really been sealed well before he allowed Reading’s 
telegram on the Turkish settlement to be published. He was the victim of a right-wing 
backlash on imperial affairs which resulted from the combination of outrage at the 
boycott of the Prince of Wales’ visit and also from fears in the Conservative Party 
that matters were going too fast with regard to Egypt and Ireland.149 As 
Rumbold argues, it was ironic that Montagu did not disagree with the Cabinet on 
many of the issues under controversy with the Government of India. But, as the Times 
argued, there was no question of recalling the Viceroy, so the Secretary of State had
146 Times, 15 Feb. 1922.
147 Hyde, Reading, p. 367.
148 V. Chirol to H. Butler, 22 Feb. 1922, Butler MSS, vol. 37, HB41. Montagu thought that his
speech in the debate had been a success (indeed Joynson-Hick’s resolution was defeated by 248 votes to
64) and was surprised to find the attack in the Times which he attributed to orders from Northcliffe. S/S
to V, U Cypher tel., 15 Feb. 1922, /?63c(i).
149 See Chirol to Sivaswamy Aiyer, 26 Apr. 1922, Aiyer MSS.
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to go.150
Reading survived; though he thought of offering his resignation, London 
notified him that it was not warranted as Montagu held the entire responsibility and 
Reading sensibly decided that two resignations would be more than the reforms could 
survive.151 Later he reflected that the publication of his telegram for all its 
fateful consequences for Montagu had had the desired effect on Muslim opinion and 
Reading dated the collapse of the non-co-operation movement from that event.152
For Montagu, the irony was that he was forced out of office just as the 
situation was beginning to improve, and he later wrote to Lloyd that he ’never felt 
much doubt but that when the Government of India asserted itself against Gandhi and 
his followers actual law-breaking with all its attendant perils would cease.’153 
Montagu seems to have suffered in many respects for the mistakes of Reading. 
Montagu quoted Lloyd George’s words to him when he asked for his resignation and, 
although denied by Lloyd George, they have a ring of truth about them and do suggest 
a much deeper dissatisfaction with the Indian policy. ’You and Reading’, Lloyd 
George is alleged to have said, ’have muddled India in a way that it was almost 
impossible it should be muddled. You have not the courage to carry through any 
decision’.154 The underlying issues that led to Montagu’s downfall, the 
indecisiveness about dealing more effectively with the leaders of the non-co-operation 
movement, and the failure to do more to protect the interests of the British in the 
army and civil service in India, were ones where Reading pursued a policy contrary to 
that advised by Montagu. Yet as the Times editorial recognised, to recall the Viceroy
130 There was additionally an element of anti-semitism involved in the attacks on Montagu and 
Reading. See e.g. Sir Walter Lawrence to Curzon, 14 Mar. 1922, Curzon MSS, EUR FI 12/226 a/16, 
cited in D. Judd, Lord Reading, pp. 213-14.
151 See Hyde, Reading, pp. 374-5.
152 V to S/S, 13 July 1922, R5.
153 Montagu to Lloyd, 8 June 1922, A Sl/6 /ll.
154 Montagu to Lloyd George, 9 Mar. 1922, AS 2/11/10.
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would be extremely damaging to Britain’s image, quite apart from the fact that 
Reading was a close personal friend of the Prime Minister.
Shortly after his resignation, Montagu assured his constituents that his 
resignation did not signify a change in the Government of India’s policy and Reading 
quickly tried to reassure Moderate Indians.155 However, as Mehrotra argues, 
Montagu’s resignation ’struck the Liberals like a thunderbolt for they had placed all 
their hopes in him...His departure made them feel like waifs and they feared that the 
forces which had contrived to bring about his downfall would attempt a policy of 
reaction or at least of stagnation in Indian affairs.’156 Sapru complained that 
’Montagu’s departure from office has robbed us of the support of the only English 
statesman who genuinely believed in our destiny.’157 Reading tried to play down 
Indian arguments that British reaction dated from the resignation of Montagu and the 
appointment of his successor, the Conservative Lord Peel. He rightly pointed out that 
Indians had begun to complain of a change in attitude before Montagu’s resignation, 
in February 1922 in fact, and had pointed to the speeches of Montagu and Lloyd 
George as evidence of a reaction against any early expansion of the reforms.158 
Those Moderates who had noticed the new tone Montagu used in the House of 
Commons on 14 February, believed that Montagu was a prisoner of the Cabinet in 
expressing these views. They failed to understand the extent to which Montagu’s 
views had hardened as a result of the non-co-operation movement. Montagu clearly 
felt that Congress, by boycotting the Councils had deprived themselves of a perfect 
chance to prove themselves and gain further concessions. By boycotting the Prince of 
Wales’ visit they had forfeited any sympathy they might have received from British 
public opinion and had made his position impossible. He wrote to Reading as a
155 Waley, Edwin Montagu, pp. 277-9.
156 Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, p. 163.
157 Sapru to Sivaswamy Aiyer, 14 May 1922, Aiyer MSS.
158 V to S/S, 29 June & 6 July 1922, R5.
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disillusioned maiv:
The fact of the matter is, Rufus, that people here are fed up with India, 
and it is all I can do to keep my colleagues steady on the accepted 
policy, let alone new instalments of it. The Indians are so unreasonable, 
so slow to compromise, so raw in their resentments, and the insults to 
the Prince of Wales have made fierce feeling in this country.159
It was not just the Extremists whom Montagu blamed; the Moderates had also made 
the situation more difficult by failing to support the Governments’s attempts to 
maintain law and order.160 Montagu was bitterly disappointed that Indians had 
not played their part in making the reforms as successful as he hoped. He believed 
that if only they had shown another year or two of solid achievement, the British 
Government would have found it hard to refuse their request for constitutional 
advance.161 It should also be remembered that it was not unusual in the Indian 
context for statesmen to hold progressive political views whilst also believing that 
unacceptable political demands and pressures should be firmly dealt with.162
Though Montagu’s attitudes towards progress in India appear to have genuinely 
hardened in the winter of 1921-22, there was also an element of the politician 
swimming with the tide and hoping for a change in the current. He told Reading only 
a fortnight before his departure that ’if we are not to have a reversal of the policy in 
India, which to my mind would mean the end of the Indian Empire, we must try and 
avoid, until things get brighter, presenting to the Government or Parliament proposals 
that they would reject’.163 That Montagu still maintained progressive views on 
India’s constitutional future can be seen from his letter to Lytton six months after his
159 S/S to V, 1 Feb. 1922, /?4.
160 See Montagu’s speech to the 1920 Club, 9 Feb. 1922, as reported in the Times, 10 Feb. 1922. 
See also S/S to V, 1 Mar. 1922, /?4.
161 S/S to V, U cypher tel., 29 Dec. 1921, R63C(i).
162 John Morley is the prime example of this phenomenon. See Moore, Liberalism, ch. 6.
163 S/S to V, 23 Feb 1922, cited in Hyde, Reading, pp. 370-1.
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resignation in which he talked of getting away from dyarchy and establishing a unified 
ministry, responsible to the Legislature, carrying on with British assistance.164
Reading wanted to establish the consistency and coherence of Government 
policy by emphasising that Montagu and he shared the basic belief that further reforms 
could only be justified on the evidence of the successful operation of the new councils 
and could not be forced by agitation. It was Reading’s belief that the prime cause of 
Moderate disappointment was the failure to make further constitutional 
advances.165 But he displayed a blindspot in ignoring a whole range of other 
issues that the Moderates felt dissatisfied with, and, of course, he could not reveal the 
extent to which Montagu and he differed on some of these issues.
With the appointment of Lord Peel as Montagu’s successor there was a much 
more conservative flavour to British policy in India. Peel had no background in 
Indian affairs and was clearly appointed to appease Conservative opinion. He defended 
Indian interests to the best of his ability and got on reasonably well with Reading. 
There was, however, no easy rapport between the two men as there had been between 
Reading and Montagu, and Reading could no longer act as he had done in the past on 
the understanding that the Secretary of State was likely to sympathise with a liberal 
line of approach.166
164 Montagu to Lytton, 30 Sept. 1922, L25.
165 V to S/S, 6 July 1922, R5; Reading to A. Chamberlain, 6 July 1922, R21.
166 In any case, as we have seen, this assumption of Montagu's liberalism was being proved less
and less reliable in his last months in office.
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CHAPTER V : POLITICS AT THE CENTRE
There were, besides the problem of dealing with non-co-operation, four main 
issues that created tension in the relationship between the British and the Indian 
Liberal Party at the all-India level: the demand for constitutional progress, which was 
closely linked to differences over finances, the future of the Indian services, the repeal 
of repressive and discriminatory legislation, and the treatment of Indians overseas.
1. Financial and Constitutional Issues
The new Legislative Assembly, which was elected in November 1920 and 
began its sittings in February 1921, was full of members who were particularly eager 
to prove to their compatriots that real power could be obtained from within the new 
constitutional system.1 They were keen not only to work the reforms but to 
expand the powers of the elected members if possible. The Government, for its part, 
also saw the importance of encouraging the new legislature so as to point up the 
futility of non-co-operation. The Duke of Connaught, in inaugurating the new 
legislature, promised that:
It is the clear intention of the Act of 1919 that the policy and decisions 
of the Government of India should be influenced, to an extent 
incomparably greater than they have been in the past by the views of 
the Indian legislature’.2
1 The new central legislature now comprised two chambers, the Council of State, consisting of 59 
members (33 elected, 26 nominated) and the Imperial Legislative Assembly, which had 143 members 
(103 elected, 40 nominated). There were about 20 Liberals in the Legislative Assembly, but they did 
not form any party grouping until 1922, and even then the so-called National Party was not an 
exclusively Liberal organisation. In this early phase, therefore, the Liberals were influential as 
individual legislators rather than as a group. See pp. 203-204 below.
2 Robb, Government o f India, p. 233.
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Later in the month the Government accepted a resolution of the Liberal, B.S. Kamat, 
which had the effect of promising that no action would be taken on reports or 
committees without first consulting the legislature.3 When the new Viceroy Lord 
Reading arrived in April 1921 there were high hopes in Liberal circles that he would 
make an offer of a further advance in the reforms. Sapru seems, even at this early 
stage, to have hoped for a round table conference to discuss India’s future. He tried to 
organise a Liberal deputation to wait on Reading, but some of the Bombay Liberals, 
including Wacha and Samarth were against the idea, feeling that it was premature to 
press Reading.4 In the end Sapru got up a Liberal deputation from his home 
province, the United Provinces.5 The deputation was to be somewhat disappointed 
by the non-committal attitude of the Viceroy’s reply, but Sapru mollified them by 
explaining that it was too early for the Viceroy to commit himself to any new line of 
policy.6
In September 1921 a Liberal member, J.N. Majumdar, moved a resolution in 
the Legislative Assembly calling for steps to be taken to ensure full provincial 
autonomy by 1924 and ’full Dominion Self-Government’ by 1930.7 The 
Government’s response was generally sympathetic but, of course, it could not 
entertain any request for constitutional advance when the new councils had only been 
operating for a few months. A compromise resolution was accepted which 
recommended the Governor-General in Council to forward to the Secretary of State 
the view of the Assembly that the progress made by India on the path to responsible 
government warranted a re-examination and revision of the constitution at an earlier
3 Ibid, p. 280.
4 Wacha to Sapru, 10 May 1921, SAP/W2.
5 See Sapru to Vincent, 8 June 1921 & annotations, SAP/V32, 2nd. series; Sapru to H.N.
Kunzru, 13 June 1921 SAP/K193, 2nd. series ; N.P. Asthana to Sapru, 20 June 1921, SAP/A154, 2nd. 
series.
6 For Reading’s speech, see Earl of Reading, Speeches, vol. 1, pp. 47-58.




The issue that offered the elected members of the Legislative Assembly the 
greatest scope for a practical increase in their powers in the interim was the annual 
debate on the budget. Although the power of the purse was kept firmly within 
government hands, the Assembly had much greater rights of debating the budget than 
ever before and could, by refusing additional taxation, force the Viceroy to certify 
certain financial measures as necessary in the national interest. Although military 
expenditure did not come within the purview of the Assembly, it could use the above 
power to force the Viceroy to intervene. Reading was extremely reluctant to use his 
powers of certification, action which he believed would amount to a breakdown of the 
new constitution.9 Malcolm Hailey, the Finance Member wrote that,
I have always felt that it is the budget sections of the Government of 
India Act which now make all the difference in our position in regard to 
the legislature. In other respects they can refuse to pass legislation and 
can pass resolutions against us but there the matter rests. It is in respect 
of their power on the budget that they acquire the real hold over us. It 
was all very well for the Joint Parliamentary Committee to say that the 
power of restoration should be genuine but as you will see yourself no 
Governor-General would exercise it save with great reluctance even in 
cases where the proposed expenditure fell within the estimated revenue 
receipts of the year, and that when it comes to a question of restoring a 
taxation bill the matter is additionally difficult.10
The post-war economic situation made such a conflict more likely, however, 
because the Government faced a series of deficit budgets and had either to make 
retrenchments or to raise taxation. The former course was difficult because the 
obvious area for cutting costs was on military expenditure, which had come to form 
about one half of government outgoings. Yet it was difficult to persuade London that
8 Mehrotra, op. cit., pp. 162-3.
9 See, e.g., V to S/S [Peel], ptel. 310, 23 March 1922, R16.
10 Hailey to Howard (10), 24 March 1921, WH4A.
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major reductions should be made in the army in India whilst there were major 
operations being undertaken on the Frontier in Waziristan and whilst the peace that 
had been recently established with Afghanistan had not yet proved itself secure. In 
addition, the home government still looked to use Indian troops to help cover their 
enlarged imperial obligations, especially in the Middle East. One solution might be to 
take British troops, who cost about four or five times as much as Indian soldiers, from 
internal security duties and replace them with Indian troops.11 However, the 
worsening political situation during the first non-co-operation movement made the 
British Cabinet balk at such suggestions; the Secretary of State, for one, fearing that
Indian troops would not prove as reliable as British troops in dealing with the
nationalist movement.12 If, on the other hand, the Government looked to meet 
their deficits from raising new taxation they faced equally serious political problems. 
For one thing it placed them at the mercy of a legislature in which the official and 
nominated members were in a permanent minority. The range of taxes available to the 
Government was also very limited. The process of devolution of power to the 
provinces, of which the 1919 Act was the culmination, had denuded the centre of 
many of its taxes, until it was left essentially with customs duties and revenues from 
imposts such as the taxes on salt and opium.13 In the post-war trade slump, 
which coincided with a number of poor harvests, the Government found its revenue 
sources failing to expand to meet fast-growing commitments. Taxation became a 
highly sensitive issue. If it decided to raise income-tax it threatened to alienate those 
very groups whose support it relied upon in the new legislatures.14 India’s 
commercial and industrial interests were already seriously concerned that the growth
11 See Hailey to Hilton Young M.P., 28 March 1921, WZ/4a.
12 S/S to V, ptel. 1664, 21 Nov. 1921, RIO.
13 Tomlinson, Political Economy o f the Raj, pp. 111-2.
14 For much fuller information on this economic trap which the British created for themselves, see
B.R. Tomlinson, ’India and the British Empire, 1880-1935, IESHR, vol. xii, no.4, (Oct.-Dec. 1975), 
pp. 337-80.
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in their internal market which had taken place during the war might be sacrificed to 
imperial economic interests. Some Indian economic interests such as the Gujarati 
banias and the Marwaris were showing sympathy with Gandhian ethics and a stronger 
nationalist economic stand. There was a feeling that the British were manipulating the 
rupee exchange rate in their own interests. It was increasingly important for the 
British, therefore, not to alienate the ’middle-ground’ of Indian economic interests, 
represented by industrialists like Purshottamdas Thakurdas and others.
Fiscal Autonomy
One way of meeting the needs of Indian industrialists , whilst at the same time 
tapping sources of revenue, was to raise tariffs so as to offer Indian industries a 
certain degree of protection from foreign competition. As a result of the so-called 
fiscal autonomy convention, Delhi now had the right to set Indian tariffs in agreement 
with the legislature, without interference from London or, more realistically, from 
Manchester. The convention, which was won as the price of India’s contribution to 
the war effort, was, however, only that, an agreement, not a binding law.15 It 
rested on the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee on the 1919 Act and on 
a Committee set up by Montagu to reform the role of the India Office, but more 
importantly it relied upon the custom and usage given it in the years after the
15 For details of the convention see T.E. Rider, ’The Tariff Policy of the Government of India and 
its Development Strategy, 1894-1924’, University of Minnesota, Ph.D., 1971, pp. 282-90. See also
C. Dewey, ’The End of the Imperialism of Free Trade: The Eclipse of the Lancashire Lobby and the 
Concession of Fiscal Autonomy to India’, in C. Dewey & A.G. Hopkins (eds.), Imperial Impact: 
Studies in the Economic History o f Africa and India, London, 1978.
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war.16 The wording of the Joint Select Committee recommendation left some 
room for the Secretary of State to intervene:
In the opinion of the Committee...the Secretary of State should as far as 
possible avoid interference on this subject when the Government of 
India and its Legislature are in agreement, and they think that his 
intervention when it does take place, should be limited to safeguarding 
the international obligations of the Empire or any fiscal arrangements 
within the Empire to which His Majesty’s Government is a party.17
Fortunately Montagu was determined to see the convention maintained and whilst he 
was Secretary of State he fought off any interference of Lancashire interests as the 
cotton duty was raised substantially, from 3.5% at the beginning of the war to 11% in 
1921.
In 1921 a Fiscal Commission was established to examine tariff policy including 
the question of whether India should follow the Dominions in adopting measures of 
imperial preference. There had been an expectation in Britain since the First World 
War that India would, once she was given fiscal autonomy, reciprocate with a policy 
of giving preferential allowances to the Empire. Montagu was particularly keen that 
India should accept imperial preference, particularly as the post-war slump in world 
trade took place and large numbers of Britons were unable to find employment.18 
But, as Indian politicians pointed out, it was the Government of India and not the 
Legislative Council that had been given the power to initiate tariff measures, and there 
was a strong feeling that, until the Indian legislature had the same powers as those of 
a Dominion legislature, imperial preference was not acceptable to India. Indeed,
16 Crewe Committee Report, Cmd. 207, 1919.
17 Rider, thesis, p. 287.
18 Montagu saw an Indian agreement to Imperial Preference as a sort of quid pro quo for the tariff 
increases the Government of India was making, and a way of staving off pressure on him to violate 
India’s fiscal autonomy. See S/S to V, ptel., 15 Aug. 1921, M12, cited in Rider, thesis, pp. 337-8.
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Indian politicians tended to be strongly protectionist, believing that India’s nascent 
industries needed protecting from foreign competition if they were ever to get off the 
ground.19 Perhaps because Montagu saw the appointment of the Fiscal 
Commission as a means of securing public Indian assent to imperial preference he 
insisted that the Commission have an Indian president and an Indian majority, whereas 
Reading preferred an English president and an equal number of Indians and Europeans 
as members.20 In the end, Sir Ibrahim Rahimtullah was selected as president, and 
the committee had a protectionist majority.21 The commission met in November 
1921 and presented its report in July 1922.22 The report represented a successful 
compromise between Indian protectionist needs and British beliefs in the efficacy of 
free trade. In many respects, the recommended policy of ’discriminating protection’ 
represented the sort of line that the Government of India preferred and which followed 
the kind of mildly interventionist policy towards encouragement of Indian industry that 
Chelmsford had favoured. A tariff board was to be set up which would recommend 
selected Indian industries which might receive protection. It was assumed that these 
industries would fulfil certain quite definite criteria. Imperial preference was 
effectively postponed, but Montagu was no longer around to bemoan the fact. His 
successor, Lord Peel, continued to press the issue, but in vain, for ’preferences for 
British imports were not within the realm of possibilities, given the state of Indian 
opinion on the subject.’23 The whole issue of fiscal autonomy was therefore a 
good example of the new powers that India was winning, powers that involved the 
sacrifice of long-held British privileges. If there is any doubt as to the reality of the
19 V to S/S ptel. 1003, 11 Dec. 1922, R16.
20 Rider, thesis, p. 348.
21 Idem. Additional members were: G.D. Birla, T.V. Seshagiri Aiyar, Sir Maneckjeee B. 
Dadabhoy, Jamnadas Dwarkadas, Sir Edgar Holberton, Narottam Moraijee, J.M. Keynes (in fact did 
not take up his place), J.C. Coyajee, Campbell Rhodes, R.A. Mant and Sir Montagu de P. Webb.
22 There was a minority report appended later, signed by 5 members including Rahimtullah. This 
report demanded a somewhat stronger adherence to Indian economic interests.
23 Rider, thesis, p. 394.
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blow to certain British economic interests one need only look at the vehemence of the 
Lancashire protests.24 But the new constitutional power of India can be seen in 
the fact that, this time, Lancashire’s protests went unheard.
The Budget, 1921
The first budget of the new legislature was also the last of Chelmsford’s 
regime, being presented in February-March 1921. Malcolm Hailey, the Finance 
Member, admitted that he came before the legislature with some trepidation due to the 
difficult financial situation in the country. ’Europeans and Indians alike’, he told his 
counterpart H.F. Howard at the India Office,’have been deeply affected by the heavy 
falls in exchange and the unsettlement due to the instability of the rupee. The whole of 
the bazaar is against us on account of their exchange losses over imports. And finally 
the deficit was one which might well terrify even a quiet and well-disposed 
citizen.’25
The Government tried to make substantial cuts in expenditure, especially in the 
military budget. The Government of India shared the resentment of many Indians at 
the Esher Report on army organisation, which was seen as having treated the Indian 
army as an imperial force and having shown little consideration for Indian concerns. 
Hailey feared that the extra expenditure resulting from the Report would ’go far to kill 
the growing moderate party on whose strength the future of the reformed constitution 
depends.’26 Chelmsford clashed with Montagu when he put forward proposals for 
the reduction of British troops in India. The Viceroy was aware that this was a key
24 See Hilton Young M.P.. to Hailey, 12 March 1921, WZ/4a. Also Howard (IO) to Hailey, 27 
March 1921, ibid., & S/S to V, 5 Aug. 1921, M12.
25 Hailey to Howard (IO), (copy), 24 March 1921 WH4a. The sterling-rupee exchange had fallen 
from a high of 2s 4d per rupee in December 1919 to below Is 4d in February 1921. This fall 
contributed to an increase in debt payments and other transfers payable in London in sterling. The 
deficit for 1921-1922 was Rs. 277 million. Rider, thesis, p. 293.
26 Esher Committee, Cmd. 943, 1920. Hailey to Duke (IO), 1 Dec 1920, WH2.
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issue for the Moderates and would be seen by them as a test of British sincerity in 
working the reforms; he stressed that if he was forced to restore taxation it might well 
drive the Moderates to walk out of the Assembly or even to join with the non-co­
operators. This would be disastrous as
the ultimate success or failure of the non-co-operation 
movement depends now upon the success of the moderate 
party in consolidating its position and winning sufficient 
popular support to maintain its hold over the Imperial and 
Provincial legislatures. To try the moderates too far will 
be to make their and our position impossible.27
Chelmsford had chosen arguments which were likely to convince Montagu, but the 
latter maintained his position, which was that it was not a propitious time to make 
reductions in the British strength in India. In Montagu’s view the savings (of £2 
million) were not worth the risks involved: non-co-operation was reaching the Indian 
masses, the Afghans were hostile, Pan-Islamism and Bolshevism were threatening, and 
the Turkish question remained unresolved.28 Montagu got his way and the matter 
was referred to a sub-committee of the Imperial Defence Committee. In view of the 
failure to offer these military reductions, Hailey felt that the Government was lucky in 
getting the budget through the legislature virtually unscathed. 29 Additional taxes 
were raised, including a rise in the customs duty from 7.5% to 11% ad valorem. He 
attributed the passing of the taxes partly to the inexperience of the new council and 
their lack of cohesion, and partly to Government use of the new skills of lobbying, 
gentle persuasion and parliamentary manoeuvre. 30 Hailey knew that members 
were keen on further raising the cotton duty from 11% to 12.5% for protectionist
27 V (FD) to S/S, ptel. 114, 30 Jan. 1921, C14.
28 See S/S to V (FD), ptels., 21 & 22 Jan., 1 & 4 Feb. 1921, C14.
29 Hailey to Howard (IO), 24 March 1921, W7/4a.
30 Idem.
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reasons, but he was able to avoid this by leaving this matter till last and then showing 
that there was no need for any additional impost. He also knew, however, that it 
would not be so easy to win approval in the future and that part of the Government’s 
success was due to the fact that they had shown a willingness to make substantial 
retrenchments in both military and civil departments before they ever went to the 
legislature. A programme of retrenchment was vital for the future.31
Political Parties in the Legislative Assembly
Reading was only too aware of the limitations in the Government’s position 
vis-a-vis the legislature. As a parliamentarian he must have felt frustrated at not being 
able to participate in debates and also in lacking any sort of party support to have 
government measures passed.32 It was not until the September 1921 session at 
Simla that any attempt was made to establish parties in the Legislative Assembly and 
then it was the ’opposition’ not the Liberals who took the lead. The Report on Lord 
Reading’s Administration states that the Democratic Party came into existence and 
whips, office-bearers and leaders were appointed. ’Of course’, Coatman, its author, 
somewhat condescendingly adds, ’measured by English standards, the ’'Democrats" 
lacked many of the marks of a true party. There was hardly any discipline among 
them and they had little or no support outside the walls of the Chamber.’33 The 
party, which claimed over 50 adherents seems to have been formed as a result of its 
leader Dr. Gour canvassing for support for his candidature as Deputy President.34 
Something of a two-party system was established in the Delhi session in the early
31 Idem.
32 V to S/S, 28 June 1923, R6.
33 J. Coatman, ’Confidential Report on the Administration of Lord Reading Viceroy and 
Governor-General of India 1921-1926’, Government of India Press, Simla, 1927, p. 5, R33a.
34 ’The Legislative Assembly 1921-22’ by A.F. Whyte , 18.4.1922. Enclosure to V to S/S, 20 
April 1922 R5. Other leading figures were named as Messrs. Seshagiri Aiyar, Rangachariar, Ginwala, 
Subrahmanyam and Sir V. Thackersey.
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months of 1922 when the National Party was formed.35 The leadership of the 
party came from Sir Sivaswamy Aiyer and N.M. Samarth, whilst the core of the party 
was formed from Liberals such as B.S. Kamat, J. Dwarkadas, Moulvi Abul Kasem 
and Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeebhoy. However, there were also members who were outside 
of the Liberal Party.36 The National Party was smaller in number than the 
Democratic Party, having some twenty-five supporters, but, according to the President 
of the Assembly, A.F. Whyte, the former group made up for this in terms of quality, 
having the better parliamentary contributors. The National Party tended to be 
composed of older and more sober politicians who had a better sense of constitutional 
realities.37 The differences between the two groups seem to have been 
highlighted during the debates on the Government’s policy of ’repression’ at the time 
of Prince of Wales’ visit; the Democratic Party showed unity in attacking government 
policy in a condemnatory resolution on 18 January 1922, whilst the National Party 
showed some sympathy with the government and attacked the activities of the non-co- 
operators. Sir Sivaswamy Aiyer, though criticising the large number of arrests that 
had taken place, went so far as to ’acknowledge with gratitude the patience and 
forbearance which the Government have exercised towards this movement of Mr. 
Gandhi.’ He went on to profess that he did not ’believe that we shall ever enjoy the 
same liberty of speech that we enjoy under the present Government, not even under 
the Gandhi regime, of which we have had an ample foretaste already.,38 The
35 It was formally announced on 10 March 1922.
36 The following were office-holders of the National Party: Sivaswamy Aiyer was its leader , 
Samarth its chief whip, Dwarkadas its secretary, Khan Bahadur Sayed Muhammed Ismail its treasurer, 
and Cotelingam & Maulvi Abul Kasem were junior whips. The party’s aims were entirely along Liberal 
lines being ’The attainment by constitutional methods of full responsible Government in India as an 
integral part of the British Empire. See the Citizen, 16 March 1922, vol. 2, no. 52, p. 1386. See also 
J. Dwarkadas to A. Besant, printed circular letter, 23 March 1922, Besant MSS. Dwarkadas saw the 
new party system as a preparation for the day when India had responsible government, and he appealed 
for local organisations of the National Party to be established at provincial, district and taluk level.
37 Idem.
38 The text of this speech may be found in K.A.N. Sastri (ed.), A Great Liberal. Speeches and 
Writings o f Sir P. S. Sivaswami Aiyer, Allied Publishers, Bombay, pp. 352-7.
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support of the-National Party was enough to ensure that the Democratic resolution was 
defeated by a majority of 20 votes.39 In the context of Reading’s need to 
maintain Moderate support when the Round Table Conference had failed to get off the 
ground and Gandhi was likely to be arrested in the near future, this support of the 
Legislature was particularly important.
The Budget, 1922, and the Debate on Army Retrenchment
In March the Assembly discussed the budget for 1922-23. The budget forecasts 
of the previous year had proved to be over-optimistic and there had been a deficit left 
over of Rs. 34 crores. Just as Hailey had predicted the year before, the Assembly 
gave this budget a much tougher passage than the previous one. The Government 
proposed a package of tax increases, including increases in income tax and super tax, 
an increase in tariffs, and on the duties on sugar, machinery, salt and articles of 
luxury. They still had to leave an uncovered deficit of nearly Rs. 3 crores. Reading 
had hoped to be able to announce substantial reductions in British troop numbers in 
India which would take place in the following year, and the implementation of a 
programme of phased Indianisation of the Army. However, the Cabinet refused to 
sanction these measures and Reading’s colleagues had to face an Assembly in which 
both European and Indian members were angered at the failure to reduce military 
expenditure sufficiently.
In November 1921, the sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 
had reported and had accepted the view of the Indian legislature that the function of 
the army was the defence of India and the maintenance of internal security rather than 
a wider imperial purpose.40 It had also agreed that, generally, Indian troops
39 J. Coatman, op. cit., p. 6.
40 For the views of the legislature on army reforms see L.F. Rushbrook Williams, India in
1921-22, pp. 14-16. For an excellent summary of the views of the Liberal Party, see Mehrotra, India 
and the Commonwealth, pp. 168-73.
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should not be used outside of the country, except after consultation with the 
Government of India and that, if they were used, the Indian taxpayer should not have 
to meet the expense.41 However, the committee could not agree to any reduction 
in the immediate future in the size of the army in India and this meant that the budget 
problems of 1921 would inevitably be repeated in 1922.
It was a sign of the hardening of attitudes in Britain brought about by the 
non-co-operation movement, and by the boycott of the Prince of Wales’ visit 
especially, that whereas Montagu had shown himself sympathetic to a programme that 
would lead to the ultimate Indianisation of the army when Reading first broached the 
subject, by February 1921 he was tending to swim with the tide of opinion in Britain 
and argued that the time was inopportune.42
Reading had agreed during 1921 to meet the request of the Legislative 
Assembly for a Military Requirements Committee which would look at the military 
situation in view of India’s new constitutional position. When Reading tried to 
implement the findings of the Committee,43 the Cabinet took a very firm line in 
rejecting the Government of India’s requests both for a reduction of British troops in 
1923 and for Indianisation, arguing that ’the acceptance of such proposals would not 
only in itself lend colour to the dangerous belief in a policy of retreat, but must 
directly hamper us in exercising the functions with which we are entrusted.,44 As 
Rumbold comments: ’The lion had at last found its roar.’45 As a result, however, 
Reading’s Government was in a much more difficult position in presenting their 
budget, which included a programme of tax increases to meet an estimated deficit of
41 See Rumbold, Watershed, p. 289, citing Report of Indian Military Requirements committee, no. 
125D, 18 Nov. 1921, Cab 16/38/1.
42 See S/S to V, ptel. 246, 15 Feb. 1922, R16. Also see S/S to V, ptel. 1664, 21 Nov. 1921,
RIO.
43 V (Army Dept.) to S/S, ptel., 5 Feb. 1922, R ll.
44 S/S to V (Army Dept.), ptel. 239, 14 Feb. 1922, Rl l .  See also ptel. 240, sent on same day.
45 Watershed, p. 297.
206
Rs. 34 crores. Reading’s displeasure at the Cabinet response was evident. ’We would 
ask His Majesty’s Government to realise that as a Government we are no longer in a 
position in which we can act as we could when we had an official majority in our 
Legislature’, he telegraphed home.46 It was pointed out what an invidious position 
the members of the Viceroy’s Government had been placed in: they were forced to 
support a view in which neither they nor their colleagues believed and many members 
of the Assembly were aware of this.
Hailey had the unfortunate duty of having to put before the legislature 
proposals to increase tariffs from 11 % to 15 % and to raise the cotton excise duty 
from 3.5% to 7.5%. In addition there were to be increases in railway fares, postal 
rates, income tax and on the duties on a number of items, including salt. Both 
European and Indian members were very critical of the budget and the Government’s 
failure to make sufficient retrenchments.47 They showed their displeasure by 
making cuts in various civil departments and by refusing to raise the salt duty, the 
cotton excise duty and the import duty on machinery and cotton goods. The result 
was that there was an uncovered deficit of Rs. 9 crores, rather than the Rs. 2.75 
crores deficit that Hailey had planned for.48 The acting Secretary of State, 
Worthington-Evans, obviously felt that this was too large a deficit and expected 
Reading to use his powers of restoration. Peel also agreed with this line when he took 
up office.49 Reading was most reluctant to use his powers of certification and 
skilfully sidestepped the views of his London colleagues. Peel was worried partly by 
the economic consequences of running a large deficit but also by the fear that Reading 
was creating a presumption in India that the Government would never use its
46 V (Army Dept.) to S/S, ptel. 262, 18 Feb. 1922. Rl l .
47 See V(FD) to S/S ptel. 752-F, 9 March 1922, R11.
48 Rushbrook Williams (ed.), India in 1922-23, p. 96.
49 Rumbold, Watershed, pp. 308-9.
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certification powers.50 The Times took the legislature’s actions on the budget as 
further evidence that the new Indian assemblies were not fulfilling British 
expectations.51
There was a strong feeling in the Legislative Assembly that London was 
dictating policy to Delhi and that this was particularly so since Montagu’s resignation. 
In this sensitive situation, it was unfortunate that Lord Rawlinson, the 
Commander-in-Chief, in explaining during the debate why army estimates could not 
be further reduced, said that he did not think that the British element in either the 
army or the civil service could be completely eliminated for several generations. 
Sapru, was only one of the voices raised in protest at this apparent change of policy, 
which strangely foreshadowed the Prime Minister’s speech in August 1922.52
In the end, a much-watered down programme of Indianisation of the army was 
drawn up in 1922, which provided for eight units of the Indian army (out of a total of 
132) to be selected for Indianisation. All Indian officers holding the King’s 
commission were to be posted to these units. Liberals found this scheme ’wholly 
inadequate’ in that it would take two hundred years to completely Indianise the officer 
corps of the entire army.53
The Retrenchment Committee
The collapse of the non-co-operation movement in 1922 coincided with an 
economic upturn in India, partly due to a much improved harvest. From March 1922 
onwards, Reading and Peel debated the terms of reference and personnel of a
30 S/S to V, 30 March. 1922, R5.
51 S/S to V(FD), ptel. 1260, 22 March 1922, Rl l.  Interestingly, Sir William Duke at the India 
Office felt that the Legislative Assembly had acted very astutely in rejecting the increase in the customs 
duty on cotton as well as the excise. They thereby disarmed Lancashire criticisms. See Duke to Lytton, 
22 March 1922, L24.
52 See Sapru to Reading, draft pi., 8 March 1922, SAPfR296t 1st. series.
53 See Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, pp. 171-2.
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retrenchment committee which would parallel the work done by Geddes’ committee in 
Britain. The main area of difference between Delhi and Whitehall was whether the 
committee should be able to deal with military matters. Reading was convinced they 
should, as this was by far the largest area of expenditure.54 Peel did not want all 
the matters that had been argued over during the last year to be raked over 
again.55
As Aruna Sinha remarks, ’the differences between the two Governments were 
becoming so pronounced that the London press was full of rumours of Reading’s 
resignation.’56 A committee was eventually appointed with Lord Inchcape as 
chairman and it met during the winter months of 1922-1923.57 Reading got his
way in that the committee was not excluded from examining military as well as civil 
expenditure. The committee came up with recommendations for reductions in 
expenditures of departments of over Rs. 19 crores, over half of which came from 
military expenditure. There were reductions in the armed forces: 5,000 British 
infantry, 6,000 Indian infantry, 3 British cavalry regiments and 10% of the artillery 
establishment were cut.
The Budget of 1923 and the Certification of the Increase in Salt Tax
Remarkably, the Government managed to include most of the reductions 
recommended by Inchcape in the 1923-24 budget. Even so, the budget could not be 
balanced and the new Finance Member, Sir Basil Blackett, had to plan for a deficit of 
nearly Rs. 6 crores. He was determined, after four years of deficits, however, that the
54 V to S/S, 3. Aug. 1922, cited in Sinha, Reading, pp. 111-12.
55 See S/S to V, ptel. 1360, 21 Nov. 1922. R16.
56 Sinha, Reading, p. 112.
57 The committee was made up of: Lord Inchcape (President) Sir Thomas Catto, Mr. Dadiba 
Dalai, Mr. Purshottamdas Thakurdas, Sir Rajendra Mookeijee and Sir Alexander Murray. Details of 
the committee’s recommendations etc. may be found in L.F. Rushbrook Williams (ed.), India in
1922-23, pp. 109-14 & Appendix III.
209
books should flow be balanced and India’s credit restored in the financial markets. He 
proposed, therefore, to double the salt tax, so as to cover the deficit. The Legislative 
Assembly, however, refused to agree to the increase and this put Reading in a serious 
dilemma. For one thing, Reading disliked the idea of raising the salt tax, although he 
could console himself that its impact on an Indian family would be limited in practice 
and offset by falling prices generally.58 In addition, taxes on the more well-to-do 
had been raised in the past and had reached their limit; furthermore the increased salt 
tax would have to come up before the assembly on an annual basis, so that body could 
be assured it would be revised downwards, if at all possible. What worried Reading 
was the political impact of certification on the Government’s Indian supporters. He
wrote to Peel that whatever, decision was reached on the salt tax,
)  *
it will seriously injure the prospects of the Moderates when the general 
election comes towards the end of the year. If they vote the tax, it will 
of course be used against them and they will be pilloried as men who 
supported the taxing of the poor for the benefit of the highly paid 
bureaucracy. If they do not vote for it, but yet the tax is imposed by 
certification, all the arguments in favour of constitutional agitation 
would be seriously prejudiced and the opponents of the reforms and the 
British will point to the futility of the Legislature and the overriding 
control of British authorities.59
Reading confided to Peel that ’there is no step I have taken as Viceroy that I have 
disliked more than this.’60 His three Indian Members of Council were against 
certification and he believed that such action would lead to a defection from Moderate 
ranks and would hit them badly just when they were gaining in strength. 61 He 
wrote to the provincial governors, asking them what they thought the political reaction
58 The Government estimated that the cost of the increase for each Indian would be 3 annas p.a. 
or Is. per family p.a.. V to S/S, 22 March 1923, R6.
59 V to S/S, 8 March 1923, R6.
60 V to S/S, 22 March 1923, R6.
61 V to S/S, ptel. 242, 24 March 1923, R ll.
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to certification of the salt tax would be, and most of them replied that, though the 
effect would not be good, they felt that any storm that resulted could be weathered 
and that the impact on the Moderates would have been dispelled by the time of the 
elections.62 Lloyd, however, thought that the impact on the Moderates would be 
more serious and wrote that it was ’of the utmost importance to maintain the very 
decided political supremacy which the moderate party have now gained and to do 
nothing which might injure that supremacy at any rate until after the elections.*63 
Reading looked for every means of compromise he could find, but the Assembly 
could not agree on alternative sources of revenue and on 26 March they rejected the 
increased salt tax by 58 votes to 47.64 Consequently, Peel was forced to certify 
the increase. Privately he admitted that it would have been much more difficult to 
certify the increase if the non-co-operation movement had been as active as one year 
previously, and there had been a real prospect of a campaign to refuse payment of 
taxes.65 Reading calculated that the political consequences of the certification 
were likely to be limited to ’certain journalistic and political elements and will not 
extend to the general population.’66 However, he did expect that it would have a 
deleterious effect on the electoral prospects of the Moderates and ’will probably result 
in the return of a larger number of non-co-operators than we should otherwise have 
expected.’67 This did not greatly worry the Government, partly because they 
expected that the Swarajists would only be in a minority in any of the re-elected
62 V to S/S, ptel. 247, 26 March 1923, R17.
63 Idem & Lloyd to Reading, ptel. 348, 25 March 1923, R25. A little later he sent Reading a 
telegram informing him of the views of his Liberal Minister Setalvad that certification would make the 
position of the Moderates impossible at the election. Lloyd to Reading, ptel. 366, 29 March 1923, R25.
64 The Council of State passed the budget by a majority of 18, which gave the Government some 
minor satisfaction as it represented (marginally) a non-official majority in favour of increasing the salt 
tax. See V(HD) to S/S, ptel. 240, 24 March 1923, R 12.
65 Idem.
66 Idem. His prediction was proved correct on the whole; the agitation was confined largely to the
legislatures and the newspapers. See V(HD) to S/S, tel. D-128-Pol., 14 May 1923, R12.
67 Idem.
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Councils, and partly because they felt that the return of some Swarajists would have a 
beneficial effect in forcing the Moderates into a role that was more supportive of the 
Government. The issue was now a constitutional one rather than an economic one, as 
Reading recognised; it was a matter of determining where the ultimate financial power 
lay in the new constitution, with the Governor-General in Council or with the 
legislature.68
The matter was raised again in the next session of the Legislative Assembly 
when a motion was moved to amend the Government of India Act (section 67-B) with 
the effect that the power of certification would be taken away.69 Hailey 
countered the resolution by stating his own genuine belief that the Assembly had 
already got more power to influence policy, for instance by using the Standing 
Committees which had been established from members of the Legislature to advise on 
Finance and most of the other government departments.70 There was much to be 
said in favour of Hailey’s argument, for the Legislative Assembly had indeed won 
major concessions in the battle for influence over government policy.71 But this 
was little consolation to the Liberals, who were looking for more solid signs of 
constitutional achievement. In February 1923 they met in Delhi under the presidency 
of Sapru, now no longer a member of government, to discuss a programme for 
attaining self-governing status within the Empire. This was to lead eventually in 
November 1924 to an all-parties convention and in 1925 the Commonwealth of India 
Bill which had a first reading in the House of Commons.72
68 V to S/S ptel. 345, 11 May 1923, R17; V(HD) to S/S, tel. 348, 14 May 1923, R\2.
69 Sinha, Reading, p. 116.
70 Ibid., pp. 116-17.
71 For instance, in January 1922 the Assembly’s financial powers were increased by the Income 
Tax Bill which laid down the lines on which the collection of income tax should be carried out, but left 
the imposition of any particular tax as a matter to come before the legislature every year. See Report on 
Reading’s Administration, p.3, R33b.
72 For details of the history of the Bill see A. Besant, India: Bond or Free?, Madras, 1939, pp. 
225-46.
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From -the-British point of view, relations with the first Assembly had been 
relatively good and Reading pointed out that,
apart from the Budget, the Legislature has not done so badly. Among 
the very important items it passed the Racial Distinctions Bill and 
accepted our resolutions on the Fiscal problem. It easily gets out of 
hand from our point of view when it becomes suspicious- as alas it does 
too easily- of the reasons for speeches and actions at home.
Reading cited Lloyd George’s ’steel frame’ speech and the appointment of the Royal 
Commission on the Services as examples.73 Reading had put his finger on a key 
point in relations between the British administration and Indian constitutionalists under 
the new reforms. Whereas, under Chelmsford, Indians had seen the Secretary of State 
as their defence against an unsympathetic Viceroy, now the situation was reversed. 
Under the reforms it was the Viceroy who was seen to be defending Indian interests 
on a range of issues, including the setting of tariffs, reductions in military 
expenditure, Indianisation of the services, the status of Indians overseas, and 
’repressive’ legislation. This was not just a matter of changing personnel, as Montagu, 
the most liberal of Secretaries of State, had come to see himself in the role of last-line 
of defence of British and imperial interests on a number of these issues. Yet Montagu 
had been aware of the need for the further devolution of power if the reforms were to 
evolve successfully. If the Secretary of State intervened too much to maintain British 
interests it would restrict the freedom of manoeuvre of the Government of India and 
thereby provoke the sort of deadlock and consequent frustration on the part of the 
Assembly as had been the case with the legislature under the Morley-Minto reforms. 
Lytton pointed this problem out to Peel, and argued that, except in matters of the first 
importance, it was easier for the Secretary of State to give way in any dispute with the
73 V to S/S, 22 March 1923, R6.
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Government of India than for the reverse to take place. According to Lytton * now the 
Viceroy has not only to accept the policy of the Secretary of State but he has to 
defend it as his own in the Indian legislature. ’74 Hailey had recognised this when 
he wrote of the sense of frustration in the Assembly in February 1922. He argued that
they have got practically everything they could out of Government.
That is to say, they have a promise of the cancellation of the repressive 
laws and the Press Act; they have established the convention that our 
major taxation should be annual; and they have realized that they can, if 
they like, definitely refuse supply on any head of civil expenditure. But 
they are being brought up to a short turn when they try to do any of the 
things which Parliament could do, namely, to force the executive to 
action which it does not like or resign in the alternative; they cannot 
touch the Army and they cannot really touch the pay of the all-India 
services. They are in consequence suffering from a kind of ennui. If 
they had complete powers, it is quite possible that they might really 
identify themselves with us, but we are getting back to the old state 
when the existence of restrictions drive them into fructuous [sic] 
opposition. I really believe that the present state of things can [not] 
continue for the ten years provided by the Government of India Act.
We have given them either too much or too little.75
Willingdon was coming to similar conclusions in Madras and wanted to go 
over completely to provincial autonomy. He was sure that in some provinces the 
British had given too little and that the only way to win the support of Indian 
politicians was to give them real power at the provincial level and allow the local 
Governor to use his skills to keep the system running smoothly. Montagu had foreseen 
that the transitional constitutional system was bound to create frustrations as all 
transitional systems do, but dyarchy proved to be a particularly frustrating half-way 
house and the financial problems that beset governments in the first councils 
exacerbated the difficulties. The financial problems of the central government
74 Lytton to Peel, 20 April 1922, L10.
75 Hailey to Howard (IO), 4 Feb. 1922, WH5A.
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emphasised the crises over Indianisation of the services, the role of the Indian army 
and over fiscal autonomy. In the provinces, the financial difficulties meant that the 
nation-building departments which had been transferred to Indian control had been 
starved of additional funds and this in turn meant that ministers had less to show for 
their term in office than would have been the case in time of prosperity.
2. The Indian Civil Service Under the Reforms
Their every word is a command, every sentence a decree, accepted by 
the people, accepted willingly with trust in their judgement and fairness 
which might be the pride of our race. I can see no period when the 
Indians can dispense with the guidance and assistance of the small 
nucleus of the British Civil Service of British officials in India- this 
twelve hundred in a population of three hundred and fifteen million. 
They are the steel frame of the whole structure. I do not care what you 
build on to it- if you take that steel frame out the fabric will collapse. 
Lloyd George, House o f Commons, 2 Aug. 1922.16
Lloyd George’s famous peroration in defence of the British Services in India 
(known thereafter as the ’steel-frame’ speech) caused a furore in India, especially 
amongst Moderate Indian politicians. Reading reported that his three Indian Members 
’expressed their profound feeling of mistrust and dissatisfaction caused by the 
speech.’77 Sapru felt particularly strongly and threatened to resign unless 
satisfactory clarification was received. Reading received a deputation on 22 August to 
seek reassurance that the speech did not mark a reversal of the previous reforms 
policy, for the promise of Indianisation of the Services had been as important a part of 
the August 1917 declaration as the promise of constitutional reforms.78 Indeed
76 157 H.C. Deb. 5s., col. 1513.
77 V to S/S, ptel. 642, 12 Aug. 1922, /?16.
78 A copy of the draft text of leading passages of the Viceroy’s reply may be found, with other 
material relating to the British response to the outcry created by the Prime Minister’s speech, in 
L/P&J/6/1819.
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Lloyd George- had touched on the latter issue in his speech as well and reminded his 
listeners that the reforms were in the nature of an experiment and that to prove the 
success of the experiment Indians must ’show themselves mastering not only the 
legislatures but also the more humdrum tasks of administration if they are to increase 
their role.,79
It was not only Indians who were dismayed by Lloyd George’s rare public 
intervention in Indian affairs.80 Reading was caught by surprise in that he had 
only just completed writing his views on a draft of the speech which Lord Peel had 
sent him and was caught off balance by the earliness of its delivery. He pointed out to 
Peel that the speech had the dual effect of antagonising the Moderates, who were 
particularly confused by the hints of extra expenditure, e.g. on enlarging the 
Viceroy’s Council and Secretariat, at a time when they were facing a large budget 
deficit, whilst not providing the Services with the concrete reassurances as to their pay 
and conditions for which they were looking.81 The Presidency Governors 
unanimously condemned the impact of the speech; Lytton reporting that it had ’done 
incalculable mischief out here. ’82
Peel hastily reassured Reading that no change of policy was intended by the 
speech. In fact Peel had drafted the speech himself and was obviously rather annoyed 
that, in his oratorical fervour, Lloyd George had departed from the set text.83 
Peel rather sheepishly tried to explain to Reading what had gone wrong:
He [Lloyd George] was making a dramatic point in contrasting the 
small number of civil servants with the vast population of India. In
79 157 H.C. Deb. 5s., col. 1513.
80 During the making of the Montford reforms Lloyd George seems to have shown little interest in
Indian affairs. See Danzig, ’The Announcement of August 20th., 1917’, p. 23.
81 V to S/S, ptel. 632, 8 Aug. 1922, R16.
82 Lytton to Peel, 24 Aug. 1922, L10. See also Willingdon to Peel, 15 Aug. 1922 & 22 Aug.
1922, W4.
83 Peel to Lytton, 31 Aug. 1922, LI.
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talking about the nucleus he intended to suggest that for some time to 
come, as most reasonable Indians agree, a complete Indianisation would 
not be possible, and that the retention of a British element would be 
necessary. Perhaps he gave rather a long extension to the date in order 
to reassure intending candidates here. But unfortunately he spoke of 
’this nucleus’ instead of ’a nucleus’ and seemed, therefore, to suggest 
that the nucleus was to be the whole existing British service.84
Lloyd George had two main audiences in mind when he made his speech. 
Firstly, he was, as Peel indicated, looking to reassure intending British candidates for 
the Indian Services and those already working in India. Secondly, he was looking to 
re-establish his leadership of what was a predominantly Conservative administration. 
There was growing disquiet within the Conservative Party at their being led by a 
radical Liberal. Furthermore, Lloyd George had weakened his position by the 
’honours for sale’ scandal and in the eyes of many Conservatives had pursued a 
reckless policy with regard to Empire.85 Many believed that his policies were 
leading to the loss of Ireland and Egypt, and that, in India, the Government had been 
very slow to deal firmly with non-co-operation and had consequently undermined 
British morale.86 Perhaps the clearest indication of the problem had been posed 
by the Prince of Wales when he returned home after his much-troubled winter tour of 
India. The Prince had clearly been hurt by the bad reception that he had received in 
parts of India especially from students in the United Provinces. He seems to have 
carried home the firm conviction that the Government of India needed strengthening in 
more ways than one. So seriously did Lloyd George take the Prince’s opinions that 
he invited him to a meeting at Downing Street on 6 July 1922, along with Lords Peel 
and Winterton from the India Office and Sir Malcolm Hailey of the Viceroy’s 
Council, who was on home leave. A number of items were on the agenda of this
84 Peel to Reading, 10 Aug. 1922, R5.
83 Peel to Lytton, 27 July 1922, LI7. For more details on the fall of the Lloyd George coalition, 
see M. Kinnear, The Fall o f Lloyd George. The Political Crisis o f 1922, London, 1973.
86 V. Chirol to H. Butler, 22 Feb. 1922, £37.
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meeting, but the problem of future recruitment of the services was one of the most 
important issues. Peel and Hailey were agreed that recruitment of Britons to the 
Services was going very badly in the years since the war. Peel said that he had made 
enquiries from headmasters of schools at Oxford and Cambridge, and among parents 
and he found that there was ’a feeling that in eight years’ time more of the higher 
posts would be open to Indians, and the British entrants would run the risk if being 
turned out at the age of thirty-five or forty without a pension.’87 The Downing 
Street meeting led to further enquiries being mounted into possible reforms but no 
concrete action. The significance of the meeting lay partly in the fact that it led 
directly to the ’steel-frame’ speech which provided a minimum-cost interim sop to the 
Services, but also in the marked shift which it signified in the relationship between 
London and Delhi in the governing of India.88
During 1922 Lloyd George was attempting to assert Whitehall’s ultimate 
authority in the governing of India, especially in matters concerning the All-India 
Services. This partly resulted from a lack of confidence in Reading’s administration, 
certainly a belief that Reading had not treated the problem of the Services with 
sufficient urgency.89 But also there was a widespread feeling that Reading was 
too sensitive to the opinions of the Indian Members of his Council and to the 
Legislative Assembly90 Unquestionably this was held to be the case in the 
slowness with which he undertook the arrest of Gandhi, a caution which seemed 
unnecessary with hindsight. But there were other examples as well, where the Viceroy 
seemed to defend Indian interests as against those of the mother country: in the 
matters of tariff reform, imperial preference and also the treatment of Indians
87 Note of a conversation held at 10 Downing Street, on 6 July 1922. Secret no. 51, WH5&.
88 A similar argument is made by Ann Ewing, ’The Indian Civil Service 1919-1924: Service
Discontent and the Response in London and Delhi.’ Modern Asian Studies, 18,1 (1984), pp. 33-53.
89 This is well detailed in Ewing, op. cit., especially pp. 39-46.
90 F.W. Duke to Lytton, 1 March 1923, L24.
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overseas, for instance. In an important letter to Reading, in which he conveyed the 
results of his Downing Street meeting and notified Reading that he would speak in the 
Commons in a week’s time on the matter of the Services, Lloyd George had argued 
that,
as the Government of India becomes more Parliamentary in character, 
the Viceroy and his Advisers must tend to speak and act more and more 
as representatives of Indian opinion, and the duties of arbiter must by 
that very fact in future fall less upon the Government of India and more 
upon the Government at home.91
Lloyd George had put his finger on an important anomaly in the Montford 
reforms. Conservatives, like Curzon, had been persuaded at the time the reforms were 
being passed through Parliament that there was to be an administrative devolution of 
power to the provinces and that the process of democratisation would be focused on 
this level of government and would largely leave the central government untouched. 
Consequently they agreed to reduce the interference of Parliament and the India Office 
in certain Indian affairs. The most important example of this devolution of power was 
the fiscal autonomy convention but there were many other examples of the reduction 
of the role of the India Office. In fact what happened in the working of the reforms, 
as men like Montagu must have expected, was that the Imperial Legislative Assembly, 
with an elected Indian majority, attempting to work in co-operation with Provincial 
Governments with elected Indian Ministers, inevitably had to respond to democratic 
pressures.92 The constant use of the Viceroy’s powers of certification was, as 
Reading quickly realised, a practical impossibility if the reforms were to survive. 
Reading’s personal commitment to working with his Indian Councillors and the 
Legislative Assembly as far as possible only brought the true nature of the reforms to
91 Lloyd George to Reading, 26 July 1922, R l\.
92 For Montagu’s position at the time of the making of the Reforms, see Danzig, ’Many-Layered 
Cake’, pp. 67-8.
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the surface quicker than might otherwise have been the case.
Reading, of course, resisted Lloyd George’s interference and possessed all the 
power of the man on the spot to do so successfully. Most of the ideas for reform that 
had been spawned at the Downing Street conference fell by the wayside. However, 
the differences between Whitehall and Delhi over the future of the British Services 
highlights a crucial problem in the working of the Montford reforms. For Indians, it 
was the most concrete indication of the reality of Britain’s promises that India was 
being prepared for self-government in the not too distant future; for Britons serving in 
India, or intending to do so, it was indicative of whether the Raj had a long-term 
future, and more immediately, whether they had a decent career in prospect. Thus 
the position of the Viceroy had become a difficult one; it was not a matter of his 
holding the balance between British and Indian interests, but rather his holding the 
balance between traditional British interests and the newer interests, which required a 
satisfactory working relationship with the Indian Legislatures.
The differences between the Viceroy and Secretary of State are epitomised by 
the fact that in early 1922 the two sides of government were pulling in entirely 
different directions. Reading, having failed to respond to pressures to do something 
for the Services, now wanted to make an announcement about Indianisation 
policy.93 As Ann Ewing argues, the Government of India’s responses were being 
shaped by the demands of the Legislative Assembly, where the Government faced a 
resolution tabled by Jamnadas Dwarkadas in the forthcoming session calling for future 
recruitment to the All-India Services (excepting the technical services) to be made, as 
far as possible in India.94 The India Office was horrified at the proposed
93 V(HD) to S/S, ptel. 1, 1 Jan. 1922, £11.
94 See Ewing, ’The Indian Civil Service’, p. 45. The debate, which took place on 11 Feb. 1922 
may be found with India Office comments in L/P&J/6/1783. The Indian Liberal case on the Services 
was ably put by the mover, Jamnadas Dwarkadas, and the Government response was equally effectively 
argued by Sir William Vincent.
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statement and-Montagu sent a telegram to Reading virtually instructing him not to 
make any pronouncement and to stand by previous Government declarations relating 
to a policy of gradual Indianisation only.95 Faced with an effective demand in the 
Assembly for faster Indianisation, which it was all the more difficult to deny in view 
of the lack of British candidates, the Government of India agreed with the Assembly 
to make enquiries of the local governments as to their views on increased 
Indianisation. The resulting circular to local governments seemed to take a very 
pessimistic view of the prospects of the European element in the Services and asked if 
the ’recruitment of Europeans for the appointments now included in the all-India 
Services should be discontinued or largely reduced’.96 Unfortunately this 
circular, which seriously worried the India Office as it seemed to go against 
Montagu’s telegrammed instructions earlier in the year, was leaked to the Morning 
Post and added to the feeling amongst the Services in India that the Government of 
India was selling them down the river.
This was the situation then when Lloyd George made the ’steel frame’ speech. 
It seemed that the Home Government had to intervene to protect the stability of the 
Services in India and future recruitment as well. Of course, if there was one area 
where the Secretary of State had traditionally maintained control over policy it was in 
relation to the European Services and this continued to be specifically written into the 
1919 Act. The problem of the Services in the post-war years was a very real 
one.97 Within the existing cadre there were worries about their pay and 
conditions which seemed to be deteriorating in the post-war inflation and the decline
95 S/S to V(HD), 7 Jan. 1922, L/P&J/6/1819.
96 Letter from GI to all local governments and administrations, no. 120-ESTS, 30, May 1922, J & 
P/422 in L/P&J/6/1783.
97 See Ewing, ’The Indian Civil Service’; R. Hunt & J. Harrison, The District Officer in India 
1930-1947, London, 1982, pp. 2-4; T.H. Beaglehole, ’From Rulers to Servants: the I.C.S. and the 
British Demission of Power in India’, Modem Asian Studies, II, 12, (1977), pp. 237-55; David C. 
Potter, ’Manpower Shortage and the End of Colonialism. The Case of the Indian Civil Service’,
Modem Asian Studies, 7, 1, (1973), pp. 47-73.
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in the value of the rupee. In addition, there were uncertainties and dissatisfaction 
created by the new reforms. If there was to be large-scale Indianisation as envisaged 
in the reforms, what were the long-term prospects for officers currently serving?
Some officers objected to the change in circumstances which they faced as a result of 
the reforms: civil servants found themselves working under the orders of Indian 
Ministers, some of whom seemed to prefer to make Indian appointments in the 
Services wherever they had the power to do so. One way or another, there seemed to 
be fewer and fewer “of the ’plum’ jobs for Britons to look forward to.98 Montagu 
and Chelmsford had been worried that a reaction in the Services would damage their 
reforms and made allowance for officers who did not wish to work the new system to 
take their pensions early. All these factors worked their way though to a decline in 
the number of suitable British candidates for the Indian Services in the post-war 
years.99 Montagu was well aware of the seriousness of the situation,100 and 
forwarded to Reading, shortly after the latter’s arrival in India, a note from an I.C.S. 
officer regarding his detailed income and expenditure, in order to show the reality of 
the Services’ grievances.101
Shortly before Montagu was forced to resign from office, he had taken steps to 
appoint an informal committee to investigate the problems in recruiting Britons to the 
Services in India. Peel, Montagu’s successor, went ahead with the committee and 
appointed Lord MacDonnell to chair it. The Committee reported in June 1922, 
confirming that the problem was a real one and offered a series of palliatives,
98 Willingdon to Reading, 27 Sept. 1921, R(P)15.
99 It was estimated by the Lee Commission that there was a shortfall of 125 European recruits 
for the I.C.S. in the years 1915 to 1923, whilst 12 Indians had been recruited over and above the 
numbers stipulated in the regulations. Report of Royal Commission on the Superior Civil Services in 
India, Cmd. 2128, 1924, p. 17, cited in Potter, ’Manpower Shortage...’, p. 52.
100 Potter points out that the India Office had first known of the problem in the winter of 
1920-1921 when they received letters from Oxbridge colleges telling them of the decline in interest 
amongst students in an Indian career. Idem.
101 Montagu to Reading, 11 May 1921, R3.
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including the-subsidising of sea passages and housing for the European 
services.102 Thpse sort of changes could be authorised without a Royal 
Commission, which the report felt would only exacerbate racial feeling, and also 
without reference to the Indian legislatures.103
Relations between the two halves of Government seemed to reach another low 
point in January 1923 when Peel merely informed Delhi that he was going to 
implement allowances in pay to the European services to cover home travel and was 
only consulting the Viceroy about the timing of the announcement. The problem was 
compounded by the fact that the original difficulty over recruitment of Britons to the 
Services was now confused with the whole question of Indianisation and even more 
broadly with the call for a further instalment of constitutional reforms. Willingdon 
argued, with his usual vehemence, for a Royal Commission to be appointed to 
consider moves to provincial autonomy (which he was calling for in Madras) and, 
linked with this, the whole question of the future of the Services.104 The latter 
was now quite out of the question in view of the dominance of conservative attitudes 
in Britain. However, as Sir F.W. Duke recognised, the question of Indianisation of 
the services should really have been dealt with at the same time as the reforms. Now 
the maintenance of All-India Services, which were being rapidly Indianised, was 
’extravagant and unsatisfactory.’ Duke believed that the answer might lie in 
re-examining the functions of the Services and seeing whether they couldn’t be divided
102 That the report offered only palliatives was frankly acknowledged in a supplementary note, 
signed by all except the chairman (who thought it outside the terms of reference of his committee) 
which called for a far more fundamental review of the organisation of the Services in the light of the 
Reforms and increased Indianisation. Enclosure, W. Johnston (secretary to MacDonnell committee) to 
Peel, 21 June 1922. Documents relating to the MacDonnell Committee may be found together in 
L/P&J/6/1800.
103 The Committee felt it was important to avoid the ’legislatures continually intervening in such 
questions as officers’ allowances.’ Ibid, p. 7. The report throws interesting light on the serious 
differences between Whitehall and Delhi, claiming at one point that, ’the Governments in India...have 
tended in certain cases to postpone the maintenance of law and order to political considerations. ’ Ibid, 
p. 4, para 14.
104 Willingdon to Peel, 7 Jan. 1923, W4.
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more effectively into a predominantly English, but much slimmed-down, All-India 
Service, and a set of enlarged and Indianised provincial Services.105
Peel had conflicting advice as to how to proceed from many quarters and in 
the end chose the truly British path of appointing a Royal Commission with an 
impartial (i.e. ignorant of India) chairman, Viscount Lee of Fareham.106 F.W.
Duke, advising Peel at the India Office, obviously felt that the failure of the 
Government of India to come up with constructive solutions, or even to appear to take 
the problem seriously enough, left the Secretary of State with no alternative.107 
The Royal Commission would partly serve as a public relations exercise to convince 
Indian opinion of the necessity of improving the pay and conditions of the services. 
The establishment of the Commission was popular with few people in India, whether 
from the European or Indian community. 108 However, both Lytton and Lloyd 
came to agree that it was better to have a Commission than to keep waiting for 
London or Delhi to come up with a solution.109
Reading naturally did not like the appointment of the Commission but was 
particularly angry that, after the Committee was announced, Peel tried unilaterally to
105 F.W. Duke to Lytton, 18 Jan. 1923, L24.
106 Peel advised Delhi of his decision to go ahead with a commission in January 1923. He stressed
that it did not bring into question the constitutional reforms but was a necessary corollary to them. The 
main question, he insisted, was to be that of the functions that the European element of the service 
should perform in future. The question of pay and conditions was an integral but subsidiary part of the 
enquiry. See S/S to V(HD), ptel. 55, 18 Jan. 1923, £12.
107 F.W. Duke to Lytton, 1 Mar. 1923, L24.
108 For the doubts of provincial governors, see Hailey to Sapru, 28 Jan. 1923, SAP, 2nd. series ; 
Lytton to Peel, 1 Feb. 1923, L10. In the Legislative Assembly an adjournment motion was successfully 
passed which protested at the appointment of a Royal Commission. The National Party and the 
Democratic Party were joined in the vote by the European members. However, whilst the Democratic 
favoured boycotting the commission, the National Party favoured giving evidence to it. See V(HD) to 
S/S, ptel. S-2220-Ests., 30 Jan. 1923. £12. The U.P. Liberal Conference meeting at Benares on 23 & 
25 Aug. 1923 recorded its opinion that the appointment of the commission was an ’unnecessary and 
unjustified’ new expense on a hard-pressed Indian budget, and that the composition of the Commission 
was ’unsatisfactory to India’. Enclosure with covering letter to Lee Commission, Q/SCS/5/174.
109 Lytton to Peel, 4 April 1923, L10.
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increase the pay -of the European Services to take account of increased travel 
costs.110 However, he tried to limit the inevitable damage caused by the setting 
up the Commission, by ensuring that Indians did not see it merely as an exercise in 
justifying large pay increases to the white sahibs.111 Originally Peel proposed to 
have an English chairman, four English members and three Indian members, but 
Reading insisted on equality between Indians and Britons among the ordinary 
membership.112 Reading worked hard to find Indian representatives who would 
be acceptable to Indian opinion but not hostile to the continuation of the European 
element in the Services. Peel had wanted to avoid Indians who were ’too political’ and 
gave as examples Sapru, Aiyer and Sastri.113 Reading was not to be 
steamrollered and suggested the Liberal politician Chimanlal Setalwad, who was a 
member of the Bombay Executive Council and he would have served but for the fact 
that the Commission turned out to require the presence of its members in England at 
the start of their proceedings.114 Setalwad was reluctant to leave India just when 
the Indian Liberal Party needed working into shape for the forthcoming 
elections.115 Another Liberal, N.M. Samarth, filled the vacancy and was 
accompanied by Bhupendra Nath Basu in addition to Kaul and Sir Muhammed 
Habibullah. Peel to some extent got his way though by appointing the 
arch-reactionary, Sir Reginald Craddock, to the Committee, in addition to a not very
110 See S/S to Viceroy (H.D.), ptel., 16 Jan. 1923, L/P&J/6/1800. In reply Reading wrote that 
such a decision'...would attract universal and unfavourable attention not only in the Legislative 
Assembly but amongst politically minded Indians generally’. Viceroy (H.D.) to S/S, ptel., 26 Jan. 
1923, idem.
111 Reading was sensitive to the needs of the Moderate Party just after the certification of the Salt 
Tax and before the preparations for the second elections in November 1923. V to S/S, ptel. 8-C, 2 
April 1923, £17.
112 Reading to Lytton, 7 Aug 1923, L2.
113 S/S to V, ptel. 280, 9 March 1923, £17.
114 Peel was worried about Setalvad because he had been a contributor to the Minority Report on 
the Hunter Committee. S/S to V, ptel. 27 April 1923, £17. He was reassured by George Lloyd who 
assured the Secretary of State that though Setalvad wanted Indianisation a great deal faster than Lloyd 
thought wise, he would treat the issue fairly. Lloyd to Reading, ptel., 2 May 1923, £25.
115 Setalvad to C.F. Adam (P.S. Governor of Bombay), 24 June 1923 £25.
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strong team of Petrie, Jackson and Reginald Coupland, with Arthur Lee, a Tory 
politician who was keen to be of public service, as chairman.116 Reading also 
ensured that the terms of reference were limited so that only administrative and not 
political considerations were dealt with.117
The Lee Commission, as Ann Ewing argues, was ’disfigured by internal 
dissent.’118 In the end a unanimous report was, by some miracle, achieved. This 
had great significance in raising the pay and conditions of the Services and turning the 
tide which had been so set against the prospects of continuing European recruitment. 
The Commission also planned a phased programme of equal recruitment of Indian and 
Britons until parity in the total cadre was reached by 1939. The Lee Report, which 
was estimated to cost nearly Rs.125 million p.a. to implement, was met by a furore in 
India and the benefits to Britons described as ’Lee Loot’ by Indian Liberals.119 
But by that time, the Liberals no longer formed the key to the Indian response.
During 1922 and 1923 they had, however, been an important consideration in the 
thinking of the Government of India. Reading’s treatment of the Services issue was 
dominated by his belief that Indianisation was inevitable, not only because of the 
promises of the reforms, but also because it offered one important path through the 
financial problems the Government was facing. Reading therefore recognised the 
limits to British action set by the need to keep the support of Indian moderate 
opinion.120 It was the Secretaries of State, Montagu and Peel, who fought for
116 For revealing comments on the English component of the Commission see the comments of 
Ruth Lee, the wife of the chairman, in A. Clark, A Good Innings. The Private Papers o f Viscount Lee 
o f Fareham, London, 1974, p. 250. For Lytton’s apprehensions re. the influence of Craddock, see 
Lytton to Peel, 19 June 1923, L10.
117 Ewing, ’The Indian Civil Service...’, p. 50.
"8 Ibid, p. 49.
119 Potter, ’Manpower Shortage...’, p. 54.
120 The extent to which Reading was influenced by the Indian political situation tends to undermine 
Potter’s argument that the decolonisation process stemmed essentially from problems in the mother 
country relating to recruitment. British decisions about the ratio of Europeans to Indians were decided 
in this crucial period not by any shortage of recruits, but by the need for the successful implementation
(continued...)
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the Services and -as Ewing argues, highlighted important anomalies in the reforms: the 
ICS ’stood outside the Constitution’, answerable neither to the Government of India 
nor to the elected Provincial Assemblies.121
3. Repeal of ’Repressive’ and Discriminatory Legislation
Reading, whose appointment nearly coincided with the start of the reformed 
councils, was as keen as his predecessor that the reforms should be a success. It was 
particularly important in view of mounting non-co-operation to show Indians that the 
reforms were not a sham, but that they offered real power and influence over 
government decision-making. One key area for implementing this policy was with 
regard to so-called ’repressive legislation’. Both Montagu and Reading shared an 
instinctive dislike of measures against the press or against individuals which allowed 
for Government officers to make arbitrary decisions without reference to ordinary 
legal procedure, for instance the power under the Press Act of 1910 to demand 
financial deposits as security from newspapers to ensure their future good 
behaviour.122 Montagu had pressed Chelmsford for a long time to repeal 
repressive legislation.123 However, whilst some members of Government felt 
that the laws were a cumbersome and unpopular weapon in Government hands, a 
number of local Governments were hostile to repeal and the events in the Punjab in
120 (...continued)
of the Reforms. It was need to work with moderate Indian nationalism that set the limits to the sort of 
protection that successive Secretaries of State argued for. See Potter, ’Manpower Shortage...’, 
especially p. 73.
121 Ewing, ’The Indian Civil Service...’, p. 52.
122 Rumbold points out that a Privy Council decision in 1919 overturned the previous 
interpretation of the-Act, namely that it did not allow judicial appeal against demands for a deposit or 
their forfeiture. Watershed, p. 234.
123 B. Ramusack, The Princes o f India in the Twilight o f Empire, Ohio, 1978, p. 123.
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1919 seemed to justify caution.124 Chelmsford took no decision on the matter 
until near the end of his term of office. Even at that point, he was keen not to tie the 
hands of his successor and therefore promised the Legislature on 22 February 1921 
that the Government would establish bodies with non-official majorities to enquire into 
the Press Act and repressive legislation.125 There were in fact two committees 
established, both chaired by Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. Reading and his Council indicated 
to the two official members of the Press Act Committee, Sapru and Vincent, that the 
Government could accept a decision to repeal the Press Act, provided that certain 
powers were maintained by incorporation in other acts.126
In June 1921 the Committee presented its report, which recommended repeal 
of the 1908 and 1910 Acts, to Government. Certain parts of the old Acts which were 
to be retained would now form part of the penal code. The Government of India was 
keen to implement the recommendations of the committee but came into conflict with 
Whitehall over one issue in particular: the fact that the committee decided not to make 
special provision to protect Princely States which were attacked in the press of British 
India.127 Initially, the Government of India had regarded such protection as a 
sine qua non of an acceptable report.128 However, Reading’s basic belief was 
that ’we should not endeavour to get [the] Committee to agree to recommendations 
which would not have the support of the Assembly’, and he noted that none of the 
Indian Princes would give evidence before the Committee, so that their case tended to
124 See, for example, the views of W. Marris, as cited in N.G. Barrier, Banned. Controversial 
Literature and Political Control in British India, 1907-1947, Missouri, 1974, p.80.
125 Rumbold states that Reading’s decision marked a great victory for the Moderates, because any 
committee of Indian politicians would inevitably recommend repeal of these enactments and it was 
predictable that the government, in their anxiety to keep on terms with the legislature would then not 
resist their disappearance.’ Rumbold, Watershed, pp. 234-5. Robb also argues that Chelmsford expected 
the committees to lead to the repeal of a wide-range of repressive Acts. See Robb, Government o f 
India, pp. 281-3.
126 Reading was clearly aware of the potential electoral advantage to the Moderates of being seen 
to have been responsible for repealing the Press Act. V to S/S(HD), ptel. 426, 22 May 1921, RIO.
127 V to S/S, ptels. 489 & 571, 11 June & 5 July 1921, RIO.
128 Idem.
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go by default.129 Montagu felt bound to press for reconsideration of this issue in 
view of ’the past history of the matter and the notorious frequency of blackmail by 
disreputable papers.*130 He warned that if there was any general demand for 
protection voiced by the Council of Princes, meeting in November 1921, ’I should 
find it difficult to approve of a bill for repeal of the Press laws unless it contained a 
provision dealing with the question of protection of the Ruling Princes. *131 Not 
surprisingly, the Princes who were represented in the Council of Princes, were 
virtually unanimous in deploring the loss of their protection, but, just as predictably, 
Indian politicians remained opposed to any special measures to protect the 
princes.132 In the new year Reading took advice from local governments 
and political officers and found that they were generally in favour of the necessity of 
special measures to protect the princes.133 He determined to pass the bill 
repealing the Press Act and then to return to the Assembly later in the year with 
another Bill affording the Princes special protection. The repeal went through the 
Legislative Assembly on 25 March and on the same day the new Secretary of State, 
Lord Peel, sent an urgent telegram saying that he would use his powers under the 1919 
Government of India Act (section 69) to disallow the new legislation unless provision 
for protection of the princes was made.134 This was a most unfortunate start to 
relations between Reading and Peel. Reading protested that the Legislature would see
129 Ramusack argues that John Wood, the political secretary, who was responsible for presenting 
the princes’ case before the committee, was not very effective in doing so. See Ramusack, Princes, pp. 
123-4.
130 S/S to V(HD), ptel. 1050, 4 Aug. 1921, RIO.
131 S/S to V, ptel. 1617, 14 Nov. 1921, RIO.
132 Ramusack, Princes, pp. 124-5. Reading had brought the matter up in his Council and found 
that ’strong opinions were expressed that the Assembly would not pass any law giving the protection to 
Ruling Princes, and it is obvious that dissatisfaction with the administration of States by ruling Princes 
prevails.’ V to S/S, ptel. 727, 6 Aug. 1921, RIO.
133 V (Leg. Dept.) to S/S, ptel. 6380, 14 Oct. 1922, R ll. The more dynamic figure of J.P. 
Thompson replaced Wood as Political Secretary in March 1922 and statistics were discovered that 
there had in fact been some 170 hostile criticisms and attacks on the states in the twelve months ending 
May 1921 and nearly 20 instances of action taken under the Press Act (including warnings) concerning 
the princes and not just 3 cases as the Press Act Committee was told.
134 Ramusack, Princes, p. 126.
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Peel’s refusal to allow the legislation to be implemented as ’a serious blow to their 
independence’.135 Reading had no choice though but to comply with Peel’s 
wishes. Vincent now argued that circumstances had changed since he had participated 
in the Press Act Committee and rather than ’leave the Princes with a real grievance’ 
he would reluctantly agree to special legislation.136 Sapru, however, opposed the 
measure strongly as he ’was not convinced that we are specifically bound by 
engagement or honour to grant this protection, and on general grounds of his 
dissatisfaction with autocratic rule of Princes and the want of redress to oppressed 
subjects by appeal to the Government of India’.137 Sapru’s views were 
overruled, however, and the new bill was introduced to the Legislative Assembly on 
23 September 1922 where it was defeated by 45 votes to 41. As a result Reading was 
forced to certify the bill, though he indicated that he would use it only in the most 
extreme cases.138 The debate had aired issues of great importance for the future, 
but had also served to show serious rifts between Peel and Reading, and also between 
Reading and the legislature. It was the first time that Reading had had to certify a 
measure and Peel’s comment that it was a good thing that certification was first used 
on a matter between Indians was not likely to have been well-received by the 
Viceroy.139
As soon as the Press Act Committee completed its work, Sapru took the chair 
of the Committee dealing with Repressive Laws. The Committee began its meetings
135 V(HD) to S/S, ptel. 534, 7 July 1922, Rl 1.
136 Note by W. Vincent, 1 Aug. 1922, Home Poll 258, 1923, cited in Ramusack, Princes, p. 127.
137 V to S/S, ptel. 644, 12 Aug. 1922, R16. It speaks a great deal for Sapru’s integrity that he 
stuck to his guns on this issue even at the cost of alienating himself from the princes, a number of 
whom were, and would be in the future, his legal clients. See Ramusack, Princes, p. 127.
138 Reading salved his conscience by arguing that his Government had refused to give the princes 
greater protection than that afforded by the now repealed Press Act, whilst they discarded the unpopular 
method of demanding securities from papers in favour of taking the matter to judicial trial. They had 
safeguarded legitimate criticism and required the sanction of the Governor-General in Council to 
prosecutions. See V(Leg. Dept.) to S/S ptel., 14 Oct. 1922, Rl l .
139 G.R. Isaacs, Rufus Isaacs, vol. 2, p. 262., cited in Ramusack, Princes, p. 128.
230
in July and completed its report by September. As with the Press Acts, some of the 
group of laws conferring special powers on the executive to imprison or deport 
without trial had fallen into disuse as the Montford reforms came into operation. 
However, as the effects of the non-co-operation movement became more widespread, 
British policy-makers must have wondered whether the decision to review the 
repressive laws was a wise one. The wartime Defence of India Act was due to expire 
soon, whilst the Rowlatt Act had never been used after the furore that accompanied its 
introduction. Regulation III of 1818 was an antique measure but was still useful to 
retain in the Government armoury whilst Congress turned to new methods of 
agitation. Sapru realised that, to a large extent, he was swimming against the official 
tide in looking to repeal measures like the Seditious Meetings Act, and he sought to 
achieve a workable compromise between official caution and Indian desires for the 
Government to confine itself to using powers approved of by the legislature.140
When the report was received by Reading’s administration they decided to 
accept it. As with the Press Acts, the Executive Council had agreed on policy with 
Sapru and Vincent before the committee began its deliberations and it was felt that, 
even if political circumstances had since changed, it was unwise to undermine the 
position of the two Government representatives.141 Additionally Reading 
recognised that if the Government refused to repeal any of the recommended acts it 
was likely that private members would bring bills to the Assembly with the same 
purpose and thus embarrass the government.142 Montagu was worried about the 
Government losing some of its most effective powers at a time when the non-co- 
operation movement seemed to be entering a lawless phase, especially in Bengal. He 
was particularly concerned that Reading’s government had accepted the report without
140 Sapru to Chintamani, 28 July 1921, SAPIC49, 2nd. series.
141 V to S/S, ptel. 1096, 9 Nov. 1921, RIO.
142 Idem.
231
consulting him.143 After arguing for so many years against the use of these laws 
against political figures, he now found himself arguing for caution, particularly in 
repealing Regulation III of 1818 as the committee recommended. ’The substitution of 
legal process for executive action, on which I have set my heart, must be gradual’, he 
told Reading, ’...there is no harm in letting India know that the silly antics of the 
non-co-operationists are delaying the progress in that as in other matters.’144
Reading, who had, of course, allowed local governments to use a number of 
repressive laws in his letter of 24 November 1921, was willing to allow Regulation III 
to remain on the statute books for the time being, and so a workable compromise was 
found. 145
Racial Distinctions Committee
One issue which Reading was very keen to come to grips with during his 
Viceroyalty was that of the discrimination that existed in law between whites and 
Indians. The latter strongly resented the fact that the law seemed to give protection to 
those whites, often planters and soldiers who physically attacked natives. This had 
been a long-standing problem, but it was one that threatened to become more serious 
as whites sometimes lashed out when they found that the newly-politicised Indian 
classes would not be cowed any longer. There was a large gap between the new 
theory of greater racial equality which formed the basis of the Montford reforms and 
the reality, particularly at the local level, of racial friction. Reading, like many of his 
predecessors, felt this was a crucial issue, and wrote to Montagu that, though he did 
not believe the instances of inequality or unjust treatment had become more frequent, 
he was ’convinced that we shall never persuade the Indians of the justice of our rule
143 S/S to V, 10 Nov. 1921, A/13 & R3.
144 Idem.
145 See V(HD) to S/S, ptel. 1227, 28 Dec. 1921, RIO.
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until we have overcome racial difficulties.’146 Reading reported that he was 
having the law examined and his interim belief was that the fault lay with the system 
of allowing Europeans to opt for jury trial and to be secure in the knowledge that at 
least half of the jury must be composed of Europeans. However, he admitted that the 
solution of the problem was not easy to find.147
In the autumn session of the Legislative Assembly, Reading’s Government 
was given the chance to initiate an enquiry into Racial Distinctions in the Criminal 
Procedure Code by a resolution on the matter by N.M. Samarth which was put 
forward on 15 September 1921.148 The process of reform in this sphere was one 
that took much longer than Reading expected and involved him in dispute with Lord 
Peel, who was Secretary of State by the time the committee reported in July 1922. 
The report largely took the line of levelling up the legal standing that Indians had so 
that they enjoyed the same privileges as those enjoyed by Britons, rather than a 
levelling down process of taking away white privileges. However, the committee 
wanted a tighter definition of what constituted a ’European British subject’ so that 
other Europeans, Americans, and Dominion subjects would not be able in future to 
claim these privileges. Secondly, British soldiers serving in India would only, in 
future, have the same rights as their civilian counterparts, unless the matter came 
under the jurisdiction of a military court. These matters were controversial: Peel saw 
himself acting as the final defence of the interests of the European community in 
India, whilst the Army Council at home fought to try to maintain the soldiers’ 
privileges. Reading was keen to give legal effect to the report as soon as possible, 
particularly in view of the fact that the two members of his Government, Sapru and 
Vincent, who had been responsible for achieving the compromise embodied in the
146 See V to S/S7 7 July 1921, R3, cited in Hyde, Reading, pp.355-6.
147 Idem.
148 See Sinha, Reading, p.89.
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report, were due to retire at the end of the year.149 Once again, Reading warned 
Peel against obstructing the changes, telling him that if they didn’t go ahead 
non-official bills would be put up in the Legislative Assembly and they would not be 
so favourable to the European community.150 Reading was referring the matter 
to Local Governments but was confident that they would approve in general, and that 
the European community’s approval was to be found in the acceptance of the report’s 
recommendations by their representative body, the European Association.151 
Reading’s prediction that Local Governments would accept the report proved correct, 
with the exception of the Bombay Government.152 Reading fought his case to the 
bitter end. He felt that the slightly lesser status now given to Dominion subjects, 
whilst not greatly diminishing their rights in practice, would prove a useful bargaining 
counter in any negotiations about the status of Indians overseas, whilst the changes 
relating to British soldiers raised an important principle of legal equity.153
Eventually, in September 1923 the new legislation came into effect. In view of 
the fact that the issue had caused great feeling for at least the last forty years, Reading 
could feel a pride in reaching a successful compromise. His predecessor, Lord Ripon, 
had, in the 1880s, found himself forced to give way to the combined pressure of the 
European community in India when he tried to deal with similar matters, but by the 
1920s there was to be no thwarting of the Indian majority legislature whilst it was 
backed by a sympathetic Viceroy.
149 See V to S/S, ptel. 577, 25 July 1922, Rl l .  Vincent was due for retirement and Sapru




152 Lloyd to Lytton, 12 Oct. 1922, L13.
153 V(HD) to S/S, ptel. 28-C, 20 Dec. 1922, Rll .
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4. The Indian liberals and Indians Overseas
The Indian Liberals made the issue of the status of Indians overseas, and 
particularly in Africa, very much their own. The efforts of the old Moderate school, 
Gandhi in South Africa and Gokhale in India, had kept the issue alive at the annual 
meetings of the Indian National Congress in the days when the Moderates dominated 
that body. Now, when Congress split in 1918, the role of watchdog of Indian interests 
within the Empire was maintained by the Liberal rump, whilst the 
Gandhian-dominated majority became embroiled in political struggles closer to home. 
As Benarsidas Chaturvedi, the champion of Fijian Indian indentured labourers, 
complained, it became harder and harder to get Congress to discuss, let alone pass, 
resolutions on the status of Indians overseas.154 Unlike the Extremists, who saw 
the British Empire only as a means for India’s repression, the Indian Liberals saw the 
Empire as having unique potential for the improvement of mankind and saw the 
treatment of fellow Indians in other parts of the Empire as a test case of the bona 
fides of the newly emerging British Commonwealth of Nations. Srinivasa Sastri could 
move British audiences to envisage Empire ideals of which they had, until then, not 
even dreamt. In one remarkable speech he told his listeners that,
...this great political organization [the British Commonwealth] stands 
unique amongst the political institutions of the world for one thing 
above all others...and that is the reconciliation of the East and the 
West, the bringing together in happy harmony the people of varied 
races and varied complexions, the blending together under one law, 
under one sovereign, under the Imperial Parliament, peoples of adverse 
nationalities, various cultures, hitherto felt in many other political 
organizations to be irreconcilable and never to be brought under one
154 Benarsidas Chaturvedi to V.S.S. Sastri, 23 Dec. 1922, Sastri MSS, NMML. Also see R.G. 
Gregory, India and East Africa: A History o f Race Relations within the British Empire, 1890-1939, 
Oxford, 1971, p. 230.
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There were more direct factors behind Liberal interests as well; the Bombay 
merchants, who were the principal financiers of the Indian Liberal Party, had trade 
and financial links with the Indian communities in South and East Africa, and were 
keen to see the Indian communities overseas develop economically, socially and 
politically.156
The Liberals were to find their imperial ideals sorely tested by events in East 
Africa in the years after the First World War. Leading Liberals, like Sastri and Sapru, 
were to serve India at the Imperial Conferences of 1921 and 1923 respectively, and 
were, by personal experience, to find both achievement and disillusionment. This 
disillusionment was an important part of the demise of the Indian Liberal Party, which 
depended so much on the goodwill of the Raj.
Indians in East Africa
Whereas before the war the main problem that Indians faced overseas was in 
South Africa, the centre of attention tended to shift after the war to East 
Africa.157 The main reason for this was that Indians knew that their power to 
influence imperial decisions was in inverse relation to the status of the different 
African colonies. The Union of South Africa now had equivalent status to the white 
dominions, such as Canada or Australia, and its leader, Smuts, played a central role 
in war and post-war imperial decision-making. Whilst Indians continued to object to 
the inferior status of Indians in South Africa, they understood realistically that they
155 Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, p. 158, n.5.
156 E.g. Purshottamdas Thakurdas, the cotton broker, was Vice-President of the Indian Merchants 
Chamber which took a keen interest in the fate of Indians in East Africa. See, Thakurdas to Sir Thomas 
Holland , 16 Oct. 1920; Thakurdas to G.I., Commerce & Industry Dept., 20 Oct. 1920 & 22 Oct. 1920 
in Thakurdas MSS, NMML. See also Pheroze Sethna to V.S.S. Sastri, 31 July 1923, Sethna MSS, 
NMML. Sethna was a prominent member of the Indian Merchants’ Chamber.
157 See Gregory, India and East Africa, p. 222.
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did not have the leverage, moral or political, to ameliorate them. Crown colonies, 
such as the British protectorate of East Africa, soon to be known as Kenya colony, 
were ruled directly by Britain and therefore should be expected to maintain imperial 
principles and standards. Even lower down the rung, captured German territory in 
East Africa, soon to become the League of Nations Mandate territory of Tanganyika, 
was considered entirely open to international concern. Indeed, some Indians originally 
supported Montagu’s idea that German East Africa should become a colony for 
Indians to settle in.158 In view of all the promises of national self-determination 
and the talk of trusteeship that was in the air during and after the Great War it is not 
perhaps surprising that this Indian imperial enterprise should come to nothing. 
However, Montagu had wanted the ex-German territory for Indian settlement precisely 
because he foresaw the likelihood that Indians would be excluded from settlement 
elsewhere by white settlers.159 This prediction was rapidly proved correct. In 
the post-war economic depression white settlers looked to safeguard their future from 
Indian competition. The whites had good reason to feel threatened, they were 
outnumbered in the East Africa protectorate by Indians by at least two to one, and 
Indian immigration was proceeding at twice the rate of European immigration.160 
The Governor of Madras, Willingdon, could sympathise with the white man’s fear of 
being swamped and argued in somewhat basic terms that,
This theory on the part of the Indian that Empire citizenship must mean 
to him the opening of the colonist’s door to him in all parts of the 
British Empire can’t be upheld. He breeds so much faster than the
138 The idea that German East Africa should be acquired for the purposes of Indian settlement is 
included in Gokhale’s ’political testament’. See ’Memo by Gokhale on Provincial Autonomy’, n.d., 
[Feb. 1915?], enclosure to G. Barnes to Chelmsford, 10 Aug 1916, C51.
159 See Montagu to Chelmsford, 23 Dec. 1918, M2.
160 Gregory, India and East Africa, p. 177. The 1921 census gave the following population figures 
for East Africa Protectorate, which in July 1920 became the Kenya Colony and Protectorate. Kenya; 
Europeans, 9,651; Indians 25,253; Africans 2,483,500.
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white man- that he’d swamp the Empire in one hundred years.161 
The Issues
There were three main considerations for the white settlers. The first was to 
restrict Indian immigration, the second to maintain and expand the concept of land 
segregation which had been applied de facto  but not de jure , third to maintain white 
political supremacy by keeping Indian political participation at a bare minimum. 
Immigration restriction did not pose as great a problem as the other issues in that 
there was no immediate prospect of any large influx of Indians into East Africa. Such 
restrictions as already existed did not have a racial basis, but required only that 
immigrants should deposit a certain amount of money on entry.
The problem of land segregation posed more important problems. It was not 
that Indians particularly wanted to settle the highland areas but they objected to any 
attempt to treat this as a closed issue, a legal right of the whites. Furthermore, they 
strongly objected to the spread of land segregation, particularly in the municipalities, 
which would hit their livelihood. Matters were made worse by the fact that the whites 
argued for this sort of segregation on grounds of hygiene, an argument calculated to 
cause grave offence to the Indian community.
The final problem, that of the vote, opened up a plethora of issues of principle. 
The most interesting issue, but one that both communities tried to play down, was 
whether the majority community, the Africans, should form part of the democratic 
process. There was tacit agreement between the whites and Indians that democracy 
was intended for ’civilised’ communities only, so that the blacks would be excluded 
from the franchise, at least for the present. However, the whites found it increasingly 
useful to argue their case in terms of ’native paramountcy’ and trusteeship. Only the 
Europeans, it was argued, could hold the ring for the future interests of the Africans.
161 Willingdon to Reading, 21 May 1923, in R25; Willingdon to Peel, 21 Apr. 1923, W4.
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Indian representatives, like Sastri, saw though this hypocrisy but have themselves been 
accused of excluding the Africans from their considerations.162 On the matter of 
Indian political representation there was the question of how many representatives the 
Indians should have (there was some agreement that on practical grounds they could 
not fill more than half the European number of representatives even if they should be 
granted it) and whether these representatives should be elected on a communal 
franchise or on a common electoral roll with the Europeans. Whereas the Indian 
Liberals insisted on a common electoral roll, their Muslim fellow-delegates in 1922, 
Jinnah and the Aga Khan, preferred a communal vote. These arguments paralleled 
those being pursued in the Indian political system and the whites latched on to this 
fact with glee, pointing out, correctly, that if the Indian Liberals had their way,
Indians in Kenya would be far better represented than Indians in their own country.
Behind these Kenyan issues there was a wider imperial consideration and that 
was whether a segregationist, white-dominated South Africa was to become the pattern 
for all areas of permanent white settlement in Africa. This raised the worrying 
question of whether Britain could in future control its settler colonies. There is little 
doubt that the South African Premier, J.C. Smuts, whether directly as in the 1921
162 Gregory suggests that Sastri was initially reluctant to give native African interests paramountcy 
and contrasts this with Gandhi’s approach. See India and East Africa, p. 237. However,this view is 
based on a misunderstanding of Sastri’s letter to his brother Ramaswami, 10 May 1923, reproduced in 
Jagadisan (ed.), Sastri Letters, p. 101. Sastri was opposed to the European settlers’ use of the argument 
of native paramountcy for their own purposes. He consistently supported the argument that African 
interests in Kenya should be paramount and when this became official Government policy in 1923 he 
argued that it was a ’gain of great significance’. Sastri speaking on 22 Aug. 1923, cited in Gregory, 
India and East Africa, p. 250. By this stage, it was very important to maintain this line of argument if 
support from influential groups like the Anti-Slavery Society was to be continued. It is important to 
remember the contemporary context of this debate. Edwin Montagu, supporting the Indian case on the 
basis of racial equality, also argued that the demand for Indian representation differed from that of the 
native Africans. Whereas the former had been promised Dominion Status, the latter had not. See 
Montagu to Churchill, 17 June 1921, AS3/5. Discussions at the recent Peace Conference regarding the 
mandate system had been based on the premise of a hierarchy of preparedness for future 
self-government in the non-European world. This hierarchy was a thinly-based reworking of old racial 
hierarchies, and as usual, the African living in tropical regions was thought to be unsuited to 
self-government in any foreseeable future. Whilst Montagu and Sastri may have shared these ideas, one 
must also remember that they were trying very hard to make their demands seem reasonable, and not to 
look as if this was the thin end of the wedge.
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Conference or behind the scenes, as in helping the Kenya settlers in 1922 and 1923, 
was the main adversary that the Indian Liberals faced.
The Imperial Conference of 1921
It was Srinivasa Sastri, the President of the Servants of India Society and a 
Member of the Council of State, whom the Government of India chose to represent 
India, along with the obligatory princely representative, the Maharao of Cutch, at the 
Imperial Conference of 1921. The fact that India was independently represented at the 
top tables of empire was the result of the recognition of her wartime contribution. 
Montagu was keen that India should be represented by genuine Indian political leaders 
and not by figureheads, and Sastri fitted his requirement admirably. Firstly, he was an 
acceptable nationalist as far as the Government of India was concerned, an ardent 
constitutionalist and foe of non-co-operation. Secondly, he was knowledgeable and 
articulate about the issue of Indians overseas: Sastri saw himself as walking in the 
footsteps of his political guru, Gokhale, who had focused on this issue.
The subject of ’The Position of Indians in the Empire’ was raised in the 1921 
Conference and a resolution tabled acknowledging ’an incongruity between the 
position of India as an equal member of the British Empire and the existence of 
disabilities upon British Indians lawfully domiciled in some other parts of the Empire’, 
and the Conference was asked to establish equality of citizenship. The prospects did 
not look promising for a successful outcome, for not only was Smuts opposed to the 
resolution, which required unanimous approval, but Sastri believed that Winston 
Churchill, the Colonial Secretary, tended to sympathise with Smuts.163 Sastri
163 Montagu pressed Churchill to persuade Smuts to make concessions on the wording of the 
relevant Conference resolution but Churchill was able to make virtually no headway. See Montagu to 
Churchill, 15 & 21 July 1921; Churchill to Montagu, 19 July 1921, AS3/5; for Sastri’s views on 
Churchill’s motives see V.S.S. Sastri to his brother, Ramaswami Sastri, 21 July 1921, Sastri MSS, 
Madras. Sastri believed that Churchill was playing up to the Tories in order to manoeuvre to succeed 
Lloyd George as Prime Minister.
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achieved great success in private talks with the dominion premiers and then made a 
moving speech in the Conference on 8 July. His secretary, G.S. Bajpai, recorded his 
words:
To us the Empire stands for equality, for absolute justice. It may be 
that this is not a legal or a juridical conception. I have no right, not 
being a lawyer, to lay down anything on that subject, but in the popular 
conception, there is this element, and we conceive that when this 
Empire reaches to the fullest extent of her moral greatness it will be 
open to every subject to receive the fullest expression of which he is 
capable in any part of the Empire unhampered and unhindered; that he 
will, to put it more particularly, be entitled to move about freely in any 
part of the Empire.164
Whilst Sastri won the support of the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, by 
his speech, he made little headway in the committee that was set up to examine the 
question more closely. The Indian resolution was not finally resolved until the last 
day of the conference when a brilliant speech by Lloyd George won over all the 
delegates and even moved Smuts to a compromise.
We are trying [said the British premier] to build up a democratic 
empire on the basis of the consent of all the races that are inside it...It 
really transfigures, I think, the human story...The British Empire will 
be a Mount of Transfiguration if it succeeds. If it fails, poor old 
humanity will fall back again...after all its Calvaries it goes back and it 
says ’We can do no better’ and it throws up its arms in despair...Well, 
do not let Mr. Sastri go back ...and say ’The British Empire has 
refused us justice’. It will be an appalling thing to say to the people 
who sent a million and a quarter volunteers to aid us.165
Smuts accepted the general principle of equal citizenship in the Dominions for
164 G.S. Bajpai’s secret memo, on Imp. Conf., 9 Aug. 1921, enclosure to Montagu to Reading, 15 
Aug. 1921, R3, and also in AS3/5. This document is quoted extensively in H.Tinker, Separate and
Unequal: India and the Indians in the British Commonwealth, 1920-1950, London, 1976, pp. 45-52.
165 Idem.
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Indians, but excluded South Africa from its implementation.166 Sastri felt that 
South Africa had been isolated and an important principle achieved. He quickly 
ensured that Dominion premiers accepted an Indian deputation to put the principle into 
practice in the near future. Sastri must have felt at the pinnacle of his powers. He had 
been taken into the confidence of Montagu at the India Office and Lloyd George at 
Chequers, he had negotiated with the Dominion Premiers on a basis of equality and 
had been made a Privy Councillor and a Freeman of the City of London. Montagu 
made great play of the significance of India’s new role, insisting that at the Imperial 
Conference India ’was granted full Dominion status- Dominion status in its imperial 
relations, anticipating its domestic Dominion status’167 He foresaw opportunities 
at future gatherings to use the principle established to press for further concessions 
from South Africa.
Sastri’s achievements were not, however, recognised by the Indian student 
population in London who barracked and insulted him and Bajpai doubted whether 
what his ’Chief had achieved would be recognized or welcomed in India.168 
There was still a large gap between conference resolutions and actual practice in 
different parts of the Empire. As G.S. Bajpai recognized, there were grounds still for 
doubting whether the method of discussion would pay better dividends than the threat 
of non-co-operation or force.169 Tinker concludes pessimistically that, on the 
important contemporary imperial issues, South Africa, Kenya and Fiji, ’The imperial 
conference had not fundamentally changed anything’.170
166 For the full resolution and a summary of the proceedings of the Conference, see Cmd. 1474., 
1921.
167 Daily Telegraph, 16 Aug. 1921, quoted in Tinker, Separate and Unequal, p. 52.
168 See Bajpai to Sapru 26 May 1921, 4 Aug. 1921, SAP/B16, 1st. series; Polak to Sapru, 8 July
1921, SAP/P62, 1st. series. Polak explained why he thought Sastri was a special target of the 
Extremists: ’A Moderate who accepts office is beyond pardon. But why a man should proclaim himself 
a Moderate and who does not accept office is beyond all understanding. ’
169 Bajpai to Sapru, 22 Aug 1921, 5/1/7B18, 1st. series.
170 Tinker, Separate and Unequal, p. 53.
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Churchill at the Colonial Office
Sastri’s optimism that the resolution of the Imperial Conference would have to 
be conformed to in Kenya was not in fact to prove justified. Over the following 
months Churchill and Montagu and their respective departments were locked in 
combat on the issue, with the Kenya settlers an ever-present threat. Churchill and the 
Colonial Office based their policy on Cecil Rhodes’s maxim, ’equal rights for 
civilised men’. The problem was that Churchill’s definition of what constituted a 
’civilised man’ differed profoundly from Montagu’s: Churchill wrote that, ’The 
Indians in East Africa are mainly of a very low class of coolies, and the idea that they 
should be put on an equality with Europeans is revolting to every white man 
throughout Africa.’171 Churchill asked Montagu not to push the Indian case too 
hard in case there should be a white settler backlash.172 It is quite clear from the 
correspondence that Montagu and the India Office fought for the Indian case tooth and 
nail. They were prepared to make temporary concessions on issues like immigration 
and land purchase rights in the highlands, provided that there was no permanent racial 
inequality allowed and that other Indian claims were satisfactorily settled.173
In February 1922, however, Churchill, seemingly lost patience with the 
protracted negotiations, and made a speech at a Kenya Dinner in which he played the 
right-wing card for all it was worth. Churchill started by declaring that, ’The
171 Churchill to Montagu, 8 Oct. 1921, ASUS.
172 This threat of a white uprising against any settlement that was too favourable to the Indians 
was an important background factor in the negotiations. Churchill to Montagu, 8 Oct. 1921, ASU3\ 
Churchill to Montagu, 25 Aug. 1921, with enclosed telegram from Governor of Kenya to S/S Colonial 
Office, 20 Aug. 1921, ASS 15.
173 See e.g., Montagu to Churchill, 20 Aug. 1921 and 31 Jan. 1922; Lytton note to Montagu 18 
Jan. 1922, ASUS. The full story of the protracted negotiations may be followed in Gregory, India and 
East Africa, pp. 198-213. This section is entitled ’Churchill’s Vacillation’, and Gregory argues that 
Churchill was quite sympathetic to the Indian case for the first year after his appointment in February 
1921. Churchill seems to have become more hostile to Indian views some time during Autumn 1921, 
under the threat of a European rising in Kenya, and apparently in conjunction with the growth of 
non-cooperation in India: see Gregory, op. cit., pp. 211-13, for the outward signs of Churchill’s 
disaffection, and Churchill to Montagu, 8 Oct. 1921, ASUS, for the possible causes.
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democratic principles of Europe are by no means suited to the development of Asiatic 
and African people. ’ He continued by stating that ’We consider we are pledged by 
undertakings given in the past to reserve the highlands of East Africa exclusively for 
European settlers, and we do not intend to depart from that pledge...We consider that 
the interests of British settlers and the native population alike require that all future 
immigration of Indians shall be strictly regulated.’ He publicly stated the principle of 
’equal rights for all civilised men’ and ominously concluded that, * We do not 
contemplate any settlement or system which will prevent British East Africa, or 
Kenya, as it has now become known, becoming a characteristically and distinctively 
British colony, looking forward in full fruition of time to complete responsible 
self-government.’174 Montagu was furious at this attempt to pre-empt a 
negotiated settlement and also to bypass Cabinet policy-making.175 He pointed 
out that the speech had made the likelihood of the Indians being in a mood to 
compromise much less likely.176 Indeed protests quickly arrived from the East 
Africa Indian delegation and from various bodies in India177 It was later clear 
that Montagu was fighting for his life in the Cabinet against a right-wing backlash, 
strengthened by the Government of India’s apparent failure to arrest Gandhi and put 
down the non-co-operation movement.
The new Secretary of State for India
On 9 March 1922 Montagu was forced to resign his office and was replaced by 
the Conservative, Lord Peel, with Lord Winterton, a Northern Rhodesian landowner,
174 The speech as reported in The Times, 28 Jan. 1922. Montagu’s marked copy may be found in 
ASl/12.
175 Montagu to Churchill, 31 Jan. 1922, .451/12.
176 Montagu to Churchill, 1 Feb. 1922, .451/12.
177 See H. Polak to A.J. Sylvester (P.M.’s Private Secretary 30 Jan. 1922, >451/12; E.African 
Indian Deputation to W. Churchill, 9 Feb. 1922, >453/6; Reading to Montagu, ptel., 11 Feb. 1922, 
enclosing resolution passed by the Indian Legislative Assembly on 9 Feb. 1922, >451/12.
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as his undersecretary.178 Just at the worst possible moment it looked as if India 
had been deprived of its chief defence in the Government. But Winterton managed to 
negotiate a compromise deal in July 1922 with his opposite number at the Colonial 
Office, Edward Wood, later to become Viceroy as Lord Irwin. This compromise, 
known as the Wood-Winterton agreement, built upon earlier agreements made 
between the India Office and the Colonial Office, and met most Indian demands, 
offering Indians a common electoral roll with the whites on a non-discriminatory 
franchise and rejecting immigration restrictions and segregation in Kenya. However 
there was to be no change in the highlands policy.179 If this deal had been 
adhered to it would not have represented an unacceptable outcome for the Kenyan 
Indians, but in October the Lloyd George coalition was replaced by a Conservative 
government and Tinker judges that the Kenya settlers felt that this was an appropriate 
time to bring pressure to bear to overturn any compromise deals. The Kenya 
Governor, Coryndon, called for legislation banning further Indian immigration and 
backed his call with tales of the threat of settler direct action.180 Public 
indignation in India was loudly expressed. A deputation was arranged to go to 
England at their own expense (but with Government of India support) and fight the 
case along with the Kenyan Indian representatives. Sastri became the effective leader 
of this delegation, which also included Jamnadas Dwarkadas, B.S. Kamat, M.A. 
Jinnah, Sir Dinshaw Petit and C.F. Andrews. Despite differences over whether there 
should be a common or communal franchise, the Indian delegation agreed its basic
178 Interestingly, Lord Lytton, who had negotiated with the Colonial Office re. Kenya when he
was Under-Secretary at the India Office, wrote that he did not trust Winterton to take on the role of
negotiating on the Kenya issue. He described Winterton’s views as ’very hostile to the Indian point of 
view’. Lytton to Peel, 10 May 1922,L10.
179 For details, see Gregory, India and East Africa, pp. 219-20.
180 See C.J.D. Duder, ’The Settler Response to the Indian Crisis of 1923 in Kenya: Brigadier-
General Philip Wheatley and "Direct Action"’, Journal o f Imperial and Commonwealth History, xvii, 3, 
May 1989, pp. 349-73. Duder points to the important part played in the settler ’revolt’ by ex-India 
Army men and the way in which their die-hard attitudes on the India question coloured their approaches 
to the Kenya issue.
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strategy at a -meeting convened in Paris by the Aga Khan on 3 May 1923. Sastri 
reported the agreement in a letter to the Indian Liberal publicist, G.A. Natesan:
1. We are to stand firm for India’s right of emigration to Kenya, no 
more restriction than there is at present.
2. On the other points we should abide by the Wood-Winterton 
agreement i.e. no segregation; the highlands question to remain open; 
the franchise to be common; based on uniform qualifications, ten per 
cent of our community to get the vote, and the constituencies to be so 
arranged as to give us four out of the total of eleven elective 
seats.181
Sastri was horrified by the reactionary views that he encountered in Britain on 
the Kenya issue.182 He forecast that ’another act of perfidy to India seems 
likely.’183 Peel was not very happy at finding the non-official deputation on his 
doorstep and felt that ’the Indian point of view should have been explained by 
Englishmen to Englishmen.’184 He was worried that Sastri and the others would 
be too extreme in their public statements and alienate the British Government185 
Reading communicated the seriousness with which Indian opinion viewed the 
proceedings in London. Despite, or perhaps because of his condescending view 
towards the Indian deputation, Peel tried his best to put the Indian case before the 
Cabinet when it met on 20 July. He was not, however, successful. Although there 
were to be no moves to responsible government in the foreseeable future, the white 
highlands would remain a white preserve, there was no block to future immigration 
restrictions and a communal electorate was chosen instead of the common electoral
181 Sastri to G.A. Natesan, 22 May 1923, in Jagadisan, Letters o f Srinivasa Sastri, pp. 101-2.
182 Sastri to Besant, 24 May 1923, Besant MSS.
183 Sastri to Besant, 21 May 1923, Besant MSS.
184 Peel to Reading, 28 Mar. 1923, R6.
185 Peel to Reading, 17 May 1923, R6.
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roll.186 Peel fried to persuade the Viceroy that the settlement embodied in the 
White Paper of 25 July was not a bad one. 187 A month later he seemed to 
realise that this was not how the White Paper was received in India and excused 
himself by arguing that,
I agree that the Kenya settlement was not satisfactory; at the same time 
I do not think we could have done better. People here would not hear 
of any settlement which gave control of a British colony to Indians, nor 
were they much impressed by the demand for equality from Indians, 
worshippers of inequality in their own country. Nor again with 
communal representation in India, were they much impressed by the 
necessity of a common franchise in India...Public opinion would never 
tolerate here the control of two and a half million of Africans by the 
thirty thousand Indians. Indeed the Indians are so much disliked and 
despised by the Africans that grave disturbance would result.188
The essence of the settlement had been the idea that African interests should be 
paramount and that Indian demands would have to be tempered with that in view. The 
Indian delegates were furious, knowing that they had been to some extent hoist with 
their own petard, as they had gone along with the native paramountcy argument in 
order to win as wide an element of support in London as possible. Sastri welcomed 
the proclamation of native paramountcy but stated that he felt that ’the Indian had 
been cruelly betrayed’189 Sastri praised the support of the Labour Party in 
Britain, but felt that the British Liberal Party had fallen down on this issue and shown
186 The Government of India and the India Office seem to have differed over the question of 
communal representation. Reading was firmly against the use of communal representation and felt that 
its use in the Indian context did not form a precedent as ’we reluctantly accepted communal 
representation in India at the request of the minority communities, but experience is already tending to 
indicate that the svstem is leading to the very dangers which we have emphasised above ’[i.e. that it 
tended to harden divisions between the communities]. V (Dept, of Education, Health & Lands) to S/S, 
ptel. 583, 16 July 1923, R\2. Indian Liberals on the deputation noticed, however, that the India Office 
disagreed on this issue with the Government of India and felt that the common roll would be 
unworkable in practice. See B.S. Kamat speech to Deccan Sabha, 18 Aug. 1923, Annual Report of the 
Deccan Sabha, 1923-24, GIPE.
187 Peel to Reading, 25 July 1923, R6.
188 Peel to Reading, 24 Aug. 1923, R6.
189 Gregory, India and East Africa, p. 250. See also Sastri to Besant, 26 July 1923, Besant MSS.
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itself demoralised.190 Sir Ali Imam saw the decision as a throwing overboard of 
the Moderate Party of India.191 No other issue had so disillusioned Indian 
Liberals in the good intentions of the British Empire: the lesson that the British 
Government was ultimately moved more by threats of force and considerations of 
’kith and kin’ than by universal moral imperatives was one that totally undermined 
previous Liberal convictions. Sastri wrote dejectedly that ’in this supreme hour of 
trial, party divisions make no appeal to me.’192
In India the Kenya decision had the effect of bringing the various political 
groupings closer together than they had been since the Congress split of 1918. 
Moderates joined with representatives of other political persuasion, including non-co- 
operators, in a meeting in Bombay to protest the Kenya decision and pressed for 
various forms of retaliatory measures to be taken by India, including a boycott of the 
1924 Imperial Exhibition at Wembley.193 The meeting comprised a number of 
organisations: the Bombay Presidency Association, the Bombay Provincial Congress 
Committee, the Indian Merchants Chamber, the Imperial Indian Citizenship 
Association, the British Indian Colonial Merchants Association, the Indian Progressive 
Association, and the National Home Rule League. Significantly, the local Liberal 
organization, the Western Indian National Liberal Association, was not included, 
apparently because some of the Bombay Liberals, notably Wacha and Samarth, did 
not seem to find the Kenya decision objectionable.194
Sastri, who felt he had been personally slighted by Winterton at the India 
Office when leaving England, was particularly devastated by what had happened and
190 Sastri to Besant, 1 Aug. 1923, Besant MSS.
191 Gregory, India and East Africa, p. 250.
192 Sastri to Besant, 1 Aug. 1923, Besant MSS. Indeed Sastri was rather disgusted with the failure
of some of his Liberal colleagues to protest effectively over the Kenya decision. He clearly expected, 
for example, that Sarma would resign.
193 See P. Thakurdas to Sapru, 21 Sept. 1923 and enclosures., SAP, 2nd. series.
194 D.G. Dalvi to Sapru, 17 Sept. 1923, SAPID6. See also G.S. Bajpai to Sastri, 2 Sept. 1923,
Sastri MSS, NMML.
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in a series of articles and speeches he gave vent to his disillusion with the imperial 
ideal:
The Kenya settlement is a grave National humiliation. It shakes the 
foundations of our public life. Party interests and party shibboleths now 
seem irrelevant as well as a heavy handicap. I am happy to believe that 
the members of the Servants of India Society are unanimous in their 
desire , while remaining true to their creed and that of its Founder, to 
co-operate with men and women of all parties in the country in trying 
in trying to get their grievous wrong righted and in the speedy 
achievement of swaraj, which is the sovereign need of the hour.195
The Imperial Conference of 1923
The Kenya White Paper was published shortly after the arrival in England of 
Sapru as his country’s representative (along with Alwar) to the Imperial Conference of 
1923. Sastri advised Sapru to return home in protest against the Kenya decision. In 
fact Sapru was inundated with advice from Liberal colleagues in India, some agreeing 
with Sastri that Sapru should withdraw immediately from the Conference. It must 
have been tempting to follow this advice as there was apparently little to be gained at 
the Conference, India was expected to figure hardly at all on the agenda, whilst there 
was much to be lost, especially with elections coming up in India. D.G. Dalvi, 
Secretary of the Bombay Presidency Association, having explained why the Bombay
195 ’Message to the Nation’, Servant o f India, 13 Sept. 1923, supplement, cited in Gregory, India 
and East Africa, p. 254. See Tinker, Separate and Unequal, p. 69 for details of the incident at the India 
Office.
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Conference had decided against recommending Sapru’s immediate withdrawal, gave 
advice that was more suited to Sapru’s way of thinking:
No right-minded person wants a theatrical demonstration or hysterical 
action on your part. But surely, if the Imperial Conference endorses this 
decision [on Kenya] directly or indirectly or denies you any real 
opportunity to raise it for discussion then it is expected of you not to 
take part in the further stages of the Conference.196
Sapru, as a gradualist and constitutionalist, was temperamentally against 
boycotting the Conference. He felt that the principle of Indian equality within the 
Empire needed restating in Conference and he would stay and fight to see the issue 
discussed so that at least Indians would know where they stood. Sapru told Reading 
of his plan to make sure that pious resolutions were this time turned into hard 
practice; he would get the Imperial Conference ’to ask each Dominion into whose ken 
the Indian problem comes to appoint a Commission of Enquiry, upon which 
Commission India should be represented, to investigate and report upon the practical 
steps that can be taken to implement the Resolution of 1921’.197
The situation in England was not propitious to the success of Sapru’s efforts as 
he was later to report to the Viceroy in an important summary of his mission, written 
on board ship returning to India:
When I arrived In England early in July it was at once obvious to me 
that the general political atmosphere was unfavourable to India. The 
Conservative Government was occupied with the problems of 
Reparations, the Ruhr and Unemployment. It had neither the leisure nor 
the inclination to concern itself much with India. But more formidable 
than the attitude of the Government was the attitude of the small section 
of the British public which takes real interest in Indian questions.
Thanks largely as it seemed to me, to the fatal boycott of the Prince of 
Wales which had come as a severe shock to British opinion, the forces
196 D.G. Dalvi to Sapru, 17 Sept. 1923, SAP!D6. [emphasis as in original].
197 Sapru to Reading, 10 Oct. 1923, SAP/R219, 2nd. series.
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of reaetion held the field.198
Sapru felt that a new approach was needed, that of responsible and quiet 
diplomacy. He canvassed all elements of opinion in Britain; the press through A.P. 
Penman of Reuters, F.H. Brown of the Times and Stanley Reed; the India and 
Colonial Offices through Rushbrook Williams and Lionel Curtis; and political circles 
in England through H.S.L. Polak and Edwin Montagu. One of Sapru’s initial 
difficulties was with Peel at the India Office. Peel seemed wary of Sapru as a 
non-official and perhaps felt that he had his fingers burnt once already in his dealings 
with Sastri. Peel also could not understand how Indians like Sapru put the principle of 
equality within the Empire above all the political realities of the situation. ’Whatever 
the subject may be’, Peel complained to the Viceroy,’ Sapru always discusses it with 
reference to this particular question...In fact Sapru is so full of this particular subject 
that, to speak quite frankly, he is perfectly useless to me at the Conference.’199 
Peel apparently envisaged ignoring Sapru and Alwar and putting the Indian case 
himself.200 Sapru philosophically blamed his poor relations with Peel on ’the 
traditional dislike of the British people for abstract principles; and their inability to 
understand that, in certain circumstances, their favourite device of a compromise 
would appear as a gross injustice in the eyes of a people more logical if less 
politically experienced than themselves.’201 After a time, however, relations 
between the two men thawed- things being much eased by Sapru’s recognition that 
Peel was in charge of the presentation of the Indian case. Peel, although very 
conservative on Indian affairs and really rather ignorant of current Indian political 
realities, saw himself as honour-bound to make the best of the Indian case, whilst not
198 Sapru to Reading, Nov. 1923, [summary of his mission to England, written on board ship 
returning to India] SAP/R223, 2nd series.
199 Peel to Reading, 10 Oct. 1923, R6.
200 Idem.
201 Sapru to Reading, Nov 1923, SAP/ R223.
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ignoring that e f  the Colonial office and Kenyan settlers. Tinker puts the position 
admirably: ’Whereas Sastri had fought his battles in 1921 with the unstinted support 
of Montagu, Sapru had to stand alone; Peel assumed the role of umpire or linesman, 
while the Maharajah of Alwar pursued his own whimsical unpredictable way’.202
What Sapru desperately needed for India and also for his own political position 
at home was some concrete indication that the Kenya decision would be re-opened and 
secondly that the Dominions were prepared to examine the question of Indians in their 
own territories alongside of Government of India representatives. At times Sapru 
threatened resignation to achieve his objectives but mostly he worked by patient 
diplomacy. By the time the Indian question was taken up by the Conference at the end 
of October Sapru was assured that the issue would be given a good hearing. In fact, 
as Tinker points out, Indian affairs took up nearly half the time of the formal 
conference.203 Sapru himself made a speech of one and three-quarter hours 
duration. ’Do not forget’ he told the delegates’ that my country, India, is the one 
country that makes the British Empire truly Imperial.’204
Once again the fly in the ointment was Smuts who went on to the offensive and 
actually wanted the 1921 Conference resolution overturned and the principle of 
inequality within the empire established. The veneer of idealism which Smuts had 
presented in the aftermath of the Great War had now been stripped aside, revealing 
the political insecurity of his domestic political situation. Sapru was stung by some 
words of Smuts’ which he took to be an insult to his government and protested 
through the English newspapers 205 In return Smuts took umbrage, particularly as 
Sapru was not even an official member of the Government of India. Peel actually
202 Tinker, Separate and Unequal, p. 71.
203 Idem.
204 Tinker, Separate and Unequal, p. 72.
205 Smuts* message for Reuters, 15 Nov. 1923, protesting at Sapru’s attack on him in the Daily 
Express, 14 Nov. 1923. Enclosure to Peel to Reading, 28 Nov. 1923, R6.
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apologised in a  private letter to Smuts and argued that Sapru should have known 
better.206 In the end the traditional British compromise was reached by allowing 
both sides to issue communiques restating their own positions whilst not attempting to 
formally reconcile them.207 The Colonial Office, whilst attempting to shut the 
door on the Kenya issue, left it slightly ajar by agreeing to confer on the subject of 
Indians in the colonies with a committee appointed by the Government of India. As 
Tinker argues this was Sapru’s ’sole tangible gain’. Reporting back to Reading, 
however, Sapru put a much stronger gloss on his achievements:
It seems to me in the first place that we have secured a most valuable 
endorsement of the 1921 Resolution. Next, we have again isolated 
South Africa. Thirdly, we have reopened the Kenya question, and given 
hope to many thousands of Indians that justice may in the end prevail.
Fourthly, we have provided a scheme for machinery which, rightly 
employed, will go far in the future to secure the proper investigation 
and the due remedy of the grievances under which Indians labour, 
whether in the colonies or in the Dominions. Fifthly, we have gained an 
unequivocal expression of good-will towards Indian aspirations from the 
other members of the British Commonwealth.208
Returning to India, Sapru had the difficult task of persuading fellow Liberals 
assembled for their annual conference that co-operation and not boycott was the 
proper policy to pursue with regard to the question of Indians overseas. Sapru 
presided over the Conference and found himself disagreeing with Sastri who moved a 
motion in the Subjects calling for a retaliatory boycott of British goods. The resolution 
was passed but later withdrawn to maintain party unity.209 Resolutions were 
passed thanking, Sapru, Sastri, B.S. Kamat, J.Dwarkadas, C.F. Andrews and H.S.L. 
Polak for their work on behalf of Indians in Kenya. A resolution was also passed
206 Peel to Smuts 20 Nov. 1923, enclosure to Peel to Reading, 28 Nov. 1923, R6.
307 Tinker, Separate and Unequal, p. 74.
208 Sapru to Reading, Nov. 1923, SAPIK123, 2nd. series.
209 Gregory, India and East Africa, pp. 254-55.
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deploring the Kenya decision of July 1922 and calling on the Government of India to 
bring pressure on the Colonial Office to rectify the Kenya Immigration Bill which was 
currently being discussed in London. Finally, the Conference called for retaliatory 
measures to be taken against South Africa for its racial discrimination against Indians 
and suggested that these measures include a prohibitive import duty on South African 
coal.210
Conclusion
In view of the Indian election results and now the treatment Indians had 
received over the Kenya issue, 1923 had been a thoroughly depressing year for the 
Indian Liberal Party. Its faith in constitutional methods, in negotiation rather than 
direct action, and its belief in the potential for good of the British Empire had all been 
severely shaken. The political atmosphere in England had changed for the worse and, 
as the Gandhian movement of non-co-operation disintegrated, the British saw less 
value in bolstering the Moderates. The electoral defeat of the Indian Liberals only 
emphasized that as a political party they were a spent force. As individual leaders they 
could still provide valuable service, but even that role was double-edged as Sastri’s 
attacks on the Empire seemed to show. Just as Govindaraghava Iyer predicted, it was 
the issue of Indians in the Empire that provided the rock on which the ship of 
British-Indian Moderate co-operation finally foundered. 211
2,0 See L/P&J/6, vol. 1898.
211 L.A.G. Iyer speaking at N.L.F. Conference, Dec. 1920, cited in Mehrotra, India and the 
Commonwealth, p. 159.
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CHAPTER V I: THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS
Liberals were appointed to key ministerial positions in three Indian provinces, 
Bengal, Bombay and the United Provinces. Working the reforms at the provincial 
level provided the true test of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms as this was the level 
at which power had been clearly devolved to Indian representatives. The experience of 
Liberal Ministers proved to be different in each of the provinces. The differences 
resulted partly from the nature of the various provincial Governors, as the Governors 
had wide powers to interpret their instructions for operating the reforms according to 
their own views. However, the very different nature of politics in each of the 
provinces was also an important factor in varying the Ministers’ experience in office, 
and each provincial section of this chapter is prefaced by a short introduction to the 
province and its politics.
1. Bengal: Community Politics
The nature of politics in Bengal derived essentially from Bengali responses to 
the long-standing and patently exploitative nature of the imperial relationship with the 
region. Bengal was the point of entry for British rule in India and Calcutta was the 
capital of the Raj until 1912. The region was the economic powerhouse not only of 
the Raj, but of the entire British Empire. The port of Calcutta was the natural outlet 
for tea, jute, coal and indigo and the major entry point for cloth, sugar, salt and other 
British manufactures. In 1914 one half of the capital invested in Indian industries was 
invested by companies with headquarters in Calcutta. Bengalis, unlike their 
counterparts in Bombay, played little part in this investment, 80% of which came 
from Britain. British managing agencies had a stranglehold on Calcutta industries,
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banking and import-export houses. There was a large European community in 
Calcutta, 13,000 in all, ’one of the largest and most exclusive European societies in 
the East’,as John Broomfield describes it.1 This racial divide was to be another 
very important factor in Bengal politics. Even physically, Calcutta was divided, with 
Europeans living in neatly defined streets in the fashionable south of the city whilst 
Indians lived in the crowded and jumbled areas of the north.2 The European 
community was powerfully entrenched both in Municipal politics and in the provincial 
legislature. Rajat Ray comments of Calcutta that ’In no other city of India was the 
relationship between the white rulers and their subjects so tinged with racism.’3
British dominance and the resentment it caused amongst the western-educated 
Bengalis was a key factor in Bengal’s leading role in the nationalist movement. Bengal 
was where Indian nationalism had its political foundations. The Indian National 
Congress can be said to have arisen out of the racial conflict in Calcutta and the 
advanced political ideas of Bengal. It was the backlash of the European community in 
Bengal, angered at the provisions in the Ilbert Bill (1883) for Indian judges to try 
criminal cases in the mofiissil involving Europeans that led Indians to organize 
themselves on a national basis. It was Bengal too that provided the issue which 
brought Indian nationalism nearest to the masses; this was the agitation over Curzon’s 
decision to partition the province of Bengal in 1905. It was generally felt that one of 
Curzon’s main motives was to undermine the powerful Bengali middle-class 
politicians, and indeed, even when the partition was revoked, the British balanced this 
by moving the capital from Calcutta to Delhi in 1912 in an attempt to thwart Bengali 
political ambitions. The rising nationalist movement had forced Britons to respond by
1 Broomfield, Elite Conflict, p.3. I gratefully acknowledge my debt to Dr. Broomfield for many of 
the ideas in this section on Bengal, particularly for his emphasis upon bhadralok politics. For emphasis 
upon the racial divide in Bengal I acknowledge my debt to Dr R.K. Ray, Social Conflict and Political 
Unrest in Bengal, 1875-1927, and Urban Roots o f Indian Nationalism, Delhi, 1979.
2 R. Ray, Urban Roots, pp. 4-5.
3 Ibid., p. 231.
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defending their privileged position by playing on the many divisions within Bengali 
society, divisions which they themselves exacerbated. The most important of these 
divisions in relation to nationalist politics was that between the educated elite, the 
bhadralok or respectable classes as they were known, and the rest of Bengali 
society.4 Paralleling this division to some extent was the Hindu-Muslim divide 
which was so pronounced in Bengal.
The peculiarity of the bhadralok elite was the narrowness of its social base. It 
was predominantly high caste and western-educated. It probably didn’t number more 
than 5 % of the Bengal population but it was peculiarly cut off from the rest of the 
population. Although many bhadralok owned pieces of land, most were absentee 
landowners and now made their living in the professions, law, journalism and 
education. There was a wide gap between the Calcutta bhadralok who looked down on 
any form of manual labour as beneath them, and the majority of the population, 
Muslims and low-caste Hindus. In many respects the isolation of the bhadralok 
resulted from the impact of colonial rule, as in Bengal the outlet of trade and industry 
was effectively barred to Indians. In any case, the separateness of the bhadralok and 
their precarious and declining economic position made them insecure. Land rents were 
falling, whilst the professions were becoming more and more competitive as other 
provinces took steps to stop the flood of Bengalis into their administrations. The First 
World War saw new provinces rise in political importance to challenge Bengali 
dominance, e.g. the United Provinces and Gujarat, Gandhi’s base. The leadership role 
of Bengal and the leadership of the bhadralok within Bengal was under pressure and 
in a state, some historians have argued, of terminal decline.5
Gandhi almost epitomised this challenge to the Bengali Hindu predominance;
4 For further discussion of the bhadralok, see Broomfield, Elite Conflict, pp. 5-20.
5 J. Gallagher ’Congress in Decline: Bengal, 1930-1939’, Modern Asian Studies, 1, 3 (1973), pp. 
589-645.
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not only was he seen as presenting an alternative, all-India leadership, but also a very 
different cultural outlook. Gandhi’s quietist beliefs did not find ready acceptance 
amongst the majority of Bengalis; many of the bhadralok could sympathise with the 
Vaishnavite world-view and the concept of ahimsa but amongst the Hindu masses, 
Saivite cults like that of the Goddess Kali had more influence.6 It was significant 
that it was the Bengali leader, C.R. Das, who most effectively held out against 
Gandhian non-co-operation until his volte-face at Calcutta in December 1920. But 
Bengal was not converted, it merely swam with the Gandhian tide because it had no 
choice. Its support was temporary and conditional, and Bengalis like Das were the 
prime movers in the Swaraj Party, which after 1923 took Congressmen into the 
legislative council, if only to obstruct. Bengali politicians were back in their element, 
the politics of power. But the Government was prepared to use all the forces at their 
command to meet the Bengali nationalist challenge- they turned to the European 
community and to the Muslims to counterbalance the bhadralok. The result was the 
increasing communalisation of Bengal politics.
The fact that it was the Hindus who predominated in landholding and in 
moneylending whilst the Muslims were predominantly poor and illiterate was 
significant for communal relations in Bengal, which had a propensity to turn violent 
on occasion. By the end of the nineteenth century most of the land in Bengal was 
owned by Hindus. Thus, despite being numerically preponderant in East Bengal, 
Muslims were economically backward. Muslims also fell behind in government 
service and the professions. The British displaced a number of Muslim administrators 
and later in 1837 their introduction of English rather than Persian as the language of 
administration dealt Muslims another blow. Muslims were slow to take up English 
education and they suffered in the professions consequently. In fact, the British belief,
6 For the Bengali response to Gandhi see Broomfield, Elite Conflict, pp. 146-51.
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in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, that Muslims were suffering 
under their rule was very much based on the backwardness of Muslims in Bengal. The 
potential for Hindu-Muslim tension was a key factor in later Bengali politics. The fact 
that the British position in Bengal came to depend on their manipulation of the 
communal divisions worsened the situation.
The New Councils
The decision taken at the Calcutta Congress in September 1920 to boycott 
British institutions and to place the professional classes at the forefront of that boycott 
ran almost entirely counter to bhadralok politics. The bhadralok had come to 
predominance through using British institutions, schools, universities, law courts etc., 
not by boycotting them. The acceptance of non-co-operation marked a reluctant 
swimming with the tide for Bengal’s politicians. There was a strong suspicion that 
Gandhi, if given enough rope, might hang himself. For the time being, however, the 
Extremist Bengali politicians were not to be outdone in the sacrifices that they made; 
C.R. Das set the example by abandoning his lucrative legal practice. The most 
immediate effect of non-co-operation, however, was the boycott of the new Legislative 
Councils. Apart from a few ’joke’ candidates, put up to ridicule the reforms, there 
was a total Congress boycott of the elections.7 It has been argued that the decision 
to support the Gandhian boycott of the Councils was influenced by the belief, 
especially in the Presidencies, that the Councils were so weighted in favour of 
communal interests and nominated supporters of Government that Congress would 
have no chance of taking power in the new councils.8 Certainly this would have 
been a sound calculation to make in regard to the Bengal Legislative Assembly where
7 Broomfield, Elite Conflict, p 175, n.13; see also confidential note from H.E.A. Cotton to 
Lytton, 18 March 1923, L36.
8 Gordon, ’Non-cooperation and Council Entry, 1919-1920’, pp. 443-73.
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the electoral system was weighted in favour of special interests and against the 
urban-based Hindu groups.9 As Lord Lytton later admitted, the Government 
always held the ’dummy hand’ of up to 26 nominated and official votes, and in a 
three-cornered contest between the Muslims, the Hindus and the European community 
it could use this bloc of votes in combination with any other substantial Indian group 
to win the majority.10
Of the 56 elected Hindu seats in the new Council, Indian Liberals took 27 and 
were considered to form the largest single political party. Accordingly, the Governor, 
Ronaldshay, called upon 2 Liberals, Surendranath Baneijea and Provas Chunder 
Mitter, to take up two of the Ministerial posts. Baneijea, as the elder statesmen, was 
offered first choice of portfolios and opted for Local Self-Government and Education. 
Ronaldshay advised him that it was impossible to combine these two departments and 
so it was agreed that Mitter, Baneijea’s preferred choice, should become Minister in 
charge of Education and Public Health.11 The third Minister was chosen less for 
his intrinsic abilities than for his out-spoken hostility to non-co-operation and power to 
pull in the Muslim vote in the Legislature; he was Nawab Ali Chaudhuri, a Muslim 
communalist from East Bengal.12 If Ronaldshay had wanted a party cabinet he 
could have chosen one of the Muslim members of the Liberal Party, such as Dr. 
Abdulla Suhrawardy, who had served as a nominated member on the Franchise
9 See Ray, Social Conflict, pp. 237-8; Broomfield, Elite Conflict, pp. 102-4.
10 Lytton to Peel, 14 Dec. 1923, L10. Table 2 [p. 260 below] shows how this operated in practice 
in the Legislative Council of 1921-23.
" S.N. Baneijea, A Nation in the Making, Bombay, 1963 (1925), p. 313. Mitter was Secretary of 
the National Liberal League and recommended himself to Ronaldshay by his courage in sitting on the 
Hunter Committee investigating the events in the Punjab in 1919. Broomfield, Elite Conflict, p. 173.
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However, the choice of Chaudhuri was more sensible in view of the need to satisfy 
mofussil needs and to keep the support of the traditionalists who formed the majority 
of Muslim members. As it turned out, the three Ministers had no difficulty working 
together.13 Nor, apparently, did they have any difficulty in working with the
13 Baneijea, Nation, p. 314.
Executive Councillors.14
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Ronaldshay and the New Ministers
Ronaldshay, along with other Governors, received a set of instructions on the 
implementation of the new reforms. These were a masterly balance between the 
traditional British goals of good government and the new goals of providing a training 
in democracy. Article III enjoined him ’as far as may be possible’ to keep the 
responsibility for reserved and transferred subjects clear and distinct. Article IV on 
the other hand, instructed him to
...encourage the habit of joint deliberation between yourself, your 
Councillors and your Ministers, in order that the experience of your 
official advisers may be at the disposal of your Ministers, and that the 
knowledge of your Ministers as to the wishes of the people may be at 
the disposal of your Councillors.15
Ronaldshay, in his last year as Governor, carried out these instructions faithfully, 
holding joint meetings to discuss all important matters but making it perfectly clear 
where the final decision lay.
The first problem which confronted the new Government when it met on 11 
January 1921 was how to cope with a projected budget deficit of more than 2 crores 
of rupees. Bengal, along with the rest of India, faced the economic problems 
associated with the First World War and its aftermath: there had been a marked 
increase of prices, but poor harvests and a world-wide economic slump had hit trade 
badly. Bengal was in a particularly difficult position because of the fixed nature of its 
land revenue under the Permanent Settlement; it was therefore very dependent on the 
income from the duties on its trade in jute, coal and tea, and also on income tax. 
Under the so-called Meston arrangement, whereby revenue heads were divided
14 Baneijea, Nation, p. 356. The Executive Councillors were: Sir H. Wheeler (Appointment, 
Political & Police); the Maharaja of Burdwan (Revenue & Irrigation); J.H. Kerr (Finance Commerce & 
Marine); Sir A. Rahim (Judicial, Jails).
15 India in 1920, Appendix IV, pp. 252-3. More explicit instructions as to when joint meetings 
were to be held were contained in the Devolution Rules and the Rules of Executive Business under 
Section 49 (2) of the Government of India Act (1919). See Government of Bengal, Report on the 
Working o f the Reformed Constitution in Bengal 1921 to 1927, Calcutta, 1929, p. 42.
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between the centre and the provinces, Bengal felt that it had been particularly hard 
done by. Customs duties, which had been one of the major sources of revenue in 
Bengal, became a Government of India asset and Bengalis complained loudly that they 
saw none of the profits of their export trades, such as the jute trade. All of the 
provinces had to make up the deficit in the Government of India’s finances by annual 
contributions, but Bengal felt that its contribution, though not large relative to other 
provinces, would be particularly difficult to pay in view of the inelasticity of the 
provincial revenues in Bengal.16
The prospect for the new Ministers was fairly dismal, in that they would either 
have to raise taxation (and immediately antagonise important interests) or cut back on 
spending programmes which would make it impossible to carry out the constructive 
programmes that they had set their hearts on and ultimately by which they would be 
judged. There was talk of resignation, but Kerr, the Finance Member, persuaded them 
to desist, on the grounds that they could fall back on savings for the first year and 
meanwhile try to get the Meston settlement overturned.17
The debates in the Legislature on the Budget revealed the basic problem for the 
Liberal Ministers, for whilst they could secure support on the matter of protesting the 
Meston settlement they were buffeted by totally unacceptable suggestions about the 
best way to make financial savings. These latter included reducing the number of 
Executive Councillors and, more embarrassingly, reducing the Ministers’ salaries. The 
Ministers obviously felt a degree of guilt in using the official bloc to protect what 
were after all generous salaries by Indian standards.18
It was Ronaldshay and not the Ministers who took the initiative in trying to 
avoid this situation in the future by organising supporters in the Council. He had been 
perturbed at the lack of party organisation, which he blamed either on the lethargy of 
the Moderates or the fear of social boycott and the prevalence of personal rivalries in 
the legislature.19 Satish Ranjan Das, a Liberal, and Standing-Council to the
16 Broomfield, Elite Conflict, pp. 177-8. See also Government of Bengal, Reformed Constitution, 
ch. iv, especially Appendix, P.C. Mitter’s ’Note on the Financial position in Bengal’, pp. 96-7.
17 Ronaldshay to Montagu, 17 Feb. 1921, M32.
18 Baneijea devotes quite a long section to defending the salaries on the grounds that they 
maintained an equality with the Executive Councillors; Nation, pp. 359-61.
19 Ronaldshay to King George V, 1 June 1921, RON4; Broomfield, Elite Conflict, pp. 179-81.
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Government, was asked to act as a ministerial whip. The new arrangement was made 
too late to save the police budget from being rejected by the Council in March 1921 
by 51 votes to 42. There were a group of up to 30 Hindu members who might be 
classed as Extremist and who could use the unpopularity of the police in Bengal as a 
weapon to attack the Government. They were joined by a number of the Muslim 
members and some of the Liberals .20 Ronaldshay handled the situation with 
great tact and diplomacy. He recognised that an immediate certification of the police 
funds would be a damaging blow to the amour propre of the Councillors and probably 
drive them to further obstruction. Through a series of questions planted through S.R. 
Das, the Government was able to stress the gravity of the situation that arose from the 
Council’s action and to adjourn to allow members to consider the full implications. 
This and Government lobbying were enough to secure a supplementary grant and to 
avoid certification.21
In September 1921 a deputation from the Bengal Legislative Council went to 
see the Viceroy to put their case about the financial plight of Bengal. Reading was 
faced with economic difficulties on all sides; he was trying to reduce expenditure but 
the main savings could only be made in the British Army in India and this was being 
resisted by the War Office. He was also aware that any attempt to raise revenue by 
increasing import duties would be resented by British industry that was going through 
post-war recession. Reading agreed to remit the Bengal contribution central funds for 
three years. This was something that no other province received but it still 
necessitated going to the Assembly for an additional Rs 1.5 crores in taxes.22 
Ronaldshay determined that retrenchments would have to be offered primarily in the 
Reserved Departments, and that cuts in the Transferred Departments could be restored 
if the Legislative Council agreed to additional taxes. 23
At last the Ministers began to organise support in the legislature so that they 
could ensure the finances necessary from improvements in the transferred
30 Reforms Enquiry Committee [Muddiman Report], Reports of Local Governments on the 
Working of the Reforms, Cmd. 2361, 1925, Report of Bengal Government, p. 117.
21 Zetland, 2nd. Marquess of, Essayez, London , 1956, pp. 140-3, cited in Broomfield, Elite 
Conflict, pp. 181-3—
22 Ronaldshay to Montagu, 18 Sept. 1921, A/32.
23 Ronaldshay to Montagu, 19 Oct. 1921, A/32.
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subjects.24 According to the Government, fear of non-co-operation and agrarian 
unrest also caused property owners to lean more heavily towards the Government, and 
a fairly compact Moderate party, with party whips and a Constitutional Club, was 
established.25 This provided a shaky basis for supporting the Ministers, though, as 
Broomfield argues, many members were not prepared to give their backing on a 
formal party basis as they feared loss of support outside the legislature.26
Indeed, one of the major problems for Ministers was that their concentration 
on working the reforms left them more and more isolated from public opinion, which 
was becoming more, aroused every day by the patriotism of non-co-operation. It would 
take some time before the Ministers’ labours in the Legislative Council bore practical 
fruit. Meanwhile they were castigated in the popular press as ’yes-men’; while the 
Ministers collected their fat salaries, Congress politicians, it was noted, were 
sacrificing livelihoods for their nationalist ideals. Incidents like that at Chandpur in 
1921, when tea labourers in Assam suffered as pawns in the struggle between 
Government and non-co-operators, seemed to reflect badly on the Ministers who, it 
was claimed, stood idly by.27
The identification of Ministers with Government was at its most acute over the 
issue of the maintenance of law and order, which, of course, remained a reserved 
subject, and therefore the responsibility of the Executive Councillors. However 
Ronaldshay liked to try and take his Ministers with him on these important matters 
and therefore involved them in discussions. In November 1921 there was an increase 
of conflict in Bengal arising from the visit of the Prince of Wales and the Khilafat 
issue. Ronaldshay decided to proclaim the volunteer corps illegal and forbade the 
holding of meetings and the organising of processions without a licence.28 He 
then held a number of joint meetings of his Government to discuss further measures 
such as the application of the Seditious Meetings Act to the mill area districts and 
Chittagong, the areas which were most affected, and the issue of extemment orders
24 Reforms Enquiry Committee, Cmd. 2361, 1925, pp. 119-20.
25 Idem; Broomfield, Elite Conflict, pp. 183-4.
26 Broomfield, Elite Conflict, p. 184.
27 See Broomfield, Elite Conflict, pp. 184, 214-19; Baneijea, Nation, p. 348, in which Baneijea 
defends himself from the charge.
28 Ronaldshay Diary, entry for 22 Nov. 1921, RON2.
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against a number of non-Bengali agitators who were felt to be responsible for the 
disorder. One of the Executive Councillors, Sir Abdur Rahim, opposed the measures 
and he was joined by the Ministers, who wanted to see the ordinary law tried first. 
Ronaldshay spent a week trying in vain to persuade Rahim and the Ministers before 
he took matters into his own hands and applied to Delhi for permission to apply the 
Seditious Meetings Act to Howrah. He decided not to press for the extemments. 
Sterner measures were taken under the law against law-breaking non-co-operators and 
some newspapers. Action was also taken to mobilise Europeans and Indians as special 
constables and through an zntx-hartal committee to persuade shop-keepers and others 
to stay open. Ronaldshay commented optimistically that T think our rapid and drastic 
measures have rattled these non-co-operators.,29 In fact the disorders intensified 
as the date of the Prince of Wales’ visit to Calcutta approached. After being advised 
by his Chief of Police that the situation was in danger of getting out of hand, 
Ronaldshay consulted separately the Viceroy, the Bengal Executive Council, and 
Ministers (but not Baneijea who was ’out of town’) and got their agreement to arrest 
the ringleaders, including C.R. Das and A.K.Azad.30
These arrests were merely the tip of the iceberg and other arrests followed 
sometimes over 200 a day, mostly millhands.31 Two things are clear from this 
account. Firstly, that the Government was keen to involve Ministers in discussions 
and decisions on matters of law and order. It was very difficult for the Ministers, 
therefore, however much they disliked these repressive measures, to avoid being 
implicated with them in the public eye. Even where they disagreed with the measures 
in such discussions they felt that they could not speak out publicly.32 Secondly, it 
does appear that the Ministers had some influence in modifying Government policy. 
As D.A. Low has argued, the Government of India was increasingly having to play 
for the middle ground and look to moderate opinion.33 From the point of view 
of the Bengal Ministers the situation relating to repression was worsened by the fact
29 Ibid., entry for 4 Dec. 1921.
30 Ibid., entry 11 Nov. 1921.
31 Ibid., entry 20 Dec. 1921. The political context of these events is dealt with on p. 146 ff.,
above. Further details on the disturbances may be found in Ray , Social Conflict, pp. 270-310.
32 Bengal Legislative Council Proceedings, 19 Dec. 1921, vol. vi, pp. 1-53, cited in Broomfield, 
Elite Conflict, p. 186.
33 Low, ’First non-co-operation movement’, pp. 320-3.
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that Ronaldshay*& successor, Lord Lytton, pursued a policy of joint deliberation rather 
than joint consultation, so that there could be no hiding place in future for the 
Ministers. Their dilemma was that they needed to be involved in deliberations if they 
were to influence policy, but the very process meant that public opinion saw the two 
halves of Government as one, and made no distinction regarding responsibility for 
repressive legislation.
Lord Lytton
The new Governor, Lord Lytton, was the son of a famous Viceroy and had 
been serving as Montagu’s Under Secretary of State at the India Office. Broomfield 
has described him as a ’man with a mission’, but he might be better described as a 
’man with someone else’s mission.’34 Lytton was reluctant to come to India and 
interrupt a promising political career for the dubious honour of governing the most 
difficult province in British India. It was only Montagu’s persuasiveness that won him 
over, and, even when he accepted the post, he seemed to be looking for routes to 
make an early exit.35 Montagu had perceived how difficult it was to find men as 
governors who would faithfully carry out the intentions of the reforms 
enthusiastically. Lytton, however, perfectly reflected Montagu’s belief that what was 
needed now was a touch of political imagination combined with racial goodwill. As 
Broomfield says, ’he had a clear vision of what the task involved: the preparation of 
Bengal for a further transfer of power by the development of the parliamentary 
system, and the provision of opportunities for Indians to influence all the decisions of 
Government.’36 There is little doubt that Lytton reflected Montagu’s preference 
for running the Provincial Governments as unified bodies, although, ironically, as 
Lytton arrived in India he found his old chief had resigned his office.37
Lytton admitted that, strictly speaking, dyarchy would mean separate meetings 
of the two halves of government but,
34 Broomfield, Elite Conflict, ch. 1.
35 See correspondence in L6.
36 Broomfield, Elite Conflict, p. 187.
37 Montagu to Lytton, 30 Sept. 1922, L25; note also Montagu’s tolerance of Willingdon’s joint 
deliberation approach, Montagu to Willingdon, 14 April 1921, W4.
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I myself have always adopted a different policy. I do not like the 
principle of dyarchy and I have tried as much as possible to treat my 
Government as a whole. I discuss all questions of general policy at joint 
meetings of both halves of Government, and though, while the present 
system lasts, actual responsibility for a decision must rest with the half 
of Government concerned with any particular matter, I always hear the 
opinions of both sides before coming to a decision. As a matter of fact 
whenever there has been any difference of opinion it has never been a 
clear-cut difference between Ministers on the one hand and Members of 
Council on the other. Acting on this principle, I have urged my 
Government to adopt a united front in the Legislative Council and have 
advised Ministers to support Members of the Executive Council in a 
debate on a reserved subject and Members of Council to support the 
Ministers in a debate on a transferred subject. I believe this policy is 
more in accordance with Indian opinion than the strict adherence to the 
principle of dyarchy.38
Reflecting on the working of the Council towards the end of its term of office, 
Lytton felt that Ministers had generally accepted this ’obligation’ and ’have loyally 
and effectively acted up to it. In matters like the taxation Bills, demands for grants, 
resolutions regarding law and order, release of political prisoners etc., they have 
called meetings of their followers and secured majorities for the Government 
policy.39
The advantages to the Government of this process of joint deliberation were 
obvious: Ministers could be persuaded to back measures which they might otherwise 
have opposed and, having won their approval, Ministers could bring support in the 
Legislature behind Government proposals. A good example of this is the discussion 
that took place soon after Lytton arrived in response to a successful resolution that a 
Member had tabled in the Legislative Council calling for the repeal of repressive 
legislation and the release of prisoners. Lytton called together both halves of his 
Government and admitted that whilst in England he had opposed the use of legislation 
such as the Criminal Law Amendment Act. However, he now felt that the Act had 
worked in Bengal and had restored calm. Additionally, the District Officers favoured
38 Lytton to Peel, 23 Oct. 1922, L10.
39 Lytton to Reading 20 Sept. 1923, R15. Lytton cited one exception, which was the Ministers’ 
abstention from voting on a private Member’s resolution for the abolition of whipping in jails. 
Government opposed the resolution and Ministers defended themselves by arguing amongst other things 
that ’the subject matter of the resolution had never been discussed at length at a joint meeting nor a 
decision arrived at.’
268
its retention. As for the prisoners, Lytton argued against any releases. He was 
supported by the Ministers, but with some reservations. After some discussion the 
Ministers dropped these reservations and agreed that Government should meet 
members of the Council ’who were disposed to give a general support to Government’ 
so as to explain why it could not act upon the Council’s Resolution, also that 
Government should explain its policy.40
Later in the summer Peel had further joint meetings to reconsider the question 
of the retention of repressive laws in the light of the improved political situation.
Once again, Lytton was able to gain the support of his Ministers in his policy which 
was to retain the laws for the time being. He commented, ’I am confident that if the 
decision had been taken by the Executive Council and the Ministers had not been 
consulted, they would not have agreed with the decision.’41 However, 
whilst the advantages to Government were clear, and Lytton built upon the situation 
by helping the European community representatives and the Indian Moderates to come 
together in support of Government measures, it was not obvious what the political 
benefits to Ministers were. Presumably they hoped that in return for their support on 
law and order measures they would gain support in the Assembly for their legislative 
programme. Perhaps, after the evidence of street violence at the time of the Prince of 
Wales’ visit, they had become convinced of the necessity of special measures despite 
their inherent dislike for such extra-legal procedures. Perhaps the fact that they were 
now party to the evidence which Government officers could provide about subversive 
movements meant they saw matters in a new light. Whatever the reason, the Ministers 
had set themselves on a slippery slope towards electoral disaster, and Lytton’s 
well-intentioned policy of joint consultation was largely to blame.42 At the time, 
however, Lytton did not see that his policies of encouraging the growth of a Moderate 
Party and that of involving Ministers in decision-making in the Reserved side were 
contradictory. By taking on this special position of being taken into Government 
confidence, but of not being responsible in any way for the decisions, the Ministers
40 Lytton to Peel, 6 Apr. 1922, L10.
41 Lytton to Peel, 25 July 1922, L10.
42 Years later, in his autobiography, Lytton regretted his use of joint deliberation, the only result
of which ’was to identify the Ministers with a Government that was disliked, and to weaken instead of
strengthening their position.’ Earl of Lytton, Pundits and Elephants, London, 1942, p. 180.
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became isolated from their Party, which most probably would have disapproved of 
their actions.43
The Ministries
In terms of constructive legislation the achievements of the Bengali Liberal 
Ministers were considerable, considering the lack of certain backing in the Assembly, 
the short time that they were in office, the shortage of funds, and the general 
preoccupation with the non-co-operation movement outside the Council. Perhaps the 
greatest achievements were made by Surendranath Baneijea as Minister of Local 
Self-Government. Baneijea saw the reform of the Calcutta Municipality, which had 
been dominated by European business interests since Lord Curzon’s reforms, as the 
climax of his career. He had refused to participate in the Municipality since 1899 and 
now he had the chance, as the first Indian Minister in charge of the subject, to bring 
greater democracy and greater autonomy to the body which governed one of the most 
important cities in the East. Baneijea saw reform of the municipality as a practical 
expression of Liberal concerns: while the non-co-operators noisily boasted of Indian 
self-government within the year, here would be practical attainment of swaraj through 
working the constitution.44 Elected Indians would become the majority in the 
Corporation and would be able to appoint the chief executive officers, subject to 
Government approval. Once this was achieved, Indianisation of the personnel of the 
Corporation would inevitably follow. Baneijea did not work from a tabula rasa- plans 
for reform had been drawn up in 1917. However, Baneijea wanted to go further in 
democratising the Corporation than had been envisaged at that time and he wanted to 
do away with the provision for communal representation contained therein.45 
Baneijea introduced the new Bill to the legislature on 22 November 1921, but it was
43 It is notable that the main opposition within the joint Government to the Government’s policy on 
law and order came not from the elected Ministers but from the Muslim Executive Councillor, Sir 
Abdur Rahim, who, after a disagreement about the treatment of political prisoners, resigned the 
portfolio for jails, see Lytton to Peel, 30 Mar. 1922, L10; Lytton to Peel, 25 July 1922, L10.
44 Baneijea, Nation, p. 333.
45 Tinker writes that ’The franchise qualification was halved, with equality for women as voters. 
Four-fifths of the members were elected while the Mayor and the Chief Executive Officer were in turn 
elected by the members. Government control was strictly limited; government approval was needed for 
the appointment of the four chief officials, for expenditure of over 2.5 lakhs and for the raising of 
loans, but for nothing else.’ Local Self-Government, p. 130.
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to take eighteen months of often bitter debating before the long Bill was passed, and 
by then it had been altered to allow for separate communal electorates for a 
transitional period of nine years.46 Baneijea was perfectly prepared to allow 
communities like the Muslims to have seats reserved for them so that they should not 
be under-represented, but he felt, like other Liberals, that separate electorates 
hindered the development of Indian nationalism. Baneijea was swimming against a 
tide that was sweeping all India before it: in Bengal the current of demand for 
separate representation was strong and was supported at all levels, even including the 
Muslims in the Bengal Government. Compromise was therefore inevitable, but it was 
not a compromise that made Baneijea popular with his fellow Hindus. As Broomfield 
points out, ’Even the Indian Association and his old newspaper the Bengalee, 
condemned him.’47 Baneijea followed his reform of the Calcutta Corporation 
with a proposed reform of the Bengal municipalities, which he introduced in the 
Legislative Council on 16 August 1923. Once again Baneijea fought to keep 
communal electorates out of the Bill, and once again he failed, though he had been 
swept out of office before the Bengal Municipal Bill had completed its passage 
through the Legislature.48
The biggest disappointment for Baneijea lay ahead. When the first elections to 
the new Corporation took place, the Swarajists swept the Board and the Liberals were 
decimated. It hurt Baneijea to see C.R. Das and his followers use the Corporation and 
its offices for what he considered to be party political rather than civic ends.49 
Das combined the offices of Mayor and President of the Council, which was not at all 
what Baneijea had intended in looking to separate legislative and executive functions. 
He also implemented his pact with the Muslims so that a substantial majority of posts 
within the Corporation went to them. He filled the 5 posts of aldermen, which 
Baneijea had intended to be filled by elder statesmen who would probably not wish to
46 The communal nature of the arguments in the Assembly is well brought out by Broomfield, 
Elite Conflict, pp. 194-7.
47 Ibid, p. 197, n. 101.
48 See Baneijea to Lytton, 24 May 1923, L22, for Baneijea’s arguments against having communal 
electorates in the terms of the Bill- he preferred the matter to be left to the municipalities themselves to 
decide. For the argument against Baneijea’s approach, see Sir Abdur Rahim to Lytton, 12 June 1923, 
L22.
49 Baneijea, Nation, pp. 336-9.
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face the rough and tumble of elections, with his own young nominees. Most 
notoriously, he used the Corporation corruptly to obtain funds for his party 
coffers.50 It was a shameful end to Baneijea’s dream of democratising local 
government.
P.C. Mitter, the other Liberal Minister, was probably even less popular than 
Baneijea. Yet Lytton considered him ’a better administrator. He has more firmness 
and independence of character and is not so susceptible to personal influences or 
political considerations.’51 Mitter explained his problems as a Minister as being 
due to the shortage of finance in Bengal, which meant that his programme of primary 
education reform in Bengal could not be carried out as intended, especially during the 
final year in office. According to Mitter the finance problem ’destroyed all faith of the 
public in Bengal in the successful working of dyarchy. *52 It must also be said 
though that some of Mitter’s unpopularity also stemmed from the nature of his job as 
Minister for Education. Education had become a battleground in the period of no-co­
operation; a boycott campaign was directed against government education institutions 
and national institutions were set up as replacements. Mitter’s planned expansion 
coincided with this campaign and brought him face to face with obstruction in local 
schools. At the same time, Miner’s attempts to reform secondary and higher education 
by reforming the overseeing body, Calcutta University, inevitably touched key areas 
of power of the bhadralok elite. The bhadralok were very jealous of the powers they 
had won in the running of the University since Curzon’s day. In Bengal these powers 
were peculiarly concentrated in the hands of one man, Sir Asutosh Mookeijee. Lytton 
had recalled Mookeijee to the post of Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University in 1921, 
at a time when the Government of Bengal had just taken over responsibility for the 
running of the University from the Government of India. The extraordinary degree to 
which Mookeijee centralised power in his own hands and those of his nominees 
inevitably alienated many Bengalis, particularly those from East Bengal who felt that
50 Ray, Urban Roots, p. 106.
51 Lytton to Reading, 20 Sept. 1923, R25; Evan Cotton the President of the Legislative Council, 
and a good judge of men, also thought that Mitter had been a ’most excellent Minister of Education’, 
Cotton to Lytton, 17 Dec. 1923, L17.
52 Reforms Enquiry Committee [Muddiman report], Appendix 5, Oral Evidence, vol. 1, Simla, 
1928, p. 181.
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the University of Dacca suffered from neglect as a result of Mookeijee’s aggrandising 
expenditure on Calcutta University.53 Lytton and his government were more 
worried by the lack of financial controls at the University and the fact that secondary 
education suffered from Mookeijee’s concentration on expanding postgraduate 
studies.54 Mitter prepared legislation which was intended firstly to take control 
of secondary education away from the University and vest it in a separate board, 
secondly to secure some control over the finances of the University, and thirdly to 
increase the representative element on the Governing Body.55 Lytton believed 
that reform was urgent as the University administration had become, as he told Peel, 
’rather a scandal’. Mookeijee resisted these reforms tooth and nail and this eventually 
led to Lytton forcing Mookeijee’s resignation. Mookeijee published the text of his 
correspondence with Lytton in order to try and show that he was the victim of 
high-handed Government bullying. In fact Lytton made every effort to conciliate the 
University authorities. Bhupendranath Basu, who was friendly with both Mookeijee 
and Mitter, was appointed as a stop-gap Vice-Chancellor. At a Conference between 
Government, Mookeijee and the University authorities in August, Lytton succeeded to 
some extent in defusing the situation by conciliation- he must have been very aware 
that his Ministers were shortly due to stand for re-election and they could not be seen 
to be responsible for a policy of coercing the University.56 The price that Lytton 
paid though for his conciliation was that he never achieved his desired reform of the 
University.
The failure to reform the University was not the only frustration that Lytton 
suffered in his five year term as Governor Bengal. When he came during the Second 
World War to write his memoirs of this time he gave the book the title, Pundits and 
Elephants, explaining that, ’It is the things that are indigenous and admirable in Indian 
civilisation which we must look for and build upon, rather than the second-hand 
imitations of our own institutions’.57 Lytton had not given up his belief in the 
transferability of western political institutions, but his experiences in Bengal had
53 Broomfield, Elite Conflict, p. 192.
54 Idem.
55 Lytton to Peel, 3 Oct. 1923, L10.
56 Lytton to Peel, 3 Oct. 1923, L10.
37 Lytton, Pundits and Elephants, p. 184.
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taught him that, because of India’s racial diversity, the process would be a longer one 
than he had originally thought. Lytton’s views were very much coloured by the 
experience of Swarajist Party obstructionism in the second Legislative Council 
(1924-26) and the increase in Hindu-Muslim tension in the mid-1920s. One must be 
careful therefore not to read back the air of disappointment that pervades Pundits and 
Elephants (1942) or the cynicism and bitterness which mark the Bengal Government’s 
submission to the Muddiman Committee (1924) to the period of the first Council 
(1921-23).58 A safer guide to Lytton’s views is the private and confidential 
report which Lytton sent to Reading towards the end of the first Council.59 In 
this very frank document Lytton praised the Ministers for their generally responsible 
attitude but argued that their work was undermined by the absence of secure support 
in the Legislative Council which he attributed to a lack of party organisation and to 
the communal nature of Bengali politics. He obviously felt that the two Hindu 
Ministers were divorced from public opinion outside the chamber and especially from 
rural Bengal. Whilst admitting that there were real problems of a shortage of funds 
and time in which to develop their programmes, Lytton felt that the Ministers spent 
too much time on politics and patronage rather than on administration.
When he touched on the issue of patronage Lytton was alluding to a sensitive 
aspect of his relations with his ministers. The reforms gave Indian ministers 
unprecedented influence over numerous appointments in the fields of local 
government, education and the medical services. Decisions on these appointments 
brought them into potential conflict with their civil servants who were used to the 
Government using rather different criteria for public appointments than the new 
Ministers. It was partly that Ministers felt obliged to reward their supporters, and 
even their relatives, whilst the civil service ethos was to regard such appointments as 
both corrupt and not conducive to good administration.60 But there was also a 
genuine conflict about the pace of Indianisation. Baneijea saw his new office as a 
golden opportunity to put into practice his lifelong belief that Indians should be
38 By 1925 Lytton was describing the Bengali politician as ’a contemptible creature. His actions 
are always dictated by personal considerations.’ Lytton to Baldwin, 12 Aug. 1925, L25.
39 Lytton to Reading, 20 Sept. 1923, R25.
60 Idem.
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appointed to posts wherever they were able to fill them. There was resistance to this 
policy especially within the Medical Service, where, incidentally, it was argued that 
European women did not like to be treated by Indian doctors. Baneijea plays down 
these differences with his civil servants, particularly in the higher echelons, in his 
autobiography and stresses that he received the complete support of both Lord 
Ronaldshay and Lord Lytton.61
With nearly a year of the expected life of the Legislative Council to run, the 
Bengal Ministers pleaded with Lytton for the life of the councils to be extended an 
extra year, i.e. to November 1924, to allow them time to complete their legislative 
programmes and thus to be able to go the electorate with a solid record of practical 
achievement behind them.62 Lytton refused, primarily on the grounds of 
constitutional propriety, but also on the ground of political tactics, in that he believed 
a postponement of elections would give any returning non-co-operators greater time to 
organise.63
When the elections did take place, the Liberals were swept aside by the 
Swarajist tide. Only a rump of 7 Liberals remained.64 Both Mitter and Baneijea 
were soundly defeated by Swarajists. A number of explanations were posited by the 
Liberal leaders for their defeat. Baneijea focused on the type of campaign that he had 
to face in his constituency. Whilst expressing his gratitude for the help of the 
authorities in his constituency, he complained that he was the victim of electoral 
malpractice by his Swarajist opponents, including a campaign of lies, such as the 
claim that Baneijea had ’raised the salt-tax, doubled the price of the post-card, 
supported cow-slaughter. ’65 Mitter was more inclined to emphasise the failings 
of the reforms themselves; he told the Muddiman Committee that ’our party tried to 
work dyarchy loyally, but dyarchy killed our party.’66 Mitter’s explanation was 
part of a wider campaign to discredit dyarchy and to press for immediate provincial
61 Baneijea, Nation, pp. 319-23, 331, 341-6. Mitter also praised the support given to him by his 
departmental secretaries. Reforms Enquiry Committee [Muddiman report], Appendix 5, Oral Evidence, 
vol. 1, Simla, 1928, p. 182.
62 Vincent to Reading, 1 Dec. 1922, R(P)%1.
63 Lytton to Peel, 21 Dec. 1922, L10.
64 Tinker, Local Self-Government, p. 137.
65 Baneijea to Hailey, 7 Dec. 1923, WHSd; Baneijea to Lytton, 2 Dec. 1923, L22.
66 Muddiman Report, 1924-25, Cmd. 2362, vol. x, p. 632, cited in Broomfield, Elite Conflict, p. 
200.
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autonomy and should not be taken at face value. However both Mitter and Baneijea 
were looking for scapegoats and missing the basic point that it was their own political 
miscalculations that led to their electoral defeat. This is well brought out by 
Broomfield who suggests that there was no necessary correlation in the new mass 
politics between performance in the legislature and electoral success. The Liberals had 
failed
to realise that there were two levels in the politics of the reformed 
order: the upper level of the more sophisticated bhadralok and the 
lower level of the new mass electorate...It was not merely a question of 
making a good showing in the Council or reaching a satisfactory modus 
vivendi with the British as Sapru had suggested. To win elections, 
nationalist politicians required not only zeal and a good record but 
organisation and discipline, inside and outside the legislature. They 
needed money for local publicity and canvassing. They needed a leader 
who could appeal to the wider electorate; and they needed to respect the 
symbols and terms of the new mass politics.67
These were precisely the qualities that the Liberals lacked but which the Swarajists
possessed.
2. Bombay : Lord Lloyd’s Ministers
Whereas in Bengal Indians were effectively excluded from manufacturing by 
European predominance, in Bombay Indians had developed a thriving cotton industry 
since the middle of the nineteenth century.68 As a result of the First World War, 
this industry, relieved at last of the burden of British competition, underwent a 
marked growth. Bombay mill-owners at the end of the war faced ambivalent relations 
with the Government. On the one hand, in contrast to the smaller traders, they 
remained dependent on British goodwill for a host of economic lubricants, without
67 Broomfield, Elite Conflict, pp. 201-2.
68 C. Markovits, Indian Business and Nationalist Politics 1931-39, Cambridge, 1985, ch. 1. I am
indebted to the complementary studies of Markovits and A.D.D. Gordon, Businessmen and Politics.
Rising Nationalism and a Modernising Economy in Bombay, 1918-1933, New Delhi, 1978, for much of
the information in this introductory section.
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which their businesses might collapse: also they needed Government on their side in 
the growing worker unrest in their factories.69 On the other hand, they resented 
the fact that they had taken (for the first time, it must be said) the weight of increased 
taxation during the war, and that they remained dependent on Government fiscal and 
economic policies for their continued well-being.70 British manipulation of 
exchange rates left them particularly vulnerable in the trade depression that set in 
during 1920. The mill-owners had forged links with the Moderate Congress in order 
to protect their interests and these links were maintained after the Indian Liberals 
broke away from Congress. The mill-owners supported the anti-non-co-operation 
movement of 1920 and the more traditional pressure politics of the intelligentsia, 
through the Western India National Liberal Association (founded in 1919).71 
They had traditionally found it useful to make links with the professional classes; they 
needed the support of lawyers, particularly, in the running of their businesses, and 
from the last quarter of the nineteenth century found the links that the professional 
classes provided with provincial and central politics a useful adjunct.72 Both 
groups shared Anglophile tastes and a moderate political outlook.
Bombay City acted as a social magnet in just the same way that Calcutta did 
and, in terms of social mix, it was even more cosmopolitan in its composition. There 
was not the same level of racial tension between Britons and Indians as existed in 
Calcutta. Bombay City however, was rivalled by a second centre of political activity, 
Poona, which was only some one hundred and fifty miles away over the Western 
Ghats in the Deccan.73 Poona, the traditional centre of Chitpavan Brahmin 
activity, remained deeply divided between the Moderate and Extreme nationalists, 
revolving around the followers of the late G.K. Gokhale and B.G. Tilak respectively. 
Poona Liberal politics, perhaps because of this competitive environment, remained 
more progressive and more socially aware than that of Bombay City, where
69 Markovits, Indian Business, pp. 29-30.
70 See P. Thakurdas to Sir T. Holland (Industries & Munitions Dept., G.I.), 16 Oct. 1920, 
Thakurdas MSS, NMML, for some of the political grievances of Indian mill-owners.
71 Gordon, Businessmen, pp. 157 & 159.
72 See C. Dobbin, Urban Leadership in Western India, Oxford, 1972, pp. 259-61.
73 The history of Poona politics is described in S. A. Wolpert, Tilak and Gokhale, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles, 1962.
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mill-owner interests were probably a constraining and conservative factor.74 
Whereas in Poona politics remained essentially a matter of difference between socially 
homogeneous groups, in Bombay City politics had an added dimension of 
inter-communal rivalry. At the end of the war one incident served to highlight the 
communal divisions in Bombay City; this was the meeting called to mark the end of 
Willingdon’s term of office as Governor of the Presidency by establishing a memorial. 
Europeans and moderate Indians, especially the Parsi community, came together in 
organising a public meeting and they ran into the hostility of the Extremists, angered 
by Willingdon’s rather autocratic record.75 Whereas the Home Rulers were able 
to rally support from the middle-classes of Bombay, and especially from the Gujarati 
sections, the Moderates were able to use their links with the mills to bring out the 
physical support of the Marathi mill-hands and from other lower class Muslim 
supporters.76 The major issues in Bombay politics in 1919, such as the Rowlatt 
satyagraha or the Khilafat movement, tended to leave the Moderates rather on the side 
lines and never again could they call upon this sort of mass support in Bombay city 
politics. Instead it was Gandhi who was to reap the benefits of popular support in 
Bombay. Support for Gandhi came from the Muslims because of the Khilafat issue, 
and from part of the Gujarati community, from the small merchants shopkeepers, 
clerks etc. As R. Kumar points out, ’few of the established Gujarati industrialists or 
businessmen, or lawyers, associated themselves at this juncture with the 
Mahatma.,77 This division was part of the broader split between the 
manufacturers, with their associated interests, and the smaller merchants, with the 
former group tending to support Liberal and anti-non-co-operation politics and the 
latter increasingly supportive of the Gandhian Congress.78
One further division in Bombay society was that between the upper-caste
74 This argument is developed further on pp. 317-319 below. A flavour of the more radical social 
policies of the Deccan may be had from the programme of work which the Deccan Liberal Party 
proposed for the new Bombay Legislative Council. See Advocate o f India, 15 Feb. 1921.
75 See J. Masselos, ’Some Aspects of Bombay City Politics in 1919’ in R. Kumar (ed.), Essays 
on Gandhian Politics, pp. 161-5. I am indebted to Dr. Masselos’ article for much of the information on 
Bombay politics in the period at the end of the First World War.
76 Ibid., pp. 163-4.
77 See R. Kumar, ’From Swaraj to Puma Swaraj. Nationalist Politics in the City of Bombay 
1920-1932.’, in D.A. Low (ed.) Congress and the Raj, London, 1977, p. 85.
78 Gordon, Businessmen, pp. 1-10.
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Hindu elite, who, along with the Parsis, traditionally had dominated nationalist 
politics, and the newly-organised non-Brahmin movement. The British allowed seven 
reserved seats for ’Marathas and allied castes’ in the new constitution and 
non-Brahmins in Maharashtra were able to win three seats over and above this special 
representation in the November 1920 elections. The Bombay Government continued to 
encourage the non-Brahmin movement as a loyalist movement. At the special request 
of the Governor, the Prince of Wales’s unveiled a memorial to Shivaji and a war 
memorial to Maratha soldiers during his visit to the Presidency in the winter of 
1921-22.79 Despite the fact that the Liberals were a predominantly high caste
organisation, they were able to build upon quite effective, if paternalistic, links with 
the non-Brahmins due to their alliance on the issue of social reform. Sir Narayan 
Chandavarkar was President of the Depressed Classes Mission Society and ’exercised 
considerable influence over the Depressed Classes.’80 In Poona the Moderates 
and non-Brahmins had allied against Tilakite conservatism on social reform 
issues.81
Sir George Lloyd and the working of the Reforms
Willingdon’s replacement as Governor of Bombay was the dashing young 
Conservative M .P., Sir George Lloyd. Lloyd was to be responsible during the crucial 
period of the making and working of the reforms. He was a firm believer in the 
civilising mission and, with his Tory imperialist background, a somewhat surprising 
supporter of the Montford reforms. Lloyd’s ideas were very much in the activist 
imperial mold of men like Curzon or Cromer. Indeed he was a somewhat 
anachronistic figure, an enthusiastic young imperialist in a period when the British 
Empire was coming to terms with the growth of anti-colonial nationalism and
79 See Lloyd to Reading, 19 Aug. 1921 and 18 Oct. 1921, R23. Lloyd assured the Viceroy that 
the Sivaji cult was no longer in the hands of Brahmins for seditious agitation, but was under the control 
of the non-Brahmin movement which was a definite counterbalance to Brahmin ascendancy.
80 B.R. Ambedkar, What Congress and Gandhi have done to the Untouchables, Bombay, 1946, p.
17.
81 G. Omvedt, Cultural Revolt in a Colonial Society. The Non- Brahman Movement in Western 
India: 1873 to 1930, Bombay , 1976, ch. xii. As Omvedt argues, the alliance was not based on firm 
ground,however, as the Moderates wanted gradual social reform only and tended to maintain their 
social distance from the non-Brahmins.
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declining imperial resources.82 He placed a greater emphasis on the provision of 
material benefits for the majority of the Indian population than he did on meeting the 
political demands of the educated Indian elite.83 The achievements of which he 
was most proud were the physical ones, such as the building of the Sukkur Barrage or 
the Bombay reclamation scheme. He saw the reforms as an experiment which should 
be given a fair chance, but reckoned that they reduced the efficiency of the 
administration and raised its cost.84 When he left office at the end of 1923,
Lloyd could look back on his term of office with a good deal of satisfaction. He told 
his successor Sir Leslie Wilson that:
I found the Presidency in the most complete state of lawlessness, 
agitation and disorder both political and economic. But we have killed 
the agitation and you could not wish for a more orderly and peaceful 
charge than is this Presidency now.85
One key to his success lay in his policy of firmness mixed with liberality, or as he put 
it to Montagu, ’The guiding "tag” or formula is this: "to pay out rope and hit the 
agitator hard"’.86 Lloyd was particularly proud that during the difficult days of 
the Prince of Wales’ visit in the winter of 1921-22, Bombay, unlike provinces such as 
Bengal, was able to deal with agitation without recourse to special powers of detention 
and summary justice. The Governor of Bombay had been able to keep his Legislative 
Council on his side and count on its support in dealing with the non-co-operation 
movement, and in financing any necessary expenditure.
82 See the official biography, J. Charmley, Lord Lloyd and the Decline o f the British Empire,
London, 1987.
83 He advised Reading that, 'After all the things that matter to these people are water, shelter and 
religion: we may leave the rest if we can satisfy them as to these.* Lloyd to Reading, 5 Oct. 1921, 
R(P) 48.
84 Lloyd to Reading, 31 July 1923, R25.
85 Lloyd to Wilson, 29 June 1923, GL10/21.
86 Lloyd to Montagu, 30 April 1920, M25.
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Table 3
CONSTITUTION OF THE BOMBAY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
UNDER THE REFORMS ACT OF 1919
Elected Members Nominated Members
Non-Muslim urban 11 Officials 20
Non-Muslim rural 35 Non-officials 5
Muslim urban 5




Commerce & Industry 7
86"
SOURCE: L.F. Rushbrook Williams, India in 1920, Calcutta, 1921, p. 249.
Another reason for Lloyd’s relative success, was the balance of interests in the 
Bombay Legislative Council, which allowed the Government to put together the 
necessary support. H.S. Lawrence, a Member of the Bombay Executive Council, 
argued that the Presidency had been fortunate in the balance of interests represented in 
the Legislative Assembly:
No other Province perhaps possesses so delicate a balance of conflicting 
interests...There are the highly educated and intelligent citizens of 
Bombay city intent on commerce and industry; the Mahomedan 
landlords of Sind intent on irrigation; the Marathas and the Lingayats of 
the Deccan bitterly opposed to Brahmin supremacy; and the intellectual 
Brahmins of the Deccan resentful of policies directed by Mr. Gandhi 
and his Gujarati clique at Ahmedabad.87
87 ’Confidential Note on the Reform System in the Bombay Presidency 1921-24’, 1 Sept. 1924, 
L15.
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Even so, Lawrence felt that the first council had not been really representative of 
Bombay interests, in that lawyers continued to be over-represented.88
Liberals were well represented on Lloyd’s Government. R.P. Paranjpye, with 
his background as an educationalist, was seen as a natural choice as Minister in 
charge of Education, Medicine and Public Health, whilst Chunilal Mehta was put, 
rather more surprisingly, in charge of Forests, Excise and Agriculture.89 The 
third Minister, Gulam Hussain Hidyatullah, seems to have been chosen less for any 
intrinsic ability than as a senior representative of the loyalist Muslims of Sind. On the 
Executive Council, Chimanlal Setalvad was given charge of the Law Department and 
the other Indian Member, Sir Ibrahim Rahimtulla, a Muslim (and a Liberal 
sympathiser), was given charge of the Revenue Department.90 When Rahimtulla 
was absent whilst presiding over the Fiscal Commission (from 6 Dec. 1921 to 26 July 
1922) he was replaced by an eminent Liberal, Sir Cowasjee Jehangir. The Ministers 
were not chosen as representatives of any particular political party nor indeed had the 
electors been presented with party programmes or labels. Lloyd did not allow his 
ministers to form a joint cabinet, he told them that each Minister was individually 
responsible to him for their relevant departments.91 Setalvad even claimed to the 
Muddiman Committee that Lloyd expected Ministers only to advise him on the 
Transferred Departments; he would take the decisions, even on day to day 
matters.92 Sir Maurice Hayward, in replying on behalf of the Bombay 
Government to Setalvad’s submission, argued that it was because Ministers did not 
represent real parties in the Legislative Council that the Government did not feel it 
right to leave them an entirely free hand to run their departments. However, he denied 
that Ministers were ever overruled by the Governor as Setalvad had claimed.93
88 Idem. He estimated that Lawyers formed one third of the Legislative Council, landlords another 
third, and commercial and industrial magnates the remaining third.
89 Indian Social Reformer, 16 Jan. 1921.
90 Setalvad believed that he was only available for'the Bombay post because the Government of 
India had gone back on an earlier private promise to make him Law Member of the Viceroy’s 
Executive Council because he had signed the minority report of the Hunter Committee on the Punjab 
disturbances. C.H. Setalvad, Recollections and Reflections. An Autobiography, Bombay, 1946, pp. 
320-1.
91 R.P. Paranjpye, 84 Not Out, Delhi, 1961, p. 71.
92 Reforms Enquiry Committee [Muddiman report], Appendix 5, Oral Evidence, vol. 1, Simla, 
1928., pp. 89-95.
93 Ibid., pp. 96-8.
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Setalvad further complained that, although there were at most times joint meetings of 
the two halves of Government, Ministers were made to feel unwelcome, whilst 
Members were left in the dark about transferred subjects. C.F. Adam, who was 
Lloyd’s Private Secretary in this period, strenuously denied these charges when he 
came to write Lloyd’s biography in 1948. He argued that joint meetings ’had been 
held almost weekly at which both transferred and reserved subjects had been freely 
discussed.’94 It does seem that Setalvad was factually mistaken in some of his 
claims, but he was right to the extent that he indicated the spirit of Lloyd’s 
administration, which was autocratic and not according to the intentions of the 
Montford reforms. Lloyd prided himself in running a ’tight ship’. He had a fairly low 
opinion of the administrative capacity of his Ministers, arguing that ’without.the most 
careful guidance of members of the Imperial Services they would be unable to frame 
any policy or carry that policy into effect.,95 Lloyd felt that the Ministers made 
partial choices when making recommendations for appointments and added that 
’corporate responsibility is almost beyond their comprehension, while loyalty to their 
subordinates and consistency of policy are not considered by them to be attributes of 
any value.,96 Lloyd blamed the failure of the system on the fact that, contrary to 
the expectations of the reforms’ makers, the Ministers did not have behind them the 
support of a well-organised party in the Legislative Council nor even the support of a 
definite majority.97 However, whilst Lytton decided that he would have to use 
Government resources to help the party process along in Bengal, Lloyd preferred to 
run Government in a more personal way, persuading and cajoling Legislative 
Councillors himself if necessary. It was certainly true that Ministers in Bombay were 
particularly isolated, in that, when an association of members of the Legislative 
Council was formed, Ministers were specifically excluded from it!98 Lloyd saw 
legislation in the transferred departments as his own achievement rather than that of
94 C.F. Adam, Life o f Lord Lloyd, London, 1948, p. 187.
95 Lloyd to Reading, 31 July 1923, R25.
96 Idem.
97 See Lloyd to Montagu, 4 March 1921, A/26, ’...how would you like to carry on a government
without a majority behind you in the house? - or rather with 16 votes against 111!’ In fact, in addition
to his officials, Lloyd could count on a majority of the Sind members , plus the non-Brahmin members. 
See Lloyd to Reading , 19 Feb. 1922, R24.
98 Muddiman Report, Appendix 5, C.H. Setalvad’s written evidence , p. 91.
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his Ministers. For example, in a letter to his wife, Lloyd wrote that, T am introducing 
free and compulsory primary education this month in the Council. It is the first 
measure for free and compulsory education ever put forward in this country.’99 
Lloyd was conveniently forgetting both British opposition before the First World War 
to G.K. Gokhale’s Compulsory Primary Education Bill, and the fact that it was his 
Education Minister, R.P. Paranjpye who introduced the Compulsory Primary 
Education Bill, which was modelled on Gokhale’s previous measure. Paranjpye had, 
indeed, devoted his whole life to educational matters and one of the first things he did 
when he was appointed a Minister was to set up a committee under Sir Narayan 
Chandavarkar to report on primary education.100 It was this report that formed 
the basis for the new bill which empowered government to call on local government 
bodies to prepare schemes of compulsory primary education.101 The measure was 
enacted in 1923.
Although, like the its Bengal counterpart, the Bombay Government felt it did 
badly out of the Meston financial settlement, which left the industrial/commercial 
provinces bereft of their expanding income tax revenues, the problem did not reach 
the crisis proportions that it did in Bengal. Lloyd was a stickler for strict balancing of 
the books and the Retrenchment Committee managed to make economies, not just of 
the Rs. 60 lakhs which they were asked to find, but of Rs. 1 crore. Whereas the 
Bengal Retrenchment Committee made the cuts as far as possible in the upper 
echelons of the Services, Bombay focused on reducing the lower ranks, thus putting 
out of work thousands of village officials, accountants, police, schoolmasters 
etc..102 It may well be that the Liberals rued their over-enthusiastic reduction of 
expenditure when it came to the Council elections in 1923. Though the Government 
had a healthy budget surplus in 1923-24, this had been achieved, in part, by starving 
the transferred departments of funds for their development.
The greatest difficulties that Lloyd had with the Indian members of his 
Government related to two issues: protection of the Imperial Services and, measures
99 G. Lloyd to B. Lloyd [his wife, Blanche], 8 Sept. 1922, GL4/1C.
100 Paranjpye, 84 Not Out, p. 80.
101 Tinker, Local Self-Government, pp. 133, 262-5.
102 Times o f India, 20 Feb. 1923.
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for dealing with -the threat from non-co-operation. Lloyd saw the protection of the 
interests of the services as an essential part of his job but one which inevitably 
brought him into conflict with his Indian Ministers who were keen to make their own 
appointments and to Indianise the Services. Of all the Provincial Governors, nobody 
did more than George Lloyd to argue the case for the British element in the 
Services.103 Lloyd even got his wife to lobby on behalf of the Services whilst 
she was in London in 1922.104 The vehemence of Lloyd’s stance stemmed from 
a number of factors. Firstly, there was his fundamental conviction as an imperialist 
that good administration could be equated with British administration. In a valedictory 
speech to the Sind Club in September 1923, Lloyd spoke of ’the incapacity of the 
peoples to govern themselves - or more accurately, to govern each other, which is 
their real desire.’105 Lloyd argued that this incapacity, based on fundamental 
antagonisms between the Indian communities had been proved in history.
Nearer to home, Lloyd’s experience of working with Indian colleagues did not 
leave him with an impression of Indian capacity for government. He described his 
colleagues [the Executive Councillors] as being ’quite ready to encourage little 
intrigues all the time and to cabal against one another busily’. ’I often think’, he told 
Montagu, ’what an easy job government here would be if one had no Indian 
colleagues to deal with!’106 As has been indicated, Lloyd felt that Indians could 
not be trusted to make administrative appointments impartially, therefore it was 
incumbent upon him to protect the interests of the British members of the 
Services.107 A good example of this came early in the life of the Council, in the 
spring of 1921, when Sir George Curtis retired as Finance Member and 
Vice-President of the Executive Council. Normal custom would have been to appoint 
the Senior Councillor in his place, but this was one of the Indians, Sir Ibrahim 
Rahimtulla, and Lloyd was reluctant to appoint Rahimtulla because it meant that he 
would stand in as Governor if ever Lloyd should need to return home for any period 
of time. This, Lloyd felt, would be ’very serious...more particularly with regard to
103 G. Lloyd to B. Lloyd, 28 July 1922, GL4/1C.
104 G. Lloyd to B. Lloyd, 12 Sept. 1922, GL4/1C.
105 Speech to Sind Club, Sept. 1923, GL22/3.
106 Lloyd to Montagu, 5 Aug. 1921, A/26
107 Lloyd to Montagu, 23 Dec. 1921, A/26.
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the civil servants?..Sir Ibrahim would immediately set to work to fill every office with 
Indians and would completely exclude the British where he could.’108 Lloyd left 
the position vacant, apparently waiting for Rahimtulla to leave when he took up the 
appointment Lloyd had found him as President of the Fiscal Commission. However, 
Setalvad saw this as a matter of racial equality and confronted Lloyd over the issue, 
even threatening him with the resignation of all the Indian members of the 
cabinet.109 Ultimately Lloyd relented, which is in itself a good indication of the 
power of Indian Members under the new system. 110 Partly, Lloyd felt that 
Rahimtulla’s natural combativeness added greatly to the work of the administration, as 
’he fights every case and every point, involving additional interviews galore.*111 
There does seem to have been a serious clash of personalities involved: the two men 
were both rather imperious in their own ways. The Indian Social Reformer felt that 
whilst Rahimtulla was in the Government, the Indian Members had stood up to 
Lloyd.112 A second factor in Lloyd’s special attention to the needs of the 
Services was that he felt that the latter were not properly defended by the Viceroy, 
and therefore it was all the more important that he put the case, especially to 
London.113
The other major area of disagreement with Indian Ministers and Councillors 
was over matters of law and order relating to dealing with the non-co-operation 
movement. Lloyd believed that Indians were too scared to face the hostile criticism 
and even social ostracism that would result from their participating in what he 
considered to be the right decisions on law and order. He saw it as his role as 
Governor to provide them with the necessary firmness and resolve. He told Montagu 
at the time of the argument with Reading about Gandhi’s arrest that the British
108 Lloyd to Reading, 26 May 1921, R3.
109 C.H. Setalvad, Recollections, pp. 326-7.
110 The vendetta with Rahimtulla continued right to the end of Rahimtullah’s period of service in 
March 1923 (a date which was in itself controversial in that it meant that Lloyd did not make any 
allowance of time for Rahimtulla’s period of absence whilst on the Fiscal Commission). Lloyd partly 
ascribed the differences between himself and Rahimtulla to the fact that the latter as a Bombay 
landowner was opposing Lloyd’s Back Bay Reclamation Scheme. Lloyd to Reading, 23 June 1921, 
R23.
1,1 G. Lloyd to B. Lloyd, 28 July 1922, GL4/1C.
112 Indian Social Reformer, 15 Dec. 1923.
113 See, e.g., G. Lloyd to B. Lloyd, 12 Sept. 1922, GLAIIC.
position in relation to Indian members of their government should be ’not to give 
these people wits for they are clever enough, but to give them our steadiness and 
greater moral courage in emergencies.’114 The key test came over the question 
of arresting the Ali Brothers, the leaders of the Khilafat movement.
Like many imperialists in India, Lloyd was particularly sensitive to maintaining 
the loyalty of the Muslim community.115 The question of prosecuting Shaukat 
and Mohammed Ali had arisen as early as the spring of 1921.116 In May 1921 
the Government of India considered prosecuting the brothers for seditious speeches 
made in the United Provinces. However, the majority of the Viceroy’s Council 
preferred that Reading should see Mahatma Gandhi before starting any prosecution; 
they feared the consequences if Gandhi should merely repeat the offence and thus 
force the Government to arrest him. As a result, Reading spent several long 
interviews with Gandhi and eventually got him to agree to try and obtain a full 
apology for the speeches from the Ali brothers, and an undertaking that they would 
not repeat them. Reading, finding that his Councillors now seemed to prefer 
prosecution, consulted Lloyd, as Governor of the Alis* home province. Lloyd had an 
interview at Simla with Reading at which Lloyd argued for immediate prosecution, 
whilst the Viceroy argued for his political strategy of driving a wedge between Gandhi 
and the Alis to be given a chance. Lloyd admitted that he was ’reluctant to interrupt 
an artist in his stride’ and seems to have helped to persuade the Council to allow 
Reading’s strategy a chance.117 The requisite apology was received and 
published at the end of May and led to a period of relative quiet. However, in July, in 
speeches to the All-India Khilafat Conference at Karachi, the Alis called for Muslims 
to leave the British army. Reading was now ready for a prosecution and consulted 
Lloyd. Lloyd recommended arrest, but, rather embarrassingly, admitted privately that 
his two Indian Councillors did not approve until they were satisfied that the Army had
114 Lloyd to Montagu, 17 Feb. 1922, A/26.
1.5 He felt that Hardinge’s mistake as Viceroy had been to look to the Hindus instead of the 
Muslims. G. Lloyd to B. Lloyd, 19 Oct. 1921, GL4/1C.
1.6 See also pp. 153-155 above.
1.7 This narrative is constructed largely from Lloyd’s ’Note of an Interview between H.E. the 
Viceroy and H.E. the Governor of Bombay regarding the prosecution of the Ali Brothers, Simla, May 
1921, GL10/20.
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real fears of disaffection resulting from these speeches.118 Presumably this was 
an issue upon which the Ministers were also consulted and Lloyd later admitted to 
Montagu that the three Indian Ministers had also opposed the prosecution and he had 
had to push it through by a bare majority.119 Lloyd added that ’The fact that my 
Indian colleagues refused to support me in this step only shows how little fit they are 
for any responsibility which can possibly make them the target for even the mildest 
criticism.’120 The Ali Brothers were prosecuted and eventually sentenced to two 
years imprisonment.
The prosecutions were deeply disturbing to the Muslim community, and were a 
prelude to the next crisis, the disturbances at the time of the Prince of Wales’ visit. 
The visit saw major inter-communal violence in Bombay between Parsis and 
Europeans welcoming the Prince on the one side, and Hindus and Muslims trying to 
enforce a hartal on the other. The Times o f India calculated that 53 people were killed 
in these disturbances, 298 wounded, and 341 arrests made.121 The experience 
of the violence of the Gandhian protest seems to have achieved the change of heart in 
his Indian colleagues that he had been looking for. In January Lloyd reported to 
Montagu that he had the unanimous support of all 3 Ministers and 4 Executive 
Councillors for the arrest of Gandhi.122 He pronounced himself ’very pleased on 
the whole’ with the attitude of his Council and reported proudly that:
It is a fact that the Bombay Moderates are the only Moderates in India 
who have stood firm by Government throughout the last two months. It 
is a fact that whilst Bengal, the Punjab, and the United Provinces have 
failed to deal with their Volunteers by means of the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act, we have succeeded in dealing with our Volunteers 
without the use of such Act at all.123
118 Lloyd to Reading, ptel. 1171, 22 Aug. 1920, R23. This division in the Government became 
public knowledge, see Bombay Chronicle, 21 Sept. 1921.
119 Lloyd to Montagu, 23 Sept. 1921, A/26 .
120 Idem.
121 Times o f India, 15 Dec. 1921. See also the account in R. Kumar, ’From Swaraj to Puma 
Swaraj’, pp. 90-93.
122 Lloyd to Montagu, 20 Jan. 1922, A/26. This is contradicted by R.P. Paranjpye who in his 
autobiography says that he and Chunilal Mehta opposed the arrest of Gandhi, but could not make this 
fact public at the time.of the Council elections of November 1923. Paranjpye, 84 Not Out, p. 83.
123 Lloyd to Montagu, 20 Jan. 1920, A/26 ; Lloyd to Reading, 21 Jan 1922, K24.; Lloyd to 
Reading, ptel. 45a, 8 Sept. 1922, R24.
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Lloyd’s relations with his Indian colleagues got warmer after Rahimtulla’s departure. 
Chunilal Mehta was eventually moved from the transferred side to take over from 
Rahimtulla.124 Setalvad resigned in February 1923 (with effect from June 1923), 
but this was not, as some of the newspapers suspected, due to differences with British 
members of the administration.125 In fact Setalvad resigned for financial reasons; 
he and Rahimtulla were among a number of people who lost large amounts of money 
with the collapse in prices on the Bombay Stock Exchange at the end of 1922, and 
therefore Setalvad felt it incumbent on him to restore his fortunes by returning to his 
legal career.126 Lloyd was obviously disappointed and had been trying for some 
time to get Reading to agree to Setalvad replacing Sapm as Law Member of the 
Government of India; he was very keen to have a Bombay man in the Viceroy’s 
cabinet.127 There was, however, the advantage that Setalvad could help to 
organise the inert Bombay Liberals in time for the forthcoming Council 
elections.128 In his final year in office Lloyd became quite concerned that the 
Liberals should do well against the returning Congressmen.129
However solicitous Lloyd was for the Liberal Party, he could do nothing to 
save it from a crushing electoral defeat in the Council elections of November 1923. 
Most of the leading Liberals were defeated by Swarajist candidates and only a rump 
of 3 or 4 official Liberals remained in the new Council.130 This heavy defeat, 
which might have been predicted after the Swarajist successes earlier in the year in the 
Bombay Municipal Council elections, was the result of a number of factors. One
124 Setalvad opposed this move as tending to give the Governor too much power of patronage over 
his Ministers; Recollections, p. 328.
125 Bombay Chronicle, 13 Dec. 1923.
126 Gordon, Businessmen, p. 176; Peel to Reading, 21 Oct. 1923, R6.
127 Lloyd to Reading, 14 Feb. 1923, R25; Lloyd to Reading, 3 June 1922, & ptel. 45a, 8 Sept.
1922, R24.
128 Setalvad to C.F. Adam (PS to G/Bombay), 24 June 1923, R25.
129 Lloyd to Reading, ptel. 348, 25 March 1923, R25., in which Lloyd warned of the damaging
effect that certification of the salt tax would have on the Moderates’s electoral prospects. Lloyd seems, 
ironically, to have taken here the sort of political stance that he had attacked when Reading took it 
regarding the arrest of Gandhi. Lloyd’s advice was ’to do nothing which might injure [the moderate 
party’s political supremacy]... at any rate until after the elections’.
130 Smith, thesis, p. 340.
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element was the paucity of Liberal preparations and party organisation; they had 
stirred themselves too little and too late against a highly energetic Swarajist campaign. 
More importantly, many of the electors must have associated the Liberals with the 
Government that had arrested Mahatma Gandhi and helped to suppress the non-co- 
operation movement: they just didn’t appear nationalist enough to meet the public 
mood. Finally, it must be said that, in contrast to the Bengal Ministers, the Bombay 
Ministers did not have much of constructive record to point too.131 This was 
largely a result of the financial stringencies which the first council worked under, but 
also, to some extent, to the degree to which the Ministers operated under the shadow 
of an interventionist Governor.
131 See the criticisms in the Indian Social Reformer, 24 Feb. 1923. Even measures such as the 
Compulsory Primary Education Act were vitiated by a lack of funds to implement them.
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3. The United Provinces: Aman Sabhas- landlords and Liberals
To be guided by the [Indian] intelligentsia only, would be as if the 
Germans had won the war, occupied this country and consulted only 
those Englishmen who could read and write German fluently. Sir 
Harcourt Butler, Governor o f the United Provinces, 1921-22.132
Whereas Bombay and Bengal were relatively urbanised provinces by Indian 
standards, the United Provinces had a much smaller percentage of its population living 
in towns.133 Until recently the United Provinces had been a political backwater, 
but by the time of the First World War it was coming to play an important role in 
national politics.134 As in Bombay and Bengal, local politics took the form of a 
symbiotic relationship between the traditional and newer elites, in this case between 
the powerful bankers, merchants and landowners on the one hand and the professional 
classes on the other.135 Politics tended to have a very provincial flavour, with 
much concentration on supporting religious/cultural organisations and the provision of 
University education.136 The new Legislative Council was dominated by the 
rural interests, particularly by the larger landlords who were such a feature of some 
parts of the United Provinces [see Table 3].137 In the first Councils, landholders 
and lawyers were the two predominant groups, with the former group holding the 
majority.138 Harcourt Butler, the Governor, reported that there were three 
blocks in the Legislative Council which usually voted solidly: landlords, Muslims and 
Liberals.139 The Government could usually rely on the support of the first two 
groups and of course, the officials and nominated members.140
However, Butler decided to choose his Ministers on ability and this meant
132 Butler to Reading, 1 Nov. 1930, R(P)1.
133 Of the 46 million people living in the U.P. in 1921, 89% lived in rural areas. G. Pandey, The 
Ascendancy o f the Congress in Uttar Pradesh 1926-34, Oxford, 1978, p. 11.
134 See C. Bayly, The Local Roots o f Indian Politics. Allahabad 1880-1920, Oxford, 1975, pp. 2-
3.
135 Bayly, Local Roots, pp. 271-8.
136 See Gordon, ’Hindu Mahasabha’, pp. 145-203.
137 As many as 77 of the general constituencies were rural as against 12 urban. Indian Statutory 
Commission [Simon Report], Cmd. 3572, vol. 3, 1929-30, p. 215. For landlord politics, see P.D. 
Reeves, Landlords and Governments in Uttar Pradesh, Bombay, 1991.
138 Ibid., p. 216.
139 Butler to Reading, 30 Nov. 1921, RT3.
140 Idem.
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turning to the intelligentsia, who formed the backbone of the Liberal Party.141 
There were to be only two Ministers in the U .P., and Butler gave the Education and 
Industries portfolio to C. Y. Chintamani, a Madras journalist who edited the Leader 
newspaper and was a leading figure in the Liberal party nationally.142 Pandit 
Jagat Narayan, a Liberal lawyer from Lucknow, became Minister for Local 
Self-Government and Public Health. On the Reserved side of Government, Butler was 
able to appoint a Muslim landowner, the Raja of Mahmudabad, to be in charge of the 
Home Department, and Ludovic Porter was in charge of the all-important Finance 
portfolio (until replaced by S.P. O’Donnell at the beginning of 1923).
Considering that Harcourt Butler had not been a friend to the Montford 
reforms in their early stages, it must be said that he seems to have made every effort 
to make the reforms a success in his province. He opted to run a system of joint 
consultation and joint decision-making of the two halves of Government. Where there 
were differences between the two sides, the decision was left to whichever side was 
responsible for the subject.143 The system worked happily, at least for the first 
eight months.144
From the Governor’s point of view, however, it was disappointing that the 
Ministers had failed to influence either the Legislative Council or public 
opinion.145 Butler commented that, ’From the outset I endeavoured, with the 
invaluable assistance of Sir Ludovic Porter, to build up a party which would support 
the Government and make the administration possible.’146 Butler was not the 
sort of person to sit idly by and allow the Government case to go by default, 
especially in the countryside where Congress was allying itself to the kisan or peasant 
movement that grew up during 1920. He planned to meet this threat with a policy
141 In this Province, as in Bombay and Bengal, the Liberals were not chosen because they were 
Members of a particular party, indeed party politics had not formed a feature of the elections of 1920. 
Butler to H.E. Richards, 27 May 1920, B21.
142 Chintamani does not seem to have been chosen for his popular support in the Legislature- as an 
outsider in U.P. politics he had earlier doubted whether he could even get elected. See H. Butler to G. 
Butler (his brother), 2 June 1920, £25.
143 Butler to Reading, 5 May 1923, R25.
144 Chintamani, evidence to Muddiman Committee, Appendix 6 , Oral Evidence, vol. 1, pp. 297- 
8, 312; J. Narayan to Butler, 27 Dec. 1925, £29; H.N. Kunzru to Sapru, 4 Mar. 1921, SAP/K86, 1st. 
series; J. Narayan to Sapru, 8 July 1921, SAP/N2, 1st. series.
145 Butler to Reading, 5 May 1923, £25.
146 Idem.
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mixing reform, repression and counter-propaganda.147 Butler prepared to amend 
the Oudh Rent Act so as to give tenants greater security, but he made sure to do so in 
a manner that
Table 4
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED PROVINCES LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
UNDER THE REFORMS ACT OF 1919
Elected Members Nominated Members
Non-Muslim urban 8 Officials 18
Non-Muslim rural 52 Non-officials 5
Muslim urban 4




Commerce & Industry 3
Too
SOURCE: L.F. Rushbrook Williams, India in 1920, Calcutta, 1921, p. 249.
ensured he did not alienate the landlords, whom he regarded as ’the only friends we 
have.’148 In April 1921 Butler wrote to local commissioners to encourage them 
to form aman sabhas or ’leagues of public security’, which would bring together
147 See P.D. Reeves, ’The Politics of Order. "Anti-Non-Cooperation" in the United Provinces, 
1921, Journal o f Asian Studies, xxv, 2, 1966, pp. 264-5.
148 Butler to Vincent, 10 Nov. 1920 £21. Butler told Reading that ’The Taluqdars are the most 
loyal body in India and a break-water between trouble in the Punjab and trouble in Bengal.’ Butler to 
Reading, 27 June 1921, £23.
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moderate opinioivon the side of law and order.149 This active Government 
intervention in politics was just the sort of thing that Montagu had been calling for for 
some time. British officials in the districts convened and chaired the sabhas which 
were formed in every district. The Liberal newspaper, the Leader, reported the 
formation of a new sabha almost daily during 1921, and the remarkable thing was that 
Liberals supported these organisations initially and worked on a joint platform with 
Government officials and local landowners.150 An editorial in the Leader of 4 
June 1921 frankly recognized the danger that these organizations might become 
’strongholds of reaction and conservatism’, but, on balance, it felt that they were in 
the best interests of the peasantry, who were now being courted by officials and 
landlords to attend these meetings. More importantly it was argued that the sabhas 
would allow the peasants to make their grievances known. With Liberals attending 
aman sabhas and landlords attending liberal conferences, it became important to 
maintain a distinction between the two organisations and, at a meeting of the 
Moradabad Liberal Association on 27 June 1921, K.P. Kaul of the Servants of India 
Society argued that the difference lay in the fact that Liberal bodies did not have 
officials as members.151
Liberals in the United Provinces believed that they could, by co-operating with 
the landlords and the Government, achieve an acceptable compromise over the 
amendment to the Oudh Rent Act (1886). When Sir Ludovic Porter introduced the 
Amending Bill into the Legislative Council on 4 August 1921, the Liberals were 
aggrieved to find that the Bill hardly improved the tenants’ position at all, and 
certainly did not give the level of tenant occupancy rights which prevailed in 
Agra.152 Liberals organised public meetings throughout Oudh to press for more
149 Reeves , ’Politics of Order’, p. 265.
150 A good example was the anti-non-co-operation meeting at Lucknow on 30 Apr. 1921, cited in 
the Leader, 2 May 1921.
131 Leader, 29 June 1921; from the evidence of the various local meetings, Kaul seems to have 
been correct, one does not fmd officials at Liberal Federation meetings but they are almost invariably 
present at aman sabha meetings.
132 Reeves argues that ’The bill in fact gave the landlords more than they surrendered and left the 
Government of India...with the feeling that many provisions were of "very doubtful expediency".’ 
Reeves, ’Politics of Order’, p. 272.
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radical changes to be incorporated.153 When the Liberals tried to use aman 
sabha meetings to criticise the new Rent Bill, they were warned by Government 
officials that they could only hold meetings if they were supporting the Bill.154 
Naturally, the Liberals felt deceived- the aman sabhas had no independent, 
constructive role, they were merely the tool of the Government in their war against 
non-co-operation.155 Liberals eventually resigned their membership of the 
sabhas and, likewise, the few taluqdars who had joined the Liberal League 
quit.156 The Liberals also protested within the machinery of Government by 
sending a deputation to wait on the Finance Minister and by trying to pass 
amendments within the Select Committee of the Legislative Council which had been 
set up to examine the Bill. However they found the Government unwilling to make 
any concessions and the five Liberal members walked out of the Committee and 
boycotted its proceedings.157 Whether as a response to Government of India 
criticism, local Liberal pressure or the fear of renewed agrarian discontent, the Bill 
was to some extent liberalised in Committee, but no concession was made on the key 
issue of hereditary security of tenure.158 I.N. Gurtu resigned as Secretary to the 
Minister of Local Self-Government, and the Liberals put up a valiant fight against the 
amended Bill when it returned to the Legislative Council, losing most votes, however, 
by a margin of at least two to one.159 When the Bill finally passed through the 
legislature and was approved by Delhi, Radha Kant Malaviya, the Liberal son of 
Pandit Mohan Malaviya, handed in his resignation as a member of the Legislative 
Council.160
The events described above seem to run counter to the picture described in the
153 A convenient summary of these meetings can be found in K. Kumar, Peasants in Revolt.
Tenants, Landlords, Congress and the Raj in Oudh, 1886-1922, New Delhi, 1984, p. 180.
154 Kumar , Peasants in Revolt, p. 182; Reeves, ’Politics of Order’, p. 272.
155 This was denied by British officials. See J.E. Goudge (Publicity Commissioner, U.P) to Sri
Prakasa, editor of the Aj, Benares, 6 Apr. 1922, Sri Prakasa MSS, NMML.
156 Kumar, Peasants in Revolt, pp. 184-85.
157 M.H. Siddiqi, Agrarian Unrest in North India. The United Provinces 1918-22, New Delhi, 
1978, p. 191.
138 Siddiqi writes that ’The "concessions" of the Rent Act would not have been achieved had it not 
been for the efforts made by the Liberals both inside the council and in public meetings.’ See Siddiqi, 
op. cit., p. 192.
139 Kumar, Peasants in Revolt, pp. 183-4.
Kumar, Peasants in Revolt, p. 187.
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Bengal and Bombay Councils, i.e. that where Liberal Ministries were in place, the 
Provincial Government usually had to adapt its policies, even on the Reserved side, to 
their views. Threats of ministerial resignation were quite powerful weapons under the 
new reforms. However in the United Provinces, the Government remained quite 
adamant and resignations would have been futile because the Governor only needed to 
turn to the majority group, the landlords, to provide him with new ministers. Butler 
believed that it was the landlords and not the Liberal intelligentsia who formed the 
most important support of British rule in the United Provinces. As Reeves concludes, 
’In the last resort the Government was more concerned to maintain order than to 
undertake far-reaching agrarian reform.’161 At the same time as they were losing 
the battle over the Oudh Rent Bill, the Liberals were also being alienated from 
Government by the more blatantly repressive actions it took towards the non-co- 
operation movement in the locality. Although the Government had used the Seditious 
Meetings Act earlier to restore order against the kisans, the Liberals had not 
objected.162 However, with the Prince of Wales’ visit to the United Provinces in 
November 1922, the Government used the Criminal Law Amendment Act to try and 
maintain the image of an orderly province. By calling together both halves of his 
Government, Butler was able to get the consent of the Ministers to the use of the 
C.L.A.A., under certain provisos. However, what the Ministers objected to was that 
Butler used the Act indiscriminately and ignored the Ministers’ conditions.163 If 
the Ministers were hostile to the Governor, the feeling was obviously mutual as Butler 
wrote home that, ’I have never been able to distinguish in practice between many 
extremists and many moderates except that an extremist openly wants to get rid of us 
and a moderate wants office.’164 Like many other Governors, Butler felt that 
the Indian Liberals had failed to show courage and support Government at the real 
hour of need. With relation to the running of the transferred departments, Butler was 
prepared to admit that ’on the whole...the Ministers showed considerable
161 Reeves, ’The Politics of Order’, p. 272.
162 Muddiman Report, Appendix 6 , vol.l, oral evidence of G.N. Misra & H.N. Kunzm of the 
U.P. Liberal Association, p. 197.
163 Ibid, pp. 197-8; Chintamani to L. Porter, 6 June 1922, £55. For the action taken by 
Government see S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru. A Biography, London, 1975, vol. 1, ch. 11.
164 Butler to Hardinge et. al., 22 Dec. 1921, £29.
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administrative capacity in their handling of transferred subjects.*165
A key issue which divided the Ministers from the landlords once again was 
Narayan’s U.P. District Boards Act (1922), under which district boards were given 
considerable powers independent of Government.166 The Bill threatened landlord 
interests by giving boards the power to raise the land revenue cess to pay for their 
expenditure, but in this case the Government took the side of the reformers against the 
landlords and encouraged the idea that local development should be paid for through 
local taxation. 167 The Ministerial position was strengthened by the formation of a 
Progressive Party in the legislature on 30 January 1922, in which independents joined 
with Liberals in a programme of responsive co-operation with Government. Landlord 
opposition was undermined by internal divisions and in November 1922 the landlords 
were heavily defeated in the legislative council. Chintamani, who worked with 
Narayan in drawing up the Bill, incurred a good deal of unpopularity amongst the 
landlords. He was quite acerbic and still controlled the Leader newspaper, and thus 
was seen as responsible for its attacks on landlord interests.168 Butler was 
convinced that Chintamani saved himself by stirring up Hindu-Muslim differences 
regarding the District Boards Bill and thus splitting the landlords.169 But 
Muslims were, in fact, concerned that there was no separate representation provided 
for them in the Bill. Provision was eventually made, over the protest of the 
Ministers.170 Whether it was due to the desire to have a solid piece of legislative 
achievement on the statute books well before the elections in 1923 or for some other 
reason, the Bill had been rushed through the Legislature and was, as Tinker comments 
’not a well-constructed measure’ which ’was often to be exploited and perverted when 
put into operation in the coming years’.171
Chintamani was convinced that Butler’s attitude hardened after Montagu’s 
resignation in March 1922.172 It may be, however, that the successful arrest of
165 Butler to Reading, 5 May 1923, £25.
166 Tinker, Local Self-Government, pp. 131-2.
167 I have followed the account in Reeves, Landlords and Government, pp. 114-/*?.
168 L.F.Rushbrook Williams to author, 2 Dec. 1971.
169 Butler to Reading, 10 Nov. 1922, £24.
170 Tinker, Local Self-Government, p. 132.
171 Ibid, p. 133.
172 Chintamani to Sapru, 21 Dec. 1922, Srinivasa Sastri MSS, NMML.
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Gandhi and the collapse of the non-co-operation movement was a more important 
factor. Whatever the case, by the time Butler left at the end of 1922 there was only 
the faintest memory of the honeymoon period that Ministers had enjoyed in the first 
three-quarters of 1921. In one division on the District Boards Bill on 6 November 
1922, the two Executive Councillors and all except one of the officials in the Council 
voted against the Ministers.173 The joint approach to dyarchy was obviously 
falling apart at the seams, and the Ministers complained that by their second year of 
office they were only being barely tolerated by their official colleagues.174
The appointment of Butler’s successor, Sir William Marris, came as a relief to 
the Services in the U.P. as he had risen from their ranks. Marris, who had been 
closely involved in writing the Montagu-Chelmsford Report, operated the reforms in 
the United Provinces in quite a different way from his predecessor. As the Simon 
Report comments, Sir William ’made no attempt to return to a unitary system. He 
held regular meetings of his Executive Council and he met his Ministers individually, 
but he did not hold meetings with them as a Ministry.’175 Chintamani wrote 
disconsolately, ’Our new Governor is working the constitution in a spirit of fairness, 
but in a technical and narrow-minded manner. Diarchy is being ridden to death and 
Ministers are complete zeroes in the administration of Reserved subjects.’176 
Financial problems had also become acute. Although the United Provinces did well 
out of the Meston Settlement, starting with extra resources worth nearly Rs. 1.6 
crores, this was soon dissipated on rises in Service pay and the extra costs involved in 
the reforms machinery. By the Spring of 1923, the two Ministers must have foreseen 
a very difficult time ahead within the Government and the prospect of setbacks at the 
polls in November 1923, with Liberal Party organisation unready.177 In April 
1923 Chintamani and Jagat Narayan both resigned, having previously agreed to act 
together if either one of them had to resign on a difference with the Governor. As has
173 Simon Commission Report, Cmd. 3572, 1929-30, vol. 3, p. 204.
174 Chintamani’s written evidence to Muddiman Committee, Appendix 5, Cmd. 2361, Simla 1924, 
p.276.
175 Simon Commission Report, Cmd. 3572, 1929-30, vol. 3, p. 201. Marris explained to the 
Viceroy that he did not consult Indian Members on Reserved subjects ’over which a definite cleavage of 
opinion was to be expected.’ Marris to Reading, 15 July 1923, £25.
176 Chintamani to Sivaswami Aiyer, 19 Feb. 1923, Aiyer MSS, NAI.
177 Simon Commission Report, Cmd. 3572, 1929-30, vol.3, p. 202.
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been indicated, Chintamani had been unhappy in Government for some time and a 
number of considerations must have weighed with him.178 Marris believed that 
the final straw was a scandal relating to a libel action which Sir Claude de la Fosse, 
Vice-Chancellor of Allahabad University, brought against Iqbal Narain Gurtu, a friend 
of Chintamani’s. Gurtu had apparently accused de la Fosse of taking bribes and 
Chintamani had tried to use his official position to stop the libel case going forward, 
arguing that Government servants had, under the rules, to refer libel actions to the 
Government for permission. Chintamani was ruled out of order, and resigned.179 
Marris decided to offer one of the vacant posts to a landlord and the other to a 
Liberal, recognising that ’ability and energy were mainly on the side of the Liberal 
party’.180 Firstly Rai Sahib Sita Ram and then Gokaran Nath Misra were 
offered a Ministry on condition that they worked with Raja Parmanand, a senior 
landlord, but both refused on the grounds that they could only work with another 
Liberal Minister.181
Chintamani’s resignation did at least allow him time to work on preparing the 
Liberal Party organisation for the forthcoming elections.182 Once again, 
however, despite the Liberal Party having a larger and more active organisational base 
than most other Provincial Liberal Parties, the U.P. Liberals were swept from the 
councils in the elections.183
What lessons can be learnt from the United Provinces’ experience of working 
the reforms? Firstly, that in a Province where the urban-based intelligentsia was very 
much in a minority in the new councils, the Liberals were inevitably very dependent 
on the support of the Governor, without which the Ministers would always be 
defeated. In the United Provinces the Governor always regarded the landlords as his 
chief constituency and the Ministers owed their positions entirely to the Governor.
178 One of the issues that he clearly thought was crucial was the intervention of the Governor in 
Transferred Departments ’...so as to weaken Ministers in the eyes of, and by comparison with 
Secretaries and Heads of Departments.. . ’. Chintamani to Srinivasa Sastri, 24 Apr. 1922, Sastri MSS, 
NMML.
179 Marris to Reading, 2 May 1923, £25. See also V to S/S, ptel. 348, 11 May 1923, £12.
180 Marris to Reading , 17 May 1923, £25.
181 Marris to Reading , 17 May 1923, £25; G.N. Misra to Besant, 14 May 1923, Besant MSS,
file AS/3.
182 See Chintamani to Sapru, 12 July & 9 Aug. 1923, SAP/C50 & 51, 2nd. series.
183 See below, p. 325, n. 75.
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Secondly, that the attitude of the Governor under the reformed system was crucial. 
Chintamani complained that the Rules of Executive Business, which were kept 
confidential, gave inordinate powers to the Governor, and that the Finance 
Department was to all intents and purposes a Reserved Department. ’It is only’, 
Chintamani argued, ’when the Governor casts his influence decisively on the side of 
the Ministers as against the permanent officials that the former can get on at all with 
self-respect. ’184
4. Summary. The Experience of the Indian Liberals of Working the Reforms in 
the Provinces
This study has focused on three Provinces where members of the Indian 
Liberal Party played a leading part as Ministers in the first reformed councils. It has 
not been the intention to analyse the working of the dyarchical system per se, but 
rather to study the relations between the Ministers and the British establishment during 
the implementation of the Montford reforms.185 Certain conclusions can be 
drawn. Firstly, one must take into account the circumstances in which the reforms 
were brought into operation. The ill-feeling that resulted from the Amritsar Massacre 
and its repercussions, the Khilafat movement, the parlous economic conditions in 
India after the War, all contributed to the worst possible atmosphere in which to start 
the new Councils. Congress’ belated decision to boycott the elections meant that the 
turnout of voters was very limited and that consequently, many of those elected did 
not feel they had a real mandate for their positions in the Councils. This may well 
have contributed to a feeling amongst the new Councillors that they should show their 
independence by attacking government, refusing to vote supplies etc.186 
Certainly there seemed to be an absence of any recognition of the difference between 
Ministers on the transferred side, whom the Council were supposed to be influencing,
184 Chintamani to Sastri, 21 Dec. 1922, Sastri MSS, NMML.
183 Muddiman Report, Reforms Enquiry Committee 1924, Cmd.2360, 1924-5. Both majority and 
minority versions provide an excellent dissection of the dyarchical system in practice, though it must be 
remembered that some of the evidence and the conclusions were coloured by the later experience of 
Swarajist obstructionism.
186 See Setalvad, Recollections, p. 324.
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and the Executive side. Ministers were treated as if they were part of the Government 
and as much to be attacked as Executive Councillors. Things did settle down 
eventually and Ministers began to work to achieve majorities for their policies, but 
this following seems to have been a personal loyalty rather than a party one, and 
Ministers often had to rely on the official bloc to achieve their policies.
Even though Congress supporters were absent from the Councils, their spectre 
continued to haunt the new Ministers. The Congress boycott of schools and other 
Government institutions, the programme of picketing liquor shops and burning foreign 
cloth, the refusal to pay revenue in parts of the countryside, the hartals at the time of 
the visit of the Prince of Wales, all brought Ministers into conflict with public opinion 
outside of the Council Chambers. As nationalists, the experience must have been very 
unpleasant for the Liberal Ministers; as members of Government their position was 
particularly ambivalent. Whilst deprecating the direct action of Congress, particularly 
the more lawless forms of non-co-operation, Liberals felt reluctant to be involved in 
taking executive action or ’repression’, as they called it, against Congress. Nothing 
divided the Ministers and the British more than this law and order issue. Some 
Governors accused the Liberals of cowardice, some argued that they would not 
support in public what they were prepared to support in private. The British failed to 
understand that Indian politicians inevitably saw the role of the police in an entirely 
different perspective to the British.187 They failed also to understand how it 
would be electoral suicide for Indian politicians to be associated with the British on 
law and order issues, such as the arrest of Gandhi and other leading Congressmen.
Problems of finance were another important factor in undermining the position 
of the Ministers. The latter were shocked to find themselves coming into office facing 
budget deficits rather than the surpluses which seemed vital if their programmes in the 
Transferred Departments were to be achieved. There was some improvement thanks to 
increased trade and improved harvests in the revenue side but there was never enough 
money for Ministers to carry out the range of their plans in transferred subjects. It
187 See B. Siva Rao to Lytton, 11 Aug. 1924, L22, for a very clear exposition of the Liberal view: 
'We see none of the difficulties of the police, we only see that they are generally harsh in the measures 
they adopt. We further see that in the budgets of the various provinces the police grant exceeds the 
education, medical, agriculture and public health grants; in a few provinces, I believe, all of them 
together. ’
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should not be forgotten that Ministers had a very short time indeed in which to make 
their mark- three years only. This, in addition to their lack of executive experience, 
would have made Ministers inevitably reliant on their civil servants’ advice.
In each of the provincial examples which have been studied, emphasis has been 
placed on the role of the Governors. Partly this is a matter of the nature of the 
documentary sources available, which are mostly written from the Governors’ point of 
view, but also this reflects an important truth about the working of the reforms. 
Governors had wide powers under the reforms: they selected the Ministers, they 
assigned the departmental portfolios, they effectively determined whether to consult 
Ministers on matters in the reserved half of Government, they had ultimate control of 
the power of the purse to determine whether Ministers had any surplus to spend on 
their Departments, they could and did intervene in the Transferred Departments, 
especially on issues concerning appointments, and finally, they controlled the official 
bloc which could make or break measures in the Legislature. The differences in the 
way in which Governors operated the reforms is remarkable, as can be seen in the 
United Provinces when Marris took over from Butler and ran the Government on 
entirely different lines from his predecessor. Considering that a number of the 
Governors had not originally been sympathetic to the reforms and that some were 
distinctly hostile to the idea of the educated elite coming to dominate the Councils, it 
is remarkable that Governors were as open to appointing and then supporting Indian 
Liberals as they were. Butler, for instance, might have selected Ministers from the 
landlord majority in the United Provinces’ Council and probably should have done so, 
properly speaking. However, Governors sensibly recognised, firstly, that they needed 
talented and capable Ministers if they were to make headway in the Transferred 
Departments, and, secondly, that it was important to the public prestige of the reforms 
that Ministers should not be seen as Government stooges. If non-co-operation made 
for problems over law and order it is also quite probable that it made the British more 
susceptible to the influence of the Ministers and the Legislatures. It was vital that the 
Councils should be seen to be working and that constitutional co-operation should be 
rewarded. Thus, despite the very real powers of the Governors, Ministers could
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generally get their way if they stuck to their guns and threatened resignation.188 
This threat would have much more impact if backed by the sort of party solidarity that 
operated in the United Provinces.
Party solidarity, or rather the lack of it, is another very important aspect of the 
working of the reforms. The reforms were predicated upon the idea that a party 
system would develop in India and that Government would not find itself on its own 
against its arrayed critics. These calculations were thrown awry by the Congress 
boycott. Now there was nothing to push the Moderates towards co-operation with the 
Government, save support of their own Ministers. In provinces like Madras the 
Liberals formed part of the opposition (to the non-Brahmin Justice Ministry) and the 
Madras Government argued that this showed that the ’differences between the views 
of the "moderates" and Congressmen were more imaginary than real...for all practical 
purposes they shared the Congress policy and sentiments.*189 There was not the 
party organisation or discipline to operate reforms in the way intended.190 The 
British blamed the lethargy of Indian politicians or the intrinsic unsuitability of the 
country to western-type democracy, and made some attempts to organise a 
Government party, even providing the whips where necessary.191 Butler even 
described the Liberals as ’political peacocks , strutting before the public, all of a 
tremble when there is any suggestion of work.’192
What the British failed to recognise was their own responsibility for the failure 
of ideologically-based parties to take root. The acceptance, and, indeed, extension of 
separate electorates under the 1919 Act, was not conducive to the development of 
political parties on ideological rather than on interest group, factional or communal 
lines. There was, therefore, a certain hypocrisy in British complaints that the Indians 
seemed incapable of breaking away from community politics. In a clear reference to 
the role of caste and religion in Govemment-formation under the 1919 Act,
188 See the example of the Bombay Ministers, Setalvad, Recollections, p. 325.
189 Muddiman Report, Cmd. 2361, 1925, Views of Local Governments, p. 44.
190 Almost every Province argued that real political parties were absent from the first Council, 
e.g. Muddiman Report, Cmd. 2360, 1925, pp. 12-13 (Bihar & Orissa); p. 13 (Central Provinces); 
Maclagan (Punjab) to Reading, 4 Jan. 1922, £24.
191 E.g. In Madras where Willingdon provided three council secretaries to act as whips. See 
Arnold, Congress in Tamilnad, p. 59.
192 Butler to H.E. Richards, 26 Apr. 1921, £21.
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C. Ramalinga Reddy of Madras argued that, ’Party implies the possibility of 
converting another to your faith. Birth is hardly susceptible of conversion after it has 
once occurred’.193 Reddy went on to point out in a brilliant and amusing piece 
of evidence to the Muddiman Committee that Governors had not chosen Ministers 
because of their party affiliation, and that they maintained Ministers in office even if 
they were defeated in the Legislature.194 Additionally, the system of dyarchy 
meant expecting Ministers to vote with Executive Councillors, who of course did not 
represent parties. At the end of the day Governors could carry on without reference to 
any party by using the bloc of officials and nominated votes in combination with 
loyalist groups such as Christians, Muslims, landholders, European commercial 
groups etc.. Reddy concluded by arguing that ’Dyarchy renders Party impossible and 
that as no true responsibility is possible without Party, the system is but camouflaged 
bureaucracy.’195 Obviously, Liberals did not go along with this conclusion, 
indeed they turned the argument on its head and argued that the problem was that until 
there was real responsibility over all departments of provincial government there 
would be no effective party system. 196
The only Province which could have claimed to have worked the reforms 
really successfully was Madras, where the Non-Brahmin Party provided the first 
Ministry. In fact the Governor, Willingdon, was prepared to move to the complete 
transfer of departments to Indian Ministers. The irony is that the Justice Party is 
generally agreed to have been very much a creation of the British themselves and that 
Willingdon’s choice of Justice Party Ministers was probably based upon a 
misapprehension that they commanded a majority in the new Legislature.197 As 
Irschick argues, in a sense the Justice Party were almost the ideal reforms party, 
moderate, if not conservative, and entirely concerned with the sort of provincial 
matters that the new reforms focused on.198 Willingdon was at first enthusiastic 
about non-Brahmin loyalty, indeed the Justice Party was entirely supportive of the
193 Muddiman Report, Appendix 5, Written Evidence, p. 33.
194 Ibid., p. 35.
195 Ibid, pp. 33-5.
196 See evidence of P.C. Mitter, Muddiman Report, Appendix 6, vol.2, Oral Evidence, p. 155.
197 Baker, The Politics o f South India, pp. 37-8. Once Willingdon had selected them ,the Justice 
Ministers were able to win over enough Independents to maintain a majority.
198 Irschick, Politics and Social Conflict in South India, p. 170.
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Government’s policies towards non-co-operation.199 However, working the 
reforms seemed to make the Justice Party more and more conservative, eschewing 
social reform and concentrating on using office to obtain community 
advantage.200 Montagu tried to dampen Willingdon’s anti-Brahmin enthusiasm 
and, by the end of the first Councils, Willingdon himself seemed to have tired of 
communally-based politics.201 Elsewhere In India, divisions tended to follow 
community rather than ideological lines.202 In the Punjab the main lines of 
division were Hindu versus Muslim and between rural and urban interests, with the 
former very much in control.203 Ramalinga Reddy argued that the British 
concentrated so much on building up their allies that they gave no consideration to the 
existence of an opposition, indeed Reddy argued that they didn’t even want
204one.
Whilst not agreeing with this last argument, it does seem that Reddy had put 
his finger on one of the great problems in the Montford reforms. One purpose of the 
reforms was, as has been argued, to develop a system of democracy in India, and the 
Westminster two-party system was an inevitable model for the British to export. 
However, most Britons governing India had fundamental doubts whether India was a 
suitable ground for planting western political institutions. Not only that, but the 
implications of establishing a parliamentary system in India were that the British 
would eventually be shown the door. A party system implies that an opposition may 
be able to gain power. Admittedly, the British made sure that only very restricted 
power was on offer initially, and ensured that they could manipulate the system to 
ensure the maintenance of their allies in what positions of power were available. But 
the logic of the position remained: if an opposition took power it could potentially 
bring Government to a standstill and/or bring sufficient pressure for an expansion of 
its powers. This is indeed what happened when the Swarajists took control of the
199 Willingdon to Montagu, 27 Aug. & 20 Dec. 1921, W4.
300 Irschick, Politics and Social Conflict in South India, pp. 188-93.
201 Montagu to Willingdon, 8 June & 10 Aug. 1921, W4; Willingdon to Peel, 30 Apr. 1923, W4.
202 In the Central Provinces the divisions followed linguistic-regional lines with Hindi-speaking
areas in the North aligned against Marathi-speaking areas in the South. See Sly to Reading, 22 July 
1923, £25; also D.E.U. Baker, Changing Political Leadership in an Indian Province: the Central 
Provinces and Berar 1919-1939, Delhi, 1979.
203 Mac lagan to Reading, 4 Jan. 1922, £24.
204 Muddiman Report, Appendix 5, Written Evidence, p. 28.
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Legislatures in Bengal and the Central Provinces in the second Councils and pursued a 
programme of obstruction. The British responded by falling back on safeguards and 
strengthening the position of their traditional allies, whilst relying on divisions in the 
nationalist movement. However, it is important not to paint the Montford reforms 
from a palette derived from the history of the 1930s. The reforms were intended to 
begin a process of developing parliamentary institutions in India. However, the 
reforms had about them much of Janus- one side facing the intended democratic 
future, the other looking to continue to protect imperial interests by the best means 
available. The new reforms were largely worked by the old personnel, so that it 
shouldn’t be surprising that attitudes took some time to change.
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CHAPTER VH : THE COLLAPSE OF THE LIBERALS
The collapse of the Indian Liberal Party as a result of the Legislative Council 
elections of November 1923 was dramatic, but not entirely unexpected. Some 
Liberals blamed the British for their electoral demise.1 They argued that the 
British cut the ground from under their feet by measures they had taken in the period 
1921-1923, including the association of the Liberals with unpopular measures taken 
against the nationalist movement, and the financial constraints placed upon the 
ministers in the provinces. Certain policies had seemed almost designed to undermine 
Liberal standing with the electorate: most particularly, they resented the certification 
of the salt tax and the failure to protect the interests of Indians overseas. The Liberals 
felt that these policies were just part of a much larger turnaround in British policy to 
India: they regarded themselves as the victims of a die-hard backlash in British 
politics which was signalled by the resignation of Edwin Montagu as Secretary of 
State in February 1922.
1. A British Backlash?
The Liberal claims require some investigation. There is some foundation to the 
idea of a hardening in British attitudes towards India in the years 1921 to 1923, but, 
as we have seen, this process started well before the resignation of Montagu and 
resulted primarily from antagonism to the Gandhian non-co-operation movement. The 
hardening of British attitudes towards Indian constitutional advance may be said to 
have continued throughout the interwar years. Never again was there the optimistic 
assumption in British governing circles that India could progress rapidly towards
1 J. Dwarkadas to P.S.S. Aiyer, 25 Nov. 1923, Aiyer Mss, NAI.
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westem-style self-governing institutions. In fact, there were increasing doubts in 
British circles whether western political institutions were suited to India at all.2 
The Government of India reacted negatively to moves by Indian politicians to speed 
up the process of constitutional change by appointing a round table conference to 
discuss constitutional progress towards Dominion self-rule. The Government’s position 
was that the Montford reforms had not yet been given a proper chance to see if they 
could work satisfactorily. The most they were prepared to consider was a review of 
the working of the constitution, with the intention that some faults within the system 
might be identified and ironed out.3 However, British Governments, of whatever 
party affiliation in the 1920s, refused to consider another major round of constitutional 
concessions.
The experience of the working of the Montford reforms had highlighted a 
number of intrinsic problems within the Indian political situation. Firstly, there had 
been a lack of Indian co-operation in the working of the reforms. It was true that 
Congress, in the form of the Swarajists, did fight the elections of 1923 and take up 
seats in the legislatures and also important offices in some cases. However, the 
obstruction of Government business by the Swarajists in the Central Provinces and 
Bengal effectively disabled the working of government for a time in the mid-1920s 
and very much antagonised British policy-makers.4 There was a strong feeling in 
Britain that Indian politicians had not made the most of the opportunities provided by 
the new constitution.5 Secondly, there was a growing belief that the working of 
the new constitution had revealed certain intrinsic flaws in India’s preparedness for
2 See, e.g., Leslie Wilson (Governor of Bombay) to Lytton, 27 Aug. 1925, L15.
3 The appointment of the Muddiman Committee in May 1924 served this very purpose. Three 
Liberals, Sapru, Sivaswamy Aiyer and R.P. Paranjpye were on the committee and signed the minority 
report.
4 For an example of the change in attitude of Lord Lytton, for instance, see Lytton to Baldwin, 12 
Aug. 1925, L25.
5 See Chelmsford to Evan Cotton, 26 Aug. 1924, Cotton MSS, EUR. F. 82, IOLR.
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future self-government. The most important problem was that India had, if anything, 
become less of an identifiable and coherent nation during the 1920s than before. Sir 
Frederick Whyte, who as President of the first Imperial Legislative Assembly, was a 
fairly sympathetic observer, put this feeling succinctly when he wrote that, ’You 
can’t talk of Self-Government unless the country has a self, and our responsibility in 
India and for India will not be over until India has found herself.’6 What Whyte 
and others focused on was the growth of Hindu-Muslim rivalry in the 1920s, and the 
implications that this held for India’s political future. There was general agreement 
that the reforms had probably exacerbated communal differences but the main point 
was that these differences could not just be talked away.7 Of course British 
politicians like Birkenhead realised that communal rivalry in India gave one of the 
best justifications for the continuance of colonial rule:
In [the] ultimate analysis the strength of the British position is that we 
are in India for the good of India. The most striking illustration of the 
truth of the position is supplied by the infinite variation of nationality, 
sect and religion in the sub-continent. The more it is made obvious that 
these antagonisms are profound, and affect immense and irreconcilable 
sections of the population, the more conspicuously is the fact illustrated 
that we, and we alone, can play the part of composers.8
In addition to the issue of communal rivalry, there were other practical 
considerations that had arisen in the early years of working the Montford reforms, 
which gave rise to doubts about the practicability of Indian self-government in the
6 F. Whyte, Diary entry, 16 June 1923, Whyte Mss, EUR D 761, vol 4. IOLR.
7 F. Whyte, diary entry 16 June 1923, Whyte MSS, 761/4. For discussion of the causes of 
Hindu-Muslim discord in this period see G.R. Thursby, Hindu-Muslim Relations in British India, 
Leiden, 1975; B. Chandra, Communalism in India, New Delhi, 1984.
8 Birkenhead to Reading, 22 Jan. 1925, cited in John Campbell, F.E. Smith. First Earl o f 
Birkenhead, London, 1983, pp. 733-4. Further evidence of the recognition that Hindu-Muslim disunity 
worked to the advantage of the British can be found in Stamfordham (PS to King George V) to Lytton, 
22 Feb. 1924, LI.
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foreseeable future.9 One such issue was the future of the Indian army, a problem 
which it was conspicuously obvious that most Indian nationalists shied away from.
The practical difficulty was that it would take several decades to build up the Indian 
contingent in the army and in the meantime India would be dependent on British 
troops for defence.10 One other important issue was the future status of the 
Indian Princes within self-governing India. As can be seen from the debate about the 
abolition of the Press Act, the Liberals had no more sensitivity to this issue than the 
Congress.11
Finally, there was the much broader consideration of the suitability of the 
pattern of the devolution of power on the Dominion model for India. There was a 
growing conviction in British governing circles that Dominion Status, which took on a 
much more concrete form in the Balfour Committee Report of 1926, was not a 
suitable goal for India. Malcolm Hailey, the Home Member of the Government of 
India, made the distinction, when speaking before the Imperial Legislative Assembly 
in February 1924, between responsible government and Dominion Status and argued 
that the British Government had promised India the former, but not the latter.12 
Birkenhead, the right-wing Secretary of State for India, privately confirmed this 
opinion only a few months later when he told the Viceroy that, ’to me it is frankly 
inconceivable that India will ever be fit for Dominion self-government.’13
The above considerations amount to a very marked reaction from the liberal 
thinking about India that permeated government circles in the years 1917 to 1921. The
9 These issues are identified by Sir Frederick Whyte in a fascinating article which he wrote in the 
Observer, 10 June 1923, a copy of which can be found in Whyte MSS, 761/4.
10 This was a matter which the Indian Liberals, especially Sir Sivaswamy Aiyer, gave more 
attention to than Congress did. The Liberals tended to be more realistic in their view that India would
need to maintain the imperial connection if only for defence purposes. See Mehrotra, India and the
Commonwealth, pp. 168-73.
11 See pp. 227-229 above.
12 Mehrotra, India and the Commonwealth, p. 175.
13 Birkenhead to Reading, 4 Dec. 1924, cited in Campbell, F.E. Smith, p. 733.
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view that India ceuld take on western parliamentary institutions and move to a 
Dominion pattern of self-government, admittedly never a completely explicit or 
unanimous view amongst policy-makers, was hardly heard of after 1924. The 
permanence of British rule became the general assumption of the day.14
However, the Liberals were wrong to place the blame for their failure in 1923 
at the door of a British die-hard reaction. The primary responsibility lay with 
themselves and their failure to use their period in office to build up a proper party 
organisation and publicity machine which might have allowed them to win over more 
of the enlarged electorate under the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. The Liberals, 
always a party of chiefs rather than followers, played the political game of the 
pre-1914 system rather than coming to terms with the transformation which the 
Montagu-Chelmsford reforms had brought into being.
2. The failure of Liberal Party Organisation
Like the old Congress, the Liberal Party had a fairly loose organisation. This 
was deliberately so, because, just as Congress had been a coalition of provincial 
organisations and leaderships, so the Liberal Party had to maintain an equilibrium 
between rival centres. Any attempt by one region to dominate the Party would put 
severe stress on a fragile coalition. As the Congress itself came to accept a much 
more rigorous constitution at Nagpur in December 1920, the Liberals put more and 
more emphasis on the argument that they did not think India was ready for a 
constitution that marked so clearly the dominance of one group within the party. 
However, like the early Congress, some provinces inevitably came to carry greater 
weight than others. Bengal had provided the founding organisation and the Indian
14 See Stamfordham to Lytton, 8 July 1925, LI: ’If only we can make plain to India that the 
British Raj is there for all time’.
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Association and the Bengal National Liberal League (both centred in Calcutta) were 
the first two constituent organisations of the central National Liberal Federation. If the 
founders of the party came from Calcutta, the financing came from Bombay City. The 
Bombay leadership, including men like Dinshaw Wacha, had links with the 
mill-owning interests and the Parsi financiers who provided the largest sources of 
Liberal funds.15 This gave the rather more conservative leaders from Bombay an 
undue weight in party decisions, a factor which came to be resented by the rising 
politicians of the United Provinces. There were two Liberal organisations in Bombay 
Presidency; the Western India National Liberal League, which was dominated by 
Wacha and friends, and the more progressive Deccan Sabha, which benefited from the 
very lively tradition of Poona politics and the influence of cognate organisations, such 
as the Deccan Education Society and the Servants of India Society. The United 
Provinces, the third region in importance in Liberal politics, tended to provide 
younger and more activist politicians, men like H.N. Kunzru of the Servants of India 
Society. The headquarters of the U.P. Liberal Association was in Allahabad, the 
political capital of the U.P., and home to politicians like Tej Bahadur Sapru. The last 
of the Presidency capitals, Madras, was the centre of the Madras Liberal League. The 
influence of Madras in Liberal politics was lessened by the intricate local political 
rivalries of the region, and the fact that leading Madras figures such as Srinivasa 
Sastri and Sir Sivaswamy Aiyer preferred to play to a national rather than a local 
gallery.16 Finally there was a growing Liberal organisation in the Central 
Provinces and Berar, established initially in Nagpur only, but by 1923 there was 
another organisation at Akola.17
15 Party funds were always short, see below, n. 25.
16 Although Sastri came from Madras, he was identified rather more with Bombay because of his 
leadership of the Servants of India Society.
17 There were also numerous minor branches many of which centred around a local political 
figure, e.g. the West Khandesh Liberal Association, Dhulia, W. Khandesh (Bombay Province) which 
was formed around S.D. Garud, M.L.C, and M.K. Apte. Citizen, vol. 28, no. 1, 17 Feb. 1921.
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Before the second Liberal conference which took place in Calcutta at the end 
of December 1919, there was some debate as to what sort of organisation the Liberal 
Party should be. There were three main issues, all of them reflecting the desire of 
some Moderates to return to the ’good old days’ of the Congress movement. Firstly, 
should the party aim to be a large-scale organisation, sending large numbers of 
delegates to its annual conference, as the Congress did? Secondly, should there be a 
subjects committee or could the decisions as to resolutions to be put before the 
conference be left to informal discussions, as had happened in the early phase of 
Congress history? Thirdly, should a formal constitution be established; Congress in 
its early years had done without one? The host province, Bengal, favoured a small 
gathering, partly because they did not feel that the Liberals could compete in numbers 
with the Congress. They also felt they could do without a subjects committee.18 
Bombay agreed, Wacha continuing his basic theme that ’it is not quantity but quality 
which is needed...a few picked men of the greatest experience and knowledge of 
public affairs, of sober and sagacious statesmanship will be enough...Let our numbers 
be a low as 50 or 75.,19 Wacha differed from Mitter, however, on the last issue, 
in that he wanted the Liberal Party constitution not to be settled immediately but to 
develop gradually as the Congress constitution had done.20 Sivaswamy Aiyer, the 
President of the forthcoming Congress and the leader of the Madras organisation, 
however, was adamant that it was important that the Liberal conference attract as 
large an attendance a possible. He also insisted that there be a proper subjects 
committee and that ’there must be no attempt by any province to bring forward cut 
and dry resolutions prepared behind the backs of the representatives of other
18 P.C. Mitter, Secretary, Bengal, National Liberal League, to Liberal organisations, 27 Nov. 
1919, W.I.N.L.A. MSS.




As it turned out, some 875 delegates attended the 1919 conference, of whom 
the vast majority, 691, were from the host province, Bengal. There was no 
embarrassment about paucity of numbers as, according to the Bengalee, all 1,500 
visitors tickets were taken up and the town hall was filled to capacity.22 The 
conference formally adopted the new title of National Liberal Federation and 
established a council to undertake work during the year.23 This council would be 
made up of up to 15 (raised to 25 in 1920) members from each province, plus the 
office-holders elected at the annual session. The President of the annual conference 
would chair the council in the year that followed. Delegates to the Conference would 
be either members of the local associations mentioned above or those chosen by them. 
Local associations were recommended to undertake a programme of constructive work 
which included educational reform, agricultural reform, amelioration of the backward 
classes, organisation of medical relief and sanitation, and prohibition work. Two 
general secretaries were appointed to carry out the work of the council during the 
year. In his speech Sir Sivaswamy Aiyer defended the creation of the new party on 
the basis that party organisation formed on issues of principle was a fundamental tenet 
of British democracy and was suited to this stage in India’s development: ’so long as 
the people had no voice in the administration and it was only a question of wresting 
privileges from the bureaucracy, the policy of a united front was indispensable. This 
was not so under responsibility.’24
In the following year at the annual conference at Madras the rules for the 
composition of the subjects committee were established and it was agreed that one half
21 P.S.S. Aiyer to P.C. Mitter, copy pi., n.d., 5 Dec. 1919, W.I.N.L.A. MSS.
22 Bengalee, 3 & 4 Jan. 1920, cited in L/P&J/1648/699/1920.
23 See National Liberal Federation, Report of 2nd. Annual Conference held at Calcutta, Dec.
1919. Copies of annual reports may be found in the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune, 
and occasionally in L/P&J files, e.g. for this conference see L/P &J/6/1656/1338/1920.
24 Bengalee, 31 Dec. 1919, L/P&J/1648/699/1920.
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of the delegates fees plus an additional £600 p.a. be set aside for the work of the 
Indian Reform Committee in London, which replaced the British Committee of the 
Congress which had been taken over by the mainstream Congress and was later to be 
disbanded. Here again the Liberals followed traditional Congress policy, whilst the 
Gandhian Congress went in an entirely different direction. The Liberals consciously 
saw themselves as maintaining Congress traditions. Thereafter annual Liberal 
conferences remained sedate affairs with typical attendances of about 500 delegates. 
Compared with the Gandhian Congress, the Liberal Party ran on a shoestring. Its 
income for 1920 amounted to only Rs. 4,487, most of which came from delegate fees 
of Rs. 10 per person.25 As had happened in the past, the British organisation was 
kept short of funds.26 Devaprasad Savadhikary who visited London in 1921 
reported that the London committee was not working effectively: ’the Secretary is not 
adequately remunerated and there is no provision for getting into touch with and 
bringing together M .P.s, journalists and leaders of public opinion interested in Indian 
reforms’.27
The problem for the party was to maintain a momentum in between 
conferences. The difficulty was that some of the most energetic leaders became 
members of Government under the new reforms and therefore were required to give 
up their active roles in the Liberal Party. The very nature of Liberal membership also 
made continued political activity problematical; many Liberals were successful 
businessmen or professional people, especially lawyers.28 They found it difficult
25 See Accounts presented to 3rd. Session N.L.F., Dec. 1920, in N.L.F. General File, 1921-23, 
at BPA offices.
26 See W. Douglas Hall, Sec. Indian Reforms Committee, to G.A. Natesan, 9 Nov. 1921 & 17 
May 1922, N.L.F. General File.
27 D. Sarvadhikary to Natesan, n.d., [Nov. 1921?], N.L.F. General File.
28 See Appendix 2 for an analysis of the occupations of members and supporters at the first 
Moderate conference, Nov. 1918. The figures represent minimum numbers as many people did not 
have their occupation recorded. 32% were lawyers; nearly 14% merchants or manufacturers; 9% 
landlord/landowners; 19% were educationalists, doctors, journalists or other professions. 27% had B.A. 
qualifications at least.
315
to devote time to Liberal activities. In addition, it was difficult to bring together the 
council of the Federation over such vast distances as the Indian sub-continent. The 
council soon became moribund and came merely to register members willing to make 
a larger (Rs. 25 p.a.) donation to party funds. B.S. Kamat, in resigning from the 
all-India council in 1922, protested that the council did not meet at all in the previous 
year.29 Things were obviously not much improved during 1922 as D.G. Dalvi 
wrote that he was ’really angry with the General Secretaries in doing next to nothing 
in this year to advance the Liberal case in these critical times...The secretaries called 
only one meeting of the council during the year and managed to call it at their doors 
at one end of the country [Madras].’30
It might be argued that the fact that the central organisation of the Liberal 
Party was not very active did not present an insuperable problem as long as the local 
associations were active. It was particularly important that the latter should maintain 
an organisation that would reach outside of the main urban centres and which would 
act effectively in preparing the party for elections. But did the associations perform 
this function? The fullest surviving records for a local association are those of the 
Western India National Liberal Association, Bombay, and they give a valuable picture 
of local organisation.31 W.I.N.L.A. was formed at the instigation of Sir Dinshaw 
Wacha, who was keen that Bombay should not be left too far in the wake of Bengal, 
which had taken the lead in establishing a local liberal organisation.32 The 
organisation paralleled to some extent the membership of the Bombay Presidency 
Association, which was no longer the absolute bastion of the Moderates and from
29 B.S. Kamat to G.A. Natesan, 22 May 1922, N.L.F. General File.
30 D.G. Dalvi to G.A. Natesan, 2 Dec. 1922, N.L.F. General File.
31 Kept at the offices of the B.P.A..
32 Wacha to various persons, circular letter, Jan 1919, W.I.N.L.A. MSS, General Correspondence 
file, 1919.
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which Wacha resigned in July 1919 as president.33 In February 1919 
W .I.N.L.A. had 82 members and this had risen to over 130 by the end of the year. 
The largest financial supporters of the Association were the Bombay mill-owners, Sir 
Hormusji Wadia, Sir Dorab Tata and Sir Shapuiji Bharucha. The two latter 
gentlemen donated Rs. 10,000 each to the fund supporting the Liberal deputation to 
Britain in 1919.34 Despite Wacha’s elitist approach, the Association gave full
approval to Bengal’s policy of undertaking educational work among the backward 
classes and also village sanitation on co-operative lines. However, it was significant 
that Bombay preferred to leave such work to existing organisations such as the Social 
Service League.35 The Association supported the Anti-Non-Co-operation 
Committee established by Sir Chimanlal Setalvad in October 1920 with Sir 
Purshottamdas Thakurdas, Sir Cowasji Jehangir and Kanji Dwarkadas as 
secretaries.36 Setalvad saw this as a propagandist organisation which would 
encompass men like Thakurdas who would not want to join a Liberal organisation. 
The committee accepted an invitation to hold a public meeting in Surat from Chunilal 
Gandhi, a Liberal who was standing in the Assembly elections.37 Gandhi was 
keen that the Liberals do more to educate the people. ’Pious resolutions’, he 
complained ’and excellent speeches in the Bombay dailies do not reach masses who 
are daily being captured in larger and larger numbers by the glamour of all the 
promises these irresponsible non-co-operationists give. The trading classes are still 
sound at core. But they are afraid of social ostracism and cannot stand up without
33 B.P.A. Minute Books, vol. v, entry 1 July 1919, B.P.A. MSS. The B.P.A. retained a balance 
between moderate and extreme members during the following years.
34 W.I.N.L.A. Membership and Donations List 1919; Wacha to Joshi, 16 Aug. 1919,
W.I.N.L.A. MSS, Correspondence File A, 1919-20.
35 Hon. Sec. W.I.N.L.A. to Hon. Sec. National Liberal League, Calcutta, draft letter, 11 May 
1919, W.I.N.L.A. MSS, General Correspondence file, 1919.
36 See K. Dwarkadas, India’s Fight fo r Freedom 1913-37, Bombay, 1966, p. 154.
37 Thakurdas to C.M. Gandhi, 24 Oct. 1920, Thakurdas MSS, NMML.
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encouragement from outside.’38 Setalvad, Thakurdas and Jamnadas Dwarkadas 
provided just this outside encouragement when they addressed a public meeting at 
Surat on 7 November. One thousand people turned up and the meeting was deemed a 
successful venture into ’mass politics’.39 Unfortunately, Wacha, who seems to 
have provided all the funds for the Committee, took umbrage at Thakurdas’ 
establishment of a separate organisation and this contretemps led to Thakurdas 
resigning from the committee, arguing that ’ it is a great pity that the few anti-non-co- 
operationists in Bombay should not agree among themselves and work in unity.140
In April 1921 a report from M.D. Altekar on his work in the mofitssil in 
establishing Liberal associations in the districts during the last six months was read to 
the council of the W .I.N.L.A.. It was resolved that Altekar should assume the post of 
Deputy Secretary and maintain this work, spending at least half of every month in the 
mqfussil*1 Indeed it was in the Deccan that the Bombay Liberals came nearest to 
their goal of establishing rural links. In 1920 Liberal centres were established at 
Satara, Dhulia, Nasik and Igatpuri. W.I.N.L.A. was aided in this work by the Deccan 
Sabha, for whom Profs. Kanitkar, Kale and Joag and Messrs. Limaye, Gadgil, 
Paranjpye and Kothari toured the Deccan and Berar propagandising against non-co- 
operation.42 The Deccan Sabha, using its long-standing social work links with 
the countryside, was quite prepared to drum up large numbers of peasant delegates to 
try and win support for the reforms at the Poona District Conference held at Junnar in
38 C.M. Gandhi to Thakurdas, 29 Oct. 1920, Thakurdas MSS, NMML.
39 Anti-non-co-operation work involved more than just mass meetings. B.S. Kamat informed the 
national conference in Dec 1920 that he had been working for the movement in the Deccan ’moving 
from village to village and explaining its [non-co-operation] evil to the masses. ’ Report of Proceedings 
of 3rd. session of N.L.F. Madras, Dec. 1920 p. 79, G.I.P.E..
40 See Thakurdas, Jehangir, & Dwarkadas to Wacha, 5 Nov. 1920- with annotations by Wacha; 
Thakurdas to Setalvad, 19 Nov. 1920, Thakurdas MSS, NMML. See also accounts of the Anti-Non-co- 
operation Committee, W.I.N.L.A. MSS.
41 W.I.N.L.A. Council minutes, 7 April 1921, W.I.N.L.A. MSS.
42 See Annual Report, Deccan Sabha, 1920-21, G.I.P.E..
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March 1920.43 However, shortly before the conference the delegates were 
excluded- the Sabha went ahead with a separate peasants’ conference.44 The 
Sabha used its links with the non-Brahmin movement to get together nearly one 
thousand delegates for the Bombay Provincial Conference at Sholapur in April 
1920.45 A Deccan Liberal Society was set up in June 1920 and the contrast with 
its more well-heeled counterpart, the W.I.N.L.A. in Bombay, can be seen in its 
programme which insisted that ’if fresh or additional taxation has to be resorted to, 
the taxes should be so devised that they will fall chiefly upon the wealthy classes who 
are able to bear the burden.’46 The Deccan Sabha provided useful support to the 
Ministers in that members toured the municipalities advising them on how to prepare 
detailed schemes for compulsory primary education without incurring additional 
costs.47
The work of the Deccan Sabha was closely related to that of another 
organisation based in Poona, the Servants of India Society, which provided the 
Liberals with their strongest links with the concerns of the majority of Indians. It was 
founded by G.K. Gokhale in 1905 in order to train what might be called secular 
missionaries to undertake national work. Srinivasa Sastri, a high school headmaster 
from Madras, became the leading member of the Society after Gokhale’s death in 
1915. New members were admitted as probationers for their first five years and 
followed the instructions of the First Member. The Society usually attached its 
members, of whom there were never more than about fifty, throughout the country, to
43 The Deccan Sabha was founded by Justice M.G. Ranade in 1896 and lapsed on his death. It 
was revived on the eve of the Morley-Minto reform and again in 1918. See The Deccan Sabha. Golden 
Jubilee Celebration, Poona, 1947, G.I.P.E..
44 Idem.
45 Idem.
46 Idem. Appendix 1. Programme of the Deccan Liberal Party 1920. The Sabha had over 150 
members but its main income was from an annual donation of Rs. 2000 from Sir Hormusji Wadia, its 
President. See Report of Deccan Sabha 1922-23, G.I.P.E..
47 Report of the Deccan Sabha 1921-22, G.I.P.E.. Paranjpye, the Education Minister for Bombay, 
was a member of the Sabha.
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a local organisation for service. Members came to specialise in certain fields. Thus 
A.V. Thakkar was assigned to work with tribals and untouchables in Gujarat, V. 
Venkatasubbiyah to the depressed classes in Madras, N.M. Joshi to labour matters, 
G.K. Devadhar to the education of women and the co-operative movement via the 
Poona Seva Sadan etc.. Most of the members were from poor or middle class 
backgrounds and relied on allowances paid by the society.48 Financial support for 
the Society came from donations from Bombay businessmen men like Sir Dorab Tata, 
A.J. Billimoria, Sir Dinshaw Wacha, Jamnadas Dwarkadas and from Annamalai 
Chettiar, the Madras banker and merchant.49
The work of members of the Servants of India Society meant that the Liberals 
had more concrete links with and knowledge of the countryside than they otherwise 
would have had. In Madras, K.G. Sivaswamy Aiyer of the Servants of India Society 
undertook Liberal propaganda and recruitment in the rural districts. He put great 
emphasis on social reform matters, especially on the abolition of caste distinctions and 
the creation of social unity, and argued that the non-co-operation movement in Madras 
was being exploited by social conservatives who supported the vama system.50 
For instance in January 1918 leading figures in the agitation in Kaira district, Gujarat, 
seeking abatement of revenue demands following failure of the kharif crop, asked 
Amritlal Thakkar of the Servants of India Society to come to the area and examine the 
situation. As a result three members of the Servants of India Society, Devadhar,
48 See P. Kodanda Rao, ’Bubbles of Memory’, articles of reminiscence published in the Deccan 
Herald, weekly 1966-1970, especially issue of 14 May 1967, P. Kodanda Rao MSS, NMML.
49 G.K. Devadhar to A. V. Patwardhan, 7 Sept. 1920, Joshi MSS, NMML; Sastri to A. V. 
Patwardhan, 2 July 1920, 8 March 1921, 24 Nov. 1923, Sastri MSS, NAI; Sastri’s diary, entries for 26 
& 29 March 1919, Sastri Microfilm, NMML.
30 Sivaswamy also asked Sastri’s permission to make overtures to the Non-Brahmin Party so as to 
oppose non-co-operation. See K.G. Sivaswamy Aiyer to Sastri, 6 Feb. 1921, Sastri MSS, S.I.S.. For 
further details of K.G. Sivaswamy’s activities see the Citizen, 9 Oct. 1920, 24 Mar., 19 May, 2 June 
1921. See also K.G. Sivaswamy Aiyer to P.S.S. Aiyer, 16 April 1921, Sivaswamy Aiyer MSS, NAI, 
in which he contrasted the negative attitude to this work of G.A. Natesan, the General Secretary of the 
Party, and of Srinivasa Sastri and the Servants of India Society who supported his rural work.
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Thakkar and Joshi, examined the situation in one taluka thoroughly and reported to 
the Government their findings.51 The Government accepted one of the 
recommendations of the report, namely that there be a suspension of half the revenue 
demand in twenty-two villages, but other recommendations were rejected or 
postponed to be further investigated. Following their work in Matar taluka the three 
men went on to continue their enquiry in Thasra taluka but gave way to the work of 
Gandhi and other members of the Gujarat Sabha who had finally acceded to the 
demands of the Kheda peasants and come to collect further evidence.
Another example of Liberal intervention on behalf of the rural classes was in 
the United Provinces in 1921 when, as we have seen, the Government was introduced 
the Oudh Rent Bill. The Liberal League of the United Provinces organised a series of 
meetings in the districts: the main speakers being Pandit Krishna Kaul of the Servants 
of India Society, Gokaran Nath Misra, and P.N. Sapru.52
In many ways the Liberals found themselves in a cleft stick when it came to 
organising themselves in rural India. It was not, it is true, a natural environment for 
them to operate in. The examples given above reflect particularly the work of the 
Servants of India Society and of the most active and radical of the local Liberal 
organisations, that of the United Provinces.53 More typically, the Liberal 
leadership was based in the Presidency cities and reflected the concerns of the urban 
professional elite.54 There was no way that they could compete in making the sort
31 For the full background of the Kaira (or Kheda) satyagraha which followed see D. Hardiman, 
Peasant Nationalists o f Gujarat, Oxford, 1981, ch.5. A printed copy of the report by the three S.I.S. 
members, dated 18 Feb. 1918, may be found in the G.I.P.E..
32 See K. Kumar, Peasants in Revolt, p. 180 for a list of the meetings. I am indebted to the 
accounts in Kumar, ch.4 and to M. Siddiqi, Agrarian Unrest in North India, pp. 186-95. See also pp. 
293-294 above.
33 I have emphasised these examples because they contradict the generally accepted view that the 
Liberals did not venture into the countryside.
34 R. Suryanarayana Rao of the Servants of India Society in Madras complained that 'the Madras 
Liberal League evinces little or no interest in matters affecting the people in general...it is mostly 
composed of vested interests and men who have no idea of the poverty and sufferings of the poor.’ R. 
Suryanarayana Rao to V.S.S. Sastri, 6 Feb. 1921 Sastri MSS, S.I.S..
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of effective contacts with rural India that the Gandhian Congress made. On the other 
hand, their most effective way of organising in the districts depended on organisations 
such as the Anti-Non-Co-operation movement in Bombay or the aman sabhas in the 
United Provinces, and the danger here was that they could easily come to be seen as 
the stooges of the Government or of vested interests, whether it be the merchants in 
Bombay or the landlords in the United Provinces.
3. Organising for Elections
The only time the Liberals across the country did come to recognise the value 
of organised links with the districts was when elections were imminent. British 
sources are agreed that elected members did very little to nurse their constituencies 
between elections.55 This may have been the result of complacency fostered by 
the Congress boycott of the first elections, or, more likely, a result of the enlarged 
size of the constituencies which meant that it was much more difficult to maintain 
contact with electors between elections.56 Constituencies, from being a matter 
of a small number of electors under the Morley-Minto Councils, and thus easily 
corruptible, became substantially larger.57 For example, in the 1923 election 
Surendranath Baneijea’s constituency, 24-Parganas Municipal North, had 11,694 
voters on the electoral roll.58 A later survey found that a high percentage (62%
55 E.g., see Ronaldshay to Reading , 3 Feb. 1922. R24. Ronaldshay stated that he could only find 
six members having taken any interest in their constituencies since the elections.
56 This can be demonstrated by looking more clearly at the growth of the Bengal electorate. 
Whereas in 1913 there were only 9000 electors in total in the Bengal Legislative Council elections, i.e. 
1 in 4650 of the population, the electorate was enlarged in 1920 to over I million in total (approx 2.5% 
of population). Broomfield, Elite Conflict, p. 58; Report of the Indian Statutory Commission [Simon] 
vol 1, p. 191.
57 See J. Broomfield, ’The Vote and the Transfer of Power : A Study of the Bengal General 
Election, 1912-1913’, in J. Broomfield, Mostly about Bengal, Delhi, 1982, pp. 54-83. Municipality 
seats under the Morley-Minto system had an average of only 199 electors, whilst landholder seats had 
an average of only 159.
58 Return Showing the Election Results in India, 1923, Cmd. 2154, 1924, p. 521.
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of the Muhammadans and 41 % of the non-Muhammadans) of the Bengali electorate 
were illiterate so that normal methods of influencing opinion through newspapers and 
circulars must have had a limited impact.59 This enlargement of the electorate 
had been a ploy of the Bengal officials to try and undermine the ’bkadralok oligarchy’ 
who might otherwise dominate the elections.60 In addition, efforts were made to 
keep rural and urban interests separate by insistence on a residence qualification for 
candidates.61 This was intended to keep the carpet-bagging urban elite out of the 
rural constituencies and to restrict the influence of the lawyer group.62
One person who did see the urgent need for the Liberal Party to reorganise 
itself in time for the elections in November 1923 was C.Y. Chintamani, who, soon 
after resigning his Ministerial position in the United Provinces in May 1923, started to 
tour Bombay Presidency to stimulate the Party into action.63 Although Chintamani 
reported some revival in the United Provinces and Bombay, he bemoaned the lack of 
virile leadership in the party and wrote that he was ’handicapped for want of 
coadjutators.’64 Sapru and Sastri, the two most likely leaders, were both absent
59 ’Secret Memorandum on the Working of the Reformed Constitution in Bengal, 1923-26’, dated 
1927, p. 6 , in L43.
60 Broomfield, Elite Conflict, pp. 102-4.
61 This was noticed by the Labour politician Josiah Wedgwood who wrote of ’the careful 
segregation of county constituencies from the towns, and the grouping of the towns into "lost seats" 
which alone should be surrendered to nationalist politicians.’ Josiah Wedgwood, The Future o f the 
Indo-British Commonwealth, Madras, 1921, p. 138.
62 Even so in the first Bengal Legislative Council it was estimated that out of 119 elected and 
nominated non-official members, 43 were lawyers, 31 were landholders, 27 from the banking and 
commercial classes, and 18 miscellaneous. Ronaldshay to Reading , 3 Feb. 1922. JR24. In the United 
Provinces however, the landholding classes retained their predominance. As many as 77 of the general 
constituencies in the United Provinces were rural as against only 12 urban seats. In the first Council 
landlords outnumbered lawyers by 46 to 41 (10 others). See Simon Report, Indian Statutory 
Commission, Cmd. 3572, 1930, pp. 215-6. The average size of a rural general constituency was 24,230 
electors. Ibid., p. 212. Franchise qualifications were based on essentially on property or rental values in 
land. For example, in the U.P., for rural constituencies the qualifications covered those who paid Rs.
25 p.a. in land revenue or who paid rents of Rs. 50 p.a. or Rs. 25 p.a. if they certain tenure rights.
See P.D. Reeves et al. (eds.) A Handbook to Elections in the United Provinces 1920-1951, Delhi, 1975.
63 Deccan Sabha Annual Report, 1923-24, G.I.P.E..
64 Chintamani to Sapru, 12 July 1923, SAPIC50, 2nd. series . Sivaswamy Aiyer, of whom
Chintamani’s complaint was mainly directed, himself complained that the Liberal organisation in 
Madras was moribund and existed only in name. ’There are very few people’, he told Sapru, ’of the
(continued...)
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in London during crucial periods of 1923.
The 1923 election files of the W.I.N.L.A. give a valuable picture of the 
Liberal organisation and its defects. Firstly, it is clear that preparations for the 
elections started too late. A meeting called to select candidates on 28 August 1923 
was dissolved without any work being done. It was not until September, therefore, 
that candidates were selected and in some cases their selection came too late for them 
to accept a party ticket.65 Following the selection of candidates it was agreed that 
the Association should provide 2 paid canvassers/agents to each candidate at the cost 
of Rs. 50 per month each. An 18 point manifesto was adopted and leaflets 
prepared.66 Candidates put out their own manifestos but in the ones that survive 
there is no mention of their party allegiance.67 The Liberals just could not 
compete with the reputation and organisation that Congress had established in the 
countryside during the non-co-operation movement. Whilst the Liberals had focused 
on legislative politics and came to be seen as supporting the Government, Congress 
had pursued issues which were of more direct meaning to the majority of Indians and 
had developed a nationalist stance and political method that restored the pride of 
Indians in their nationality. John Broomfield puts this very well when he outlines the 
advantages of the Bengal Swarajists in the elections:
64 (...continued)
right sort that is qualified for the work who are willing to spare time and trouble for any honest 
political work. Indignation meetings, resolutions and anglophobic talk exhaust all their spare energies’. 
Aiyer to Sapru, 27 Sept. 1923. SAP, 2nd. series.
65 See, e.g., V.V. Kalyanpurkar to W.I.N.L.A., 18 Sept. 1923. Kalyanpurkar, a retired judge 
from Kumta in N. Kanara, received the Liberal nomination after he had already toured his constituency 
telling them that he was standing as an independent candidate. G.B. Pradhan wrote from Nasik on 30 
Sept. 1923 to the same effect. Pradhan was a member of the Liberal Party but not having received the 
party nomination in time he stood as an ’Independent Liberal’. W.I.N.L.A. election file, 1923.
66 There was a reciprocal arrangement for the Bombay Government and the W.I.N.L.A. to 
circulate each other’s leaflets, but it is not clear if this was implemented for the election. Director of 
Information Government of Bombay to W.I.N.L.A., 29 Aug. 1923, W.I.N.L.A. Election File, 1923.
67 See the manifesto of M.N. Dastur who stood in Poona City 1 Sept. 1923; also A.N. Surve, for 
Bombay City North (Non-Muhammadan) 2 Oct. 1923. Surve’s main claim to fame was that he had 
voted 54 times against the Government out of 93 divisions in the last legislature! W.I.N.L.A. Election 
File, 1923.
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They were the heroes of the greatest anti-Govemment agitation India 
had ever seen and they proudly bore the new title of honour: prison 
graduates. They had symbols such as the wearing of khadi, by which 
they could appeal to the new mass electorate and they could offer 
themselves to the people as Mahatmaji’s disciples.68
The example of Surendranath Baneijea’s heavy defeat at the hands of Dr. 
Bidhan Chandra Roy, described in the Statesman as ’an amiable doctor whose name 
was chiefly known to his numerous patients’ illustrates the failure of the Liberal 
campaign perfectly.69 Roy began his campaign as early as May 1923 and, 
according to Broomfield, ’spent most of his evenings and his Sundays among his 
electors’ in the 24-Parganas North constituency.70 By contrast, ’in the same 
period Baneijea visited the constituency twice only, for he was in Darjeeling 
throughout the summer. ’71 Roy skilfully played to all the various interest groups 
in the constituency and had the invaluable support of Congress volunteers and the 
personal backing of the popular Bengali leader C.R. Das. The result was a devastating 
blow to Baneijea, who polled only 2,283 votes against the 5,689 of his 
opponent.72 Broomfield calculates that the Swarajists captured three-quarters of 
the Hindu constituencies and half the Muslim seats. ’The Moderate party had been 
reduced to a rump and nearly all its leaders had been kept out of the Council.*73 
In the Bombay Legislative Council, ten official Liberals were reduced to three or
68 Broomfield, Elite Conflict, p. 239.
69 Statesman, 1. Dec. 1923, cited in B.R. Nanda, ’The Swarajist Interlude’ in B.N. Pande (ed.),
A Centenary History o f the Indian National Congress (1885-1985), vol. 2, p. 119. On the election 
campaign, see Broomfield, Elite Conflict, pp. 240-2.
70 Broomfield, Elite Conflict, p. 241.
71 Idem.
72 Interestingly, Baneijea thanked the authorities for the help they had given him in his constituency 
and singled out Sir Alexander Murray for gratitude. Baneijea argued that he lost the election due to a 
campaign of personal vilification against him, and he called on the Government to rescue the Liberals 
by nominating them to the councils. Baneijea to W. Hailey, 7 Dec. 1923, WH5(d).
73 Broomfield,-Elite Conflict, p. 242. Tinker, Local Self-Government, p. 137, says that 7 Liberals 
were elected to the second Bengal Legislative Council, as against 47 Swarajists and 19 other 
independent Nationalists, who gave the Swarajists ’general’ support.
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four.74 The Leader calculated that five official Liberals survived in the U.P. 
Legislative Council, to which might be added six potential sympathisers.75 In the 
Imperial Legislative Assembly elections Liberals did very badly, losing candidates like 
Chintamani, Kunzru and Gurtu from the United Provinces, and Setalvad, J.
Dwarkadas and B.S. Kamat in Bombay. It was only through Government nomination 
that five Liberals were able to enter the Assembly, to be joined by three members 
elected from Madras.76
The lack of Liberal Party organisation was therefore the major reason for the 
Liberal inability to maintain themselves as a viable national party after 1923.77 It 
was typical of their plight that the sub-committee which the party appointed in 1923 to 
examine their organisation seems never to have reported.78
4. The Indian Liberals after 1923
After 1923 the Liberals as a party in the legislatures were effectively defunct. 
In the Imperial Legislative Assembly the Liberals were reduced from some twenty 
seats to only five nominated and three elected seats.79 It was apparently difficult 
to maintain a party discipline over even this small number of representatives.80 
Whatever power the Liberals could exercise was a balancing power, offering their 
support sometimes to the Government, sometimes to the Nationalist opposition, which
74 Smith, thesis, p. 340.
75 Leader, 15 Dec. 1923, p. 3, cited in Smith, thesis, p. 340. Tinker, however, calculates that
there were 20 Liberals in the U.P. Legislative Council after the 1923 elections, as against 50 landlords 
and 30 Swarajists: Local Self-Government, p. 137. Lack of clear party affiliations makes precise 
calculation impossible.
76 Idem.
77 This conclusion contradicts the more generous view taken by R. Smith, thesis, p. 321, that the 
Liberals actually campaigned vigorously.
78 B.D. Shukla, History o f the Indian Liberal Party, Allahabad, 1960, p. 242.
79 Smith, thesis, p. 340.
80 Smith, thesis, pp. 354-66. See also V.S.S. Sastri to Editor of the Leader, 3 Apr. 1924, in
Jagadisan (ed.), Sastri Letters, pp. 117-19.
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included Swarajists, Independents and later some Responsivists. The Liberals did a 
little better in the Imperial Legislative Assembly elections of 1926, returning six 
members by election and one by Government nomination. With the Swarajists much 
reduced in number, the balancing role of the Liberals was maintained. This rather 
prosaic existence in the legislatures was eked out until 1937 when the Liberal Party 
was finally swept into oblivion by the Congress decision to contest elections under the 
1935 reforms with a view to taking ministerial office in the provinces. To some extent 
the Liberals could see the Congress decision as a victory for their brand of 
constitutionalism, indeed they consoled themselves at the time of the Swarajist 
victories in 1923 that to all intents and purposes Congress was coming round to the 
constitutionalist stance that the Liberals had fought for since 1918.81 The 
Swarajists gradually dropped their policy of obstructionism within the Councils and in 
1925 some of their leaders took up office just as the Liberals had done. Motilal Nehru 
accepted a place on the Skeen Committee on the army; V.J. Patel was elected to 
presidency of the Imperial Legislative Assembly, succeeding Sir Frederick Whyte;
S.B. Tambe, leader of the majority Swarajists in Central Provinces accepted the post 
of Executive Councillor in the Central Provinces.82
However, in many respects the most important role of the Liberals after 1923 
was not as a party within the legislatures, a role for which neither their small numbers 
nor their lack of party discipline particularly fitted them, but rather as individuals at 
the service of the state or as mediators between the colonial state and the broader 
nationalist movement.83 Srinivasa Sastri and Tej Bahadur Sapru, the leading 
Liberal figures of the 1918-1923 period, continued to play the most noteworthy roles
81 Smith, thesis, pp. 321-2.
82 B.R. Nanda, ’The Swarajist Interlude’, p. 138.
83 The mediating role of the Liberals is the central argument of Ray Smith’s thesis, op. cit., and 
also of later writings such as H. Baneijee, Political Activity o f the Liberal Party in India, 1919-1937, 
Calcutta, 1987.
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after that date. Sastri, following on from his earlier work for Indians overseas, was 
appointed member of an India-South Africa Round Table Conference in 1926, and the 
following year took up the position of India’s first Agent in South Africa.84 
Sapru, in addition to continuing a distinguished legal career, played an important role 
as Chairman of the Delhi all party conferences of 1923 and 1924, and drafted the 
Commonwealth of India Bill under Mrs Besant’s auspices. Sapru continued to seek the 
sort of all party, cross-community consensus that he had contributed to achieving at 
Lucknow in 1916, but which became more and more difficult to achieve in the 
interwar years as communal rivalry and political factionalism increased markedly. In 
1928 Sapru succeeded, in conjunction with Motilal Nehru, in drawing up an all-party 
constitutional proposal, the Nehru Report, but he was not able ultimately to win 
majority Muslim approval for the scheme. In the 1930s Sapru was a leading figure in 
the Round Table Conferences and played a key role in mediating between the British, 
the Congress and the Princes.85
Liberal relations with their British rulers did not improve after 1923, but rather 
tended to worsen as constitutional concessions became harder to obtain with the 
dominance of the Conservative Party in politics. At times a chink of opportunity was 
presented by events such as the coming to power of Labour minority governments in 
1924 and 1929, or by the British search for a means to take the initiative from the 
Congress programme of civil disobedience, but these opportunities were wasted more 
often than not. Sapru and other Liberals played an important role in trying to progress 
the constitutional position towards Dominion status and to bring the nationalists and 
the Government around the discussion table to achieve that object. But usually the 
Liberal mediators were squeezed between the mutually re-enforcing forces of
84 Sastri’s later career can be followed in P. Kodanda Rao, V.S. Srinivasa Sastri, Bombay, 1963.
85 See D.A. Low, ’Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and the First Round Table Conference’, in Low (ed.), 
Soundings, pp. 294-329.
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Government intransigence and Congress extremism.86 The Liberals were 
frustrated by the Government’s complete unwillingness to accept the minority report 
of the Muddiman Committee, which was presented in the spring of 1925. Sapru, 
Sivaswami Aiyer and R.P. Paranjpye had, together with M.A. Jinnah, signed the 
minority report which argued, contrary to the majority version, that dyarchy, the key 
feature of the Montford reforms, had failed. The remedy was full responsible 
government in the provinces and central government, save for defence, foreign affairs, 
and political relations, which should continue to be reserved subjects at the centre.
For the Liberals this marked a painful outcome to their experience of the years 1918 
to 1923, when they had pinned everything to the hope that they could make the 
reforms work.
There were further British rebuffs for the Indian Liberal approach, most 
especially when the Government decided in 1927 to appoint an all-white Parliamentary 
body to examine constitutional change, as required under the 1919 Act. Liberals 
boycotted the Simon Commission as wholeheartedly as other nationalist groups. The 
fact that the Government finally agreed to a series of Round Table Conferences to 
discuss India’s progress to Dominion Status in the early 1930s, and that the Liberals, 
led by Sapru, played a key role in those conferences, was some final vindication of 
the Liberal faith in the constitutional path towards independence within the Empire. 
Even then, the proposed reforms were so hedged with safeguards and the British 
position so entrenched by the support of the Princes, Muslims and other non-Congress 
groups that the final goal seemed a long way off still.
When Independence eventually came in 1947, the Liberals, individuals now 
and no longer a party, could take some satisfaction that they had contributed to the 
achievement and that the constitutional model that was followed was the one that they
86 Smith, thesis, p. 650 on.
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had fought for all- along. India remained in the Commonwealth, even after it became a 
Republic in 1950.
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CHAPTER VHI : CONCLUSION
To the courage of those who called themselves ’Liberals’ is due the fact 
that the new Constitution launched in 1921 has had any chance of life at 
all. These men co-operated with Government to inaugurate and establish 
the new Legislatures; and if these bodies have weathered the storms of 
the past three years, the National Liberal Federation and the 
Government of India may share the credit between them.
Sir Frederick Whyte, President o f the Imperial Legislative Assembly, 1923.1
It is tempting when analysing the significance of the British-Indian Liberal 
relationship in the years 1920 to 1923 to write in terms of an unfolding tragedy, using 
imagery of a marriage that failed etc. ? The undoubted collapse of the Liberal 
Party after 1923 and the return to a more conservative line of British policy in India 
might lead one to conclude that this was merely a brief encounter without long-term 
significance. Alternatively, there is an attraction in placing too much weight on the 
long-term significance of the role of the Liberals in relation to the ruling power. Thus 
some historians have seen the Liberals as the guardians of the constitutionalist 
tradition within Congress.3 They have argued that the Liberals kept this tradition 
alive in the difficult period between the demise of the old Congress in 1918 and the 
acceptance by Congress of a constitutionalist role in 1937. A third assessment might 
treat the Liberals as ’collaborators’ with the British, allowing the rulers to maintain a 
facade of constitutional propriety and betraying the sacrifices of Congressmen and
1 Diary entry, ’notes for C.S.K.’, Oct. 1923, Whyte MSS, IOLR, vol. 6.
2 Baneijee’s study, The Political Activity o f the Liberal Party in India, 1919-1937, tends towards 
this approach, see conclusion, pp. 226-39 especially.
3 This is the argument of R. Smith, thesis, p. 668. This is also the implication of Low, ’Sir Tej 
Bahadur Sapru and the First Round Table Conference’, pp. 321-2: ’India would have become 
independent without Sapru, but the manner in which it became independent owed a great deal to men of 
his ilk; and one may-reasonably doubt if India would have become independent without a violent 
revolution, or would then have sustained a parliamentary system of government, but for his efforts and 
those of his colleagues in the tumultuous years 1929-31.’
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women in these years. This view sees the Liberals as cowardly mendicants, breaking 
with their nationalist colleagues for the sake of the lure of office.4
The above views seem inadequate as explanations of the role of the 
British-Indian relationship in this period. To see the Liberal role as tragic is to play 
down the fact that they chose the path they took for themselves. In fact, in certain 
respects, Montagu and others were offering them a way out of almost certainly being 
consigned to a secondary role if they had stayed within the Congress. Many Liberals 
would only be satisfied with a leadership role, and their secession from Congress 
allowed them to strut on the political stage until their rival actors returned and they 
became understudies once more. The Liberals seceded from Congress of their own 
volition; there was no deliberate British policy to split the Congress, indeed all the 
signs are that the British initially opposed the break-away. As has been argued, the 
tendency of the British to divide Indian politicians into groups of reconcilables and 
irreconcilables, to take the Moderates into their confidence in the making of the 
reforms, and to use Moderate support as part of their political strategy in Parliament, 
contributed to the Congress split, but were not decisive factors.
The second approach which sees the Liberals as guardians of the 
constitutionalist tradition also has serious flaws. It tends to assume that without the 
Liberals the nationalist movement might have maintained a programme of civil 
disobedience, possibly leading to revolution, particularly in the countryside. Most 
research into Congress activities between the wars suggests that the Congress 
leadership was quite determined to maintain orderly change and to control more 
socially revolutionary forces.5 Gandhi himself contributed to this policy of
4 See J. Nehru, An Autobiography, New Delhi, 1962 edn., pp. 392-3, for one of the most 
powerful contemporary critiques of the Liberals.
5 See, e.g, the following regional studies; D. Hardiman, Peasant Nationalists o f Gujarat', G. 
Pandey, The Ascendancy o f the Congress in Uttar Pradesh 1926-1934; D. Arnold, The Congress in 
Tamilnad.
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evolutionary change and the constitutionalist strain in Congress remained strong 
throughout the interwar period. The Swarajists and Responsivists, represented the 
constitutionalist strain that was ultimately successful. Men like Malaviya and Motilal 
Nehru did not need the Liberals to teach them the importance of working the 
legislatures.
The third or collaborationist approach is also too simplistic to match the facts. 
There were Liberals who were tempted by office and the warm glow of official 
recognition, but the majority of Liberals maintained their integrity as nationalists 
throughout this period. Liberals clashed with the British, as we have seen, on 
numerous issues, the most important of which related to repressive legislation, the 
treatment of the non-co-operation movement, the Indianisation of the services, and the 
treatment of Indians overseas. In many cases the Liberal contribution to the new 
legislation was made at the cost of public popularity, personal health and 
income.6 The Liberals differed with the majority in Congress about the best way 
forward for the nationalist movement. This was, contrary to the views of some 
historians, primarily an ideological difference and not a matter of personal rivalries or 
factionalism.7
The most fruitful way to see the British-Indian Liberal relations after the First 
World War is not in terms of some broad over-arching historical explanation, but 
rather in the specific context of imperial politics and nationalist response at that 
particular time. The period between 1917 and 1922 was critical for the British 
Empire. During that period the Empire expanded to its largest extent ever, yet it also 
faced the most serious threat from nationalist movements that it had faced to that date. 
The two facts were, of course, not unrelated. The war aim of national
6 Sapru is a case in point, he was forced to resign as Law Member due to ill-health and to take on 
that post he had given up an extremely lucrative legal practice.
7 For a contrary view see, Brown, Gandhi's Rise to Power, p. 131 ff.
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self-determination, originally an aim that was restricted to Europe, became extended 
to the Near East and beyond as a result of the exigencies of the war. In 1917 the 
British and their allies faced a desperate situation and they used the promise of future 
national self-determination in the Middle East and India to try and extend their 
alliances and fortify the existing support for the war in key parts of the empire. The 
promises that were made to Arab, Jew and Indian alike were notoriously ill-defined, 
but the important fact was that they had been made, could not easily be retracted, and 
began to take on a meaning and life of their own in nationalist circles. The power of 
the concept of national self-determination, pushed to the forefront by Lenin and by 
Woodrow Wilson, had a force well beyond that intended by British policy makers. 
Officials, who had previously remained confident in the permanence of British rule; 
now had to adjust their policies to try and avoid being submerged in the flood-tide of 
demands for national rights. The fact that simultaneously the empire was patently 
overstretched, particularly in military terms, gave the nationalists an opportunity to 
test the strength of colonial rule to the limit.8 Finally, the British manipulation of 
the territorial settlement in the Middle East provoked a major nationalist response in 
the Islamic world, particularly in Palestine, Iraq and India (the Khilafat movement).
Facing a ’crisis of empire’,9 an upsurge of nationalism, which marked an 
unprecedented unity in the nationalist movements and which reached well beyond the 
urban educated elite which had until that time dominated non-European nationalist 
movements, the British responded by offering major constitutional concessions. These 
concessions amounted to an offer of limited independence in Egypt (1922), dominion 
status in Eire (1922), constitutional reforms in India (1919) and the possibility of a 
further instalment of reforms if the talk of a round table conference in 1922 had
8 See K. Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis o f Empire, 1918-1922, Manchester, 1984.
9 J. Gallagher’s term, ’Nationalisms and the Crisis of Empire, 1919-1922’, Modern Asian Studies, 
15, 3, (1981), pp. 355-68.
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materialised. The wider purpose of these concessions was to try to re-draw imperial 
commitments and priorities in line with the extension of empire and the reduction of 
finances with which to rule it. The political purpose of these concessions was to 
re-stabilise the political situation, to ’rally the moderates’ to the government side, 
whilst setting firm limits on ’extremist’ ambitions. In the case of India the 
constitutional concessions had a broader significance as they appeared to envisage a 
process of the gradual devolution of power through defined parliamentary stages, an 
exclusive privilege of the white colonies until that time. In all cases the concessions, 
despite meeting very mixed responses, were enough to allow imperial rule to be 
re-stabilised, with the image of authority intact and essential imperial powers largely 
undiminished.
In each colonial situation it was the British who defined who the ’moderates’ 
were who were going to be the recipients of their concessions. It was in the nature of 
colonial rule that their choice could be somewhat arbitrary; in Egypt Zaghlul Pasha 
was the beneficiary,10 in the Middle East the Hashimite dynasty,11 in India 
the Indian Moderate Party. Of course, colonial officials did not define with any clarity 
the ’moderates’ that they had in mind. In India one can surmise that when most 
bureaucrats used the term ’moderate’ before 1918 they meant a range of Government 
supporters, including landlords and Muslim traditionalists as well as the more 
conservative elements in the Indian National Congress. However, it is interesting to 
see that, increasingly, the British used the term ’moderate’ to mean the group of 
Congressmen who supported the Montford reforms and seceded from Congress in 
order to do so. In other words, in India the Montford reforms crystallised the 
Moderate/Extremist divisions. Increasingly British policy-makers, like Montagu,
10 See E. Kedourie, ’Sa’ad Zaghlul and the British’ in The Chatham House Version and Other 
Middle Eastern Studies, London, 1970, pp. 82-159.
11 The literature on this subject is massive, see, e.g., R. Baker, King Husain and the Kingdom of 
Hejaz, London, 1979.
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Chelmsford and Willingdon were turning to the western-educated politicians as 
representative of the middle-ground in Indian politics. This was a substantial advance 
in British attitudes and marked an important new flexibility in colonial policy-making.
The British willingness to work with moderate Indian nationalism marked a 
recognition of the fact that they could not rely on their old autocratic methods, but 
now had to survive by playing the political game in the legislative arena. The furore 
over the Rowlatt Acts and the Amritsar Massacre which followed indicated the 
impossibility of pursuing a policy of outright repression for any length of time. There 
were now clear limits of both public revenue and public acceptability of any 
programme of wholesale repression of nascent nationalism in the Empire.12 
Playing the political game under the Montford reforms meant British officials learning 
new tricks: establishing propaganda machinery to put forward the government case in 
India and abroad, taking Indian politicians into their confidence in policy-making, 
devolving power at a provincial level to Indian ministers representative of elected 
members in the legislatures, establishing coalitions of Indian representatives within the 
legislatures in order to pass important legislation without resort to certification, and 
even, if necessary, providing support to organise political parties in the legislatures.
This remarkable change in the British role in India was a natural outcome of 
the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms which were designed to politicise both Indians and 
their rulers. The reforms broke the previous British refusal to establish parliamentary 
institutions in India, and inherent within this change of policy was the acceptance of 
moves towards encouraging the formation of political parties in India. The process of 
making the reforms undoubtedly led to the proliferation of political organisations in
12 Post-war demobilisation, economic retrenchment and sheer war-weariness set practical limits to 
any policy of large-scale intervention in the colonies. See Darwin, Britain, Egypt and the Middle East, 
pp. 26-36. For the impact of public opinion in limiting the Government’s policy of repression in 
Ireland, admittedly a much more politically sensitive area than India, see D.G. Boyce, Englishmen and 
Irish Troubles. British Public Opinion and the Making o f Irish Policy 1918-1922, London, 1972, pp. 
51-4 passim; also C. Townshend, The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919-1921, Oxford, 1975, p. 170.
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India, but these were almost all predicated on lines of sectional interest rather than on 
ideological bases. This was clearly unsatisfactory to a number of key British 
policy-makers, but it was one of the clear lessons of the working of the reforms that, 
until greater responsibilities had been devolved to Indians by the British, such party 
formation would prove exceedingly difficult. The reforms were both a form of 
political training and an experiment in democracy. As we have seen, many British 
officials quickly became disillusioned with the experiment and concluded that the 
reforms had been based upon the false assumptions that western parliamentary 
institutions would transfer readily to India.13
From the British perspective, therefore, the relationship with the Moderates 
offered a number of advantages. The Moderates formed a key group within the 
legislatures, both under the Morley-Minto and the Montford systems, and it was 
important for the British to be able to gain their support on important issues. On some 
issues the Government were to be disappointed by Moderate support. The most 
important example is that of Government attempts to pass counter-terrorism 
legislation, which not only threatened the Moderate position as nationalists but also 
challenged their fundamental beliefs in individual liberty and the due methods of 
legality. But the issue on which the British most needed the support of the Moderates 
was, of course, that of pressing ahead with constitutional reforms. The Moderates 
gave the reforms an image of acceptability to reasonable Indian opinion, which was a 
vital ingredient if Montagu was going to succeed in passing the reforms through a 
Cabinet which included such imperialists as Curzon, Milner and Balfour and through a 
Conservative majority in both Houses of Parliament.14 The Moderates were also
13 C.A. Kincaird to E. Cotton, 28 Jan. 1925, Cotton MSS, IOLR.
14 Interestingly, the die-hards seemed to realise this. See Indo-British Association pamphlet, The 
Political Situation in India- The Defection o f the Moderates, London, 1919: ’The salient fact for the 
British public to realise is that the whole "moderate" movement is fundamentally artificial. It is a purely 
ephemeral offshoot of the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals designed to deceive Parliament into the belief
(continued...)
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important to Montagu in pressing his case with the Government of India to widen the 
scope of the reforms even further, perhaps even to include the central government in 
the devolution of power to elected Indians. The Moderates, therefore, gave the 
reforms an imprimatur which became more and more important to the British as it 
became clear in the last half of 1920 that Congress was going to boycott the new 
Councils. The Congress boycott had the effect of driving the British and the 
Moderates more firmly into each other’s arms. An important effect of this was that 
the relationship became steadily less one-sided. The Government soon became 
remarkably dependent on Moderate support to maintain an image of constitutionality 
which was becoming increasingly important in view of the growing attention paid to 
imperial affairs across the globe. As we have seen, the Government of India made a 
series of important concessions to Moderate demands in order to maintain their 
support and to keep the Reformed Councils working with a minimum of resort to the 
Viceroy’s power of certification. Under Reading’s regime, important concessions were 
made on issues such as finance, the repeal of repressive legislation, the status of 
Indians overseas, Indianisation of the services, and the treatment of the leaders of the 
non-co-operation movement. Indeed, Reading went much too far for the shaky Lloyd 
George coalition to tolerate. Concessions to Moderate nationalism in Ireland and 
Egypt had stretched Conservative support for the coalition to the limit, and India was 
now seen as the final straw. Montagu’s resignation was the price that was paid for 
Reading’s continuance in office, and thereafter British rule re-stabilised itself in India 
and returned to some of its old ways. As the Gandhian non-co-operation movement 
collapsed, the Government became less reliant on the Moderates and took actions in 
1923, such as the certification of the increase in the salt tax, the Kenya decision, and
14 (...continued)
that there is in India a large and influential body of broad-minded and sagacious men, opposed to 
extremism and anarchy and prepared to assist them in the increasingly complex task of administering 
the country, men who can be fully trusted to support all reasonable and legislative acts.’
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the appointment of the Lee Commission, which seemed to undermine their position. 
The Moderates quickly became disillusioned and demoralised and were heavily 
defeated in the elections at the end of 1923. The relationship with the imperial ruler 
had been fatal to their public image as nationalists. They could offer none of the 
appearance of vigour and self-sacrifice that the Swarajists could offer the electorate, 
they merely appeared as government lackeys.
Under the colonial situation probably no political relationship between ruler 
and ruled is going to work entirely satisfactorily.15 If the Government fails to 
support its proteges it is accused of indifference, whilst if it intervenes on their behalf 
it is accused of creating collaborators. It was an error of British policy-makers in this 
period to imagine that the could build up a ’government party’ to whom they could 
look for support in the legislatures whilst that party would retain its image of 
independence and integrity. It is a tribute to the Moderates that they did, on the 
whole, maintain their integrity and independence, even under the very trying 
circumstances of these years.
Moderate support for the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms allowed the liberal 
reforms to survive a very difficult period. It was obviously the intention of Montagu 
and Chelmsford that if reforms proved a success that there should be a further 
devolution of power in India at an early stage. In other words, the reforms set the 
goal of British rule and the impetus for future moves towards that goal. It was an 
inherent part of the liberal assumption that the reforms would build up their own 
dynamic for change: as Indians came to taste the fruits of power they would inevitably 
demand further concessions, and the fact that Indians had proved their capability of
15 Studies of British relations with two Indian groups in particular support this view. On relations 
with the princes see Ramusack, The Princes o f India; S.R. Ashton, British Policy Towards the Indian 
States 1905-1939, London, 1982. On relations with the landowners in the United Provinces, see F. 
Robinson, ’Consultation and Control. The U.P. Government and its Allies, 1860-1906’, Modem Asian 
Studies, 5, 4, (1971), pp. 313-36; and also the writings of Peter Reeves.
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working the new -constitutional machinery soberly and successfully would satisfy their 
rulers that it was politic and practical to transfer more power. The transfer of power 
within an imperial framework would therefore have a self-perpetuating momentum 
which would grow exponentially. In these crucial years after the War, the British had 
had to come to terms with the temporariness of their rule in India and the implications 
of that realisation. Plans had had to be drawn up which envisaged an ultimate transfer 
of power within a generation. The fact was that by 1923 the British had come a very 
long way from the cautious considerations that marked their thinking in 1916.16
The fact that neither British or Indian Liberal hopes for an early transition to 
self-government within the empire came to fruition was the fault primarily of the 
circumstances in which the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms came into operation and of 
the fundamental and unresolved tension that remained within British policy-making 
between the liberal and paternalist approaches.17 The non-co-operation 
movement, especially the boycott of the Prince of Wales* visit, convinced influential 
British politicians that concessions to Indian nationalists had gone too far and their 
determination to ’hold the fort’ in India strengthened the views of those administrators 
in India who had never been convinced that dyarchy was workable. The whole 
concept of the devolution of responsibility to Indians, on which the reforms had been 
based, was undermined as it was argued from the experience of the first and second 
councils that the necessary signs of Indian responsibility had not yet emerged. The 
constitutional process, however, remained intact, only very much slowed down in its 
implementation.
The Moderates could take some pride in the maintenance of the constitutional 
transition in India, but it should not be supposed that it was in any way the sort of
16 Clear evidence of this can be found in Sir Frederick Whyte’s assumption that India would in the 
foreseeable future be governed by a Parliamentary Executive and a constitutional Governor General. 
Observer article, 10 June 1923, enclosed in diary entry 16 June 1923, Whyte MSS, IOLR, vol. 5.
17 See ch. 1 , section 1.
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constitutional transition that they and Montagu had envisaged when the reforms were 
conceived in the winter of 1917-1918.
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Appendix 1- Biographical Notes 
[Names in bold print were members of the Indian Liberal Party in this period]
ALI, Mohammed (1878-1931). Educated at Aligarh and Oxford University; failed ICS 
& Allahabad bar examinations; Opium agent, Baroda, 1904-12; Pan-Islamist 
journalist; interned May 1915-Dec. 1919; Khilafat leader; interned 1921-3.
ALI, Shaukat (1873-1937). Elder brother of Mohammed; Pan-Islamist journalist and 
politician; interned with Mohammed as above.
AIYER, C.P. Ramaswamy (1879-1966). Madras lawyer; Gen-Sec. INC 1917-18; 
Moderate delegation to England 1919; Advocate-General, 1920-23; Law Member, 
Madras Executive Council, 1923-28.
AIYER, Sir P.S. Sivaswamy (1864-1946). Lawyer/educationalist; Advocate-General, 
1907; Madras Executive Council 1912-17; I.L.A. 1920-1923 (Tanjore & 
Trichinopoly);Indian delegation to League of Nations, 1922; President, N .L.F., 1919 
& 1926; particularly interested in army matters.
BAJPAI, Giija Shankar (1891-1954). ICS; Under-Secretary to U.P. Government,
1920-21; private secretary to V.S.S. Sastri at Imperial Conference, 1921, & at 
Washington Conference, 1921-22.
BALFOUR, Arthur James (1848-1930). Prime Minister, 1902-05; Foreign Secretary,
1916-19; Lord President of the Council, 1919-22.
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BANERJEA, Surendranath (1848-1925). Kulin Brahmin, ICS 1871 to dismissal in 
1874, educationalist, journalist and politician; President INC, 1895 & 1902; Calcutta 
Corporation, 1876-1899; leading role in movement against partition of Bengal; 
Member, Bengal Legislative Council, 1920-23 (24 Parganas North); Minister, Bengal 
Government, 1921-23; knighted 1921.26
BASU, Bhupendranath (1859-1924). Kayastha; Bengali lawyer; Bengal legislature, 
1909-12; President, INC 1914; Member, Council of India, 1917-23; Member, Bengal 
Executive Council, 1924.
BESANT, Annie (1847-1933). Political activist, social reformer, journalist and 
politician in Britain before moving to India as a Theosophist in 1893; established 
Central Hindu College, Benares, 1898; 1907 elected President of Theosophical Society 
and moved to Adyar , Madras, her new headquarters. Joined INC in 1914; founded 
Home Rule League, 1916; interned by Madras Government 1917, President, INC, 
1917.
BUTLER, Sir Spencer Harcourt (1869-1938). ICS 1888; Member G/I, 1910-15; 
LG/Burma, 1915; LG/United Provinces Feb. 1918 (Governor, Jan 1921- Dec. 1922).
CARMICHAEL, Sir Thomas David Gibson-Carmichael, created Lord Carmichael of 
Skirling, 1912 (1859-1926). G/Madras, 1911-12; G/Bengal, 1912-17.
CHAMBERLAIN, Rt. Hon. Austen (1863-1937). Son of Joseph Chamberlain. 
Chancellor of the Exchequer , 1903-05; Chairman of Royal Commission on Indian 
finance and currency, 1913; SSI, 1915-17; member of War Cabinet 1918-19; 
Chancellor of Exchequer, 1919-21, Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of
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Commons, 1921-22.
CHELMSFORD, Frederic John Napier Thesiger, (1868-1933) 3rd. Lord and 1st 
Viscount (created 1921). Fellow of All Souls; Barrister; London School Board, 1900- 
04, G/Queensland, 1905-09; G/New South Wales, 1909-13; Viceroy and G/G of 
India, 4 April 1916- 2 April 1921; First Lord of Admiralty, 1924.
CHINTAMANI, C.Y. (1880-1941). Telegu Brahmin; editor of the Leader 
(Allahabad); Member, U.P. Leg. Council, 1916-23; Minister, U.P. Government,
1921-23; Gen-Sec., N.L.F. 1918-20; 1923-29; President, N .L.F., 1920 & 1931.
CHIROL, Sir Valentine (1852-1929). Traveller, journalist, author; in charge of 
foreign department of the Times, 1897-1912; frequent visitor to India; knighted, 1912; 
Member, Royal Commission on Indian Public Services, 1912-14; defendant in libel 
case brought by B.G. Tilak, 1919. Chirol’s views on India became considerably more 
liberal between his Indian Unrest (1910) and his India Old and New (1921).
CHITNAVIS, Sir G.M. (1863-1929). Kayastha Prabhu; leading landholder in 
Nagpur, Central Provinces; President, Nagpur Municipality, 1896-1918; landlord 
representative in C.P. Council, 1907-16; Nominated Member, Viceroy’s Legislative 
Council, 1918; President, C.P. Legislative Council, 1921-25 .
CHURCHILL, Rt. Hon., Winston Spencer (1874-1965). Colonial US/S, 1906-08; 
President of Board of Trade, 1908-10; Home Secretary, 1910-11; First Lord of the 
Admiralty, 1911-15; Minister of Munitions, 1917, S/S for War, 1919-21; Colonial 
Secretary, 1921-22; leader of die-hard opposition to 1935 Indian reforms.
344
COTTON, H. Evan. A. (1868-1939). Member of an old India family; long-standing 
Calcutta barrister and member of the Calcutta Municipality; L.C.C. councillor, 1914; 
Liberal M.P. July-Nov. 1918; County Alderman, 1919-22; Hon. Sec. Indian Reforms 
Committee; served on advisory committee in India Office on 1919 Act; President, 
Bengal Legislative Assembly, 1922-25. His experience in dealing with Swarajist 
obstruction soured his views on the constitutional reforms.
CRADDOCK, Sir Reginald H. (1864-1937); ICS, 1884; Commissioner/Chief 
Commissioner Central Provinces, 1902-12; Home Member of Viceroy’s Executive 
Council, 1912-17; L/G Burma Feb. 1918-Dec. 1922; Member, Lee Commission on 
Civil Services of India, 1923-24. Formidable right-wing critic of reforms.
CURTIS, Lionel (1872-1955). Member of Lord Milner’s ’kindergarten’ in South 
Africa in first decade of twentieth century; Fellow of All Souls Oxford; founder of the 
Round Table journal to advocate the federation of the self-governing territories of the 
British Commonwealth; took prominent part in discussions on Indian constitutional 
reforms during the First World War and in 1920 published Dyarchy.
DAS, Chitta Ranjan (1870-1925). Calcutta lawyer; despite doubts about boycotting 
councils, he allied with Gandhi, 1920, and led Bengal non-co-operation; founder with 
M. Nehru of Swaraj Party, 1923.
DUKE, Sir F.William (1863-1924). ICS, 1882; Member, G/Bengal, 1910-14;
Member, India Council, 1914-19; Member, Montagu’s deputation to India, 1917-18; 
US/S for India, Jan. 1920-1924. An influential figure in drawing up the 1919 reforms.
DWARKADAS, Jamnadas; Gujarati dye importer; Home Ruler and follower of Mrs
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Besant; edited Young India, 1916-19; Member, Bombay Municipal Corporation; India 
Tariff Commission, 1923.
DWARKADAS, Kanji (1892-?). Treasurer and Secretary of All-India Home Rule 
League, 1917-19; Gen-Sec., National Home Rule League, 1919-33; Member, Bombay 
Legislative Council, 1921-23; follower of Mrs Besant and active social reformer.
DYER, Brigadier-General Reginald E.H. (1864-1927). Indian army, 1888; responsible 
for Amritsar massacre, 1919; forced to retire; received sizeable collection from 
supporters.
GAIT, Sir Edward (1863-1950). ICS, 1882, served Assam & Bengal; L/G, Bihar and 
Orissa 1915-20; member of S/S Council, 1922-27.
GANDHI, Mohandas Karamchand (1869-1948). Lawyer and political activist in South 
Africa 1893-1914; follower of G.K. Gokhale, but was refused membership of 
Servants of India Society in 1915. Led first nationwide satyagraha in 1919 against the 
Rowlatt legislation and began non-co-operation movement in September 1920 until he 
called it off in Feb. 1922.
GOKHALE, Gopal Krishna (1866-1915). Chitpavan Brahmin; university teacher and 
journalist; Member Imperial Legislative Council, 1901-15; founded Servants of India 
Society, 1905. Leader of Moderates.
HAILEY, Sir Malcolm (1872-1969). ICS, 1895; served in the Punjab; Chief 
Commissioner, Delhi, 1912-18; Finance Member, 1919-22; Home Member, G/I, 
1922-24; G/Punjab, 1924-28.
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HARDINGE, Charles, 1st. Baron Hardinge of Penshurst (1858-1944). Diplomatic 
service; Permanent US/S, Foreign Office, 1906-10, 1916-20; Viceroy & G/G of 
India, 1910-16; Ambassador at Paris, 1920-22. A Viceroy with a popular touch but no 
Liberal, as his private letters attest.
HIRTZEL, Sir F. Arthur (1870-1937). India Office career, 1894-1930; Political 
Secretary, 1909-17, Assistant US/S, 1917-21; Deputy Under-Secretary, 1921-24; 
Permanent Under-Secretary, 1924-30. A Christian imperialist.
IYER, L.A. Govindaraghava (1867-1935). Madras barrister and politician;
President, N .L.F., 1921.
JINNAH, Mohammed Ali (1876-1948). Barrister, President of the Muslim League, 
1916, 1920; supporter of Lucknow Pact, 1916; leading Bombay politician; opposed 
Gandhian non-co-operation.
JOSHI, Narayan M alkar (1879-1955). Member of Servants of India Society;
Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1919-23; nominated Member, I.L.A ., 1921. Trade 
unionist and social reformer.
KELKAR, Narasimha Chintaman (1872-1947). Pleader, then Tilakite journalist, and 
politician. Editor of Kesari and Mahratta; Councillor, Poona Municipality, 1898- 
1924; member, Home Rule deputation to London, 1919; Member, ILA, 1923 and 
1926.
KHAPARDE, Ganesh Srikrishna, (1854-1938). Pleader from Amraoti, C.P.; follower 
of Tilak and opponent of Gandhi’s non-co-operation.
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KUNZRU, Hirday Nath (1887-78). Kashmiri Brahmin; Agra lawyer and small 
zamindar; joined Servants of India Society, 1909; Member, U.P. Legislative Council
1921-23.
LEE, Arthur, Lord Lee of Fareham (1868-1947). Chairman, Royal Commission on 
Civil Service in India (1923-4).
LLOYD, Sir George A. (1879-1941); MP, 1910-18; G/Bombay, Dec. 1918-Dec.
1923; created Baron, 1925; High Commissioner in Egypt, 1925-29; led opposition in 
House of Lords to 1935 India Act. A Curzonian imperialist.
LLOYD GEORGE, Rt. Hon. David (1863-1945). Solicitor; Liberal MP, 1890-1945, 
President of the Board of Trade, 1905-08; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1908-15; 
Minister for Munitions, 1915-15; S/S for War, 1916, Prime Minister, 1916-22.
LYTTON, Victor Alexander George Robert, Lord Lytton (1876-1947). Son of a 
former Viceroy of India; Under-Secretary at India Office, 1920-22; G/Bengal, Mar.
1922-Mar. 1927.
MACLAGAN, Sir Edward D. (1864-1952); ICS, 1883, served in Punjab; Secretary to 
G/I in revenue & agriculture department, 1910-14, and in education department,
1915-18; Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab, 1919-21 and Governor, 1921-24.
MALAVIYA, Madan Mohan (1861-1946). U.P. lawyer, educationalist, journalist and 
politician; Member I.L.C. 1910-19, President, INC 1909 , 1918; founded Benares 
Hindu University, 1916. Hindu revivalist.
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MARRIS, Sir William. S. (1873-1945); ICS, 1895, served in U.P.; lent to Transvaal, 
1906-07; involved in working on the making of constitutional reforms, 1917/19; 
Home Secretary, G/I, 1919-21; G/Assam 1921-22; G/U.P., 1922-28.
MEHTA, Pherozeshah Mehta (1845-1915). Parsee, Bombay barrister, leading figure 
among Congress Moderates.
MESTON, Sir James S. (1865-1943). ICS, 1883, served in U.P.; lent to Cape Colony 
& Transvaal, 1905-06; Secretary to G/I finance department, 1906-12; L/G U.P., 
1912-28; on deputation to Imperial War Conference and Cabinet, 1917; Finance 
Member, 1918; retired, Nov. 1919.
MONTAGU, Rt. Hon. Edwin S. (1879-1924). Liberal MP, 1906-22; Private 
Secretary to Asquith, 1906-10, US/S.India, 1910-14; Financial Secretary to the 
Treasury, 1914-15; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1915-16; Minister for 
Munitions, 1916; S/S for India, July 1917- March 1922.
MUDDIMAN, Sir Alexander P. (1875-1928). ICS, 1897, served in Bihar; Secretary 
to the Legislative Department G/I, 1915-21; officiating Law Member, 1919;
President, Council of State, 1920-24. Home Member, G/I Executive Council &
Leader of Legislative Assembly, 1924-27. Chaired Committee reporting on working 
of 1919 reforms, 1924-5.
NAIR, Sir C. Sankaran (1857-1934). Lawyer; opponent of Madras brahmins; 
education member of G/I, 1915-19; member S/S Council, 1920-21.
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NARAYAN, Pandit Jagat. Liberal lawyer from Lucknow; politician, member of 
Hunter Committee on Punjab events, 1919; Minister, Government of U.P. 1921-23.
NATES AN, G.A (1873-1949). Publicist and publisher. Editor of Indian Review.
NEHRU, Pandit Motilal (1861-1931). Kashmiri brahmin; highly successful advocate 
at Allahabad; played leading part in Congress sub-committee investigating Punjab 
atrocities, 1919; gave up legal practice at time of 1st. non-co-operation movement, 
1920-22; founded Swaraj Party with C.R. Das, 1923.
NEHRU, Pandit Jawaharlal (1889-1964). Son of Motilal; U.P. barrister and 
politician; played active part in U.P. kisan movement.
O’DWYER, Sir Michael F. (1864-1940); ICS, 1885; L/G Punjab 1913-19; 
assassinated 1940.
PARANJPYE, Raghunath Purshottam (1876-1966). Chitpavan Brahmin; 
educationalist; Member, Bombay Legislative Council, 1913-23. Minister, Bombay 
Government, 1921-23; signed Muddiman Committee minority report.
PEEL, Rt. Hon. William Robert Wellesley, Viscount (1867-1937). Conservative MP; 
US/S, War Office, 1919-21; Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1921-22; S/S for 
India, Mar. 1922- Jan. 1924, 1938-39.
PENTLAND, Rt. Hon. John Sinclair (1860-1925). MP, 1892-95, 1897-1909; 
baronetcy, 1909; S/S Scotland, 1909-12; G/Madras, 1912-19.
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RAHIMTULLA, Sir Ibrahim (1862-1942). Merchant, millowner and landlord. Khoja 
Muslim. Member, Bombay Legislative Council, 1899-1912; President, Muslim 
League, 1912; Member, Government of Bombay 1918-23; President, Bombay 
Legislative Council, 1923-26; President, ILA, 1931-33.
READING, Rt. Hon. Rufus D. Isaacs (1860-1935); barrister; Liberal MP, 1904-13; 
Attorney-General, 1910-13; Lord Chief Justice, 1913-21, Baron, 1914; Ambassador 
at Washington, 1918-19; Viceroy and G/G India, 1921-26.
RAY- Prithwis Chandra (1870-1927). Journalist; Secretary, INC, 1906 & 1911; 
founder of National Liberal League, Bengal, 1918; member, Liberal delegation to 
England, 1919; member, Bengal landholders’s delegation to England, 1920; editor of 
the Bengalee, 1921-24; somewhat maverick Liberal.
REED, Sir Stanley (1872-69). Editor of Times o f India, 1907-23; President Publicity 
Board during First World War; made himself unpopular with European community in 
Bombay for his criticisms of General Dyer in 1919; Director of Century Mills, 
Bombay; chaired Bombay Strikes Committee, 1920.
RONALDSHAY, Rt Hon. Lawrence J.L. Dundas, Lord Dundas, later 2nd. Marquess 
of Zetland (1876-1961); traveller, author, Conservative MP, 1907-16; Member, Royal 
Commission on Public Services of India, 1912-15; G/Bengal, March 1917-March 
1922. Curzon’s biographer and himself rather in the Curzon mould. Strongly 
interested in oriental religion and psychology; author of The Heart o f  Aryavarta,
1925.
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SAPRU, Tej Bahadur (1875-1949). Kashmiri Brahmin; U.P. lawyer and politician; 
Member, U.P. Legislative Council, 1913-16; Member, Imperial Legislative Council,
1916-20; Law Member, G/I, 1920-23; Member, Functions Committee 1918-19; 
represented India at Imperial Conference, 1923; President, N.L.F. 1923; signed 
Muddiman Committee minority report. Key figure in Round Table Conferences, 1930- 
32.
SARMA, Bayya Narasimheswara (1867-1932). Lawyer; Member, Madras 
Legislative Council, 1906; Member, G/I, 1920-25.
SASTRI, V.S. Srinivasa (1869-1946). Tamil Smartha Brahmin; schoolmaster; 
member of Servants of India Society since 1907, President, 1915-27; nominated 
Member of Madras Legislative Council, 1913-16; Member, I.L .C ., 1916-20;
Member, Franchise Committee 1918-19; Member, Council of State, 1920-24; Indian 
representative to Imperial Conference and League of Nations, 1921; Privy Councillor, 
1921.
SELBORNE, Rt. Hon. William Waldegrave Palmer (1859-1942), succeeded to 
earldom, 1895; MP, 1885-95; US/S, Colonial Office, 1895-1900, First Lord of 
Admiralty, 1900-05; High Commissioner in South Africa, 1905-10; President, Board 
of Agriculture, 1915-16; chairman of Joint Select Committee on G/I bill, 1919.
SETALVAD, Chimanlal Harilal (1866-1947). Advocate and judge, Bombay High 
Court; Member ILC, 1915-18; Member, Southborough Committee, 1918-19; Hunter 
Committee, 1919; knighted, 1919; Member, G/Bombay’s Executive Council, 1921- 
23.
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SETON, Sir Malcolm (1872-1940). ICS, 1895; India Office, 1898-1933; Secretary, 
Judicial and Public Department, 1911-19; on deputation with S/S , 1917-18; Assistant 
US/S 1919-24; knighted 1919.
SINHA, Sir Satyendra Prasanno, (1864-1928). Barrister, Calcutta High Court; 
Advocate-General, Bengal, 1907-9, 1915-17; President INC, 1915; Member, Bengal 
Legislative Council, 1916-19; Imperial War Conference and Cabinet, 1917, 1918; 
Parliamentary US/S, India, 1919-20; created Baron Sinha of Raipur, 1919; G/Bihar 
and Orissa, 1920-21.
SLY, Sir Frank G. (1866-1928). ICS; Member, Islington commission, 1912-14; 
Member, Franchise Committee, 1918-19; Chief Commissioner, Central Provinces
1920-21, and Governor, 1921-25.
TILAK, Bal Gangadhar (1856-1920). Chitpavan Brahmin, journalist and politician of 
Maharashtra. Leader of Extremists. Helped found Kesari and Mahratta newspapers. 
Imprisoned 1897, 1908-14.
VINCENT, Sir William H.H. (1866-1941). ICS, 1887, served in Bengal; Judge, 
Calcutta High Court, 1909; Secretary in Indian Legislative Department, 1911-15; 
Member, Executive Council of L/G, Bihar & Orissa, 1915-17; Home Member, G/I, 
1917-23; Member, S/S Council, 1923-31.
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WACHA, Sir Dinshaw Edulji (1844-1936). Parsi mill agent, journalist and 
politician; Sec. Bombay Presidency Association, 1885-1918 and President, 1915-18; 
Joint Secretary INC, 1896-1907, Secretary , 1908-13, President, 1901; Member, 
Bombay Legislative Council, 1915-16; Member, Imperial Legislative Council, 1916- 
20.
WHYTE, Sir A. Frederick (1883-1970). MP, 1910-18; Parliamentary Private 
Secretary to W. Churchill, 1910-15; President of the ILA, 1920-25.
WILLIAMS, Laurence Frederick RUSHBROOK (1890-). Fellow of All Souls, 1914- 
21, Professor of History at Allahabad, 1914-19; on special duty with G/I on publicity, 
1917-19; Director, Central Bureau of Information, 1920-26; Secretary to Indian 
delegation at Imperial Conference, 1920. Author of ’Moral and Material Progress’, 
annual reports, 1917-1925.
WILLINGDON, Freeman Freeman-Thomas (1866-1941). Liberal MP 1900-10, 
created baron, 1910; G/Bombay, 1913-18; G/Madras, 1919-24; G/G, Canada, 1926- 
30; Viceroy & G & G/G, India, 1931-6.
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Appendix 2 Moderate Party Members and Supporters
calculated from Appendix to Proceedings of the First Session of the All-India 
Conference of the Moderate Party held at Bombay on 1 and 2 Nov. 1918. [G.I.P.E.]
TOTAL Membership =  790 
RELIGION
Hindu =  585 Jain =  4
Muslim =  41 Christian =  17
Parsi = 130 Other/N.R. =  13
CASTE (where recorded)
Brahmin = 232
Writer Castes =  108
Kayastha = 81
Baidya = 23
Pratare Prabhu = 4
Trading Castes = 25
Bania = 20
Vaisya =  2
Agrawal =  3 ctd....
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=  380 





=  2 
= 790
OCCUPATION ( Primary recorded occupation) QUALIFICATION
Lawyer 254 BA 213
Merchant = 97 MA 51
Manufacturer = 12 PhD 9
Landlord/owner = 71 Medical 27




Other Profess. = 54
Servant of India = 15
Worker — 2
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